



# HISTORY OF EUROPE

"BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile, quæ unquam gesta sint, me scripturum; quod, Hannibale duce, Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque *his* ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit: et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello: odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus: et adeo varia belli fortuna ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt."—LIVY, lib. xxi.







# HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM

THE COMMENCEMENT OF

## THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

TO THE

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN MDCCCXV

BY

ARCHIBALD ALISON, L.L.D.

F.R.S.E.

New Edition, with Portraits

VOL. V.



WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS

EDINBURGH AND LONDON

MDCCCXLIX

AL-4  
A/48/5

PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS, EDINBURGH.

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# HISTORY OF EUROPE.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

### CAMPAIGN OF 1799.

#### FROM THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR, TO THE BATTLE OF THE TREBBIA.

THE cannon of Nelson, which destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir, re-echoed from one end of Europe to the other, and everywhere revived the spirit of resistance to the ambition of the Republic. That great event not only destroyed the charm of her invincibility, but relieved the Allies from the dread arising from the military talents of Napoleon and his terrible Italian army, whom it seemed permanently to sever from Europe. The subjugation of Switzerland and the conquest of Italy were no longer looked upon with mere secret apprehension ; they became the subject of loud and impassioned complaint over all Europe : and the Allied sovereigns, upon this auspicious event, determined to engage in open preparations for the resumption of hostilities.<sup>1</sup>

Austria felt that the moment was approaching when she might regain her lost provinces, restore her fallen influence, and oppose a barrier to the revolutionary torrent which was overwhelming Italy. She had accordingly been indefatigable in her exertions to recruit and remodel her armies since the treaty of Leoben ; and they

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1.  
Revival of  
the spirit of  
Europe by  
the battle of  
the Nile.

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 144,  
145. Ann.  
Reg. 236.  
Jom. xi. 10,  
11.

2.  
Prepara-  
tions of  
Austria and  
Russia.

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were now, both in point of discipline, numbers, and equipment, on the most formidable footing. She had two hundred and forty thousand men, supported by an immense artillery, ready to take the field, all admirably equipped and in the finest order; and to these were to be added fifty thousand Russians, who were advancing under the renowned Suwarroff, flushed with the storming of Ismael and Warsaw, and anxious to measure their strength with the conquerors of southern Europe. The Emperor of Russia, though he had been somewhat tardy in following out the designs of his illustrious predecessor, had at length engaged warmly in the common cause; the outrage committed on the Order of Malta, which had chosen him for their protector, filled him with indignation; and he seemed desirous not only to send his armies to the support of the Germanic states, but to guarantee the integrity of their Confederation. Turkey had forgotten its ancient enmity to Russia, in animosity against France for the unprovoked attack upon Egypt; and its fleets and armies threatened to enclose the conqueror of the pyramids in the kingdom he had won. Thus, while the ambition of the Directory in Switzerland and Italy roused against them the hostility of the centre of Europe, their impolitic and perilous expedition to the shores of Africa arrayed against France the fury of Mussulman zeal and the weight of Russian power.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
i. 40, 41, 47.  
Jom. xi. 96.  
Th. x. 146.  
Ann. Reg.  
238.

3.  
Treaty of  
alliance, of-  
fensive and  
defensive,  
between  
England and  
Russia, 29th  
Dec. 1798.

On the 29th December 1798, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded between Great Britain and Russia, for the purpose of putting a stop to the further encroachments of France. By this treaty, Russia engaged to furnish an auxiliary force of forty-five thousand men, to act in conjunction with the British forces in the north of Germany; and England, besides an immediate advance of £225,000, was to pay a monthly subsidy of £75,000. The Emperor Paul immediately entered, with all the vehemence of his character, into the prosecution of the war. He gave an asylum to Louis



XVIII. in the capital of Courland ; behaved with munificence to the French emigrants who sought refuge in his dominions ; accepted the office of Grand Master of the Knights of St John of Malta, and excited by every means in his power the spirit of resistance to the advances of republican ambition. All his efforts, however, failed in inducing the Prussian cabinet to swerve from the cautious policy it had adopted ever since the retreat of the Duke of Brunswick, and the neutrality it had observed since the treaty of Bâle. That power stood by in apparent indifference, while a desperate strife was raging between the hostile powers, in which her own independence was at stake, when her army, now two hundred thousand strong, might have interfered with decisive effect in the struggle ; and she was rewarded for her forbearance by the battle of Jena.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Hard. vii.  
6, 7. Ann.  
Reg. 76, 78.  
Jom. xi. 9,  
10. See the  
treaty in  
Martens,  
vi. 557.

Great Britain made considerable exertions to improve the brilliant prospects thus unexpectedly opened to her. Parliament met on the 20th November 1798, and shortly after entered on the arduous work of financial arrangement. To meet the increased expenses which the treaty with Russia, and the vigorous prosecution of the war in other countries, were likely to occasion, Mr Pitt proposed a new tax, hitherto unknown in this island—that on incomes. No income under £60 a-year was to pay any duty at all ; those from £100 to £105 only a fortieth part, and above £200 a tenth. The total income of the nation was estimated at £102,000,000, including £20,000,000 as the rent of lands ; and the estimated produce of the tax on this graduated scale was £7,500,000. This tax proceeded on the principle of raising by taxation as large a portion as possible of the supplies of the year within its limits, and compelling all persons to contribute, according to their ability, to the exigencies of the state—an admirable principle, if it could have been fully carried into effect, and one which, if practicable and uniformly acted upon, would have prevented all the financial embarrassments consequent on the war. But this was very far indeed from being the

4.  
The income-  
tax is im-  
posed by  
Mr Pitt.

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<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
176, 191.  
Parl. Hist.  
xxi. 174.

case. The expenses incurred so far exceeded the income, even in that very year, that a supplementary budget was brought forward on June 6, 1799, which very much augmented the annual charges. Between the two budgets, loans were contracted to the amount of £15,000,000; and the total expenditure—including £13,653,000 for the army, £8,840,000 for the navy, and a subsidy of £825,000 to Russia—amounted, exclusive of the charges of the debt, to no less than £31,000,000.<sup>1</sup>

5.  
Observa-  
tions on the  
expedience  
of this tax.

The principle of making the supplies of the year as nearly as possible keep pace with its expenditure, is the true system of public as well as private finance; which has suffered, in every country, from nothing so much as the convenient but ruinous plan of borrowing for immediate exigencies, and laying the permanent burden of interest upon the shoulders of posterity. But a greater error in finance never was committed than the introduction of the *income-tax*, without any graduation but that arising from amount of revenue to correct its manifold inequalities. In appearance the most equal, such a tax is in reality the most unequal of burdens; because it assesses at the same rate many classes whose resources are widely different. The landed proprietor, whose estate is worth thirty years' purchase of the rental at which it is assessed; the fundholder, whose stock is worth twenty or twenty-five of the same annual rate; the merchant, whose profits one year may be swallowed up by losses the next; the professional man, whose present income is not worth five years' purchase; the young annuitant, whose chance of life is as twenty, and the aged spinster, in whom it is not two, are all assessed at the same annual rate. The tax, in consequence, falls with excessive and undue severity upon one class, and with unreasonable lightness upon others; it extinguishes the infant accumulations of capital, and puts an end to the savings of laborious industry; while it is comparatively unfelt by the great capitalists and the opulent landed

proprietors. Unlike the indirect taxes, which are paid without being felt, or forgotten in the enjoyments of the objects on which they are laid, it brings the bitterness of taxation, in undisguised nakedness, home to every individual, and produces, in consequence, a degree of discontent and exasperation which nothing but the excitement of continual warfare, or a sense of uncontrollable necessity, can induce a nation possessing but the shadow of real freedom to bear for any considerable time.

A considerable addition was made to the army this year. The land forces were raised to 138,000 men; the sea to 120,000, including 20,000 marines; and 104 ships of the line were put in commission. Besides this, 80,000 men were embodied in the militia of Great Britain, and 40,000 in Ireland—an admirable force, which soon attained a very high degree of discipline and efficiency; proved, through the whole remainder of the war, the best nursery for the troops of the line; and was inferior only in the quality and composition of its officers to the regular army.<sup>1</sup>

The forces with which France was to resist this formidable confederacy were by no means commensurate either with the ambition of the Directory, or the vast extent of territory which they had to defend. Both externally and internally the utmost discontent and dissatisfaction existed. The Republican armies, which in the outset roused division among the inhabitants of so many states by the delusive promises of liberty and equality, had excited universal hatred by the exactions which they had made, and the stern tyranny to which they had everywhere subjected their new allies. Their most devoted adherents no longer attempted to palliate their conduct. From the frontier of the Jura to the extremity of Calabria, one universal cry had arisen against the selfish cupidity of the Directory, and the insatiable rapacity of its civil and military officers. The Swiss democrats, who had called in the French to revolutionise their country, made

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6.  
Land and  
sea forces  
voted by  
parliament.

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxi. 231,  
242. James'  
Naval Hist.  
App. vol.  
iii. Ann.  
Reg. 193.  
App. to  
Chron.

7.  
Universal  
discontent at  
the French  
government.

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the loudest lamentations at the unrelenting severity with which the great contributions, to which they were so little accustomed, had been exacted from the hard-earned fruits of their industry. The Cisalpine republic was a prey to the most vehement divisions; furious Jacobinism reigned in its legislative assemblies; the authorities imposed on them by the French bayonets were in the highest degree unpopular; while in Holland, the whole respectable class of citizens felt the utmost dissatisfaction at the violent changes made, both in their government and representative body, by their imperious allies. From the affiliated republics, therefore, no efficient support could be expected; while the French government, nevertheless, was charged with the burden of their defence. From the Texel to Calabria, their forces were expanded over an immense surface, in great, but still insufficient numbers; while the recent occupation of Switzerland had opened up a new theatre of warfare hitherto untrod by the Republican soldiers.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
88, 89, Th.  
ii. 161, 173,  
174, 207,  
208. Bot.  
iii. 94, 97.

8.  
State of the  
military  
forces of  
France.

During the two years which had elapsed since the termination of hostilities, the military force of France had signally declined. The fervour which had filled, the ardent spirit which had sustained, the armies of the Republic in the first years of hostilities, were no more. To them had succeeded the languor and depression which, in nations not less than individuals, invariably succeeds a vehement burst of passion. Sickness and desertion had greatly diminished the ranks of the army; twelve thousand discharges had been granted to the soldiers, but more than ten times that number had left their colours, and lived without disguise at their homes, in such numbers as rendered it neither prudent nor practicable to attempt enforcing their return. Forty thousand of the best troops were exiled under Napoleon on a distant shore; and though the addition of two hundred thousand conscripts had been ordered, the levy proceeded but slowly, and some months must

yet elapse before they could be in a condition to take the field. The result of the whole was, that for the actual shock of war, from the Adige to the Maine, the Directory could only count on one hundred and seventy thousand men; the remainder of their great forces being buried in the Italian peninsula, or too far removed from the theatre of hostilities to be able to take an active part in the approaching contest. The administration of the armies was on the most corrupt footing; the officers had become rapacious and insolent in the command of the conquered countries; and the civil agents either lived at free quarters on the inhabitants, or plundered without control the public money and stores which passed through their hands. Revolutionary energy had exhausted itself; regular and steady government was unknown; and the evils of a disordered rule, an unrestrained democracy, and an abandoned administration, were beginning to recoil on those who had produced them.<sup>1</sup>

The disposition of the Republican armies was as follows:—Of one hundred and ten thousand men who were stationed in Italy, thirty thousand under Macdonald were lost in the Neapolitan dominions, and the remainder so dispersed over the extensive provinces of Lombardy, Tuscany, and the Roman states, that only fifty thousand could be collected to bear the weight of the contest on the Adige. Forty-two thousand, under General Jourdan, were destined to carry the war from the Upper Rhine, across the Black Forest, into the valley of the Danube. Massena, at the head of forty-five thousand, was stationed in Switzerland, and intended to dislodge the Imperialists from the Tyrol and the upper valley of the Adige. Thirty thousand, under Bernadotte, were destined to form a corps of observation on the Lower Rhine from Düsseldorf to Mannheim; while Brune, at the head of fifteen thousand French, and twenty thousand Dutch troops, was intrusted with the defence of the Batavian Republic. The design of the Directory was to turn the position of the Imperialists

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<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 182,  
208, 209.  
Jom. xi. 89,  
94. Dum. i.  
33. Arch.  
Ch. Cam-  
pagne de  
1799, i. 48,  
51.

9.  
Their dispo-  
sition over  
the theatre  
of approach-  
ing war.

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1799.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. i. 32,  
33. Jom. xi.  
90, 91.  
Arch. Ch.  
i. 30, 31.

on the Adige by getting possession of the mountains which enclosed the upper part of the stream, and then to drive the enemy before them, with the united armies of Switzerland and Italy, across the mountains of Carinthia; while that of the Upper Rhine, descending the course of the Danube, was to unite with them under the walls of Vienna.<sup>1</sup>

10.  
Forces of  
the Imperialists,  
and their disposition.

The forces of the Austrians were both superior in point of number, better equipped, and stationed in more advantageous situations. Their armies were collected behind the Lech, in the Tyrol, and on the Adige. The first, under the command of the Archduke Charles, consisted of fifty-four thousand infantry and twenty-four thousand cavalry; in the Grisons and Tyrol, forty-four thousand infantry and two thousand five hundred horse were assembled under the banners of Bellegarde and Laudon; twenty-four thousand foot-soldiers and one thousand four hundred horse, under the command of Hotze, occupied the Voralberg; while the army on the Adige, seventy-two thousand strong, including eleven thousand cavalry, obeyed the orders of Kray; and twenty-four thousand on the Maine, or in garrison at Würzburg, observed the French forces on the Lower Rhine. Thus two hundred and forty-six thousand men were concentrated between the Maine and the Po, their centre resting on the mountains of the Tyrol—a vast fortress which had often afforded a sure refuge in case of disaster to the Imperial troops, and whose inhabitants were warmly attached to the house of Austria. Above fifty thousand Russians were expected; but they could not arrive in time to engage in operations either on the Danube or the Adige at the commencement of the campaign.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Arch. Ch.  
i. 40, 41.  
Dum. i. 33.  
Jom. xi. 95,  
96. Th. x.  
226.

11.  
Principle of  
the warfare  
on both  
sides.

These dispositions on both sides were made on the principle that the possession of the mountains insures that of the plains, and that the key to the Austrian monarchy was to be found in the Tyrolese Alps—a great error, and one which has been since abundantly refuted

by the campaigns of Napoleon, and the reasoning of the Archduke Charles. The true road to Vienna is the valley of the Danube; it is there that a serious blow struck is at once decisive, and that the gates of the monarchy are laid open by a single great defeat on the frontier. It was not in the valley of the Inn, nor in the mountains of the Grisons, but on the heights of Ulm and in the plains of Bavaria, that Napoleon prostrated the strength of Austria in 1805 and 1809; and of all the numerous defeats which that power experienced, none was felt to be irretrievable but that of Hohenlinden, on the banks of the Iser, in 1800. There is no analogy between the descent of streams from the higher to the lower grounds, and the invasion of civilised armies from mountains to the adjacent plains. Military strength ascends from plains and great rivers to the summits of the adjacent ridges; it does not descend like water from the mountains to the level fields at their feet. In tactics, or the art of handling troops on a field of battle, the case is different; the possession of the heights which command the plain is often of decisive importance; but the principle of strategy, or the directions of armies in a campaign, is in general just the reverse. A ridge of glaciers is an admirable fountain for the perennial supply of rivers, but the worst possible base for military operations.<sup>1</sup>

By the invasion of Switzerland, the French government had greatly weakened, instead of having strengthened, their military position. Nothing was so advantageous to them as the neutrality of that republic, because it covered the only defenceless frontier of the state, and gave them the means of carrying on the campaigns in Germany and Italy, for which the fortresses on the Rhine and in Piedmont afforded an admirable base, without the fear of being taken in rear by a reverse in the mountains. But all these advantages were lost when the contest was conducted in the higher Alps, and the line of the Rhine or the Adige was liable to be turned by a single reverse on the Aar

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<sup>1</sup> *Jom. x.*  
286, and xi.  
96. Arch-  
duke, i. 53.  
*Guerre de*  
1799; and i.  
117, 162.  
*Camp. de*  
1796.

12.  
Ruinous  
effects of the  
invasion of  
Switzerland  
and Italy to  
the French  
military  
power.

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or the St Gothard. The surface over which military operations were carried, was by this conquest immensely extended, without any proportionate addition either to the means of offensive or defensive warfare. The Tyrol was a great central fortress, in which the Imperialists had often found shelter in moments of disaster, but no such advantage could be hoped for by the Republicans from their possession of the hostile or discontented cantons of Switzerland; while no avenue to the heart of Austria was so difficult as that which lay through the midst of the brave and indomitable inhabitants of the former almost inaccessible province. Nor had the invasion of the Roman and Neapolitan states, and the banishment of Napoleon to the sands of Egypt, contributed less to weaken the formidable power with which, two years before, he had shattered the Austrian monarchy. Now was seen the sagacity with which he had chosen the line of the Adige for tenacious defence, and the wisdom of the declaration, that if he had listened to the suggestions of the Directory, and advanced to Rome, he would have endangered the Republic. Though the forces in the peninsula were above one hundred and ten thousand, and were soon increased by the arrival of conscripts to one hundred and thirty thousand men, the Republicans were never able to meet the Imperialists in equal force on the Adige; and Italy was lost, and the retreat of the army from Naples all but cut off, while yet an overwhelming force, if it could only have been assembled at the decisive point, existed in the peninsula.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
95, 96. Th.  
x. 217, 218,  
219, 226.  
Arch. Ch.  
i. 56.

13.  
The French  
commence  
hostilities.  
March 1.

Notwithstanding the deficient state of their military preparations, and the urgent representations of all their generals, that the actual force under their command was greatly inferior to the amount which the Directory had led them to expect, the French government, led away by ill-founded audacity, and eager to replenish the now exhausted coffers of the Republic by the plunder of the adjoining states, resolved to commence hostilities. The



Austrian cabinet having returned no answer to the peremptory note, in which the Directory required the sending back of the Russian troops, Jourdan received orders to cross the Rhine, which was immediately done at Kehl and Huningen, and the Republicans advanced in four columns towards the Black Forest. A few days after, Bernadotte, with ten thousand men, took possession of Mannheim, and advanced against Philippsburg, which refused to capitulate, notwithstanding an angry summons from the Republican general. Upon receiving intelligence of these movements, the Archduke passed the Lech, and advanced in three columns towards Biberach, Waldsee, and Ravensberg, at the head of thirty-seven thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry; while Starray, with thirteen thousand men, was moved upon Neumarkt, and six thousand men were thrown into the fortifications of Ulm.<sup>1</sup>

While the hostile armies were thus approaching each other, in the space between the Rhine and the Danube, the contest had commenced, on the most extended scale, in the mountains of the Grisons.\* During the night of the 5th March, Massena marched upon Sargantz, and having summoned the Austrian general, Auffenberg, to evacuate the district, his troops advanced at all points to cross the Rhine. The left wing, under OUDINOT,† afterwards Duke of Reggio, “a general,” said Napoleon after-

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<sup>1</sup> *Jom. xi.*  
*93, 96. Th.*  
*x. 227, 229.*  
*Arch. Ch.*  
*i. 140.*

14.  
Operations  
in the Gri-  
sons.  
March 5  
and 6.

\* See the descriptions of the theatre of war in this memorable campaign in Switzerland and the Grisons in Chap. XXXVIII. at the commencement.

† Charles Nicolas Oudinot, afterwards Duke of Reggio, was born at Bar-sur-Ornain, on the 25th April 1767. He was originally intended for commerce; but hardly had he attained his sixteenth year, when an invincible attraction drew him into the profession of arms. He entered, in 1781, into the regiment of Médoc; but, at the earnest entreaties of his old father, quitted it in 1787, and returned to his paternal home, where he remained till 1789. During the tumults of July in that year, which were so general in the kingdom, he distinguished himself by the energy and intrepidity with which, collecting a band of volunteers, he checked the depredations of a band of rioters who had begun to plunder Bar-sur-Ornain. In 1792, when the war with Austria broke out, he was, from his acquaintance with the military art, elected by his comrades chief of the third battalion of the Volunteers of the Meuse, in which capacity he distinguished himself by the defence of the fort of Bitsch, and by several successful actions against the Prussians in the close of the campaign of that year.

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<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
i. 141, 142.  
Dum. i. 36,  
37. Jom.  
xi. 100, 101.  
Th. x. 230,  
231.

15.  
The French  
are at first  
successful.  
March 6.

wards, "tried in a hundred battles," was destined to make a false attack on the post of Feldkirch, so as to hinder Hotze, who commanded at that important point, from sending any succour to the centre at Coire, and the left at Reichenau; the right wing, under Dumont, was destined to cross at the latter place, and turn the position of Coire by the upper part of the stream; while Massena himself, in the centre, was to force the passage opposite to Luciensteg, and carry the intrenchments of that fort. Subordinate to these principal attacks, Loison, with a brigade, was directed to descend from the valley of Unsern upon Disentis, and support the attack of Dumont. At the same time Lecourbe, who lay at Bellinzona, received orders to penetrate over the snowy summit of the Bernardine, and down the stupendous defile of the Via-mala, by Tisis, into the Engadine, and open up a communication with the Italian army on the Adige.<sup>1</sup>

These attacks were almost all successful. The Rhine, yet charged with melting snows, was crossed under a murderous fire; after an obstinate resistance, the fort of Luciensteg was carried by the intrepidity of the French chasseurs, who scaled an almost inaccessible height which commanded it, and eight hundred men, with five pieces of cannon, were made prisoners. Meanwhile Dumont, having forced the pass of Kunkel, and made himself master of the central point and important bridge of Reichenau,

These services led to his obtaining the command as colonel of the regiment of Picardy, where his personal influence and entreaties had the effect of retaining in their command a large proportion of the officers who had intended to emigrate. On the 2d June 1794 he gloriously distinguished himself, at the head of his regiment, in resisting a greatly superior force of Austrian cuirassiers—a service which immediately procured for him the rank of general of brigade. In July of the same year he made himself master, by a bold advance, of the town of Trèves, of which he obtained the command, and remained there till the end of 1795, when he joined the army of the Rhine and Moselle. He took an active part in the campaign which followed in 1796, between Moreau and the Archduke Charles, and distinguished himself at Nordlingen, Donauwerth, and Ingolstadt. In the latter action he was severely wounded, but he soon rejoined his regiment, and charged, with his arm in a sling, at Ettenheim, where he made prisoners an entire battalion.—See *Biographie des Hommes Vivants*, iv. 573-4.

situated at the junction of the two branches of the Rhine, not only succeeded in maintaining himself there, but made prisoners an Austrian detachment which had resisted Loison at Disentis. The result of this movement was, that Auffenberg, who fell back slowly, contesting every inch of ground, towards Coire, found his retreat cut off by the Rhine: and, being surrounded there by superior forces, he had no alternative but to lay down his arms, with two thousand men, and ten pieces of cannon, while a battalion he had stationed at Ems underwent the same fate.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
101, 102.  
Dum. i. 33,  
39. Arch.  
Ch. i. 58, 62.

While these successes were gained on the centre and right, Oudinot advanced against Feldkirch. Hotze instantly collected his troops, and advanced to meet him, in order to preserve his communication with Auffenberg; but, after maintaining his ground for a whole day, he was at length driven back to the intrenchments of Feldkirch, with the loss of a thousand men and several pieces of cannon. At the same time, Lecourbe, having broken up from Bellinzona, crossed the Bernardine, yet encumbered with snow, and arrived at Tüsis by the terrible defile of the Via-mala, where he divided his forces into two columns, one of which moved over the Julian Alps, towards the sources of the Inn, while the other, under Lecourbe in person, began to ascend the wild and rocky valley of the Albula. The intention of the Republicans was to have supported this irruption by Dessoles, who received orders to debouche from the Valteline into the valley of the Upper Adige; but the march of the latter column across the mountains having been retarded by unavoidable accidents, General Bellegarde, who commanded the Austrian forces in that quarter, made preparations, by occupying all the passes in the neighbourhood, to envelop the invaders.<sup>2</sup>

16.  
The Aus-  
trians are  
driven back  
with great  
loss into the  
Tyrol.  
March 7.

<sup>2</sup> Arch. Ch.  
i. 98. Jom.  
xi. 114.

Martinsbruck in consequence was assailed by Lecourbe without success; but although Laudon, in his turn, made an attack with his own troops, combined with its garrison,

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17.  
Great suc-  
cesses of  
Dessoles and  
Lecourbe.  
March 14.  
March 24.

in all fourteen thousand men, upon the French forces, he was unable to gain any decisive advantage ; and the Republicans, awaiting their reinforcements, suspended their operations for ten days. At length, Dessoles having come up, and other reinforcements arrived, Lecourbe commenced a general attack on Laudon's forces, leading his division against Martinsbruck ; while Dessoles was directed to cross the mountains into the Munsterthal, and cut off their retreat. To arrive at that valley, it was necessary for the division of the former to cross, amidst ice and snow, ridges which might have deterred the most intrepid chasseurs. With undaunted courage his soldiers ascended the glaciers of the Wurmser Joch, which separates the sources of the Adda from one of those of the Adige. After having turned the fortifications on the summit, which the Imperialists occupied in perfect security, he descended by the wild and rocky bed of the torrent of Rambach, amidst frightful precipices, where a handful of men might have arrested an army, surprised the post of Tauffers, which Laudon had fortified with care, and totally routed its garrison, after a desperate resistance, with the loss of four thousand prisoners and all its artillery. The situation of the Austrian general was now altogether desperate ; for while Dessoles was achieving this decisive success, Loison had seized upon Nauders, and Lecourbe forced the post and passage of Martinsbruck in his rear ; so that all the avenues by which his retreat could be effected were cut off, and he had no resource but to throw himself, with three hundred men, into the glaciers of Gebatch, from whence, after undergoing incredible hardships, he at length reached the valley of Venosta, and joined General Bellegarde, who was marching to his relief. After this glorious success, achieved with forces hardly half the number of the vanquished, and which cannot be appreciated but by those who have traversed the rugged and inhospitable ridges among which it was effected, Dessoles

March 25.

advanced to Glurns; and the French found themselves masters of the upper extremities of the two great valleys of the Tyrol, the Inn and the Adige. But here their advance was arrested by General Bellegarde, who had collected nearly forty thousand men to oppose their progress, and by the intelligence of events in other quarters, which restored victory to the Imperial standards.<sup>1</sup>

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1799.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. i. 54,  
56. Jom. x.  
114, 116.  
Arch. Ch.  
i. 98, 136.  
Personal ob-  
servation.

The intelligence of the first success in the Grisons reached Jourdan on the 11th, and induced him to move forward. On the 12th he passed the Danube, and advanced in four marches to Pfullendorf and Mengen, between that river and the lake of Constance. Judging, however, that he was not in sufficient strength to attempt anything until the post of Feldkirch was carried, the French general urged Massena to renew his attacks in that quarter. That important town, situated on a rocky eminence in the middle of the valley, and supported by intrenchments extending from the river Ill, which bathed its feet, to inaccessible cliffs on either side, was repeatedly assaulted by Oudinot, at the head of the French grenadiers, with the utmost impetuosity; but all his efforts recoiled before the steady courage of the Imperialists. Massena, conceiving this post to be of the last importance, from its commanding the principal passage from the Voralberg into the Tyrol, united the whole division of Menard to the troops of Oudinot, and advanced in person to the attack. But the great strength of the works, and the invincible tenacity of the Austrians, defeated all his efforts. In vain the French sought to establish themselves on the right of the position; the Tyrolese sharpshooters ascended the adjacent eminences, and assailed the Republicans with such a close and destructive fire, as rendered it impossible for them to maintain their ground; and Massena, after beholding the flower of his army perish at the foot of the intrenchments, was obliged to draw off his forces, with the loss of three thousand men, to Luciensteg and Coire,<sup>2</sup>

18.  
But Mas-  
sena is de-  
feated in  
repeated  
attacks on  
Feldkirch.

March 11,  
12, and 14.

March 23.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xi.  
110, 113.  
Dum. i. 47,  
48. Arch.  
Ch. i. 112,  
118. Per-  
sonal obser-  
vation.

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XXVII.

1799.

19.  
Jourdan  
sustains a  
check from  
the Arch-  
duke  
Charles.

while Oudinot recrossed the Rhine, and established himself at Rheineck.

While the war was thus furiously raging amidst the precipices of the Alps, events of still greater importance had taken place under the Archduke in person, between the Upper Rhine and the Danube. Jourdan, to compensate the inferiority of his force, had taken up a strong position between the Lake of Constance and the Danube. Two torrents, the Ostrach and the Aach, flowing in opposite directions—the one into the Danube, the other into the lake—from a marsh in his centre, ran along the front of his position. St-Cyr, with the left, was stationed at Mengen; Souham, with the centre, at Pfullendorf; Ferino, with the right, at Barnsdorf; while Lefebvre, with the advanced guard, occupied the heights behind the village of Ostrach. That point was the most accessible of the line: placed at the source of the two torrents, it was to be reached by a chaussée, which crossed the marshy ground from which they descended. It was against this part of the line that the principal efforts of the Imperialists were directed, while subordinate attacks were simultaneously commenced on the right and left against St-Cyr and Ferino. The force brought to bear against Ostrach, under the Archduke in person, was long resisted, notwithstanding the great superiority of numbers in the attacking columns, by the Republicans under Jourdan; but at length the left, under St-Cyr, having been outflanked at Mengen, and the centre being on the point of sinking under the increasing masses of the assailants, a general retreat was ordered; and such was the danger of the left wing that it was continued, without intermission, on the day following, till they reached the position of STOCKACH.<sup>1</sup>

March 21.  
March 23.  
1 Arch. Ch.  
i. 147, 151.  
Th. x. 233.  
Dum. i. 43,  
45. Jom.  
xi. 120, 124.  
St-Cyr, i.  
130, 132.  
Personal ob-  
servation.

20.  
Importance  
of this suc-  
cess.

This affair did not cost above two thousand men to the vanquished party, and the loss of the victors was nearly as great; but it had the most important effect upon the fate of the campaign. It broke the charm of

Republican invincibility, compelled the French standards openly to retreat before the Imperial, and gave to the Austrians all the advantages of a first success. Now appeared the good use which they had made of their time during the short interval of peace. Their cannon, well served and formidable, were much more numerous in proportion to the troops engaged than they had been in the former war; and the light artillery in particular, formed on the French model, had attained a degree of perfection which entirely deprived the Republicans of their advantage in that important weapon of modern warfare.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXVII.  
1799.

<sup>1</sup> Dum.i.42,  
43. Arch.  
Ch. i. 156,  
165.

Jourdan clearly saw the importance of the village of Stockach, where all the roads to Suabia, Switzerland, and the valley of the Neckar, unite, and beyond which he could not continue his retreat, without abandoning his communications with Massena and the Grisons. Perceiving that the Archduke was preparing an attack, he resolved to anticipate him, and obtain the advantage of the initiative, always an object of importance in the commencement of a campaign. The Austrians were by this time in great force on the Stockach, a small stream which flows in a winding channel before the village of the same name, and terminates its devious course in the Lake of Constance; their centre occupied the plateau of Nellenberg in front of the river, their right extended along the same plateau towards Liptingen, their left from Zollbruck to Wahlweis. On the side of the Republicans, Souham commanded the centre, Ferino the right, and St-Cyr, whose vanguard was led by Soult, the left wing. This last body was destined to attack Liptingen, where Meerfeld was stationed; and it was in that quarter that the principal effort was to be made, with a view to turn the Austrians, and force them to retreat by the single chaussée of Stockach in their rear, where they of necessity must, in case of disaster, have lost all their artillery. At five in the morning all the columns were in motion, and the

21.  
Position of  
the French  
at Stockach.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

1799.

March 26.  
1 Jom. xi.  
128, 130.  
Dum. i. 49,  
50. St-Cyr,  
i. 133, 139.  
Arch. Ch. i.  
171, 175,  
100.

advanced guard of Soult soon came in sight of the videttes of Meerfeld. The Imperialists were soon attacked so vigorously by that general and St-Cyr, that they were driven from Liptingen, and thrown back in confusion into the woods which lay along the road to Stockach. Speedily they were expelled from that stronghold; the infantry in great disorder retreated to Stockach, and the cavalry on the road towards Möeskirch. Meanwhile the two armies were engaged along the whole line. Souham and Ferino in the centre and right repulsed the light troops of the enemy as far as Wahlweis and Orsingen on the Stockach, and menaced the plateau of Nellenberg. A violent cannonade was heard along the whole front of the army; a decisive success had been gained on one point, the Austrian right was turned, the victory seemed already decided.<sup>1</sup>

22.  
Battle of  
Stockach.

No sooner, however, did the Archduke perceive the impression which the French had made on his right wing, than he set off at the gallop for that quarter of the field, followed by twelve squadrons of cuirassiers, after whom succeeded six battalions of grenadiers; while a powerful body of cavalry was stationed on the plateau of Nellenberg to protect the retreat of the army, in case of its becoming necessary to have recourse to that extremity. These dispositions, rapidly adopted at the decisive moment, changed the fortunes of the day; and their effect was increased by a faulty step of Jourdan, who, instead of supporting the menaced point with all his disposable force, sent orders to St-Cyr to advance to Möeskirch, in the idea of cutting off the retreat of the Imperialists. A violent struggle now ensued in the woods near Liptingen, which Soult had gained in the first moment of success. The Archduke attacked them with fresh troops, the Republicans defended them with heroic valour; and one of the most furious combats that occurred in the whole war continued, without intermission, in those copses for several hours. Three times the French advanced out of



the wood to meet their enemies, and three times, notwithstanding the most vigorous efforts, they were repulsed by the obstinate perseverance of the Germans. At length the Imperialists became the assailants; the Archduke charged in person at the head of the Hungarian grenadiers. Prince Furstemburg and Prince Anhalt-Bernburg were killed while leading on their respective regiments, and the flower of the army on both sides perished under the terrible fire which overspread the field of battle. Jourdan, who felt that St-Cyr had gained what, if properly supported, might have become a decisive success, long and obstinately maintained his ground; but at length, finding that the principal effort of the Austrians was directed against his left wing, and that their reserves were coming into action, he ordered Soult to evacuate the wood, and retire into the plain of Liptingen. This perilous movement was performed by that able officer in presence of a victorious enemy, and when his rearguard was almost enveloped by their cuirassiers, with admirable steadiness; but, when they reached the open country, they were charged by Kollowrath, at the head of the six battalions of grenadiers and twelve squadrons of cuirassiers, which the Archduke had brought up from the reserve. This effort proved decisive. In vain Jourdan charged the Austrian cavalry with the French horse; they were broken and driven back in disorder by the superior weight and energy of the cuirassiers, and the general-in-chief narrowly escaped being made prisoner in the flight. This overthrow constrained the infantry to a disastrous retreat, during which two regiments were enveloped and made prisoners; and St-Cyr, who was now entirely cut off from the centre of his army, only escaped total destruction by throwing himself across the Danube, the sole bridge over which he was fortunate enough to find unoccupied by the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

This great success, and the consequent separation of St-Cyr from the remainder of the army, was decisive of the victory. Souham and Ferino, with the centre and right,

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1799.

<sup>1</sup> St-Cyr, i.  
139, 150.  
Th. x. 238,  
240. Jom.  
x. 131, 134.  
Dum. i. 50,  
52. Arch.  
Ch. i. 190,  
198.

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XXVII.

1799.

had maintained their position, notwithstanding the superiority of force on the part of their opponents; but they had gained no advantage, and they were totally unequal, now that the left wing of the army was separated, and unable to render any assistance, to maintain their ground against the victorious troops of the Archduke. Although, therefore, the French had bravely withstood the superior forces of the enemy, and the loss on both sides was nearly equal, amounting to about five thousand men to each party, yet, by the separation of their left wing, they had sustained all the consequences of a serious defeat; and it became necessary, renouncing all idea of co-operating with the Republicans in Switzerland, which could not be accomplished without the sacrifice of St-Cyr and his wing, to endeavour to reunite the scattered divisions of the army by a retreat to the passes of the Black Forest. Jourdan was so much disconcerted with the result of this action, that, after reaching the defiles of that forest, he surrendered the command of the army to Ernouf, the chief of the staff, and set out for Paris, to lay in person his complaints as to the state of the troops before the Directory.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 238, 241, 242.  
Jom. xi. 131, 139. St-Cyr, i. 139, 160, 167. Arch. Ch. i. 190, 198. Dum. i. 50, 51.

24.  
Retreat of  
the French  
across the  
Rhine.

With superior forces, and twenty thousand cavalry in admirable order, the Austrians had now an opportunity of overwhelming the French army in the course of its retreat to the Rhine, such as never again occurred to them till the battle of Leipsic. The Archduke clearly perceived that there was the important point of the campaign; and had he been the unfettered master of his actions, he would, in all probability, have constrained the enemy's army to a retreat as disastrous as that from Würzburg in 1796. But the Aulic Council, influenced by the erroneous idea that the key to ultimate success was to be found in the Alps, forbade him to advance towards the Rhine till Switzerland was cleared of the enemy. He was compelled, in consequence, to put his army into cantonments between Engen and Wahlweis; while the Republicans

leisurely effected their retreat through the Black Forest, by the valley of Kinzig and that of Hell, to the Rhine, which stream they crossed at Old Brisach and Kehl a few days after, leaving only posts of observation on the right bank. This retreat compelled Bernadotte, who, with his little army of eight thousand men, had already commenced the siege of Philippsburg, to abandon his works with precipitation, and regain the left bank; so that, in a month after the campaign had been commenced with so much presumption and so little consideration by the Directory, their armies on the German frontier were everywhere reduced to the defence of their own territory. The bad success of their armies at the opening of this campaign, to which the French had been so little accustomed since the brilliant era of Napoleon's victories, might have proved fatal to the government at Paris, had it not been for an unexpected event which occurred at this time, and restored to the people much of the enthusiasm and vigour of 1793. This was the massacre of the French plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Rastadt.<sup>1</sup>

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1799.

April 6.

April 7.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
139, 141.  
Arch. Ch. i.  
211, 218.  
Th. x. 242.

Though at war with Austria, France was yet at peace with the German empire, and the Congress at Rastadt was still continuing, under the safeguard of neutrality, its interminable labours. When the victory of Stockach had placed that city in the power of the Imperialists, the cabinet of Vienna ordered the Count Lehrbach, their minister plenipotentiary, to endeavour to obtain intelligence of the extent to which the princes of the empire had made secret advances to the Directory. The Count conceived the most effectual way would be to seize the papers of the French embassy at the moment of their leaving the city; and for this purpose he solicited and obtained from his court authority to require an armed force from the Archduke Charles. That gallant officer refused, in the first instance, to comply with the request, alleging that his soldiers had nothing to do with the concerns of diplomacy;<sup>2</sup> but fresh orders from Vienna

25.  
The Congress of Rastadt were still sitting.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xi.  
142, Lac.  
xiv. 318.  
Th. x. 255.

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1799.

26.  
Its dissolution, and  
assassination of the  
French plenipotentiaries.

April 19.

<sup>1</sup> Hard. vii.  
236, 238.  
Jom. xi.  
142, 143.  
Lac. xiv.  
318, 320.  
Th. x. 256,  
275. *Procès*  
*Verbal des*  
*Ministres*  
*Plénipot. à*  
*Rastadt.*  
Lac. xiv.  
435. Arch.  
Ch. i. 224.

obliged him to submit, and a detachment of the hussars of Szeckler was in consequence placed at the disposal of the Imperial plenipotentiary.

Towards the end of April, the communications of the ministers at Rastadt having been interrupted by the Austrian patrols, the Republicans addressed an energetic note on the subject to the Austrian authorities, and the remonstrance having been disregarded, the Congress declared itself dissolved. The departure of the diplomatic body was fixed for the 28th April, but the Austrian colonel gave them orders to set out on the 19th, as the town was to be occupied on the following day by the Imperial troops, and refused to grant the escort which they demanded, upon the plea that it was wholly unnecessary. The French plenipotentiaries, in consequence, Jean Debry, Bonnier, and Roberjot, set out on the same evening for Strassburg; but they had scarcely left the gates of Rastadt, when they were attacked by some drunken hussars of the regiment of Szeckler, who seized them, dragged them out of their carriages, slew Bonnier and Roberjot, notwithstanding the heroic efforts of the wife of the latter to save her husband, and struck down Jean Debry, by sabre blows, into a ditch, where he escaped destruction only by having the presence of mind to feign that he was already dead. The assassins seized and carried off the papers of the legation, but committed no other spoliation; and leaving two of their victims lifeless, and one desperately wounded, on the ground, disappeared in the obscurity of the night. Jean Debry, whose wounds were not mortal, contrived to make his way, after their departure, into Rastadt, and presented himself, bleeding and exhausted, at the hotel of M. Goertz, the Prussian envoy.<sup>1</sup>

This atrocious violation of the law of nations excited the utmost indignation and horror throughout Europe. The honour of the Germans felt itself seriously wounded by the calamitous event, and the members of the deputation who remained at the Congress unanimously signed a

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1799.

27.  
General  
horror  
which it  
excites in  
France, and  
throughout  
Europe.<sup>1</sup> Nap. in  
Month. vi.  
40.

declaration expressive of detestation at its authors. It is, perhaps, the strongest proof of the high character and unstained honour of the Emperor Francis and the Archduke Charles, that although the crime was committed by persons in the Austrian uniform, and the hussars of Szeckler had been detached from the army of the Archduke to the environs of Rastadt, no suspicion fell upon either of these exalted persons as having been accessory to the nefarious proceeding. That it was committed for political purposes, and not by common robbers, is evident from their having taken nothing but state papers; and although the Directory has not escaped the suspicion of having been the secret authors of the crime,<sup>1</sup> in order to inflame the national spirit of the French, there seems no ground for imputing to them so atrocious a proceeding, or ascribing it to any other cause than an unauthorised excess by drunken or brutal soldiers in the discharge of a duty committed to them by their government, requiring more than ordinary discretion and forbearance. But though Austria has escaped the imputation of having been accessory to the guilt of murder, she cannot escape from the disgrace of having been remotely the cause of its perpetration; of having authorised an attack upon the sacred persons of ambassadors, which, though not intended to have been followed by assassination, was at best a violation of the law of nations, and a breach of the slender links which unite humanity together during the rude conflicts of war, and of having taken guilt to herself by adopting no judicial steps for the discovery of the perpetrators of the offence.\* As such, it is deserving of the severest reprobation, and, like all other unjustifiable actions, its consequences speedily recoiled upon the head of its authors. The military spirit of the French, languid since the recommencement of hostilities, was immediately roused to the

\* The Queen of Naples was the real instigator of this atrocious act, though the catastrophe in which it terminated was as little intended by her as by the single-hearted general who detached from his army the hussars by whom it was committed.—D'ABRANTES, ii. 304.

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Th. x. 257,  
258. Jom.  
xi. 143, 144.  
Lac. xiv.  
324. Hard.  
vii. 244, 245.

highest pitch by this outrage upon their ambassadors. No difficulty was any longer experienced in completing the levies of the conscription; and to this burst of national feeling is, in a great measure, to be ascribed the rapid augmentation of Massena's army, and the subsequent disasters which overwhelmed the Imperialists at the conclusion of the campaign.<sup>1</sup>

28.  
Commence-  
ment of  
hostilities in  
Italy. Im-  
prudent dis-  
persion of  
the French  
forces there.

While an implacable war was thus breaking out to the north of the Alps, reverses of a most serious character attended the first commencement of hostilities in the Italian plains. The approach of the Russians, under Suwarroff, who, it was expected, would reach the Adige by the middle of April, rendered it an object of the last importance for the Republicans to force their opponents from the important line formed by that stream before the arrival of so powerful a reinforcement; but by the senseless dispersion of their vast armies, suggested by the desire of plunder, through the whole peninsula, they were unable to collect a sufficient body of men in the plains of the Mincio, in the commencement of the campaign, to effect that object. The total force commanded by Scherer on the Adige was now raised, by the arrival of conscripts, to fifty-seven thousand men; Macdonald was at the head of thirty-four thousand at Rome and Naples; ten thousand were in the Cisalpine republic, the like number in Piedmont, five thousand in Liguria; but these latter forces were too far removed to be able to render any assistance at the decisive point; while, on the other hand, the Imperial troops consisted of fifty-eight thousand combatants, including six thousand cavalry, cantoned between the Tagliamento and the Adige, besides a reserve of twenty thousand infantry and five thousand horse in Carinthia and Croatia. Their field-artillery amounted to a hundred and eighty pieces; the park of the army to a hundred and seventy more; and a heavy train of eighty battering-guns, admirably provided with horses and ammunition,

was ready at Palma-Nuova, for the siege of any of the fortresses that might be attacked. This summary is sufficient to demonstrate the erroneous principles on which the Directory proceeded in their plan of the campaign, and their total oblivion of the lessons taught by Napoleon as to the importance of the line of the Adige to the fate of the peninsula. While the Imperialists were collecting all their forces for a decisive blow in that quarter, half the French troops lay inactive and scattered along the whole extent of its surface, from Piedmont to Calabria.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXVII.

1799.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
147, 148.  
Dum. i. 58.  
Th. x. 243,  
244. St-Cyr,  
i. 172, 173.  
Arch. Ch. i.  
225.

The Austrians had, with great foresight, strengthened their position on the Adige during the cessation of hostilities. Legnago, commanding a bridge over that river, had become a formidable fortress; the castles of Verona were amply supplied with the means of defence; a bridge of boats at Polo enabled them to communicate with the intrenched camp of Pastrengo, on the eastern slope of the Monte-Baldo; Venice, placed beyond the reach of attack, contained their great magazines and reserves of artillery stores; all the avenues by which it could be approached were carefully fortified; a flotilla of forty boats, carrying three hundred pieces of cannon, was prepared, either to defend the Lagunæ of that capital, or carry the supplies of the army up the Po: while bridges, established over the Piave and the Tagliamento, secured the communication of the army in the field with the reserves by which it was to be supported. Scherer had obtained the command of the French army—an officer who had served with distinction in the Pyrenees, and the Alps during the campaign of 1795; but, being unknown to the Italian army, he possessed the confidence neither of the officers nor soldiers; while Moreau, the commander of the retreat through the Black Forest in 1796, occupied the unworthy situation of inspector of infantry. On the side of the Austrians, Melas had obtained, upon the death of the Prince of Orange, the supreme command—an officer of considerable experience and ability, but whose age, above seventy years, rendered

29.  
Position of  
the Imperial-  
lists on the  
Adige.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

1799.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
149, 153.  
St-Cyr. i.  
173, 175.

him little competent to cope with the enterprising generals of the Republic. Until his arrival, however, the troops were under the orders of General Kray, a Hungarian by birth, and one of the most distinguished officers of the empire. Active, intrepid, and indefatigable; gifted with a cool head and an admirable *coup-d'œil* in danger, he was one of the most illustrious generals of the Imperial army, and, after the Archduke Charles, has left the most brilliant reputation in its military archives of the last century.<sup>1</sup>

30.  
French plan  
of opera-  
tions.

March 21.

The plan of the Directory was for Scherer to pass the Adige, near Verona, drive the Austrians over the Piave and the Brenta, while the right wing of Massena's army, commanded by Lecourbe, was to form a junction with a corps detached from the Italian army into the Valteline, and fall, by Brixen and Botzen, on the right flank of the Imperial army. But at the very time that they meditated these extensive operations, they detached General Gauthier, with five thousand men, to occupy Tuscany—a conquest which was indeed easily effected, but was as unjustifiable as it was inexpedient, both by weakening the effective force on the Adige, and affording an additional example of that insatiable desire for conquest and plunder which the Allied powers so loudly complained of in the Republican government. Meanwhile Scherer, having collected his forces, established himself on the right bank of the Adige, opposite to the Austrian army, the right at Sanguinetto, the left at Peschiera; and immediately made preparations for crossing the river. At the same time Kray threw eight thousand men into the intrenched camp of Pastrengo, under Generals Gottesheim and Elnitz, while the divisions Kaim and Hohenzollern, twenty thousand strong, were established round Verona, with detachments at Arcola; Frœlich and Mercantin, with an equal force, were encamped near Bevilacqua; and Klenau, with four thousand, was stationed near Arqua; and the reserves, under Ott and Zoph, received orders to draw near to the Brenta.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xi.  
155, 156.  
Dum. i. 58.  
Th. x. 245.  
Bot. iii. 216.  
217. Arch.  
Ch. i. 226.



The French general having been led to imagine that the bulk of the Austrian forces were encamped at Pastrengo, between Verona and the lake of Garda, resolved to make his principal effort in that quarter. With this view, the three divisions of the left wing, commanded by Serurier, Delmas, and Grenier, were moved in that direction; while Moreau, with the divisions of Hatry and Victor, received orders to make a false attack near Verona, and on the extreme right Montrichard was to advance against Legnago. Kray, on his part, being led to believe that their principal force was directed against Verona, repaired in haste to Bevilacqua, where he concerted with Klenau an attack on the right flank of the Republicans. Thus both parties, mutually deceived as to each other's designs, manœuvred as if their object had been reciprocally to avoid each other; the bulk of the Austrian forces being directed against the French right, and the principal part of the Republicans against the Imperial left.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXVII.

1799.

31.  
Preliminary  
movements  
of both  
parties.

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 246.  
Jom. xi. 162.  
Dum. i. 58.

At three in the morning of the 26th March, the whole French left wing was in motion, while the flotilla on the lake of Garda set sail during the night to second their operations. In this quarter they met with brilliant success. The redoubts and intrenchments of Pastrengo were carried, Rivoli fell into their hands; and the garrison of the intrenched camp, crossing in haste the bridge of Polo, left fifteen hundred prisoners and twelve pieces of cannon in the hands of the Republicans. In the centre, the action did not begin till near ten o'clock, but it soon became there also extremely warm. The villages in front of Verona were obstinately contested, but, after a desperate resistance, the Republicans pressed forward, and nearly reached the walls of that town. At this sight, Kaim, who was apprehensive of being attacked in the town, made a general attack on the front and flanks of the assailants with fresh forces; and the village of San Massimo, taken and retaken seven times during the day, finally remained in the possession of the Austrians till night separated the combat-

32.  
Mixed suc-  
cess on the  
Adige.

March 26.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

1799.

ants. The Imperialists sensibly lost ground, however, upon the whole, in that quarter; and the post of Saint Lucie, also the theatre of obstinate contest, was carried by the Republicans. But while fortune favoured their arms on the left, and divided her favours in the centre, the right was overwhelmed by a superior force, conducted by Kray in person. General Montrichard advanced in that quarter to Legnago, and had already commenced a cannonade on the place, when Frœlich debouched in three columns, and commenced a furious attack along the dikes which led to the French column, while the division of Mercantin advanced as a reserve. The Republicans were speedily routed; attacked at once in front and both flanks, they lost all their artillery, and were driven with great loss behind Torre on the road to Mantua.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
166, 170.  
Th. x. 247.  
Dum. i. 59.  
60. St-Cyr,  
i. 177, 179.  
Arch. Ch. i.  
226.

33.  
Which leads  
to no deci-  
sive result.

The loss of the French in this battle amounted to four thousand men, while that of the Imperialists was nearly seven thousand; but nevertheless, as the success on the left and centre was in some degree balanced by the disaster on the right, the former were unable to derive any decisive advantage from this large difference in their favour. The capture of the camp at Pastrengo and of the bridge of Polo was of little importance, as the Austrians held Verona, and the only road from thence to the plain passed through that town. Kray, abandoning the pursuit of Montrichard, hastened to Verona with the divisions of Mercantin and Frœlich, leaving a few battalions only to guard the line of the Lower Adige; while the Republicans recrossed the upper part of that river above Verona, and retired towards Peschiera. Thus the bulk of the forces on both sides were assembled near Verona, which was felt to be the key to the Adige equally by the Imperialists and Republicans. Already the courage of the Austrians was elevated by the balanced success which they had obtained;<sup>2</sup> and, from the hesitation of the enemy in following up his advantage at Pastrengo, they perceived with pleasure that

<sup>2</sup> Dum. i.  
60, 61. Jom.  
xi. 172, 173.  
St-Cyr, i.  
179, 181.

the genius of Napoleon had not been inherited by his successor.\*

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34.

Serurier defeated above Verona.

After much irresolution, and assembling a council of war, Scherer resolved to descend the Adige with the bulk of his forces, to attempt a passage between Verona and Legnago at Ronco or Albaredo: while Serurier, with one division, was thrown across the upper stream, at Polo, to distract the attention of the enemy. Preparatory to this design, the army was countermarched from left to right, a complicated operation, which fatigued and embarrassed the soldiers without any adequate advantage. At length, on the 30th March, while the main body of the army was descending the river, Serurier crossed with seven thousand men at Polo, and boldly advanced towards Verona on the high-road leading to Trent; Kray, debouching from the central point at Verona, assailed the advancing columns with fifteen thousand men of the divisions Froelich and Elnitz, and attacking the Republicans with great vigour, drove them back in disorder to the bridge, and pressing forward, approached so near, that it would have fallen into his hands, if the French had not sunk the boats of which it consisted. The situation of Serurier was now altogether desperate: part of his men dispersed and saved themselves in the mountains; a few escaped over the river at Rivoli; but above fifteen hundred were made prisoners, and the total loss of his division was nearly three thousand men.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
177. Dum.  
i. 62, 63.  
Th. x. 248,  
249. St-Cyr,  
i. 182, 183.

Notwithstanding this severe check, Scherer persisted in his design of passing the Adige below Verona. After countermarching his troops, without any visible reason, he concentrated them below Villa-Franca, between the Adige and the Tartaro; his right encamped near Porto-Legnago, the remainder in the position of Magnano. Kray, perceiving the defects of their situation, wisely resolved to bring the weight of his forces to bear on the

35.  
Counter-marches of both parties.

\* "Saguntinis, quia præter spem resisterent, crevissent animi. Poenus, quia non vicisset, pro victo esset."—Livy, xxi. 9.

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Republican left, so as to threaten their communications with Lombardy. For this purpose he directed Hohenzollern and St Julien to the Monte-Baldo and the road to Trent; while Wukassowich, who formed part of Bellegarde's corps in the Tyrol, was to move on la Chiesa, by the western side of the lake of Garda, and he himself debouched from Verona, at the head of the divisions of Kaim, Zoph, and Mercantin, right against the Republican centre at Magnano. The peril of the left wing of the French was now extreme, and it became indispensable to move the right and centre towards it, in order to avoid its total destruction. Had Kray, whose army was now raised, by the arrival of his reserves, to forty-five thousand, attacked on the 4th April, he would have surprised the French in the midst of their lateral movements, and probably have destroyed two of their divisions; but by delaying the action till the day following, the perilous change of position was completed, and the opportunity lost.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
179, 181.  
Dum. i. 65.  
Th. x. 250.  
St. Cyr, i.  
184.

36.  
Decisive  
battle at  
Magnano.  
April 5.

It was just when the lateral movement was on the point of being accomplished that the hostile armies encountered each other on the plains of MAGNANO. The French force amounted to thirty-four thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry; the Austrians were superior, having nearly forty-five thousand in the field, of whom five thousand were horse. Mercantin was intrusted with the attack of the French right; Kaim of the centre, and Zoph of the left; while Frœlich, at the head of a powerful reserve, was to follow the steps of Kaim, and Hohenzollern was moved forward against Villa Franca on the road to Mantua. The marshy plain to the south of Magnano is intersected by a multitude of streams, which fall into the Tartaro and the Menago, and render the deploying of infantry difficult, that of cavalry impossible. The right wing of the French, commanded by Victor and Grenier, overwhelmed the division of Mercantin to which it was opposed. But

while this success attended the Republicans in that quarter, the Austrian centre, under Kaim, penetrated, without opposition, between the rear of Montrichard and the front of Delmas, who were in the act of completing their lateral movement from right to left, and occupied a salient angle in the centre of the French position. Had the Imperialists been in a situation to have supported this advantage by fresh troops, it would have been decisive of the fate of the day; but Kray, alarmed at the progress of the Republican right, was at the moment hastening to support Mercantin with the reserve of Frölich; and thus time was given to Moreau and Delmas, not only to restore affairs in that quarter, by causing their rear and vanguards to form in line to resist the further progress of the enemy, but even to attack and carry the village of Buttapreda, notwithstanding the most vigorous resistance from Kaim's division. On the left, Moreau, having arrived at the open plain, favourable to the operations of cavalry, executed several brilliant charges, and drove the Austrians from all the villages which they occupied, almost into the walls of Verona.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. i. 65.  
Jom. xi. 186,  
187.

Victory on every side seemed to incline to the Republican standards, though decisive success was no longer to be expected from the insulated situation of all the divisions, and the unconnected operations which they were severally carrying on. But Kray changed the fortune of the day by a decisive operation against the French right. Placing himself at the head of the reserve of Frölich, supported by two batteries of heavy artillery, he fell unawares upon the division of Grenier, and put it to the rout; Victor, trying to restore the combat, was charged in flank by the Imperial horse, and driven back in disorder, while the overthrow of that wing was completed by the attack of Mercantin's division, which had now rallied in its rear. Meanwhile, Moreau continued to maintain his ground in the centre, and Serurier made himself master on the left of Villa Franca, and advanced

37.  
Brilliant  
attack of  
Kray with  
the reserve  
gives the  
Austrians  
the victory.

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<sup>1</sup>Th. x. 251,  
252. Jom.  
xi. 190, 194.  
Dum. i. 64,  
65. St-Cyr,  
i. 185, 190.

38.

Its decisive  
results.  
Disorderly  
retreat of  
the French.

near to Verona. But the rout of the right wing, which was now driven a mile and a half from the field of battle, so as to leave the centre entirely uncovered, was decisive of the victory. Before night, Scherer drew off his shattered forces behind the Tartaro, carrying with them two thousand prisoners and several pieces of cannon—a poor compensation for the loss of four thousand killed and wounded, four thousand prisoners, seven standards, eight pieces of cannon, and forty caissons, which had fallen into the hands of the Imperialists.<sup>1</sup>

This victory, one of the most glorious in the annals of the Austrian monarchy, was decisive of the fate of Italy. Thenceforth, the French fell from one disaster into another, till they were driven over the Maritime Alps, and expelled from the whole peninsula—a striking example of the importance of early victory to the whole fate of a campaign, and of the facility with which the confidence and vigour resulting from long-continued triumphs may, by a single well-timed success, be exchanged for the depression and irresolution which are the sure forerunners of defeat. The advantages gained by the Imperialists were mainly owing to the possession of the fortified posts of Verona and Legnago, and the interior line of operations which they afforded them on the Adige—another instance, among the many which this war exhibited, of the inestimable importance of a central position in the hands of one who can avail himself of it, and the degree to which it may sometimes, in the hands of a skilful general, counterbalance the most decided superiority in other respects. The Republicans, thrown into the deepest dejection by this defeat, retired on the following day behind the Mincio; and not feeling themselves in security there, even with the fortress of Mantua on one flank and that of Peschiera on the other, Scherer continued his retreat behind the Oglio, and then the Adda. This retrograde movement was performed in such confusion, that it entirely lost that general the little consideration

which remained to him with his troops, and they loudly demanded the removal of a leader who had torn from their brows the laurels of Rivoli and Arcola. The Austrians, astonished at their own success, and fearful of endangering it by a precipitate advance, moved slowly after the beaten army. Eight days after the battle elapsed before they crossed the Mincio, and established themselves at Castellar, after detaching Elnitz, with ten thousand men, to observe Mantua, and three battalions to form the investment of Peschiera.<sup>1</sup>

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April 14.

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 252,  
253. Jom.  
xi. 195, 199.  
Dum. i. 66.  
St Cyr, i.  
191, 195.

While the Republican fortunes were thus sinking in Italy, another disaster overtook them in the capture of Corfu, which surrendered to the combined forces of Russia and Turkey, shortly after the commencement of hostilities; and thus they were deprived of their last footing in the Ionian isles. Thus on every side the star of the Republic seemed to be on the wane, while that of Austria was rising to the ascendant.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>39.</sup>  
Corfu sur-  
renders to  
the Russo-  
Turkish  
fleet.  
March 3.

<sup>2</sup> Ann. Reg.  
80. Jom.  
xi. 199.

While these important events were in progress to the south of the Alps, the Austrians evinced an unpardonable tardiness in following up their success at Stockach. In vain the Archduke urged the Aulic Council not to lose the precious moments. Desirous not to endanger the advantages which they had already gained, they peremptorily enjoined him to confine his operations to clearing the right bank of the Danube by detached parties. After several engagements, the French were finally expelled from the German side; but in their retreat they, with needless barbarity, burned the celebrated wooden bridge at Schaffhausen, the most perfect specimen of that species of architecture that existed in the world. Massena, to whom the command of the army on the Rhine, as well as of that in the Alps, was now intrusted, found himself, by these disasters, under the necessity of changing entirely the disposition of his forces.<sup>3</sup> Turned on the one flank by the Imperialists on the lake of Constance, and on the

<sup>40.</sup>  
Operations  
in Germany.

April 13.

<sup>3</sup> Jom. xi.  
205. Dum.  
i. 72. Arch.  
Charles, i.  
215, 221.

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other by the advance of Kray beyond the Adige, he was compelled to retire into the central parts of Switzerland; and the Directory soon found how grievous an error they had committed in attacking that country, and rendering its rugged frontiers the centre of military operations.

41.  
Massena  
falls back  
on the Alps,  
and takes a  
defensive  
position in  
the Grisons.

Deprived of the shelter which they had hitherto found for their flanks in the neutral ridges of the Alps, the Republicans were now compelled to maintain one uninterrupted line of defence from the Texel to the gulf of Genoa, and any considerable disaster in one part of that long extent weakened their operations in every other. Massena was well aware that a mountainous country, in appearance the most easy, is frequently in reality the most difficult of defence; because the communication from one part of the line to another is often so much obstructed, and it is so easy for a skilful adversary to bring an overwhelming force to bear against an unsupported part. Impressed with these ideas, he drew back his advanced posts at Taufers, Glurns on the Adige, and Finstermüntz on the Inn, and arranged his forces in the following manner. The right wing was composed of the division Lecourbe in the Engadine, that of Menard in the Grisons, and that of Lorges in the valley of the Rhine, as far down as the lake of Constance; the centre, consisting of four divisions, supported by an auxiliary Swiss corps, occupied the line of that river as far as Huningen. Headquarters were established at Bâle, which was put in a respectable posture of defence. The left wing, scattered over Huningen, Old Brisach, Kehl, and Mannheim, was destined to protect the line of the Rhine below that place. The whole of these forces amounted to one hundred thousand men, of whom about two-thirds were stationed in Switzerland and in the Grisons.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. i. 71.  
Jom. xi. 211,  
213, 215.  
Th. x. 277,  
278. Arch-  
duke, i. 233,  
241.

42.  
Description  
of the thea-  
tre of war.

Three impetuous streams, each flowing within the other, descend from the snowy ridges of the Alps towards the north, and form, by their junction, the great river of the Rhine. The first of these is the Rhine itself, which, rising



in the glaciers near the St Gothard, and flowing through the Grisons to the north, loses itself in the great lake of Constance; issues from it at Stein, and flows to the westward as far as Bâle, where it commences its majestic and perpendicular course towards the sea. This river covers the whole of Switzerland against an enemy advancing from the eastward, and contains within the ample circuit of its course all the secondary streams. The second is formed by the course of the Linth, which, rising in the Alps of Glarus and the Wallenstätter See, forms in its course the charming lake of Zurich, and issuing from its northern extremity at the town of the same name, under the appellation of the Limmat, falls into the Aar, not far from the junction of that river with the Rhine. That line only covers a part of Switzerland, and is of much smaller extent than the former; but it is more concentrated, and offers a far more advantageous position for defence. Lastly, there is the Reuss, which, descending from the St Gothard through the precipitous valley of Schollenen, swells into the romantic lake of the Four Cantons at Altdorf, and, leaving its wood-clad cliffs at Luzern, falls into the Aar, near its junction with the Rhine. All these lines, shut in on either side in the upper part of their course by enormous mountains, strengthened by deep rivers, and intersected by vast lakes and ridges of rock, present the greatest advantages for defence. Massena soon found that the exterior circle, that of the Rhine, could not be maintained, with the troops at his disposal, against the increasing forces of the Austrians, and he retired to the inner line, that of the Limmat and Linth, and established his headquarters at Zurich, in a position of the most formidable strength.<sup>1</sup>

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Meanwhile Hotze and Bellegarde were combining a general attack upon the whole line of the Republicans in the Grisons. Towards the latter end of April, their forces were all in motion along the immense extent of mountains from the valley of Coire to the Engadine. After a

<sup>1</sup> Personal observation.  
Th. x. 278,  
279. Jom.  
xi. 213.

43.  
General  
attack upon  
Massena's  
line in the  
Grisons.  
April 30.

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vigorous attack, Bellegarde was repulsed by Lecourbe, from the fortified post of Ramis, in the Lower Engadine; while a detachment sent by the Col de Tcherfs to Zernetz was cut to pieces, with the loss of six hundred prisoners, among whom was the young Prince de Ligne. But, as the Imperialists were advancing through the valleys on his flanks, Lecourbe retreated in the night, and next day was attacked by Bellegarde at Suss, whence, after an obstinate resistance, he was driven with great loss to the sources of the Albula. At the same time a general attack was made, in the valley of the Rhine, on the French posts; but though the Imperialists were at first so far successful as to drive back the Republicans to Luciensteg and the heights of Mayenfeld, yet, at the close of the day, they were obliged to fall back to their former position.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
215, 219.  
Dum. i. 114,  
117. Arch-  
duke, i. 253,  
256.

44.  
Insurrec-  
tion of the  
Swiss in his  
rear; being  
unsupport-  
ed, it is  
crushed.

This general attack upon the French line in the Grisons was combined with an insurrection of the peasants in their rear and in the small cantons, where the desire for revenge, on account of the cruelties of the Republicans during the preceding year, had become extremely strong. This feeling had been worked up to a perfect fury by an attempt of the Directory to complete the auxiliary force of eighteen thousand men, which Switzerland was bound to furnish, by levies from the militia of the different cantons. Determined to combat rather against than for the destroyer of their liberties, ten thousand men took up arms in the small cantons and adjoining districts of the Grisons, and fell with such rapidity upon the French posts in the rear, that they not only made themselves masters of Disentis and Ilantz, but surprised the important bridge of Reichenau, which they strongly barricaded, thus cutting off all communication between the divisions of Lecourbe, at the sources of the Albula, and the remainder of the army. Had the attack of Hotze and Bellegarde succeeded at the same time that this formidable insurrection broke out in their rear, it is highly pro-

bable that Massena's right wing would have been totally destroyed ; but the check of Hotze at Luciensteg gave the Republicans time to crush it before it had acquired any formidable consistency. Massena, aware of the vital importance of early success in subduing an insurrection, acted with the greatest vigour against the insurgents ; Menard moved towards Reichenau, which was abandoned at his approach, and pursued the peasants to Ilantz and Disentis. At this latter place they stood firm, in number about six thousand ; and, though destitute of artillery, May 5. made a desperate resistance. At length, however, they were broken, and pursued with great slaughter into the mountains, leaving about one thousand men slain on the spot. At the same time, Soult proceeded with his division to Schwytz, where he overthrew a body of peasants ; and, embarking on the lake of Luzern, landed, in spite of the utmost resistance, at Altdorf, and cut to pieces a column of three thousand men, supported by four pieces of cannon, who had taken post in the defiles of the Reuss about that place. The broken remains of this division fled by Wasen to the valley of Schollenen, but there they were met and entirely dispersed by Lecourbe, who, after subduing the insurrection in the Val-levantina, had crossed the St Gothard, and fallen upon the fugitives in rear.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
219, 221.  
Dum. i. 117,  
119. Arch.  
Ch. i. 267,  
268.

In this affair, above two thousand peasants were killed and wounded ; and such was the consternation excited by the military executions which followed, that the people of that part of Switzerland made no further attempt, during the progress of the campaign, to take a part in hostilities. They saw that their efforts were of little avail amidst the immense masses of disciplined men by whom their country was traversed ; and, suffering almost as much, in the conflicts which followed, from their friends as from their enemies, they resigned themselves, in indignant silence, to be the spectators of a contest, from which they had nothing to hope, everything to fear, and which they had

45.  
Massena  
draws back  
his right  
wing in the  
Italian Alps.

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. i.  
120, 121.  
Jom. xi.  
222, 223.  
Arch. Ch.  
i. 263, 267.

no power to prevent. These movements, however, rendered it indispensable for the French to evacuate the Engadine, as great part of the troops who formed the line of defence had been drawn into the rear to quell the insurrection. Loison retired from Tirrano, and joined Lecourbe at St Giacomo; and as the Imperialists, who were now far advanced in Lombardy, were collecting forces at Lugano, evidently with the design of seizing upon the St Gothard, and so turning the flank of Massena's position, that active general instantly crossed the Bernardine, and descending the Misocco, advanced to Bollinzona, in order to protect the extreme right of his interior line, which rested on the St Gothard, the lake of Zurich, and the Limmat.<sup>1</sup>

46.  
General  
attack by the  
Austrians  
on the  
French in  
the Grisons.  
Luciensteg  
is carried.

The Archduke, convinced that it was by turning the right of Massena in the mountains, that he would be most easily forced from this strong line of defence, strengthened Hotze by fresh troops, and combined a general attack on Lecourbe for the 14th May. The forces they brought into action on that day were very considerable, amounting to not less than thirty thousand men; while those of Menard, since the greater part of Lecourbe's division had retreated to Bellinzona, did not exceed fourteen thousand. Luciensteg, since it fell into the hands of the Republicans, had been greatly strengthened; a narrow defile, bounded by the precipices of the Alps on one side, and a rocky eminence bathed by the Rhine on the other, was crossed by strong intrenchments, mounted with a formidable artillery; but the intelligence which the Archduke received of the approach of thirty thousand Russians to support his army, who had already arrived in Gallicia, determined him without delay to commence offensive operations. Accordingly, on the 12th May, the columns were everywhere put in motion on the mountains, and two days afterwards this important post was attacked. The assailants were divided into four columns; one was destined to engage the attention of the enemy by a false attack in front; the second to make a circuit by the Alps of May-

May 14.

enfeld, and descend on the intrenchments in rear; a third to cross the Suvisir Alps; and the fourth, to which the cavalry and artillery were attached, to assail the pass called the Slapiner Joch. Hotze commanded in person the attack in front, while Jellachich directed the other columns. After twelve hours of fatiguing march, the latter succeeded in bringing his troops in rear to attack the intrenchments. When the animating sound of their hurra was heard, Hotze pressed forward to assail the works in front, and, after a stout resistance, the barriers were burst open, and the fort carried, with the loss to the Republicans of fifteen hundred prisoners.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. i.  
122, 124.  
Jom. xi.  
224, 225.  
Arch. Ch.  
i. 271, 278.

This important success occasioned the immediate retreat of the French armies from the Grisons. Their left fell back by Sargans to Wallenstatt; the centre by the gorge of Vettis; the right by Reichenau, Ilantz, and Disentis, into the valley of Unsern. The centre of the army was forced; and had Bellegarde been at hand to follow up the successes of Hotze, it would have been all over with the Republicans in Switzerland. As it was, they did not effect their retreat from the Grisons without sustaining a loss of three thousand men in prisoners alone; while the total loss of the Imperialists was only seventy-one men—an extraordinary, but well-authenticated proof of the immense advantage of offensive operations in mountain warfare, and the great disasters to which even the best troops are subjected by being exposed, when acting on the defensive, to the loss of their communications, by their adversary turning their position. This catastrophe obliged Massena to alter entirely his line of defence. The right wing in the Alps being driven back, it was no longer possible to maintain the line of the lake of Constance and the Rhine from Stein to Eglisau. In consequence, he fell back from the Rhine behind the Thur; Lecourbe received orders to evacuate the St Gothard, and concentrate his forces below the Devil's Bridge, in the valley of the Reuss;<sup>2</sup> while the bulk of his army was assembled round the headquarters

<sup>47.</sup>  
General  
retreat of  
the French  
behind the  
lake of  
Zurich.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xi.  
226, 228.  
Dum. i. 124,  
127. Arch.  
Ch. i. 271,  
281.

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at Zurich, all the approaches to which were fortified with the utmost care.

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48.

Part of the  
Austrian  
left wing is  
detached  
into Lombardy.

Notwithstanding the strength of this position, Lecourbe would have been unable to have maintained his ground with the right wing against the impetuous attacks of Hotze, had that enterprising general been supported by Bellegarde. But the Aulic Council, conceiving that Italy was to be the theatre of decisive operations, directed the latter to descend into Lombardy, and reinforce the army there, now commanded by Suwarroff, leaving only ten thousand men to guard the Valteline and gain possession of the St Gothard. In pursuance of these orders he crossed the Splugen, and proceeded by the lake of Como to Milan; while Hotze vigorously pursued the retreating enemy in the valley of the Rhine, and everywhere drove them back to the Swiss frontiers. Encouraged by these successes, and the near approach of the Russian auxiliaries, to push the war with vigour, the Archduke published a proclamation to the Swiss, in which he announced that he was about to enter their territory to deliver them from their chains, and exhorted them to take up arms against their oppressors. At the same time the Rhine was passed at all points: a large column crossed at Stein, under Nauendorf; another at Eglisau; while Hotze crossed the upper part of the stream in the Grisons, and penetrated, by the source of the Thur, into the Toggenberg. To prevent the junction of the Archduke and Hotze, Massena left his intrenchments on the Limmat, and commenced an attack on the advanced guard of Nauendorf. A desultory action ensued, which was maintained with great vigour on both sides; fresh troops continually came up to reinforce those who were exhausted with fatigue; and, though undecided upon the whole, Oudinot gained a considerable advantage over an Austrian division, commanded by Petrasch, which was defeated with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners. Notwithstanding that check, however, the object was gained; the Archduke marched on the

May 22.

May 24.

May 25.

following day towards Winterthur, while Hotze descended with all his forces to support him. The important post called the Steigpass was attacked at noon, and carried by that intrepid general; while the Archduke effected his junction with the left wing of his army at Winterthur and Nestenbach. Massena, upon this, fell back to Zurich, and the Republicans confined themselves to their defensive position on the Limmat.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. i.  
124, 126,  
164, 167.  
Jom. xi. 228,  
235, 237.  
Arch. Ch.  
i. 283, 292,  
306.

While the French centre was thus forced back to their interior line of defence, the right wing, under Lecourbe, was still more severely pressed by the Imperialists. No sooner had Bellegarde arrived in Lombardy, than Suwarroff, who had now arrived and assumed the general command in Italy, detached General Haddick, with ten thousand men, to drive the French from the St Gothard. Loison's division, defeated at the Monte Cenere by Hohenzollern, retired up the valley of the Tessino to Airole, where it was reinforced by several additional battalions, in order to maintain the passage of the St Gothard, and give time for the baggage and artillery to defile to Altdorf. Overwhelmed by numbers, Loison was at length driven over the snowy summit of that rugged mountain, through the smiling valley of Unsern, and down the deep descent below the Devil's Bridge, to Wasen, with the loss of six hundred prisoners. An Austrian brigade even chased him from Wasen down to Amsteg, within three miles of Altdorf, on the lake of Luzern; but Lecourbe, justly alarmed at so near an approach, sallied forth from that place, at the head of a considerable body of troops, and attacked them with such vigour, that they were obliged to retrace their steps in confusion up the whole valley of Schollenen, and could only prevent the irruption of the enemy into the valley of Unsern, by cutting an arch of the Devil's Bridge.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, General Xaintrailles, at the head of a strong French division which Massena had despatched to the support of the army of Italy, attacked and routed a body of six thousand

49.  
The right  
wing of the  
French is  
driven from  
the St  
Gothard.  
May 29.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xi.  
240, 244.  
Dum. i. 158.  
Arch. Ch. i.  
286, 290.

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50.

Massena's  
position at  
Zurich.  
He is there  
unsuccess-  
fully attack-  
ed by the  
Archduke.

June 5.

peasants, who had taken post at Leuk, in the upper Valais, and made himself master of Brieg, the well-known village at the foot of the Simplon.

Meanwhile, the bulk of the Austrian forces were concentrated in the environs of Zurich, where Massena still maintained, with characteristic obstinacy, his defensive position. The French lines extended from the intrenched heights of Zurich, through those of Regensberg, and thence to the Rhine, in a direction nearly parallel to the course of the Aar. The camp around Zurich was strengthened by the most formidable redoubts, at which the army had laboured for above a month ; while the whole country by which it could be approached, situated between the Glatt, the Limmat, and the Aar, filled with wooded heights, and intersected by precipitous ravines, presented the greatest obstacles to an attacking army. On the 5th June, the Archduke, having assembled all his forces, assailed him along the whole line. The chief weight of his attack was directed against Massena's centre and right. At the latter point, Hotze gained at first what seemed an important success ; his advanced posts even penetrated into the suburbs of Zurich, and carried the whole intrenchments which covered the right of the army. But before the close of the day, Soult, coming up with the reserve, regained the lost ground, and forced back the Imperialists, after a desperate struggle, to the ground they had occupied at the commencement of the action. The combat, at the same time, raged in the centre with uncertain success ; and at length the Archduke, seeing the repulse of Hotze, and deeming the Zurichberg the decisive point, detached General Wallis, with a portion of the reserve, to renew the attack, while the Prince of Lorraine made a simultaneous effort on the side of the Attisberg. Wallis at first made a great impression, carried the farm of Zurichberg, and, after a vehement struggle, arrived at the palisades of the intrenchments ; but Massena, seeing the danger, flew to the spot at the head of a column of



grenadiers, and assailed the Imperialists in flank, while a tremendous fire of grape and musketry from the summit of the works tore down the foremost of their ranks. Notwithstanding all their efforts, the Austrians were unable to force the intrenchments; Hotze himself was severely wounded; and, after a bloody conflict, they retired over the Glatt, leaving three thousand killed and wounded on the field of battle.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
249, 251.  
Dum. i. 169,  
170. Th. x.  
295. Arch.  
Ch. i. 327,  
344.

Noways discouraged by this check, the Archduke, after a day's repose, made arrangements for a renewal of the attack; and, taught by experience, adopted such dispositions as must have insured success. Before daybreak on the morning of the 6th, two columns, of eight thousand men each, were destined to assault the Zurichberg and the Wipchengerberg, while all the left, the reserve, and part of the centre, were to support their attack. But Massena, apprehensive of the result, retreated during the night, defiled over the bridges of Zurich and Wettingen, and took post, between Luzern and Zurich, on Mount Albis, a rocky ridge stretching from the lake of Zurich to the Aar, in a position even stronger than the one he had left. The retreat was effected without loss under cover of night; but the great arsenal of Zurich, containing a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, and immense warlike stores, fell on the day following into the hands of the Imperialists. The evacuation of the intrenched camp at Zurich drew after it the dissolution of the forces of the Swiss Confederacy in the interest of France. The battalions of Berne and Soleure, already much weakened by desertion, were entirely dissolved by that event; while those of Zurich and Turgovia, menaced with military execution on their dwellings if they continued longer with the enemy, made haste to abandon a cause of which they were already ashamed in their hearts.<sup>2</sup> In a week the battalions of the Pays de Vaud, and a few hundreds of the most ardent of the Zurich democrats, alone remained of the eighteen thousand auxiliaries first assembled under the tricolor

51.  
The latter  
prepares  
a second  
attack.  
Massena  
prevents it  
by a retreat.  
Dissolution  
of the Swiss  
forces in the  
French service.  
June 6.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xi.  
251, 256.  
Arch. Ch.  
i. 350, 357.  
Dum. i. 169,  
170. Th. x.  
296.

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standard. At the same time, the provisional government of Helvetia, no longer in safety in Luzern, set off for Berne: the long file of its carriages excited the ironical contempt of the peasantry, still ardently attached to the institutions of their fathers, in the rural districts through which they passed.

52.  
Reflections  
on the mag-  
nitude of  
the preced-  
ing opera-  
tions in the  
Alps.

The details which have now been given of the campaign of the Alps, though hardly intelligible to those who have not traversed the country, or studied the positions with care in an excellent map, offer the most remarkable spectacle, in a military point of view, which the revolutionary war had yet exhibited. From the 14th May, when the attack on the fort of Luciensteg commenced, to the 6th June, when the intrenched camp at Zurich was abandoned, was nothing but one continual combat, in a vast field of battle, extending from the snowy summits of the Alps to the confluence of the great streams which flow from their perennial fountains. Posterity will hardly believe that great armies could be maintained in such a situation, and the same unity of operations communicated to a line one hundred and fifty miles long, extending from Bellinzona to Bâle, across the highest mountains in Europe, as to a small body of men manœuvring on the most favourable ground for military operations. The consumption of human life during these actions, prolonged for twenty days—the forced marches by which they were succeeded—the sufferings and privations which the troops on both sides endured—the efforts necessary to find provisions for large bodies in those inhospitable regions, in many of which the traveller or the chamois-hunter can often hardly find a footing, combined to render this warfare both the most memorable and the most animating which had occurred since the fall of the Roman empire.<sup>1</sup>

Dum. i.  
172, 173.  
Jom. xi.  
257, 258.

While success was thus attending the Imperial standards on the Rhine and the Alps, events of a still more decisive character occurred on the Italian plains. A few days

after the important battle of Magnano, twenty thousand Russians, under Suwarroff, joined the Imperial army, still encamped on the shores of the Mincio. Thus were the forces of the north, for the first time since the commencement of the Revolution, brought into collision with those of the south, and that desperate contest begun which was destined to inflict such terrible wounds on both empires; to wrap in flames the towers of the Kremlin, to bring the Tartars of the desert to the shores of the Seine, and ultimately to establish a new balance of power in Europe, by arraying all its forces under the banners either of Asiatic despotism or European ambition. The Emperor Paul, who now entered, with all the characteristic impetuosity of his character, into the alliance against France, had embraced the most extensive and visionary ideas as to the ulterior measures which should be adopted upon the overthrow of the French revolutionary power. He laboured to accomplish the formation, not only of a cordial league between all the sovereigns of Europe, to stop the progress of anarchy, but of a system which should effect the restoration of all the potentates and interests which had been subverted by the French arms, and the closing of the great schism between the Greek and Catholic Churches, which had so long divided the Christian world. He went even so far as to contemplate the union of the Catholics and Protestants, the stilling of all the controversies which distracted the latter body, and the assemblage of the followers of Christ, of whatever denomination, under the banners of one Catholic Church. Captivating ideas, which will never cease to attract the enthusiastic and benevolent in every age, but which the experienced observer of human events will dismiss to the regions of imagination, and class with the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, or the probable extinction of death which amused the reveries of Condorcet.<sup>1</sup>

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53.

Arrival of  
the Rus-  
sians, under  
Suwarroff,  
on the  
Mincio.<sup>1</sup> Hard. vii.  
215, 217.

The troops thus brought against the Republicans, though very different from the soldiers of Eylau and


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
1799.

54.  
Character of  
these troops  
and their  
commander.

Borodino, were still formidable by their discipline, their enthusiasm, and their stubborn valour. Their cavalry, indeed, was poorly equipped, and their artillery inferior in skill and science to that of the French; but their infantry, strong, hardy, and resolute, yielded to none in Europe in the energy and obstinacy so essential to military success. Field-marshal SUWAROFF, who commanded them, and now assumed the general direction of the allied army, though the singularity of his manner and the extravagance of his ideas in some particulars have detracted, in the estimation of foreigners, from his well-earned reputation, was yet unquestionably one of the most remarkable generals of the last age. Impetuous, enthusiastic, and impassioned, brave in conduct, invincible in resolution, endowed with the confidence and ardour which constitute the soul of the conqueror, rather than the vigilance or foresight which are requisite to the general, he was better fitted to sweep over the world with the fierce tempest of Scythian war, than to conduct the long and cautious contests which civilised nations maintain with each other. No man ever understood so well the peculiar character of the troops he was called to command, or turned to such good account that ardent spirit and mingled enthusiasm and superstition which distinguish the Slavonic character. His favourite weapon was the bayonet; his system of war incessant and vigorous attack; and his great advantage the impression of superiority and invincible power which a long course of success under that method had taught to his soldiers. The first orders he gave to General Chastelar, chief of the staff to the Imperialists, were singularly characteristic, both of his temper of mind and system of tactics. That general having proposed a reconnoissance, the marshal answered warmly, "Reconnoissance! I am for none of them; they are of no use but to the timid, and to inform the enemy that you are approaching. It is never difficult to find your opponents when you really wish it.<sup>1</sup> Form column;


<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
261, 262.  
Dum. i. 173.  
Hard. vii.  
218, 219.







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charge bayonet ; plunge into the centre of the enemy : these are my reconnoissances ;” words which, amid some exaggeration, unfold more of the real genius of war than is generally supposed.

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Pierre Alexis Wasiltowich, Count Suwarroff, was born in 1730 at Suskoi, in the Ukraine ; so that, when he took the field against the French in 1799, he was already sixty-nine years of age. His father was an officer, and sent him early to the school of young cadets at St Petersburg. At the age of seventeen he entered the army, and made his first campaign against the Swedes in 1748. But his energy and valour was soon called to a greater theatre, and in combating the Prussians under the great Frederick during the Seven Years' War, he found an enemy alike worthy of his imitation, and fit to arouse his rivalry. He took an active part in the terrible battle of Cunnersdorf, where the invincible steadiness of the Russian troops first became known to all Europe, and was with the detachment which afterwards gained possession of Berlin. He distinguished himself subsequently in several lesser affairs in the same war, particularly at Landsberg, near Schweidnitz, when he made General Corbière and a considerable body of the Prussians prisoners. On the conclusion of peace between the cabinets of St Petersburg and Berlin in 1762, he returned to his own country, where he was soon promoted to the rank of colonel, which was ere long exchanged for that of brigadier-general.<sup>1</sup>

55.  
Early history of Suwarroff.

<sup>1</sup> Biog. Univ. xliii. 214. (Souwaroff.)

His genius for military affairs having now become known to the war-office at St Petersburg, he was employed, when hostilities next broke out, in more important commands. In 1768 he commanded a brigade which, in the first Polish war, took Cracow by assault ; and by the rapidity of its marches, and the ability with which it was conducted, rendered the most essential service during the campaign. When the Turkish war broke out in 1773, he was intrusted with the command of a separate corps,

56.  
His campaigns against the Poles and Turks.

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with which he swam across the Danube, attacked and beat the enemy in two encounters, and gained a victory at Hirsowa. Soon after, under Kaminski's orders, he contributed to the decisive victory of Korlidgie; and in 1782 effected the reduction of the Nogay Tartars, who had revolted against the government of Catherine. War having again broken out with the Turks in 1785, he was unexpectedly attacked by a large body of Osmanli horse, in the town of Kinburn, when his corps, dispersed in the adjoining country, could ill concentrate, and in consequence they gained at first great success over one of his generals. Instead of showing any agitation when the news arrived, he went instantly to church, caused "Te Deum" to be chanted as for a decisive victory, in which he fervently joined; and having meanwhile collected a small body of troops, he sallied forth when the service was concluded, attacked the enemy, who were already approaching in strength, and, by the vehemence of his onset, drove them back to a considerable distance. In the middle of his success, however, he was wounded, and his soldiers, discouraged by the disappearance of their beloved commander, again fell into confusion and fled, upon which Suwarroff leapt from the litter in which he was carried, mounted bleeding as he was on horseback, and exclaiming, "My children, I am still alive," again led them against the enemy. The attack was now so vigorous that the Turks were driven down to the water's edge, and all killed or taken, to the number of six thousand men.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Biog.  
Univ. xliii.  
215. Mém.  
de Souva-  
roff, i. 74.  
111. Biog.  
des Cont.  
xix. 304.

57.  
His glorious  
successes at  
Fokschany  
and Rim-  
niski.

Shortly after this glorious exploit, he took part under Potemkin in the siege of Oczakoff, on which memorable occasion he commanded the right wing of the army, and received a severe wound in the neck, and was soon after nearly killed by the blowing-up of a powder magazine. These injuries confined him for some months to bed. In 1789, however, being recovered from his wounds, he again commanded a division of the Muscovites on the

Danube, and gained the brilliant victory of Fokschany. Shortly after, the Turks having received immense reinforcements, the Grand Vizier advanced at the head of a hundred thousand men against the Austrian army, under Cobourg, which was reduced by sickness and the losses of the campaign to eighteen thousand combatants. Their destruction appeared inevitable, for the Osmanlis, who had entirely surrounded the Austrian general, had regained all their ancient audacity, and confidently anticipated his immediate surrender. But Suwarroff no sooner heard of his danger than he flew at the head of ten thousand Russians to his relief; and, skilfully concealing his march from the enemy, combined his attack with Cobourg with such ability, that he gained a complete victory. The victorious Russians immediately invested Ismael, which was carried by storm after a dreadful struggle, in which twelve thousand of the victors, and twenty-four thousand of the vanquished, fell. The booty was immense; but Suwarroff, without retaining an article to himself, surrendered his whole share to his soldiers. His despatch to the Empress announcing this triumph was laconic and characteristic—"Mother,\* Ismael is at your feet."<sup>1</sup>

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1799.

July 22,  
1789.Sept. 22,  
1789.

Dec. 11.

<sup>1</sup> Mém. de  
Souvaroff, i.  
264, 301.  
Bibl. Univ.  
xliii. 217.  
(Suwar-  
roff.)

The conquest of Poland and sack of Praga, which was the next achievement of the conqueror of Ismael, has affixed a darker spot on his memory, for the carnage was terrific, and fell in great part on the citizens. Yet, even on that dreadful day, when the Vistula ran red with Christian blood, and Poland expiated the popular insanity of five centuries, impartial justice must admire the skill of his design, the irresistible fury of his attacks, the iron arm which terminated a war and extinguished a nation in a single day. "You know," said Catherine, in reply to his despatch announcing this decisive triumph, "that I never promote an officer before his turn; I am incapable of doing injustice to his senior; but you have made

58.  
His con-  
quest of  
Poland.

\* The usual expression of the soldiers in addressing the Empress.

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yourself field-marshal by the conquest of Poland." Shortly after, the Empress died; and Suwarroff, who had the most profound veneration for her, was far from being equally submissive to her successor Paul, whose minute and peremptory regulations about the soldier's dress, proved exceedingly vexatious to the old field-marshal. "Hair-powder," said he, "is not gunpowder, and pig-tails to the hair are not bayonets." These, and a variety of similar sallies, occasioned his banishment from the court; but the army loudly murmured at his disgrace, and, on the breaking out of the war with France in 1799, he was almost as a matter of course placed at the head of the army.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mém. de  
Souvaroff, i.  
361, 365.  
Biog. des  
Cont. xix.  
365, 366.

59.  
His charac-  
ter as a  
general.

Suwarroff was not only a general of the very highest order, but he was a man of a character and turn of mind peculiar to Russia, and which belong perhaps exclusively to the Slavonic race. He united, in the most eminent degree, the enthusiastic ardour with the nice perception and address in manner which distinguishes that great family of mankind. Eminently national in his ideas and attachments, he often affected the dress, habits, and manners of his Tartar ancestors; and the bizarre contrast which this afforded to the refinements of a luxurious court and elegant nobility, frequently gave occasion among foreigners to misconception and surprise. But although, to maintain his influence over his troops, to whom such peculiarities were inexpressibly dear, he retained these habits, he had the whole diplomatic finesse of the Russian in his character. He was highly educated, polished in his manners, could speak and write seven languages with facility, had read much, especially on the art of war, and no one, when necessary, could assume a more refined and courtly address. When introduced to the Empress Catherine, he often, to amuse her, spoke at first in the uncouth strains of the soldiers, and sometimes like a mere buffoon; but when she said, "Come now, general, we have had enough of this, let us proceed to business,"

no one brought forward more lucid views, or more clearly struck at the essential points of the subject. He had the greatest admiration of Napoleon, and was peculiarly captivated by the vehemence and daring of his campaign in Italy, which was entirely in accordance with his own fiery temperament in war. Alone, perhaps, of all the statesmen and warriors in Europe, he saw the necessity of straining every nerve to arrest his dangerous ascendancy. In 1797, he said to General Koves, "They should instantly send me to combat Buonaparte; if not, he will ere long pass over the body of Germany, and will end by coming to seek us at our hearths."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Marmont's  
Voyages, i.  
235. Biog.  
des Cont.  
xix. 365,  
366.

No general, in ancient or modern times, understood better the spirit of the soldier and the moral incitements which have so material an influence in war. He had also, like Alexander and Hannibal, that great quality which is perhaps of still higher importance in gaining their affections, a constitution of iron, and a patience under privation which enabled him to share without difficulty all their hardships. Often, when provisions were scarce, he proclaimed a fast for a day, telling his soldiers that their sins called for such a mortification; and it was cheerfully obeyed, for he set the first example of abstaining from food during the prescribed period himself. Like Napoleon, he frequently shared the soldier's bivouac, and partook of his fare; he marched on foot with the infantry, rode at the head of the cavalry, laboured in the trenches with the pioneers, and often strove to pull a gun out of the mud with the artillerymen. To inspire confidence in his men was his great object. When the Grand Vizier threatened him with an immediate attack at Rimniski, and the danger was imminent, as the Austrians under Cobourg had not yet arrived, seeing that two hours must elapse before the action commenced, he retired to a warm bath after his dispositions were made, and when the intelligence arrived that the heads of the Austrian columns were in view, he came out, dressed in

60.  
His vast influence with his soldiers.

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<sup>1</sup> Mém. de  
Souvaroff, i.  
356, 427.  
Marmont,  
Voyages, i.  
234, 236.  
Biog. des  
Cont. xix.  
367, 369.

presence of the soldiers, and led them to the attack. And when his leading files were repulsed at the foot of the St Gothard by the French posted in the rocks, he desired a grave to be dug, and ordered his soldiers to place him in it, for he would not survive his children's discomfiture. He was perhaps the only general, after Marlborough, recorded in history, who never sustained a defeat; a fact which speaks volumes as to his military capacity, for none ever exceeded him in the daring and hardihood of his attacks.<sup>1</sup>

61.  
His ideas of  
the principles on  
which the  
war should  
be carried  
on.

Fearless and impetuous in conversation as action, the Russian veteran made no secret of the ultimate designs with which his imperial master had entered into the war. To restore everything to the state in which it was before the French Revolution broke out; to overturn the new republics, re-establish, without exception, the dispossessed princes, restrain universally the spread of revolutionary ideas, punish the authors of fresh disturbances, and substitute for the cool policy of calculating interest, a frank, generous, disinterested system, was the only way, he constantly maintained, to put down effectually the Gallic usurpation. The Austrian officers, startled at such novel ideas, carefully reported them to the cabinet of Vienna, where they excited no small disquietude. To expel the French from the whole Italian peninsula, and, if possible, raise up an effectual barrier against any future incursions in that quarter from their ambition, was, indeed, a favourite object of their policy; but it was no part of their designs to sanction a universal restitution of the possessions acquired since the commencement of the war, or exchange the distant and rebellious province of Flanders for the rich and submissive Venetian territories adjoining the Hereditary States, and affording them at all times a secure entrance into the Italian plains. Hence a secret jealousy and distrust speedily arose between the coalesced powers,<sup>2</sup> and experienced observers already began to predict, from the very rapidity of the success

<sup>2</sup> Hard. vii.  
220.

with which their arms were at first attended, the evolution of such causes of discord as would ultimately lead to the dissolution of the confederacy.

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The plan of operations concerted between the Archduke and Suwarroff was to separate entirely the French armies of Switzerland and Italy, and to combine the movements of the two allied armies by the conquest of the Italian Alps, Lombardy, and Piedmont, in order to penetrate into France on its most defenceless side, by the Vosges mountains and the defiles of the Jura—the same quarter on which the great invasion of 1814 was afterwards effected. It was on this principle that they maintained so vigorous a contest under Bellegarde and Hotze, in the Val-levantina and the Grisons; and by their successes the right wing of Massena was forced to retire: the Imperialists were interposed in a salient angle between the Republican armies, and the one of these thrown back on the line of the Po, the other on that of the Aar. Moreau succeeded Scherer in the command of the army of Italy at this momentous crisis. He found it reduced by sickness and the sword to twenty-eight thousand combatants; and, after a vain attempt to maintain the line of the Oglio, the troops retired towards Milan, leaving the immense military stores and reserve artillery parks at Cremona to the conquerors; while a bridge equipage, which was descending the Mincio from Mantua, with a view to gain the Po, also fell into the hands of the Allies.<sup>1</sup>

62.  
Plan of the  
Allies; and  
condition  
of the  
French  
army.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
262, 263.  
Dum. i. 174,  
175. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 33,  
34.

Moreau, finding himself cut off from his connexion with Massena in the Alps, and being unable to face the Allies in the plains of Lombardy, resolved to retire towards the mountains of Genoa, in order to facilitate his junction with Macdonald, who had received orders to evacuate the Parthenopeian republic, and retire upon the Apennines. Mantua was blockaded; and all the frontier towns of the Cisalpine republic were abandoned to their own resources. Soon after, Peschiera was invested,

63.  
Moreau  
retreats  
behind the  
Adda.

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1799.  
April 20.

Ferrara besieged, and Brescia summoned. Kray, to whom the right wing was intrusted, carried the latter town without opposition; and the garrison, eleven hundred strong, who had retired into the castle, soon after surrendered at discretion. The French now retired behind the line of the Adda, a rapid stream, which, descending from the lake of Lecco, runs in a deep and swift torrent, over a surface of twenty-four leagues, to the Po. The right bank is almost everywhere so lofty as to command the left; and the bridges at Lecco, Cassano, Lodi, and Pizzighitone are defended either by fortified towns or strong *têtes-de-pont*. On the 25th April the Allies approached this formidable line; and a sharp skirmish ensued between the Russians, under Prince BAGRATHION, destined to meet a glorious death on the field of Borodino, and the French, before the walls of Lecco, in which the former were repulsed: commencing thus a contest which was never destined to be finally extinguished till the Russian standards waved on the heights of Montmartre.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
265, 267.  
Dum. i. 79.  
St-Cyr, i.  
200, 202.

64.  
The passage  
of the Adda  
is forced  
with im-  
mense loss  
to the  
French.

Suwarroff left twenty thousand men, under Kray, to besiege Peschiera and blockade Mantua, and prepared to force the passage of the Adda. To frustrate this intention, Moreau accumulated his troops in masses on that part of the river which seemed chiefly threatened. But while actively engaged in this design, the Austrian division of General Ott succeeded in throwing over a bridge during the night at Trezzo, and before morning his whole troops had crossed over to the right; while, at the same time, Wukassowich surprised the passage at Brivio. The French line was thus divided into three parts; and Serurier's division, eight thousand strong, which formed the extreme left, was not only cut off from all support, but even from receiving any orders from the remainder of the army. The divisions of Ott and Zoph commenced a furious attack on Grenier's men, and, after a brave resistance, drove them back towards Milan, with a loss



of two thousand four hundred men, including eleven hundred prisoners; while Serurier, whose division was entirely isolated by the passage of Wukassowich at Brivio, took post at Verderio, in a strong position, determined to defend himself to the last extremity. Guillet, with the brigade under his orders, who was returning from the Valteline, escaped destruction by embarking on the lake of Como, steering for Menagio, and making his way to the lake of Lugano by the beautiful valley, so well known to travellers, which leads from that place to Porlezza. By remaining in his position at Verderio while the Allied army was advancing, Serurier necessarily was soon enveloped by their columns; evincing thus rather the courage of a soldier who disdains to retire, than the conduct of an officer who knows how to extricate his men from difficulties. He was soon surrounded on all sides by the Imperialists; and, after an honourable resistance, finding his retreat cut off, and the assailants triple his own force, laid down his arms with seven thousand men. At the same time, Melas carried the *tête-de-pont* at Cassano, and pursued the fugitives with such vigour that he passed the bridge pell-mell with them, and pushed on before night to Gorgonzale, on the road to Milan.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 284.  
Jom. xi. 276,  
278. Dum.  
i. 112. St-  
Cyr, i. 194,  
199. Arch.  
Ch. i. 230,  
231.

The situation of the French was now in the highest degree critical. In these engagements they had lost above eleven thousand men, and could now, even with all the reinforcements which they received, hardly muster in their retreat twenty thousand to meet the great army of the Allies, above sixty thousand strong, which was advancing in pursuit. In these disastrous circumstances, Milan was abandoned, and the army withdrawn behind the Tessino. Suwarroff, the same day, made his triumphal entry into that capital, amidst the transports of the Catholic and aristocratic party, and the loud applause of the multitude, who greeted him with the same acclamations which they had lavished,<sup>2</sup> on a similar occasion,

65.  
Suwarroff  
enters Milan  
in triumph.

April 29.  
<sup>2</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 35, 36.  
Th. x. 286.  
Jom. xi.  
278, 279.  
St-Cyr, i.  
199, 201.

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66.  
Moreau  
retires to  
Alessandria  
and Turin.

May 7.

<sup>1</sup> *Jom.* xi.  
280, 284.  
*Th. x.* 286,  
287. *Dum.*  
*i.* 141, 142.  
*St-Cyr, i.*  
200, 203.

on Napoleon three years before. The Republican army, having left a garrison of two thousand men in the castle, moved slowly in two columns towards Turin, in deep dejection, and heavily burdened with the numerous families compromised by the Revolution, who now pursued their mournful way towards the frontiers of France.

Nothing now remained to Moreau but to retire to such a position, as might enable him to rally to his standards the yet unbroken army which Macdonald was bringing up from the south of the peninsula. For this purpose he divided his forces into two columns, one of which, under his own command, escorting the parks of artillery, the baggage, and military chest, took the road to Turin, while the other, consisting of the divisions of Victor and Laboissière, moved towards Alessandria, with a view to occupy the defiles of the Bochetta and the approaches to Genoa. Having effected the evacuation of the town and the arsenal of Turin, provided for the defence of the citadel, in which he left a garrison of three thousand men, under General Fiorilla, and secured the communications with the adjacent passes of the Alps, the French general moved the remainder of his army into the plain between the Po and the Tanaro, at the foot of the northern slope and principal debouches of the Apennines, where they encircle the bay of Genoa and join the Maritime Alps. This position,—extending only over a front of four leagues, supported on the right by Alessandria, and on the left by Valence, affording the means of manœuvring either on the Bormida or the Po, and covering at once the roads from Asti to Turin and Coni, and those from Acqui to Nizza and Savona,—was better adapted than any other that could have been selected to enable the Republicans to maintain their footing in Italy, until they were reinforced by the army of Macdonald, or received assistance from the interior of France.<sup>1</sup>

Master of all the plain of Lombardy, and at the head of an overwhelming force, Suwarroff did not evince that

activity in pursuing the broken remains of his adversary which might have been expected from the general vigour of his character, For above a week he gave himself up to festivities at Milan, while an army hardly a third of his own was in full retreat, by diverging columns, before him. At length, finding his active disposition wearied with triumphal honours, he set out for Alessandria, leaving Latterman to blockade the castle of Milan with four thousand men. At the same time Orzi, Novi, Peschiera, and Pizzighitona surrendered to the Allies, with a hundred pieces of cannon, twenty gunboats, a siege equipage, and immense stores of ammunition and provisions; an advantage which enabled Kray to draw closer the blockade of Mantua, and despatch Hohenzollern to assist at the siege of the castle of Milan. On the 9th the Allies reached Tortona, blew open the gates and drove the French into the citadel; while their advanced posts were pushed to San Julian, Garofalo, and Novi. Meanwhile, though a reinforcement of six thousand Russians arrived at Tortona, Moreau remained firm in his position behind the Po and the Tanaro. To divert his attention, the Russian general extended his left from Novi to Serravalle and Gavi, threatening thereby his communications with Genoa and France; but this was a mere feint, intended to mask his real design, which was to cross the Po, turn Moreau's left, and force him to a general and decisive action.<sup>1</sup>

The right, or southern bank of the Po, from the junction of the Tanaro to Valence, is more lofty than the northern, which is low, marshy, and approachable only on dykes. Some large islands opposite Mugarone having afforded facilities for the passage, Rosenberg, who commanded one of Suwarroff's divisions directed against Valence, was induced, by his military ardour, to attempt to cross it in that quarter. In the night of the 11th, he threw six thousand men across the principal arm into a wooded island, from whence they shortly passed over,

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67.  
Whither he  
is tardily  
followed by  
Suwarroff.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. i.  
142, 145.  
Jom. xi. 289,  
290. St-Cyr,  
i. 203. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 37,  
39.

68.  
Check of  
the Rus-  
sians under  
Rosenberg,  
in endeavoring  
to cross the  
Po.

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XXVII.1799.  
May 11.

some by swimming, others by wading, with the water up to their armpits, and took possession of the village of Mugarone. Moreau no sooner heard of this descent, than he directed an overwhelming force to the menaced point; the Russians, vigorously attacked in the village, were soon compelled to retire; in vain they formed squares, and, under Prince Rosenberg and the Archduke Constantine, defended themselves with the characteristic bravery of their nation; assailed on every side, and torn to pieces by a murderous fire of grape-shot, they were driven back, first into the island, then across to the northern bank, with the loss of eight hundred killed and wounded, four pieces of cannon, and seven hundred prisoners. No sooner was Suwarroff informed of the first success of Rosenberg's attack, than he pushed forward two divisions to support him, while another was advanced towards Marengo to effect a diversion; but the bad success of the enterprise, which failed because it was not combined with sufficient support at the first, rendered it necessary that they should be recalled, and the Allied army was concentrated anew in the intrenched camp of Garofalo. A few days after this, Suwarroff raised his camp at San Juliano, with the design of crossing the Po near Casa Tenia, and marching upon Sesia. The attempt was not attended with decisive success. A warm action ensued between the division of Victor, which had crossed the Bormida near Alessandria, and the Russian advanced-guard, nine thousand strong, under the orders of Generals Bagration and Lusignan. Victory was long doubtful, and although the French were at length forced to retreat under shelter of the cannon of Alessandria, the demonstration led to no serious impression at the time on the position of the Republican general.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
292, 296,  
297. Dum.  
i. 146. St.  
Cyr. i. 204,  
205. Th. x.  
288.

Tired with the unsatisfactory nature of these manœuvres, Suwarroff resolved to march with the bulk of his forces upon Turin, where the vast magazines of artillery and military stores of the French army were assembled, in

the hope that, by reducing its citadel, and occupying the plains of Piedmont to the foot of the Alps, the position of Moreau on the Po and the Tanaro might be rendered no longer tenable, from the interruption of his communications with France. By a singular coincidence, not unusual in war, at the very time that the Russian marshal was adopting this resolution, Moreau had resolved, on his part, to retire by Asti, upon Turin and Coni, and, abandoning the line of the Apennines, concentrate his forces upon the inhospitable ridges which connect them with the Alps, for the preservation of his communication with France on the one hand, and with Macdonald's army, approaching through Tuscany from the south of Italy, on the other. Invincible necessity compelled him to adopt this retrograde movement. Great part of Piedmont was in a state of insurrection; a large body of peasants had recently occupied Ceva, another had made themselves masters of Mondovi, which closed the principal line of retreat for the army, the only one then practicable for artillery and carriages. The recent success of the Russians towards Alessandria led him to believe that the weight of their force was to be moved in that direction, and that he would soon be in danger of having his communications with France cut off. Influenced by these considerations, he detached the division of Victor, without artillery or baggage, by the mountain paths, towards Genoa, in order to maintain the crest of the Apennines, and reinforce, when necessary, the army of Macdonald, which was approaching from Naples; while he himself, having first thrown three thousand men into Alessandria, retired by Asti towards Turin, with the design of maintaining himself, if possible, at Coni, the last fortified place on the Italian side of the Alps, until he received the promised reinforcements from the interior of France.<sup>1</sup>

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1799.

69.

Moreau at  
length re-  
treats to the  
crest of the  
Apennines  
and Turin.

May 19.

1 Th. x. 291.  
Dum. i. 148,  
149. Jom.  
xi. 300, 301.  
St-Cyr, i.  
206, 208.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 44, 45.

No sooner was Suwarroff informed of the retreat of Moreau, than he occupied Valence and Casale, which

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1799.

70.

Suwaroff  
surprises  
Turin, and  
the castle  
of Milan  
is taken.  
May 27.

had been abandoned by the Republicans; and, after having moved forward a strong body under Schwiezkowsky to form the investment of Alessandria, advanced himself with the main body of the army towards Turin. Wukassovich, who commanded the advanced-guard, with the aid of some inhabitants of the town who favoured his designs, surprised one of the gates, and rapidly introducing his troops, compelled the French to take refuge in the citadel. The fruits of this conquest were two hundred and sixty-one pieces of cannon, eighty mortars, sixty thousand muskets, besides an enormous quantity of ammunition and military stores, which had been accumulating in that city ever since the first occupation of Italy by the arms of Napoleon. This great stroke, the success of which was owing to the celerity and skill of the Russian generals, deprived Moreau of all his resources, and rendered the situation both of his own army and that of Macdonald in the highest degree critical. At the same time, intelligence was received of the fall of the castle of Milan, after four days of open trenches—an advantage which permitted the division of Hohenzollern to reinforce the besieging army before Mantua; while the artillery was despatched to Tortona, the citadel of which was now closely invested.<sup>1</sup>

May 24.  
<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
302, 305.  
Dum. i. 152,  
158. Th. x.  
292. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 45.

71.  
Moreau  
retreats  
towards  
Genoa.

Unable from these disasters to maintain his ground in the basin of Piedmont, Moreau now thought only of regaining his position on the ridge of the Apennines, and covering the approaches to the city of Genoa—the only rallying point where he could still hope to effect a junction with Macdonald, and which covered the principal line of retreat for both armies into France. For this purpose he retired to Savigliano, having first moved forward an advanced guard, under Grouchy, to clear the road he was to follow, by retaking Mondovi and Ceva, into the latter of which the Austrians had succeeded in throwing a small garrison to support the insurgents who had occupied it. That general retook Mondovi; but all

his efforts failed before the ramparts of Ceva. The closing of the great road through this town rendered Moreau's situation apparently hopeless. Suwaroff, with a superior force, was close in his rear; the only route practicable for artillery by which he could regain the Apennines was blocked up; and he could not retire by the Col de Tende into France, without abandoning all prospect of rejoining Macdonald, and leaving the army of that general to certain destruction. From this desperate situation, the Republicans were extricated by the skill and vigour of their chief, aided by the resources of Guillemillot and the engineer corps under his directions. By their exertions, and the indefatigable efforts of one-half of the French army, a mountain path, leading across the Apennines from the valley of Garesio to the coast of Genoa, was, in four days, rendered practicable for artillery and chariots; and as soon as this was done, the blockade of Ceva was raised, three thousand men were thrown as a garrison into Coni, which was abandoned to its own resources; and the remainder of the army, after a strong rear-guard had been posted at Murialto to cover the passage, defiled over the narrow and rocky path, and arrived in safety at Loano, on the southern side of the mountains. No sooner were they arrived there than they formed a junction with Victor, who had successfully accomplished his retreat by Acqui, Spegno, and Dego, and occupied all the passes leading towards Genoa over the Apennines; Victor was intrusted with the important post of Portremoli, while the other divisions placed themselves on the crest of the mountains from Loano to the Bochetta.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
307, 308.  
Th. x. 292.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 45. Dum.  
i. 176, 177.

Suwaroff, on being informed of the retreat of Moreau from the plain of Piedmont, spread his troops over its rich surface, and up the glens which run from thence into the heart of the Alps. The Russian divisions entered into the beautiful valleys of Suza, St Jean de Maurienne, and Aosta. Frelich pushed his advanced posts to the

72.  
Suwaroff  
spreads over  
the whole of  
Piedmont  
and Lom-  
bardy.

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
310, 315.  
Dum. i. 176,  
179. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 46,  
48.

73.  
Reflections  
on these  
rapid suc-  
cesses of the  
Allies.

neighbourhood of Coni : Pignerol capitulated ; Suza surrendered at discretion ; and the advanced posts of the Allies, everywhere appearing on the summit of the Alpine passes, spread consternation over the ancient frontiers of France. At the same time the citadel of Turin was closely invested ; the sieges of Tortona and Alessandria were pushed with vigour ; while intelligence was received that a detachment, sent by Kray from before Mantua, had made itself master of Ferrara ; that a flotilla from Venice had surprised Ravenna, and an insurrection had broken out in the mountainous parts of Tuscany and the Ecclesiastical States, which threatened Ancona, and had already wrested Arezzo and Lucca from the Republicans.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, in less than three months after the opening of the campaign on the Adige, the French standards were driven back to the summit of the Alps ; the whole plain of Lombardy was regained, with the exception of a few of its strongest fortresses ; the conquests of Napoleon had been lost in less time than it had taken to make them ; and the Republican armies, divided and dispirited, instead of carrying the thunder of their victorious arms over the Italian peninsula, were reduced to a painful and hazardous defence of their own frontiers. A hundred thousand men were spread over the plain of Lombardy, of whom forty thousand were grouped under Suwarroff round Turin. History has not a more brilliant or decisive series of triumphs to record ; and they demonstrate on how flimsy and insecure a basis the French dominion at that period rested ; how much it was dependent on the genius and activity of a single individual ; how inadequate the revolutionary government was to the long-continued and sustained efforts which were requisite to maintain the contest from their own resources ; and how easily, by a combined effort of all the powers at that critical period, when Napoleon was absent, and time and wisdom had not consolidated the conquests of democracy, they might have been wrested from their grasp, and the peace of Europe



established on an equitable foundation. But, notwithstanding all their reverses, the European governments were not as yet sufficiently awakened to the dangers of their situation. Prussia still kept aloof in dubious neutrality; Russia was not irrevocably engaged in the cause; and Great Britain, as yet confining her efforts to the subsidising of other powers, had not descended as a principal into the field, or begun to pour forth, on land at least, those streams of blood which were destined to be shed before the great struggle was brought to a termination.<sup>1</sup>

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1799.

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 47.

These successes, great as they were, were yet not such as might have been achieved, if the Russian general, neglecting all minor considerations, and blockading only the principal fortresses, had vigorously followed up with his overwhelming force the retreating army of the Republicans, and driven it over the Maritime Alps. Unable to withstand so formidable an assailant, they must have retired within the French frontier, leaving not only Mantua and Genoa, but the army which occupied the Neapolitan territory, to its fate. This bold and decisive plan of operations was such as suited the ardent character of the Russian general, and the one which, if left to himself, he would unquestionably have adopted; but his better judgment was overruled by the cautious policy of the Aulic Council, who, above all things, were desirous to secure a fortified frontier for their Venetian acquisitions, and compelled him, much against his will, to halt in the midst of the career of victory, and besiege in form the fortresses of Lombardy. Something was no doubt gained by their reduction; but not to be compared with what might have been expected if an overwhelming mass had been interposed between the French armies, and the conquerors of Naples had been compelled to lay down their arms between the Apennines and the Po.<sup>2\*</sup>

74.  
Errors of  
the Aus-  
trians, who  
coerced  
Suwarroff.

<sup>2</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 47, 48.  
Hard. vii.  
248, 249.

\* A Russian officer of Suwarroff's staff at this juncture wrote to Count Rostopchin at St Petersburg:—"Our glorious operations are thwarted by those very persons who are most interested in their success. Far from applauding the brilliant triumphs of our arms, the cursed cabinet of Vienna seeks only to

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1799.

75.  
Affairs of  
the Parthe-  
nopeian  
republic,  
and general  
revolt at  
Naples.

While these disastrous events were in progress in the north of the Peninsula, the affairs of France were not in a more favourable train in its southern provinces. The Parthenopeian republic, established at Naples in the first fervour of revolutionary success, had been involved in those consequences, the invariable attendant on a sudden concession of power to the people—spoliation of the rich, misery among the poor, destruction of credit, and inextricable embarrassment in the finances of the state. In truth, the Directory, pressed by extreme pecuniary difficulties, looked to nothing so much in their conquests as indemnifying themselves for the expenses of their expeditions, and invariably made it the first condition with all the revolutionary states which they established, that they should pay the costs of the war, and take upon themselves the sole support of the armies which were to defend them. In conformity with these instructions, the first fruits of democratic ascendancy in Naples were found to be bitter in the extreme. The successive contributions of twelve and fifteen millions of francs levied on the capital and provinces, of which mention has already been made, excited the utmost dissatisfaction, which was greatly increased soon after by the experienced insolence and rapacity of the civil agents of the Directory. A provisional government was established, which introduced innovations that excited general alarm; the Jacobin clubs speedily began to diffuse the arrests and terror of revolutionary times; the national guard totally failed in producing any efficient

retard their march. It insists that our great Suwarroff should divide his army, and direct it at once to several points, which will save Moreau from total destruction. That cabinet, which fears a too rapid conquest of Italy, from designs which it dares not avow, as it knows well those of our magnanimous Emperor, has, by the Aulic Council, forced the Archduke Charles into a state of inactivity, and enjoined our incomparable chief to secure his conquests rather than extend them; that the army is to waste its time and strength in the siege of fortresses which would fall of themselves if the French army were destroyed. What terrifies them even more than the rapidity of our conquests, is the generous project, openly announced, of restoring to every one what he has lost. Deceived by his ministers, the Emperor Francis has, with his own hand, written to our illustrious general to pause in a career of conquest of which the very rapidity fills him with alarm.”—HARD. vii. 249, 250.

force to insure the public safety ; while the confiscation of the church property, and the abolition of its festivals, spread dismay and horror through that large portion of the population who were still attached to the Catholic faith, or lived on its charities. These circumstances speedily produced partial insurrections. Cardinal Ruffo, in Calabria, succeeded in exciting a revolt, and led to the field an army, fifteen thousand strong, composed of the descendants of the Bruttians and Luccanians ; while another insurrection, hardly less formidable, broke out in the province of Apulia. But these tumultuary bodies, imperfectly armed and totally undisciplined, were unable to withstand the veteran troops of France. Trani, where the principal force of the insurgents of the latter province had established themselves, was carried by assault with great slaughter ; but, on the other hand, Ruffo, in Calabria, defeated an attack on Castellucio by the democratic bands of the new republic ; and, encouraged by this success, marched into Apulia, where his forces were soon greatly augmented, and he was reinforced by some regular troops despatched from Sicily.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
316, 338.  
Orloff's  
Memoirs, ii.  
190, 220.

Affairs were in this dangerous state in the Neapolitan dominions, when orders reached Macdonald to evacuate, without loss of time, the south of Italy, in order to bring his army to support the Republican arms in Lombardy. He immediately assembled all his disposable forces, and after having left garrisons in fort St Elmo, Capua, and Gaeta, set off for Rome at the head of twenty thousand men. His retreat, conducted with great rapidity and skill, was exposed to serious dangers. The peasantry, informed by the English cruisers of the disasters experienced by the French in Upper Italy, broke out into insurrection in every quarter. Duhesme left Apulia in open revolt, and had a constant fight to maintain before he reached Capua ; a few hundred English landed at Salerno, and, aided by the peasantry, advanced to Vietri and Castel-a-Mare ; while the insurgents of the Roman

76.  
Macdonald  
commences  
his retreat,  
and retires  
in safety to  
Tuscany.  
May 7.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

1799.

May 29.

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 297.  
Jom. xi. 338,  
341. Dum.  
i. 154, 156.

77.  
He enters  
into com-  
munication  
with Mo-  
reau, and  
concerts  
measures  
with him.

<sup>2</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 49. Jom.  
xi. 341, 342.  
Th. x. 299.

and Tuscan states, becoming daily more audacious, interrupted all the communications with the north of Italy. Notwithstanding these menacing circumstances, Macdonald effected his retreat in the best order, and without sustaining any serious loss. He arrived at Rome on the 16th, where he reinforced his army by the divisions of Grenier, continued his route by Acquapendente to Florence, where he rallied to his standards the division of Gauthier and Montrichard, who were in the environs of Pistoia and Bologna, and established his headquarters at Lucca in the end of May. The left wing, composed of the Polish division Dombrowsky, took post at Carzana and Aula; the centre occupied the great road from Florence to Pistoia; the right, the high-road to Bologna, and all the passes into Modena, with an advanced guard in the city of Bologna itself.<sup>1</sup>

In this situation, Moreau and Macdonald were in open communication; and it was concerted between them that the chief body of their united forces should be brought to bear upon the Lower Po, with a view to threaten the communications of the Allies, disengage Mantua, and compel their retreat from the plain of Lombardy. For this purpose it was agreed that Macdonald should cross the Apennines and advance towards Tortona, his left resting on the mountains, his right on the right bank of the Po, while Moreau, debouching by the Bochetta, Gavi, and Serravalle, should move into the plain of that river. As the weight of the contest would in this view fall upon the former of these generals, the division of Victor, which formed the eastern part of Moreau's army, was placed under his orders, and a strong division directed to descend the valley of the Trebbia, in order to keep up the communication between the two armies, and support either as occasion might require.<sup>2</sup>

The positions of the allied armies, when these well-combined preparations were making to dislodge them from their conquests, were as follows:—Kray, who commanded

the whole forces on the Lower Po, had twenty-four thousand men under his orders, of whom one-half were engaged in the siege of Mantau, while five thousand, under Hohenzollern, had been despatched to cover Modena, and six thousand, under Ott, watched the mouths of the lateral valleys of the Taro and the Trebbia. The main body of the army, consisting of the divisions Zoph, Kaim, and the Russians, amounting to twenty-eight thousand men, was encamped in the neighbourhood of Turin, with its advanced posts pushed into the entrance of the Alpine valleys. Frœlich, with six thousand men, observed Coni; Wukassowich, with five thousand seven hundred, occupied Mondovi, Ceva, and Salicetto; Lusignan, with three thousand combatants, blockaded Fenestrelles; Bagrathion, with a detachment of fifteen hundred men, was posted in Cezanna, and the Col de l'Asietta; Schwiekowsky, with six thousand men, invested Tortona and Alessandria; the corps of Count Bellegarde, fifteen thousand strong, detached from the Tyrol, was advancing from Como to form the siege of these two fortresses: while that of Haddick, numbering fourteen thousand bayonets, which kept up the communication between the rear of the army and the left wing of the Archduke Charles, was preparing to penetrate into the Valais by the Simplon and the pass of Nuffenen.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
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1799.

78.

Position of  
the Allies at  
this juncture.

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 48, 49.  
Jom. xi.  
343, 344.  
Dum. i. 160,  
182, 185.  
Th. x. 297,  
298.

Thus, though the Allies had above a hundred thousand men in the field, they could hardly assemble thirty thousand men at any one point; so immensely had they extended themselves over the plains of Lombardy, and so obstinately had the Aulic Council adhered to the old system of establishing a cordon of troops all over the territory which they occupied. This vast dispersion of force was attended with little danger as long as the shattered army of Moreau alone was in the field; but the case was widely different when it was supported by thirty-five thousand fresh troops, prepared to penetrate into the centre and most unprotected part of their line. Had Macdonald

79.

Dangers  
arising from  
their great  
dispersion.

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1799.

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 298,  
299. Dum.  
i. 184, 189.  
Jom. xi. 344.

been able to push on as rapidly from Florence as he had done in advancing to it, he might have crushed the divisions of Klenau, Hohenzollern, and Ott, before they could possibly have been succoured from other quarters; but the time consumed in reorganising his army in Tuscany, and concerting operations with Moreau, gave Suwarroff an opportunity of repairing what was faulty in the disposition of his forces, and assembling a sufficient body of men to resist the attack at the menaced point.<sup>1</sup>

80.  
Macdonald's  
advance.  
First combats with  
the Republicans.  
June 12.

Macdonald, having at length completed his preparations, raised his camp in the neighbourhood of Pistoia on the 7th June, with an army, including Victor's division, of thirty-seven thousand men, and marched across the Apennines to Bologna. Hohenzollern, who commanded in the adjoining territory, Modena, withdrew his posts into the town of the same name, where he was attacked in a few days, and, after a bloody engagement, driven out with the loss of fifteen hundred men. Had the right wing of the Republicans punctually executed their instructions, and occupied the road to Ferrara, during the combat round the town, the whole of the Imperialists would have been made prisoners. Immediately after this success, Macdonald advanced to Parma, driving the Austrian cavalry before him; while Ott, who was stationed at the entrance of the valley of the Taro, seeing that his retreat was in danger of being cut off, retired to Placentia, leaving the road open to Victor, who upon that debouched entirely from the Apennines, and effected his junction with Macdonald at Borgo San Donino, to the north of the mountains. On the day following, Placentia was occupied by the Republicans, and their whole army established in the neighbourhood of that city.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 51, 52.  
St-Cyr, i.  
213, 214.  
Dum. i. 191,  
192. Jom.  
xi. 346, 349.

81.  
Able and  
energetic  
resolution  
immediately  
adopted by  
Suwarroff.

No sooner was Suwarroff informed of the appearance of Macdonald's army in Tuscany, than he adopted the same energetic resolution by which Napoleon had repulsed the attack of Wurmser on the Adige three years before. All his advanced posts in Piedmont were recalled; the

brigade of Lusignan near Fenestrelles, the divisions Frœlich, Bagrathion, and Schwiekowsky, began their march on the same day for the general rendezvous at Asti; and Kray received orders instantly to raise the siege of Mantua, despatch his artillery with all imaginable speed to Peschiera and Verona, and hasten with all his disposable force to join the main army in the neighbourhood of Placentia. The vigour of the Russian general communicated itself to all the officers of his army. These movements were all punctually executed, notwithstanding the excessive rains which impeded the movements of the troops; the castles of Milan and Pizzighitone were provisioned, a great intrenched camp was formed near the *tête-de-pont* of Valence, and all the stores recently captured, not necessary for the siege of the citadel, were removed from Turin. By these means the Allied army was rapidly reassembled, and on the 15th June, although Kray with the troops from Mantua had not yet arrived, thirty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry were encamped at Garofalo, on ground they had occupied six weeks before.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> St-Cyr, i.  
215, 217.  
Jom. xi.  
349, 353.  
Dum. i. 193.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 55.  
Mém de  
Souv. par.  
Laverne,  
373.

The intelligence of Suwarroff's approach induced MacDonald to concentrate his forces; but, nevertheless, he flattered himself that he would succeed in overwhelming Ott before he could be supported by the succours which were advancing. Three torrents, flowing parallel to each other in a northern direction from the Apennines to the Po, intersected the plain occupied by the French army; the Nura, the TREBBIA, and the Tidone. The bulk of the Republican forces were on the Nura; the divisions Victor, Dombrowsky, and Rusca, were in advance on the Trebbia, and received orders to cross it, in order to overwhelm the Austrian division stationed behind the Tidone. For this purpose, early on the morning of the 17th, they passed both the Trebbia and the Tidone, and assailed the Imperialists with such vigour and superiority of force, that they were speedily driven back in great disorder; but Suwar-

82.  
The two  
armies meet  
on the  
Trebbia.  
First and  
indecisive  
action there.

June 17.

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roff, aware, from the loud sound of the cannonade, of what was going forward, despatched Chastellar, with the advanced-guard of the main army, which speedily re-established affairs. By degrees, as their successive troops came up, the superiority passed to the side of the Allies; the Austrians rallied, and commenced a vigorous attack on the division of Victor, while the Russian infantry, under Bagrathion, supported the left of the Imperialists. Soon after, Dombrowsky, on the left, having brought up his Polish division, by a sudden charge captured eight pieces of cannon, and pushed forward to Caramel; but at this critical moment Suwarroff ordered a charge in flank by Prince Gortschakoff, with two regiments of Cossacks, and four battalions, while Ott attacked them in front. This movement proved decisive; the Poles were broken, and fled in disorder over the Tidone. Meanwhile the right of the Republicans, composed of Victor's division, withstood all the efforts of Bagrathion, and was advancing along the Po to gain possession of the bridge of St Giovanni, when the rout of Dombrowsky's division obliged them to retire. This retreat was conducted in good order, till the retiring columns were charged in flank by the Cossacks who had overthrown the Poles; in vain the French formed squares, and received the assailants with a rolling fire; they were broken, great part cut to pieces, and the remainder fled in disorder over the Trebbia. The Russians, in the heat of the pursuit, plunged like the Romans of old into that classic stream; but they were received with so destructive a fire of musketry and grape-shot from the batteries of the main body of the French on the other side, that they were forced to retire with great loss; and the hostile armies respectively bivouacked for the night on the same ground which had been occupied two thousand years before by the troops of Hannibal and the Roman legions.<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
354, 357.  
Dum. i. 195,  
197. Th. x.  
300, 301.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 53.

\* It is remarkable that the fate of Italy has thrice been decided on the same spot; once in the battle between the Romans and Carthaginians, again, in



During the night, Suwarroff brought up all his forces, and, encouraged by the success of the preceding day, made his dispositions for a general action. Judging, with great sagacity, that the principal object of Macdonald would be to maintain his ground on the mountains, by which his communication with Moreau was to be preserved, he directed towards his own right, which was to assail that quarter, his best infantry, consisting of the divisions Bagrathion and Schwiekowsky, under the orders of Prince Rosenberg. These troops received orders to pass the Trebbia, and advance by Settimo to St Giorgio, on the Nura, in order to interpose between the French left and the mountains. Melas commanded the centre, supported by a powerful reserve under Frœlich; while Ott, with a small corps, formed the left, and was established on the high-road to Placentia, rather to preserve the communication with its castle, than to take any active part in the engagement. The day was the anniversary of the battle of Kolin; and Suwarroff, to stimulate the ardour of the Austrians, gave for the watchword, "Theresa and Kolin," while the general instructions to the army were to combat in large masses, and as much as possible with the bayonet.<sup>1</sup>

Macdonald, who intended to have delayed the battle till the day following, had only the divisions Victor, Dombrowsky, and Rusca, with the brigade of Salm, in position on the Trebbia; those of Olivier and Montrichard could not arrive in line till noon. A furious action commenced at six o'clock, between the troops of Bagrathion and Victor's division, which formed the extreme left of

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83.

Suwarroff's  
judicious  
plan of  
attack.

June 18.

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 54. Jem.  
xi. 358, 359.  
Dum. i. 196,  
197. Th. x.  
302.

84.

Battle of the  
Trebbia, and  
success of  
the Russians  
on the se-  
cond day.

1746, in that between the Austrians and French, and in 1799, between the French and Russians. A similar coincidence will frequently again occur in the course of this work, particularly at Vitoria, Leipsic, Lutzen, Fleurus, and many others; a striking proof how permanent are the operation of the causes, under every variety of the military art, which conduct hostile nations, at remote periods from each other, to the same fields of battle.—See ARCHDUKE CHARLES, ii. 61. The author visited this field in 1818, along with his valued friend, Captain Basil Hall: the lapse of nearly two thousand years had altered none of the features described by the graphic pen of Livy.

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the French, and rested on the mountains. The French general, seeing he was to be attacked, crossed the Trebbia, and advanced against the enemy. A bloody conflict ensued on the ground intersected by the Torridella, till at length, towards evening, the steady valour of the Russians prevailed, and the Republicans were driven back with great slaughter over the Trebbia, followed by the Allies, who advanced as far as Settimo. On the French right, Salm's division, enveloped by superior forces, retreated with difficulty across the river. In the middle of the day, the divisions of Olivier and Montrichard arrived to support the centre; but though they gained at first a slight advantage, nothing decisive occurred, and at the approach of night, they retired at all points over the Trebbia, which again formed the line of separation between the hostile armies.<sup>1</sup>

85.  
Singular  
nocturnal  
combat on  
the second  
night.

Worn out with fatigue, the troops on both sides lay down round their watchfires, on the opposite shores of the Trebbia, which still, as in the days of Hannibal, flows in a gravelly bed, between banks of considerable height, clothed with stunted trees, brambles, and underwood.\* The corps of Rosenberg alone had crossed the stream, and reached Settimo, in the rear of the French lines; but, disquieted by its separation from the remainder of the army, and ignorant of the immense advantages of its position, it passed an anxious night, in square, with the cavalry bridled and the men sleeping on their guns, and before daybreak withdrew to the Russian side of the river. Towards midnight, three French battalions, misled by false reports, entered, in disorder, into the bed of the Trebbia, and opened a fire of musketry upon the Russian videttes, upon which the two armies immediately started to their arms;<sup>2</sup> the cavalry on both sides rushed into the river, the artillery played, without discrimination, on friends and foes, and the extraordinary spectacle was

<sup>2</sup> Personal  
observation.  
Jom. xi.  
362. Th.  
x. 304.

\* "Erat in medio rivus, præaltis utrimque clausus ripis, et circa obsitus palustribus herbis, et, quibus inculta ferme vestiuntur, virgultis vepribusque."  
—Livy, xxi. 54.

exhibited of a nocturnal combat by moonlight, carried on by hostile bodies up to the middle in water. At length the officers succeeded in putting an end to this useless butchery, and the rival armies, separated only by the stream, sank into sleep within a few yards of each other, amidst the dead and the dying.<sup>1</sup>

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The sun arose for the third time on this scene of slaughter; but no disposition appeared on either side to give up the contest. Suwarroff, reinforced by five battalions and six squadrons, which had come up from the other side of the Po, again strengthened his right, renewed to Rosenberg the orders to press vigorously on in that quarter, and directed Melas to be ready to support him with the reserve. Hours, even minutes, were of value; for the Russian general was aware that Moreau had left his position on the Apennines, and that the force opposed to him was totally inadequate to arrest his progress. In extreme anxiety, he was in momentary expectation of hearing the distant sound of his cannon in the rear of the army. Everything, therefore, depended on a vigorous prosecution of the advantages gained on the two preceding days, so as to render the co-operation of the Republican armies impossible. On the other hand, Macdonald, having now collected all his forces, and reckoning on the arrival of Moreau on the following day resolved to resume the offensive. His plan was to turn at once both flanks of the enemy; a hazardous operation at all times, unless conducted by a greatly superior army, by reason of the dispersion of force which it requires, but doubly so in the present instance, from the risk of one of his wings being driven into the Po. The battle was to be commenced by Dombrowsky moving in the direction of Niviano to out-flank the corps of Rosenberg, while Rusca and Victor attacked it in front; Olivier and Montrichard were charged with the task of forcing the passage of the river in the centre;<sup>1</sup> while the extreme right, composed of the brigade of Salm and the reserve of Watrin, were to drive

86.  
Prepara-  
tions of both  
parties for  
battle on the  
third day.

June 19.

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 55. Jom.  
xi. 563. Th.  
x. 303.

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back the Russian left by interposing between it and the river Po.

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87.

Desperate  
conflict on  
the Trebbia.

Such was the fatigue of the men on both sides, that they could not commence the action before ten o'clock. Suwarroff at that hour was beginning to put his troops in motion, when the French appeared in two lines on the opposite shore of the Trebbia, with the intervals between the columns filled with cavalry; and instantly the first line, exactly as the Romans had done, crossed the river with the water up to the soldiers' arm-pits,\* and advanced fiercely to the attack. Dombrowsky pushed on to Rivalta, and soon outflanked the Russian right; and Suwarroff, seeing the danger in that quarter, ordered the division Bagrathion to throw back its right in order to face the enemy, and, after a warm contest, that general succeeded in driving the Poles across the river. But that manœuvre having uncovered the flank of the division Schwiekowsky, it was speedily enveloped by Victor and Rusca, driven back to Casaleggio, and only owed its safety to the invincible firmness of the Russian infantry, who formed square, faced about on all sides, and by an incessant rolling fire maintained their ground till Bagrathion, after defeating the Poles, came up in the enemy's rear, and Chastellar brought up four battalions of the division of Forster to attack them in front. The Poles, entirely disconcerted by their repulse, remained inactive; and, after a murderous strife, the French were overwhelmed, and Victor and Rusca driven, with great loss, over the Trebbia.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
364, 365.  
Dum. i. 200,  
201. Th. x.  
304. Hard.  
vii. 256,  
257.

88.  
Decisive  
attack of  
Prince Lich-  
tenstein on  
the French  
centre.

In the centre, Olivier and Montrichard had crossed the river, and attacked the Austrians under Melas, with such vigour that they made themselves masters of some pieces of artillery, and threw the line into disorder. Already Montrichard was advancing against the division Forster, in the middle of the Russian line, when the Prince of

\* "Ut vero, refugientes Numidas [Romani] insequentes, aquam ingressi sunt (et erat *pectoribus tenuis*, aucta nocturno imbri); tum utique egressis rigere omnibus corpora."—LIVY, xxi. c. 54.

Lichtenstein, at the head of the reserve, composed of the flower of the Allied army, which at that moment was defiling towards the right to support Schwickowsky, suddenly fell upon their flank, already somewhat disordered by success, and threw them into confusion, which was soon increased into a defeat by the heavy fire of Forster on the other side. This circumstance decided the fate of the day. Forster was now so far relieved as to be able to succour Suwarroff on the right, while Melas was supported by the reserve, who had been ordered, in the first moment of alarm, in the same direction. Prince Lichtenstein now charged the division of Olivier with such fury, that it was forced to retire across the river. At the extreme left of the Allies, Watrin advanced, without meeting any resistance, along the Po; but he was ultimately obliged to retreat, to avoid being cut off and driven into the river by the victorious centre. Master of the whole left bank of the river, Suwarroff made several attempts to pass it; but he was constantly repulsed by the firmness of the French reserves, and night at length closed on this scene of carnage.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the terrible battle of the Trebbia, the most obstinately contested and bloody which had occurred since the commencement of the war, since, out of thirty-six thousand men in the field, the French, in the three days, had lost above twelve thousand in killed and wounded, and the Allies nearly as many. It shows how much more fierce and sanguinary the war was destined to become when the iron bands of Russia were brought into the field; and how little all the advantages of skill and experience avail, when opposed to the steady perseverance and heroic valour of northern states. But though the losses on both sides were nearly equal, the relative situation of the combatants was very different at the termination of the strife. The Allies were upon the whole successful, and soon expected great reinforcements from Hohenzollern and Kleinau, who had already occupied Parma and Modena,

<sup>1</sup> Dum. i.  
201, 202.  
Jom. xi. 367  
368. Th. x.  
305, 306.  
Hard. vii.  
257, 258.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 55.

89.  
Victory remains with the Russians. Excessive loss on both sides.

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
367, 368.  
Th. x. 306,  
307. Dum.  
i. 202, 203.

and would more than compensate their losses in the field; whereas the Republicans had exhausted their last reserves, were dejected by defeat, found themselves cut off from Moreau, and had no second army to fall back upon in their misfortunes. These considerations determined Macdonald; he decamped during the night, and retired over the Nura, directing his march with the view of re-entering the Apennines by the valley of the Taro.<sup>1</sup>

90.  
The disastrous retreat  
of the French  
over the  
Apennines.

Early on the following morning, a despatch was intercepted from the French general to Moreau, in which he represented the situation of his army as almost desperate, and gave information as to the line of his retreat. This information filled the Allied generals with joy, and made them resolve to pursue the enemy with the utmost vigour. For this purpose, all their divisions were instantly despatched in pursuit; Rosenberg, supported by Forster, moved rapidly towards the Nura, while Melas, with the divisions Ott and Frœlich, advanced to Placentia. Victor's division, which formed the rearguard on the Nura, was speedily assailed by superior forces both in front and flank, and, after a gallant resistance, broken, great part made prisoners, and the remainder dispersed over the mountains. Melas, on his side, quickly made himself master of Placentia, where the French wounded, five thousand in number, were taken prisoners, including the generals Olivier, Rusca, Salm, and Cambray; and had he not imprudently halted the division Frœlich at that town, the whole troops of Watrin would have fallen into his hands. Macdonald, on the following day, retired to Parma, from whence he dislodged Hohenzollern, and with infinite difficulty rallied the remains of his army behind the Larda, where they were reorganised in three divisions. The melancholy survey showed a chasm in his ranks of above fifteen thousand men since crossing the Apennines. At the same time Lapoype, defeated at Casteggio by a Russian detachment,<sup>2</sup> was driven from the high-road, and with great difficulty escaped by mountain paths into the neighbour-

June 21.

<sup>2</sup> Dum. i.  
205. Th. x.  
306. Jom.  
xi. 371, 373.

hood of Genoa. All the French wounded fell into the hands of the Allies; they made prisoners in all, during the battle and in the pursuit, four generals, five hundred and six officers, and twelve thousand seven hundred and seventy-eight private soldiers. The pursuit of Suwarroff was not continued beyond the Larda, in consequence of intelligence which there reached him of the progress of Moreau. Macdonald retired, therefore, unmolested to Modena and Bologna, where he repulsed General Ott, who made an attack on his army at Sassocolo, and regained the positions which he had occupied before the advance to the Trebbia.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
374, 375.  
Dum. i. 205.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 56.

In effect, the return of Suwarroff towards Tortona had become indispensable, and the dangerous situation of matters in his rear showed the magnitude of the peril from which, by his rapid and decided conduct, he had extricated his army. Moreau on the 16th debouched from the Apennines by Gavi, and moved in two columns towards Tortona, at the head of fourteen thousand men. He advanced, however, with such circumspection, that on the 18th he had not passed Novi and Seravalle; and on that day the fate of Macdonald's army was determined on the banks of the Trebbia. Bellegarde, unable with four brigades to arrest his progress, retired to a defensive position near Alessandria, leaving Tortona uncovered, the blockade of which was speedily raised by the French general. Immediately after, Moreau attacked Bellegarde with forces immensely superior, and defeated him, after a sharp action, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners and five pieces of cannon. The Austrians, in disorder, sought refuge behind the Bormida, intending to fall back under the cannon of Valence; and Moreau was advancing towards Placentia, when he was informed of the victory of Suwarroff and the fall of the citadel of Turin.<sup>2</sup>

91.  
Successful  
operations,  
during the  
battle, of  
Moreau  
against  
Bellegarde.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xi.  
379, 380.  
Dum. i. 204.  
Th. x. 307.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 57.

The vast military stores found by the Allies in the city of Turin had enabled them to complete their preparations for the siege of its citadel with great rapidity. A hundred

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92.  
Fall of the  
citadel of  
Turin.  
June 20.

pieces of heavy cannon speedily armed the trenches; forty mortars were shortly after added; the batteries were opened on the night of the 10th June, and on the 19th the second parallel was completed. Without intermission the besiegers from that time thundered on the walls from above two hundred pieces of artillery; and such was the effect of their fire, that the garrison capitulated within twenty-four hours after it commenced, on condition of being sent back to France. This conquest was of immense importance. Besides disengaging the besieging force of General Kaim, which instantly set out to reinforce Bellegarde, and rendering the Allies masters of one of the strongest fortresses in Piedmont, it put into their hands 618 pieces of cannon, 40,000 muskets, and 50,000 quintals of powder, with the loss of only fifty men.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> St-Cyr, i.  
220. *Jom.*  
xi. 380, 381.  
*Dum.* i. 206.

93.  
Moreau  
retreats on  
Suwarroff  
turning  
against  
him, and  
Macdonald  
regains  
Genoa, after  
a painful  
circuit.  
June 23.

No sooner was Suwarroff informed, upon the Larda, of the advance of Moreau and the defeat of Bellegarde, than, without losing an instant, he wheeled about, and marched with the utmost expedition to meet this new adversary. But Moreau fell back as rapidly as he approached, and after revictualling Tortona, retired by Novi and Gavi to his former defensive position on the Apennines. The Allies occupied Novi, and pushed their advanced posts far up the valleys into the mountains, while the blockade of Tortona was resumed; and the besieging force, which had been removed from the lines before Mantua, sat down again before that important fortress. Macdonald commenced a long and painful retreat over the Apennines into Tuscany and the Genoese territory; a perilous lateral operation at all times in presence of an enemy in possession of the plain of the Po, and doubly so after the recent disaster which had been experienced. Fortunately for the French, Suwarroff had received at this time positive orders from the Aulic Council, ever attached to methodical proceedings, to attempt no operation beyond the Apennines till the fortresses of Lombardy were reduced; in consequence of which he was compelled to



remain in a state of inactivity on the Orba, while his antagonist completed his hazardous movements. Macdonald arrived, leaving only a detachment on the Apennines near the sources of the Trebbia, at Genoa by Lerici, in the middle of July, in the most deplorable state—his artillery dismounted or broken down, the cavalry and caissons without horses, the soldiers half-naked, without shoes or linen of any sort, more like spectres than men. How different from the splendid troops which, three years before, had traversed the same country, in all the pomp of war, under the standards of Napoleon!<sup>1</sup>

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July 17.  
<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
381, 387,  
388. St-  
Cyr, i. 218.  
219. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 63.  
65, 67.

Mutual exhaustion, and the intervening ridge of the Apennines, now compelled a cessation of hostilities for above a month. Suwarroff collected forty-five thousand men in the plain between Tortona and Alessandria, to watch the Republicans on the mountains of Genoa, and cover the sieges of those places and of Mantua, which were now pressed with activity. The French, in deep dejection, commenced the reorganisation of their two armies into one; Macdonald was recalled, and yielded the command of the right wing to St-Cyr; Perignon was intrusted with the centre, and Lemoine, who brought up twelve fresh battalions from France, put at the head of the left. Montrichard and Lapoype were disgraced, and Moreau continued in the chief command. Notwithstanding all the reinforcements he had received, this skilful general was not able, with both armies united, to reckon on more than forty thousand men for operations in the field; the poor remains of above a hundred thousand that might have been assembled for that purpose at the opening of the campaign.<sup>2</sup>

94.  
Reorganisa-  
tion of both  
French  
armies  
under Mo-  
reau.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xi.  
388, 390.  
Dum. i. 220,  
223. St-Cyr,  
i. 220.

The remarkable analogy must strike the most inattentive observer, between the conduct of Suwarroff previous to the battle of the Trebbia, and that of Napoleon on the approach of Wurmser to succour Mantua. Imitating the vigour and activity of his great predecessor, the Russian general, though at the head of an army considerably

95.  
Reflections  
on Suwar-  
roff's admir-  
able conduct  
in the pre-  
ceding  
movements.

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inferior to that of his adversaries, was superior everywhere at the decisive point. The citadel of Turin, with its immense magazines, was captured by an army of only forty thousand men, in presence of two whose united force exceeded fifty thousand; for although Suwarroff ordered up great part of the garrison of Mantua to reinforce his army previous to the battle of the Trebbia, they were prevented from joining by an autograph order of the Emperor, who deemed the acquisition of that fortress of greater importance than any other consideration to the Austrian empire. The Russian general, therefore, had to contend not only with the armies of Macdonald and Moreau, but with the obstacles thrown in his way by the Imperial authorities; and when this is considered, his defeat of the Republicans, by rapidly interposing the bulk of his forces between them, and turning first on the one, and then on the other, must be regarded as one of the most splendid feats which the history of the war afforded.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xi.  
386. Hard.  
vii. 250,  
251.

96.  
Naval efforts  
of the Di-  
rectory to  
get back the  
army from  
Egypt,  
which come  
to nothing.

During these critical operations at the foot of the Appenines, the Directory had succeeded in assembling a great naval force in the Mediterranean. Already convinced by the disasters they had experienced, of the impolicy of the eccentric direction of so considerable a part of their force as had resulted from the expedition to Egypt, they exerted all their efforts to accomplish their return, or at least to open a communication with that far-famed, now isolated army. No sooner was intelligence received of the defeat of Jourdan at Stockach, than Bruix, minister of marine, repaired to Brest, where he urged, with the utmost diligence, the preparations for the sailing of the fleet. Such was the effect of his exertions, that, in the end of April, he was enabled to put to sea, with twenty-five ships of the line, at the time when Lord Bridport with the Channel fleet was blown off the coast. As soon as intelligence was received that

they had sailed, the English admiral steered for the southern coast of Ireland; while Bruix, directing his course straight to Cadiz, raised the blockade of that harbour, which Admiral Leith was maintaining with fifteen ships of the line, and passed the straits of Gibraltar. The entrance of the combined fleet into the Mediterranean seemed to announce decisive events, but nevertheless it came to nothing. The immense armament, amounting to fifty ships of the line, steered for the bay of Genoa, where it entered into communication with Moreau, and for a time powerfully supported the spirits of his army. But after remaining some weeks on the Italian coast, Bruix sailed for Cadiz, from whence he returned to Brest, which he reached in the middle of August, without either having fallen in with any of the English fleets, or achieved anything whatever, with one of the most powerful squadrons that ever left a European harbour.<sup>1</sup>

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Aug. 13.  
1 Jom. xi.  
394, 396.  
Ann. Reg.  
291.

The retreat of Macdonald was immediately followed by the recovery of his dominions by the King of Naples. The army of Cardinal Ruffo, which was soon swelled to twenty thousand men, advanced against Naples, and having speedily dispersed the feeble bands of the revolutionists who opposed his progress, took possession of that capital; and a combined force of English, Russians, and Neapolitans having a few days after entered the port, the Fort St Elmo was so vigorously besieged, that it was obliged to capitulate, the garrison returning to France, on condition of not again serving till exchanged. Capua was next attacked, and surrendered, by capitulation, to Commodore Troubridge; and this was followed, two days after, by the reduction of the important fortress of Gaeta, on the same terms, which completed the deliverance of the Neapolitan dominions. The French, who surrendered in the last-mentioned fortresses, gave up unconditionally to their indignant enemies the revolted Neapolitans who had taken a part in the late revolution. A special commission was immediately appointed, which, without much

97.  
Expulsion  
of the Re-  
publicans  
from Naples,  
and bloody  
revenge  
of the  
Royalists.  
June 20.

July 29.

July 31.

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formality, and still less humanity, condemned to death the greater part of those who had been engaged in the insurrection; and a dreadful series of executions, or rather massacres, took place, which but too clearly evinced the relentless spirit of Italian revenge. But the executions at Naples were of more moment, and peculiarly call for the attention of the British historian, because they have affixed the only stain that exists upon the character of the greatest naval hero of his country. The garrisons of the Castello Nuovo, and the Castello del Uovo, had capitulated to Cardinal Ruffo, who commanded the Neapolitan forces as vicar-general, on the 23d June, on the express condition that they themselves, and their families, should be protected, and that they should have liberty either to retire to Toulon, or remain in Naples, as they should feel inclined; but in this latter case they were to experience no molestation in their persons or property.\* This capitulation was subscribed by Cardinal Ruffo, as viceroy of the kingdom; by Kerandý, on the part of the Emperor of Russia; and by Captain Foote, on the part of the King of Great Britain; and the cardinal, in the name of the King, shortly after published a proclamation, in which he granted an entire amnesty to the republicans; guaranteeing to them perfect security if they remained at Naples, and a free navigation to Marseilles, if they preferred following the fortunes of the tricolor standard. In terms of this treaty, two vessels, containing the refugees from Castel-a-Mare, had already arrived safe at Marseilles.<sup>1</sup>

But these wise and humane measures were instantly

\* "1. The troops composing the garrisons shall keep possession of their forts until the vessels, which shall be spoken of hereafter, destined to convey such as are desirous of going to Toulon, are ready to sail. 2. The garrisons shall march out with the honours of war, each with five pieces of artillery. 3. *Persons and property, both movable and immovable, of every individual of the two garrisons shall be respected and guaranteed.* 4. All the said individuals shall have their choice of embarking on board of cartels, which shall be furnished them to go to Toulon, or of remaining at Naples, without being molested either in their persons or families." See the capitulation in *Nelson Despatches*, iii. 487.

<sup>1</sup> Nelson  
Desp. iii.  
487, 489.  
Bot. iii.  
401, 402.  
Ann. Reg.  
292.

interrupted by the arrival of the king and queen, with the court, on board of Nelson's fleet. They were animated by the strongest feelings of revenge against the republican party; and unfortunately the English admiral, who had fallen under the fascinating influence of Lady Hamilton, the celebrated wife of the British ambassador at the court of Naples, who shared in all the feelings of that court, was too much inclined to adopt the same principles. He instantly declared the capitulation null, which had not been carried into execution at that time, owing to the want of vessels to convey the persons in the forts to Marsilles. The ground assigned was, that it had been entered into by Cardinal Ruffo without sufficient authority, and that the king refused to ratify it. Soon after, entering the harbour at the head of his fleet, he made all those who had issued from the castles, in virtue of it, prisoners, and had them chained, two and two, on board his own fleet. The king, whose weakness could not endure the sight of the punishments which were preparing, returned to Sicily, and left the administration of justice in the hands of the queen and Lady Hamilton. Nelson was made aware, soon after his arrival on the evening of the 24th, that the capitulation had been signed by the Russian admiral and Captain Foote on the part of Great Britain; but he at once condemned the treaty as infamous, and intimated to the rebels they must surrender at discretion. Cardinal Ruffo strongly protested against this, and refused to be a party to the suspension of the capitulation. In this debate between Cardinal Ruffo and Nelson, Sir William and Lady Hamilton acted as interpreters. On the 26th Nelson took possession of the Castello del Uovo and the Castello Nuovo; and the prisoners, who had no means of resistance, suffered great hardships during their removal to the fleet in the roads. Some petitioned Nelson for mercy; others indignantly referred to the capitulation. But it was of no avail. Numbers were immediately condemned and

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98.

Violation of  
the capitula-  
tion by the  
Neapolitan  
court, and  
Nelson con-  
curs in  
these iniqui-  
tous pro-  
ceedings.  
Deplorable  
fate of  
Prince Car-  
raccioli.

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executed; the vengeance of the populace supplied what was wanting in the celerity of the criminal tribunals; neither age, nor sex, nor rank was spared; women as well as men, youths of sixteen, and grayheaded men of seventy, were alike led out to the scaffold, and children of twelve years of age sent into exile. The republicans behaved, in almost every instance, in their last moments, with heroic courage, and made men forget, in pity for their misfortunes, the ingratitude or treason of which they had previously been guilty. The fate of the Neapolitan admiral, Prince Francis Carraccioli, was particularly deplorable. He had been one of the principal leaders of the revolution, and after the capitulation of the castles had retired to the mountains, where he was betrayed by a domestic, and brought bound on board the British admiral's flag-ship. A naval court-martial was there immediately summoned, composed of Neapolitan officers, by whom he was condemned to death. In vain the old man entreated that he might be shot, and not die the death of a malefactor; his prayers were disregarded, and, after being strangled by the executioner, he was thrown from the vessel into the sea. Before night his body was seen erect in the waves from the middle upwards, as if he had risen from the deep to reproach the English hero with his unworthy fate.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Southey's  
Nelson, ii.  
47, 53. Bot.  
iii. 406, 407,  
414, 415.  
Nelson  
Desp. iii.  
495, 501.

99.  
Reflections  
on these un-  
pardonable  
atrocities.

For these acts of cruelty no sort of apology can or ought to be offered. Whether the capitulation should or should not have been granted, is a different and irrelevant question. Suffice it to say, that it had taken place, and that, in virtue of its provisions, the Allied powers had gained the command of the castles of Naples. To assert in such a case that the king had not ratified the capitulation, and that without such a sanction it was null, is a quibble, which, though frequently resorted to by the Continental powers, and sometimes by the French, is unworthy of a generous mind, and destitute of any support in the law of nations. Cardinal Ruffo, who concluded the capitulation,

was not merely the commander-in-chief of the royal Neapolitan forces, but the vicar-general of the king, and signed it as such. His powers unquestionably extended to concluding such a treaty, and the deed of the king has never been produced, restraining his powers *ab ante* in this particular. The capitulation, when Nelson arrived in the bay of Naples, had not been fully executed, but matters had arrived at that point that it could not be rescinded. The British line-of-battle ships lay alongside of the transports which were to convey away the prisoners, who were for the most part on board. The deserted fortresses were at their mercy. When Nelson intimated to them that the capitulation would not be observed, they had no alternative but submission, for their means of defence were at an end. The capitulation of the vanquished should ever be held sacred in civilised warfare—for this reason, if no other existed, that, by acceding to it, they have deprived themselves of all chance of resistance, and put the means of violating it with impunity into the hands of their adversaries: it then becomes a debt of honour which should be paid. The sovereign power which takes benefit from one side of a capitulation, by gaining possession of the fortress which the capitulants held, is unquestionably bound to perform the other part of the bilateral engagement, by whomsoever entered into, seeing it has, by that very act, so far from repudiating, homologated and acquiesced in it. If the Neapolitan authorities were resolutely determined to commit such a breach of public faith, the English admiral, if he had not sufficient influence to prevent it, should at least have taken no part in the iniquities which followed, nor stained the standard of England by judicial murders committed under its shadow. In every point of view, therefore, the conduct of Nelson in this tragic affair was inexcusable: his biographer may perhaps with justice ascribe it to the fatal ascendancy of female fascination; but the historian, who has the interests of humanity and the cause of justice to support, can admit of no such

<sup>1</sup> Southey, 47, 53. Bot. iii. 415, 416. Hard. vii. 332, 333. Nelson Desp. iii. 513, 517.

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100.  
And on the  
inferences  
to be drawn  
from the  
campaign.

palliation, and will best discharge his duty by imitating the conduct of his eloquent annalist, and with shame acknowledging the disgraceful deeds. \*

The events of this campaign demonstrate, in the most striking manner, the vast importance of assuming the offensive in mountain warfare; and how frequently a smaller force, skilfully led, may triumph over a greater in such a situation, by the simple expedient of turning its position by the lateral valleys, and appearing unexpectedly in its rear. The nature of the ground is singularly favourable to such an operation, by the concealment which lofty intervening ridges afford to the turning column, and the impossibility of escape to the one turned, shut in on both sides by difficult, perhaps impassable ridges, and suddenly assailed in rear when fully occupied in front. The brilliant successes of Lecourbe at Glarus and Martinsbruck, and of Hotze at Luciensteg, were both achieved, in opposition to superior forces, by the skilful application of this principle. Against such a danger, the intrenchments usually thrown up in the gorge or at the summit of mountain passes, afford but little protection;<sup>1</sup> for, open behind,

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
i. 95, 96.

\* It deserves to be recorded to the honour of Napoleon, that he endeavoured to palliate Nelson's share in these dark transactions, ascribing it to misinformation, and the fascinating ascendant of Lady Hamilton.—O'MEARA, i. 308.

Volumes have been written on the subject of Nelson's proceedings at Naples, but all the essential facts of the case will be found in the preceding narrative. Sir Nicholas Harris has attempted a laboured vindication in the appendix to the third volume of his valuable edition of the *Nelson Despatches*; but no zeal or ability can overcome the facts above stated. The substance of Nelson's defence is to be found in the following letter to Mr Stephens, which will be given in his own words: "Neither Cardinal Ruffo nor Captain Foote, nor any other person, had any power to enter into any treaty with the rebels: even the paper they signed was not acted upon. I happily arrived at Naples, and prevented such an infamous transaction from taking place: therefore, when the rebels surrendered, they came out of the castles as they ought, without any of the honours of war, and trusting to the judgment of their sovereign. I put aside, and sent them notice of it, the infamous treaty, and the rebels surrendered, as I have before said."—NELSON to ALEXANDER STEPHENS, Esq., Feb. 10, 1803; *Nelson Despatches*, iii. 520. This contains Nelson's whole vindication, and therefore has been given in his own words. But it is evidently insufficient to exculpate him for the following reasons:—1. In the first place, it does not appear that Nelson held any commission in the Neapolitan service; at least none such has ever been referred to or alleged to exist, though from his great influence and reputation he seems to have by common consent become vested



they are easily taken by the column which has penetrated into the rear by a circuitous route, and, destitute of cascades, they afford no sort of protection against a plunging fire from the heights on either side.

Nor did this memorable struggle evince in a less convincing manner the erroneous foundation on which the opinion then generally received rested, that the possession of the mountains insured that of the plains at their feet; and that the true key to the south of Germany and north of Italy was to be found in the Alps which were interposed between them. Of what avail was the successful irruption of Massena into the Grisons, after the disaster of Stockach brought back the Republicans to the Rhine; or the splendid stroke of Lecourbe in the Engadine, when the disaster of Magnano caused them to lose the line of the Adige? In tactics, or the lesser operations of strategy, the possession of mountain ridges is often of decisive importance, but in the great designs of extensive warfare it is seldom of any lasting value. He that has gained a height which commands a field of battle is often secure of the day; but the master of a ridge of

101.  
In strategy  
the possession  
of the  
valleys se-  
cures that  
of the  
mountains.

with the supreme direction of affairs. He had no right, therefore, to declare null, or infringe upon the treaty concluded in the king's name by his vicar-general or vicerent. 2. Cardinal Ruffo's powers as vicar-general beyond all question extended to concluding a capitulation with the rebels; a power inherent in a more general of the royal forces. 3. Though Nelson asserts that Cardinal Ruffo had no power to conclude such a capitulation, he does not allege that his powers as vicerent had been restrained by any express prohibition in this particular, which alone could have prevented him from concluding it legally. 4. If Nelson had the king's authority to refuse to sanction the capitulation, what he should have done was to have reinstated the rebels in the full possession of the forts, and drawn his own ships out of the range of shot, and given them full time for their preparation before hostilities were renewed, as Schwartzberg offered to St-Cyr's men, when he refused to sanction the capitulation of Dresden in November 1813.—*Infra*, Chap. LXXXII § 36. Even if such an offer had been made, it is more than doubtful whether it would have justified a breach of the capitulation; for it is impossible to restore a garrison which has surrendered to the *statu quo* before the surrender, for their minds are depressed, and their destitution has become known to the besiegers. But even such an illusory offer as this was not made; the garrison were simply told they must surrender at discretion, a demand which, as their defence was abandoned, and commanded by the British, they could not resist.—*Nelson Despatches*, iii. 520.

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lofty mountains is by no means equally safe against the efforts of an adversary, who, by having acquired possession of the entrance of all the valleys leading from thence into the plain, is enabled to cut him off both from his communications and his resources. Water descends from the higher ground to the lower; but the strength and sinews of war in general follow an opposite course, and ascend from the riches and the fortresses of the plain to the sterility and desolation of the mountains. It is in the valley of the Danube and the plain of Lombardy that the struggle between France and Austria ever has been and ever will be determined; the lofty ridges of Switzerland and the Tyrol, important as an accessory to secure the flanks of either army, are far from being the decisive point.

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
i. 53, 54.

102.  
Selfish desires which  
at this  
period paralysed all the  
operations  
of the Allies.

Although the campaign had lasted so short a time, it was already apparent how much the views of the Austrian cabinet were hampered by the possession of Venice, and how completely the spoliation of that republic had thrown the apple of discord between the Allied powers. The principle laid down by the Emperor Paul, of restoring to every one what he had lost—though the true foundation for the anti-revolutionary alliance, which had been eloquently supported by Mr Burke, and afterwards became the basis of the great confederacy which brought the war to a successful issue—gave the utmost uneasiness to the cabinet of Vienna. They were terrified at the very rapidity of the Russian conqueror's success, and endeavoured, by every means in their power, to moderate his disinterested fervour, and render his surprising success the means only of securing their great acquisitions in the north of Italy. Hence the jealousies, heartburnings, and divisions which destroyed the cordial co-operation of the Allied troops, which led to the fatal separation of the Russian from the Austrian forces both in Italy and Switzerland, and ultimately brought about all the disasters of the campaign. Had the hands of Austria been

clean, she might have invaded France by the defenceless frontier of the Jura, and brought the contest to a glorious issue in 1799, while Napoleon was as yet an exile on the banks of the Nile. Twice did the European powers lose the opportunity of crushing the forces of the Revolution, and on both occasions from their governments having imitated its guilt; first by the withdrawal of Prussia in 1794, to secure her share in the partition of Poland, and next from the anxiety of Austria, in 1799, to retain her unjust acquisitions in Italy. England alone remained throughout unsullied by crime, unfettered by the consciousness of robbery; and she alone continued to the end unsubdued in arms. It is not by adopting the iniquities of a hostile power, but by steadfastly shunning them, that ultimate success is to be obtained; the gains of iniquity to nations, not less than individuals, are generally more than compensated by its pains; and the only true foundation for durable prosperity is to be found in that strenuous but upright course, which resists equally the seduction and the violence of wickedness.

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## CHAPTER XXVIII.

## CAMPAIGN OF 1799—PART II.

FROM THE BATTLE OF THE TREBBIA TO THE CONCLUSION OF  
THE CAMPAIGN.CHAP.  
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1.

Dangerous  
position of  
the Repub-  
lic at this  
juncture.

SINCE the period when the white flag waved at Saumur, and the tricolor was displaced at Lyons and Toulon, the Republic had never been in such danger as after the first pause in the campaign of 1799. It was, in truth, within a hairbreadth of destruction. If the Allied forces in 1793 were nearer her frontier, and the interior was torn by more vehement dissensions, on the other hand the attacking powers in 1799 were incomparably more formidable, and the armies they brought into the field greatly superior both in military prowess and moral vigour. The war no longer languished in affairs of posts or indecisive actions, leading to retreat on the first reverse. A hundred thousand men no longer fought with the loss of three or four thousand to the victors, and as many to the vanquished. The passions had been roused on both sides, and battles were not lost or won without a desperate effusion of human blood. The military ardour of the Austrians, slow of growth, but tenacious of purpose, was now thoroughly awakened, from the reverses the monarchy had undergone, and the imminent perils to which it had been exposed; the steady valour of the Russians had been roused to the highest pitch by the ardent genius and enthusiastic courage of

Suwarroff; and Great Britain, taught by past misfortunes, was preparing to abandon the vacillating system of her former warfare, and put forth her strength in a manner worthy of her present greatness and ancient renown. From the bay of Genoa to the mouth of the Rhine, nearly three hundred thousand veteran troops were advancing against the Republic, flushed by victory, and conducted by consummate military talent; while the Revolution had destroyed the capacity which directed, as well as wore out the energy which sustained its fortunes. The master-spirit of Carnot had ceased to guide the movements of the French armies; the genius of Napoleon languished on the sands of Egypt; the boundless enthusiasm of 1793 had exhausted itself; the resources of the assignats were at an end; the terrible Committee of Public Salvation no longer was at the helm to wrench out of public suffering the means of victory. An exhausted nation and a dispirited army had to withstand the weight of Austria and the vigour of Russia, guided by the science of the Archduke Charles and the energy of Suwarroff.

Though the war had lasted for so short a time since its recommencement, the consumption of human life had already been prodigious; the contending parties fought with unprecedented exasperation, and the results gained had outstripped the calculations of the most enthusiastic speculators. In little more than four months, the French and Allied armies had lost nearly a half of their effective force—those cut off or irrecoverably mutilated by the sword being above one hundred and sixteen thousand;<sup>1</sup> while the means of supplying these vast chasms were much more ample on the part of the Allied monarchs than of the French Directory. Never in ancient or modern times had such immense armies contended on so extensive a field. The right of the Allies rested on the Maine; their centre was posted in Switzerland; while their left stretched over the plain of Lombardy to the foot

2.  
Enormous  
consump-  
tion of hu-  
man life  
since the  
opening of  
the cam-  
paign.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. i.  
434.

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of the Appenines; and a shock was felt all along this vast line, from the rocks of Genoa to the marshes of Holland. The results hitherto had been, to an unprecedented degree, disastrous to the French. From being universally victorious, they had everywhere become unfortunate; at the point of the bayonet they had been driven back, both in Germany and Italy, to the frontiers of the Republic; the conquests of Napoleon had been lost as rapidly as they had been won; and the power which recently threatened Vienna, now trembled lest the Imperial standards should appear on the summits of the Jura, or the banks of the Rhone.

3.  
Clear proof  
thus afford-  
ed of the  
error of  
attacking  
Switzerland  
and Italy.

It was now apparent what a capital error the Directory had committed in overrunning Switzerland; in extending their forces through the Italian peninsula, instead of concentrating them to bear the weight of Austria on the Adige; and in exiling their best army and greatest general to Africa, at the very time when the Allies were summoning to their aid the forces of a new monarchy, and the genius of a hitherto invincible conqueror. But these errors had been committed; their consequences had fallen like a thunderbolt on France; the return of Napoleon and his army seemed impossible; Italy was lost; and nothing but the invincible tenacity and singular talents of Massena enabled him to maintain himself in the last defensive line to the north of the Alps, and avert invasion from France in the quarter where its frontier is most vulnerable. To complete its misfortunes, internal dissension had paralysed the Republic at the very time when foreign dangers were most pressing, and a new government added to its declining fortunes the weakness incident to every infant administration.

4.  
Military  
preparations  
of the Allies.

The preparations of the Allies to follow up this extraordinary flow of prosperity were of the most formidable kind. The forces in Italy amounted to one hundred and fifteen thousand men; and after deducting the troops required for the sieges of Mantua, Alessandria, and other

fortresses in the rear, Suwarroff could still collect above fifty thousand men to press on the dispirited army of Moreau in the Ligurian Alps, which could not muster twenty thousand soldiers round its banner. This army was destined to clear the Maritime Alps and Savoy of the enemy, and turn the position of Massena, who still maintained himself with invincible obstinacy on the banks of the Limmatt. The Archduke had not under his immediate orders at that period above forty-three thousand men, twenty-two thousand having been left in the Black Forest, to mask the garrisons in the *têtes-de-pont* which the French possessed on the Upper Rhine, and sixteen thousand in the Grisons and the central Alps, to keep possession of the important ridge of the St Gothard. But a fresh Russian army of twenty-six thousand men was approaching under Korsakoff, and was expected in the environs of Zurich by the middle of August; and something was hoped from the insurrection of the Swiss who had been liberated from the French armies.<sup>1</sup>

To meet these formidable forces, the French, who had directed all the new levies to the north of Switzerland, as the point most menaced, had seventy-five thousand men, under Massena, on the Limmatt, and the utmost efforts were made in the interior to augment to the greatest degree this important army. The English and Russians had also combined a plan for the descent of above forty thousand men on the coast of Holland; for which purpose seventeen thousand men were to be furnished by his Imperial Majesty, and twenty-five thousand men by Great Britain. This force, it was hoped, would not only liberate Holland, but paralyse all the north of France, as General Brune had only fifteen thousand French troops in the United Provinces, and the native soldiers did not exceed twenty thousand. Thus, while the centre of the French was threatened with an attack from overwhelming forces in the Alps, and an inroad was preparing, by the defenceless frontier of the Jura, into the heart of their territory,<sup>2</sup> their

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<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 2, 92.  
Dum. i. 223,  
225. Jom.  
xii. 60, 72.

5.  
And of the  
Republi-  
cans.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xii.  
60, 178, 182.  
Ann. Reg.  
301. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 2, 92.

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left was menaced by a more formidable invasion from the northern powers than they had yet experienced, and their right with difficulty maintained itself with inferior forces on the inhospitable summits of the Maritime Alps.

6.  
Objects of  
the contend-  
ing generals.

But although the plan of the Allies was so extensive, the decisive point lay in the centre of the line; and it was by the Archduke that the vital blow was to be struck, which would at once have opened to them an entrance into the heart of France. This able commander impatiently awaited the arrival of the Russians under Korsakoff, which would have conferred a superiority of thirty thousand men over his opponent, and enabled him to resume the offensive with an overwhelming advantage. The object of Massena, of course, was to strike a blow before this great reinforcement arrived; as, though his army was rapidly augmenting by conscripts from the interior, he had no such sudden increase to expect as awaited the Imperial forces. It was equally indispensable for the Republicans to resume the offensive without any delay in Italy, as the important fortresses of Mantua and Alessandria were now hard pressed by the Allies, and, if not speedily relieved, must not only, by their fall, give them the entire command of the plain of Lombardy, but enable them to render the position of Massena untenable to the north of the Alps.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 79, 86.  
Dum. i. 226.

7.  
Great levy  
of troops by  
the Direc-  
tory.

To meet these accumulating dangers, the French government exhibited an energy commensurate to the crisis in which they were placed. The imminence of the peril induced them to reveal it without disguise to both branches of the legislature. General Jourdan proposed to call out at once all classes of the conscripts, which, it was expected, would produce an increase of two hundred thousand men to the armies, and to levy a forced loan of 120,000,000 francs, or £4,800,000, on the opulent classes, secured on the national domains. Both motions were at once agreed to by the Councils. To render them as soon as possible available, the conscripts were ordered to be formed into



regiments, and drilled in their several departments, and marched off, the moment they were disposable, to the nearest army on the frontier; while the service of Lille, Strassburg, and the other fortresses, was, in great part, intrusted to the national guards of the vicinity. Thus, with the recurrence of similar circumstances in the affairs of the Republic, the revolutionary measures which had already been found so efficacious were again put in activity. Bernadotte, who at this crisis was appointed minister at war, rapidly infused into all the departments of the military service his own energy and resolution; and we have the best of all authorities—that of his political antagonist, Napoleon himself—for the assertion, that it was to the admirable measures which he set on foot, and the conscripts whom he assembled round the Imperial standards, that not only the victory of Zurich, at the close of the campaign, but the subsequent triumph of Marengo, were in a great degree owing.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Nap. in  
Las Cases,  
ii. 241. Goh.  
i. 90. Jom.  
xii. 18, 20.  
Th. x. 336,  
337.

In order to counteract as far as possible the designs of the Allies, it was resolved to augment to thirty thousand men the forces placed on the summit of the Alps, from the St Bernard to the Mediterranean; while the army of Italy, debouching from the Appenines, should resume the offensive, in order to prevent the siege of Coni, and raise those of Mantua and Alessandria; and Massena should execute a powerful diversion on the Limmat ere the arrival of the Russians under Korsakoff. For this purpose all the conscripts in the eastern and southern departments were rapidly marched off to the armies at Zurich and on the Alps; and the fortresses of Grenoble, Briançon, and Fenestrelles, commanding the principal entrances from Piedmont into France, were armed and provisioned. At the same time the direction of the troops on the frontier was changed. Championnet, liberated from confinement, was intrusted with the command of the army of the Alps; while that of the army of Italy was taken from Moreau, under whom, notwithstanding his great

8.  
Their mea-  
sures to re-  
inforce the  
armies.

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
25, 26. St  
Cyr, i. 221,  
222.

abilities, it had experienced nothing but disaster, and given to Joubert—a youthful hero, who joined heroic valour to great natural abilities, and who, though as yet untried in the separate command of large armies, had evinced such talents in subordinate situations as gave the promise of great future renown. He was cut off in the very outset of his career, in high command, on the field of Novi.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>9.</sup>  
The Aulic  
Council in-  
judiciously  
restrain  
Suarroff  
from active  
operations.

Suarroff, who was well aware of the inestimable importance of time in war, was devoured with anxiety to commence operations against the army of Moreau in the Ligurian Alps, now not more than twenty thousand strong, before it had recovered from its consternation, or was strengthened by the arrival of Macdonald's forces, which were making a painful circuit by Florence and Pisa in its rear. But the Aulic Council, who looked more to the immediate concerns of Austria than the general interest of the common cause, and were invincibly attached to a slow and methodical system of war, insisted upon Mantua being put into their hands before anything was attempted either against Switzerland, Genoa, or the Maritime Alps; and the Emperor again wrote to Suwarroff positively forbidding any enterprise until that important fortress had surrendered. The impetuous marshal, unable to conceal his vexation, and fully aware of the disastrous effects this resolution would have upon the general fate of the campaign, exclaimed, "Thus it is that armies are ruined!" Nevertheless, like a good soldier, obeying the orders, he despatched considerable reinforcements and a powerful train of artillery by the Po, to aid the siege of Mantua, and assembled at Turin the stores necessary for the reduction of Alessandria. Disgusted, however, with the subordinate part thus assigned to him, the Russian general abandoned to General Ott the duty of harassing the retreat of the army of Naples, and encamped with his veterans on the Bormida, to await the tedious operations of the besieging forces.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Chastel-  
lar's Me-  
moires, 137.  
Jom. xii. 27,  
28. Hard.  
vii. 250,  
251. La-  
verne, Mém.  
de Souva-  
roff, 268,  
274.

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10.

Leds to an  
agreement  
for a disas-  
trous separa-  
tion of the  
Russian and  
Austrian  
forces.

This circumstance contributed to induce an event, attended ultimately with important effects on the fate of the campaign—viz., the separation of the Austrian and Russian forces, and the rupture of all cordial concert between their respective governments. The cabinet of Vienna was too desirous of the exclusive sovereignty of the conquests in Italy, to be willing to share their possession with a powerful rival; while the pride of the Russians was hurt at beholding their unconquered commander, whom they justly regarded as the soul of the confederacy, subjected to the orders of the Aulic Council, who could not appreciate his energetic mode of conducting war, and frequently interrupted him in the midst of his career of conquest. At the same time, the English government were desirous of allowing the Russian forces to act alone in Switzerland, aided by the insurrection which they hoped to organise in that country, and beheld with satisfaction the removal of the Muscovite standards from the shores of the Mediterranean, where their establishment in a permanent manner might possibly have occasioned them some uneasiness, and where they saw no cordial co-operation with the Austrians was to be expected. These feelings on all sides led to an agreement between the Allied powers, in virtue of which it was stipulated, that the whole Russian troops, after the fall of Alessandria and Mantua, should be concentrated in Switzerland under Marshal Suwarroff; that the Imperialists should alone prosecute the war in Italy, and that the army of the Archduke Charles should act under his separate orders on the Upper Rhine. This plan was of itself highly advisable, as it tended to remove the jealousies consequent on the troops of different nations acting together; but, from the time at which it was carried into execution, and the immediate dislocation of force with which it was attended, it led to the most calamitous results. The whole forces of the Republic at this period, actually on foot, did not exceed two hundred and twenty thousand

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<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 83, 84.

11.  
Resumption  
of hostilities  
by the Im-  
perialists  
around  
Genoa.  
Progress of  
the siege of  
Mantua.

July 29.

combatants; and although the new conscription was pressed with the utmost vigour, it could not be expected that it would add materially to the efficiency of the defending armies for several months, in the course of which, to all appearance, their fate would be decided.<sup>1</sup>

The arrival of the army of Naples at Genoa in the end of July having raised the French force to forty-eight thousand men, including three thousand cavalry and a powerful artillery, it was deemed indispensable on every account to resume offensive operations, in conjunction with the army of the Alps, which had now been augmented to a respectable amount. Everything, accordingly, was put in motion in the valleys of the Alps and Appenines; and the French army, whose headquarters were at Cornegliano, occupied at Voltri, Savona, Vado, and Loano, nearly the same position which Napoleon held previous to his memorable descent into Italy in March 1796. But it was too late: all the activity of Moreau and Joubert could not prevent the fall of the bulwarks of Lombardy and Piedmont. The siege of Mantua, which had been blockaded ever since the battle of Magnano, was pressed in good earnest by General Kray after the victory of the Trebbia. The capture of Turin having placed at the disposal of the Allies immense resources, both in artillery and ammunition, and the defeat of Macdonald having relieved them from all anxiety as to the raising of the siege, thirty thousand men were soon collected round its walls, and the batteries of the besiegers armed with two hundred pieces of cannon. The garrison originally consisted of nearly eleven thousand men; but this force, barely adequate at first to man its extensive ramparts, was now considerably weakened by disease. The peculiar situation of this celebrated fortress rendered it indispensable that, at all hazards, the exterior works should be maintained, and this was no easy matter with an insufficient body of troops. The soldiers were provisioned for a year; but the inhabitants, thrice impover-

ished by enormous contributions, were in the most miserable condition; and the famine with which they were menaced, joined to the natural unhealthiness of the situation during the autumnal months, soon produced those contagious disorders ever in the rear of protracted war, which, in spite of every precaution, seriously weakened the strength of the garrison.

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. i.  
256, 258,  
260. Jour.  
xii, 29, 35.  
St Cyr, i.  
222.

Mantua, situated in the middle of a lake formed by the Mincio in the course of its passage from the Alps to the Po, depends entirely for its security upon its external works, and the command of the waters which surround its walls. Two chaussées traverse the whole extent of the lake on bridges of stone: the first leads to the citadel, the second to the faubourg St George. Connected with the citadel are the external works and intrenched camp, which surround the lake, and prevent all access to its margin. These works, with the exception of the citadel, are not of any considerable strength; the real defence of Mantua consists in the command which the garrison has of the waters in the lake, which is formed by three locks. That of the citadel enables them at pleasure to augment the upper lake; that of Pradella gives them the command of the entrance of its waters into the Pajolo; while that of the port Gêrèse puts it in their power to dam up the canal of Pajolo, and let it flow into inundations to obstruct the approach to the place. But, on the other hand, the besiegers have the means of augmenting or diminishing the supply of water to the lake itself, by draining off the river which feeds it above the town; and the dykes which lead to Pradella are of such breadth as to permit trenches to be cut and approaches made along them. Upon the whole, an exaggerated idea had been formed both of the value and strength of Mantua, by the importance which it had assumed in the campaign of 1796, and the result of the present siege revealed the secret of its real weakness.<sup>2</sup>

12.  
Description  
of that for-  
tress.

<sup>2</sup> Personal  
observa-  
tion. Jour.  
xii, 34, 35.  
Dum. i. 262.

Kray, taking advantage with ability of all the means

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13.

Commence-  
ment of the  
siege by  
Kray, and  
surrender of  
the place.

July 14.

July 24.

July 30.

at his disposal, had caused his flotilla to descend by Peschiera and Goito from the lake of Garda, and brought up many gunboats by the inferior part of the Mincio into the lower lake. By means of these vessels, which were armed with cannon of the heaviest calibre, he kept up an incessant fire on the dykes, and at the same time established batteries against the curtain between the citadel and fort St George. These were intended merely as feints, to divert the attention of the besiegers from the real point of attack, which was the front of fort Pradella. On the night of the 14th July, while the garrison were reposing, after having celebrated by extraordinary rejoicings the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille, the trenches were opened, and after the approaches had been continued for some days, the tower of Gêrèse was carried by assault, and the besiegers' guns rapidly brought close up to the outworks of the place. On the night of the 24th, all the batteries of the besiegers being fully armed, they opened their fire, from above two hundred pieces, with such tremendous effect, that the defences of the fortress speedily gave way before it. In less than two hours the outworks of fort Pradella were destroyed; while the guns intended to create a diversion against the citadel soon produced a serious impression. Nothing could stand against the vigour and sustained weight of the Allied fire; their discharges gradually rose from six thousand cannon-shot to twelve thousand in twenty-four hours, and the loss of the garrison from its effects was from five to six hundred a-day. Under the pressure arising from so terrible an attack, the fort of St George and the battery of Pajolo were successively abandoned; and at length the garrison, reduced to seven thousand five hundred men, surrendered, on condition of being sent back to France, and not serving again until regularly exchanged. Hardly were the terms agreed to, when the upper lake flowed with such violence into the under, through an aperture which the governor had cut to let in the waters, that sixty

feet of the dyke were carried away, and the inundation of Pajolo deepened to such a degree that it might have prolonged for at least eight days his means of defence, and possibly, by preventing the besieging force taking a part in the battle of Novi, which shortly followed, altered the fate of the campaign.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.

37, 47.

Dum. i. 262,

272.

While the bulwark of Lombardy was thus falling, after an unexpectedly short resistance, into the hands of the Imperialists, Count Bellegarde was not less successful against the citadel of Alessandria. Trenches were opened on the 8th July; in a few days, eighty pieces of cannon were placed in battery; and such was the activity with which they were served, that in seven days they discharged no less than forty-two thousand projectiles. On the 21st, the garrison, consisting of sixteen hundred men, surrendered at discretion. This conquest was of great importance to the future projects of Suwarroff; but it was dearly purchased by the loss of General Chastellar, his chief of the staff, who was severely wounded soon after the first trenches were opened—an officer whose talents and activity had, in a great degree, contributed to the success of the campaign. After the fall of Alessandria and Mantua, Suwarroff, faithful to the orders he had received from Vienna, to leave no fortified place in the enemy's hands in his rear, commenced the siege of Tortona. His army was soon augmented by the arrival of General Kray, with twenty thousand men, from the siege of Mantua, who entered into line on the 12th August. The trenches were opened before Tortona on the 5th August, and on the 7th, the castle of Serravalle, situated at the entrance of one of the valleys leading into the Appenines, was taken after a short cannonade. But the French army, which was now concentrated under Joubert on the Appenines, was preparing an offensive movement, and the approaches to Genoa were destined to be the theatre of one of the most bloody battles which had yet occurred in modern times.<sup>2</sup>

14.

Fallof Alessandria, and commencement of the siege of Tortona. July 8.

July 21.

Aug. 2.

Aug. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xii.

48, 54, 96.

Arch. Ch.

ii. 70, 71.

Dum. i. 254,

255, 317.

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15.

Position of  
the Republic-  
ans in front  
of Genoa.

The Republicans at this epoch occupied the following positions. The right wing, fifteen thousand strong, under St-Cyr, guarded the passes of the Appenines from Portremoli to Torriglia, and furnished the garrison of Genoa. The centre, consisting of ten thousand, held the important posts of the Bochetta and Campo Freddo at the summit of the mountains; while the left, twenty-two thousand strong, was encamped on the reverse of the range, on the side of Piédmont, from the upper end of the valley of the Tauaro—and both guarded the communications of the whole army with France, and kept up the connexion with the corps under Championnet, which was beginning to collect on the higher passes of the Alps. On the other hand, the Allies could only muster forty-five thousand men in front of Tortona: General Kaim, with twelve thousand, being at Chierasco to observe the army of the Alps; Klenau in Tuscany, with seven thousand combatants; and the remainder of their great army occupied in keeping up the communications between their widely scattered forces.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 71. Journ.  
xii. 96, 97.  
St-Cyr, i.  
221, 222.

16.  
Magnani-  
mous con-  
duct of  
Moreau on  
Joubert's  
assuming  
the com-  
mand.

The arrival of Joubert, to supersede him in the command of his army, had no tendency to excite feelings of jealousy in the mind of his great predecessor. Moreau was incapable of a personal feeling when the interest of his country was at stake; and with a magnanimity truly worthy of admiration, he not only gave his youthful successor the full benefit of his matured counsel and experience, but offered to accompany him for some days after he opened his campaign; contributing thus, by his advice, to the glory of a rival who had just supplanted him in the command. Joubert, on his side, not only profited by the assistance thus generously proffered, but deferred on every occasion to the advice of his illustrious friend; and to the good understanding between these great men the preservation of the Republican forces, after the defeat at Novi and the death of Joubert, is mainly to be ascribed.<sup>2</sup> How different from the presumption of

<sup>2</sup> Journ. xii.  
97. Dum. i.  
319, 320.  
St-Cyr, i.  
222.



Lafeuillade, who, a century before, had caused the ruin of a French army near the same spot, by neglecting the advice of Marshal Vauban before the walls of Turin !

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On the 9th of August, the French army commenced its forward movement; and, after debouching by the valleys of the Bormida, the Erro, and the Orba, assembled on the 13th at Novi, and blockaded Serravalle, in the rear of their right wing. A fourth column, under the orders of St-Cyr, destined to raise the siege of Tortona, descended the defiles of the Bochetta. Suwarroff no sooner heard of this advance than he concentrated his army, which, on the evening of the 14th, occupied the following positions : Aug. 14.

Kray, with the divisions of Bellegarde and Ott, was encamped in two lines on the right, near the road from Novi to Bosco; the centre, consisting of the divisions of Forster and Schwickowsky, commanded by Derfelden, bivouacked in rear of Pozzolo-Formigaro; while Melas, with the left, consisting of the Austrian divisions of Frœlich and Lichtenstein, occupied Rivalta. The army of Joubert was grouped on the plateau in the rear of Novi, with his right on the Scrivia, his centre at Novi, and his left at Basaluzzo—a position which enabled him to cover the march of the columns detached from his right, which were destined to advance by Cassano to effect the deliverance of Tortona. The French occupied a semicircle on the northern slopes of the Monte Rotondo; the left, composed of the divisions Grouchy and Lemoine, under the command of Perignon, extended itself, in a circular form, around Pasturana; in the centre, the division Laboissière, under St-Cyr, covered the heights to the right and left of Novi; while the division Watrin, on the right, guarded the approaches to the Monte Rotondo from the side of Tortona, and Dombrowsky, with the Polish division, blockaded Serravalle.<sup>1</sup> The position was strong, and the concentrated masses of the Republicans presented a formidable front among the woods, ravines, slopes, and vine-

17.  
Advance of  
the French  
to raise the  
siege of Tor-  
tona. Posi-  
tions of the  
Allies and  
French.

<sup>1</sup> Personal  
observa-  
tion. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 71,  
72. Jom.  
xii. 98, 103.  
Dum. i. 321,  
322. Th. x.  
349, 350.  
St-Cyr, i.  
227, 234.

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yards with which the foot of the Apennines was broken. On the side of the French, forty-three thousand men were assembled; while the forces of the Allies were above fifty-five thousand—a superiority which made the first desirous of engaging upon the rugged ground at the foot of the hills, and the latter anxious to draw their opponent into the plain, where their great superiority in cavalry might give them a decisive advantage.

18.  
Joubert re-  
solves to re-  
treat on  
learning  
the fall of  
Mantua.

Joubert, who had given no credit to the rumours which had reached the army of the fall of Mantua, and continually disbelieved the asseverations of St-Cyr, that he would have the whole Allied army on his hands, received a painful confirmation of its truth, by beholding the dense masses of Kray encamped opposite to his left wing. He was thrown by this unexpected discovery into the utmost perplexity. To engage with so great an inferiority of force was the height of temerity, while retreat was difficult in presence of so enterprising an enemy. In these circumstances, he resolved, late on the night of the 14th—after such irresolution as throws great doubts on his capacity as general-in-chief, whatever his talents as second in command may have been—on retiring into the fastnesses of the Appenines; and he was only waiting for the arrival of his scouts in the morning, to give the necessary orders for carrying it into effect, when the commencement of the attack by the Allies compelled him to accept battle in the position which he occupied. Suwarroff's order of battle at Novi was highly characteristic of that singular warrior. It was simply this: "Kray and Bellegarde will attack the left, the Russians the centre, Melas the right." To the soldiers he said, "God wills, the Emperor orders, Suwarroff commands, that to-morrow the enemy be conquered." Dressed in his usual costume, in his shirt down to the waist, he was on horseback at the advanced posts the whole preceding evening, attended by a few horsemen, minutely reconnoitring the Republican position.<sup>1</sup> He was recognised from the French lines

<sup>1</sup> Hard. vii.  
271. St-Cyr,  
i. 236, 237.  
Jom. xii.  
103.

by the singularity of his dress, and a skirmish of advanced posts in consequence took place.

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19.

He is attacked before doing so by Suwarroff. Death of Joubert. Aug. 15.

Suwarroff's design was to force back the left of the French, by means of the corps of Kray, while Bagrathion had orders to turn their right, and unite in their rear, under cover of the cannon of Serravalle, with that corps. At the same time, Derfelden was to attack Novi in the centre, and Melas commanded the reserve, ready to support any part of the army which required his aid. In pursuance of these orders, Kray commenced the attack at five in the morning; Bellegarde assailed Grouchy, and Ott Lemoine. The Republicans were at first taken by surprise; and their masses, in great part in the act of marching, or entangled in the vineyards, received the fire of the Austrians without being able either to deploy or answer it. Notwithstanding the heroic resistance of some brigades, the Imperialists sensibly gained ground, and the heads of their columns were already mounting the plateau on which Novi stands, when Joubert hurried in person to the spot, and when in the act of waving his hat, giving the word, "Forward, let us throw ourselves among the tirailleurs!" received a ball in his breast. He instantly fell, and with his last breath exclaimed, "Advance, my friends, advance!"<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
105, 107.  
Dum. i. 323.  
Th. x. 351.  
St-Cyr, i.  
245, 246.

The confusion occasioned by this circumstance would have proved fatal, in all probability, to the French army, had the other corps of the Allies been so far advanced as to take advantage of it. But, by a strange fatality, though their attacks were all combined and concentric, they were calculated to take place at different times: and while this important advantage was gained on their left, the Russians in the centre were still resting at Pozzolo-Formigaro, and Melas had merely despatched a detachment from Rivalta to observe the course of the Scrivia. This circumstance, joined to the opportune arrival of Moreau, who assumed the command and harangued the troops, restored order, and the Austrians were at length

20.  
Battle of Novi. The Allies are at first repulsed.

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driven down to the bottom of the hill on their second line. During this encounter, Bellegarde endeavoured to gain the rear of Pasturana by a ravine which encircled it, and was on the point of succeeding, when Perignon charged him so vigorously with the grenadiers of Partonneaux and the cavalry of Richepanse, that the Imperialists were driven back in confusion, and the whole French left wing rescued from danger. Hitherto the right of the Republicans had not been attacked, and St-Cyr availed himself of this respite to complete his defensive arrangements. Kray, finding the whole weight of the engagement on his hands, pressed Bagrathion to commence an attack on Novi; and though the Russian general was desirous to wait till the hour assigned by his commander for his moving, he agreed to commence, when it was evident that, unless speedily supported, Kray would be compelled to retreat. The Russians advanced with great gallantry to the attack; but a discharge from the division Laboissière of musketry and grape, at half gunshot, threw them into confusion; and, after an obstinate engagement, they were finally broken by a charge by Watrin, with a brigade of infantry, on their flank, and driven back with great loss to Pozzolo-Formigaro.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. i.  
323. Jom.  
xii. 106, 109,  
110. Th. x.  
352. St-Cyr,  
i. 248, 250.

21.  
Combined  
attack of all  
their forces.

The failure of these partial attacks rendered it evident that a combined effort of all the columns was necessary. It was now noon, and the French line was unbroken, although the superiority of numbers on the part of the Allies was fully twelve thousand men. Suwarroff, therefore, combined all his forces for a decisive movement. Kray, whom nothing could intimidate, received orders to prepare for a fresh attack; Derfelden was destined to support Bagrathion in the centre, Melas was directed to break up from Rivalta to form the left of the line, while Rosenberg was ordered in all haste to advance from Tortona to support his movement. The battle, after a pause, began again with the utmost fury at all points. It was long, however, most obstinately disputed. Not-

withstanding the utmost efforts of Kray, who returned above ten times to the charge, the Imperialists could make no impression on the French left: in vain column after column advanced to the harvest of death—nothing could break the firm array of the Republicans; while Bagrathion, Derfelden, and Milaradowitch, in the centre, after the most heroic exertions, were compelled to recoil before the terrible fire of the infantry and batteries which were disposed around Novi. For above four hours, the action continued with the utmost fury, without the French infantry being anywhere displaced; until at length the fatigue on both sides produced a temporary pause, and the contending hosts rested on their arms amidst a field covered with the slain.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 353.  
Jom. xii.  
112, 113.  
Dum. i. 321,  
325. St-Cyr,  
i. 252, 254.

The resolution of any other general but Suwarroff would have been shaken by so terrible a carnage without any result; but his moral courage was of a kind which nothing could subdue. At four o'clock the left wing of the Allies came up under Melas, and preparations were instantly made to take advantage of so great a reinforcement. Melas was directed to assail the extreme right of the Republicans, and endeavour, by turning it, to threaten the road from Novi to Genoa; while Kray again attacked the left, and Suwarroff himself, with the whole weight of the Russians, pressed the centre. The resistance experienced on the left was so obstinate that, though he led on the troops with the courage of a grenadier, Kray could not gain a foot of ground; but the Russians in the centre, after a terrible conflict, succeeded in driving the Republicans into Novi, from the old walls and ruined towers of which, however, they still kept up a murderous fire. But the progress of Melas on the right was much more alarming. While one of his columns ascended the right bank of the Scrivia and reached Serravalle, another by the left bank had already turned the Monte Rotondo, and was rapidly ascending its sides; while the general himself, with a third, was advancing against the eastern

22.  
The advance  
of Melas  
decides the  
victory.

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. i.  
324, 327.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 72. St-  
Cyr, i. 254,  
259. Jom.  
xii. 104, 112.

flank of the plateau of Novi. To make head against so many dangers, Moreau ordered the division Watrin to move towards the menaced plateau; but finding itself assailed during its march, both in front and rear, by the divisions of Melas, it fell into confusion, and fled in the utmost disorder, with difficulty cutting its way through the enemy on the road in the rear of the French position.<sup>1</sup>

23.  
The French  
retreat.

It now became indispensable for the Republicans to retire, for Lichtenstein, at the head of the Imperial cavalry and three brigades of grenadiers, was already established on the road to Gavi; his triumphant battalions, with loud shouts, were sweeping round the rear of the Republicans, while the glittering helmets of the horsemen appeared on every eminence behind their lines, and no other way of communication remained open but that which led by Pasturana to Ovada. Suwarroff, who saw his advantage, was preparing a last and simultaneous attack on the front and flanks of his opponent, when Moreau anticipated him by a general retreat. It was at first conducted in good order, but the impetuous assaults of the Allies soon converted it into a rout. Novi, stripped of its principal defenders, could no longer withstand the assaults of the Russians, who, confident of victory, and seeing the standards of the Allies in the rear of the French position, rushed forward with resistless fury and deafening cheers, over the dead bodies of their comrades, to the charge. Lemoine and Grouchy with difficulty sustained themselves, in retiring, against the impetuous attacks of their unwearied antagonist Kray, when the village of Pasturana in their rear was carried by the Russians, whose vehemence increased with their success, and the only road practicable for their artillery cut off.<sup>2</sup> Despair now seized their ranks; infantry, cavalry, and artillery disbanded, and fled in tumultuous confusion across the vineyards and orchards which adjoined the line of retreat. Colli and his whole brigade

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xii.  
104, 120.  
Th. x. 351,  
354. Dum.  
i. 324, 327.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 72, 73.  
St-Cyr, i.  
255, 264.

were made prisoners; and Perignon and Grouchy, almost cut to pieces with sabre-wounds, fell into the hands of the enemy. The army, in utter confusion, reached Gavi, where it was rallied by the efforts of Moreau, the Allies being too much exhausted with fatigue to continue the pursuit.

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The battle of Novi was one of the most bloody and obstinately contested that had yet occurred in the war. The loss of the Allies was 1800 killed, 5200 wounded, and 1200 prisoners; that of the French was still greater, amounting to 1500 killed, 5500 wounded, and 3000 prisoners, besides 37 cannons, 28 caissons, and 4 standards. As the war advanced, and fiercer passions were brought into collision, the carnage was daily becoming greater; the officers were more prodigal of their own blood and that of their soldiers; and the chiefs themselves, regardless of life, at length led them on both sides to the charge, with an enthusiasm which nothing could surpass. Joubert was the victim of this heroic feeling; Grouchy charged with a standard in his hand, and when it was torn from him in the *mêlée*, he raised his helmet on his sabre, and was thrown down and wounded in the shock of the opposing squadrons; and Kray, Bagrathion, and Melas led on their troops to the mouth of the enemy's cannon, as if their duty had been that of merely commanding grenadier battalions.<sup>1</sup>

24.  
Great loss on  
both sides.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. i.  
328, 330.  
Jom. xii.  
121. St-Cyr,  
i. 264, 270.  
Th. x. 355.

The consequences of the battle of Novi were not so great as might have been expected from so desperate a shock. On the night of the 15th, Moreau regained in haste the defiles of the Appenines, and posted St-Cyr, with a strong rearguard, to defend the approaches to the Bochetta. In the first moments of consternation, he had serious thoughts of evacuating Genoa, and the artillery was already collected at St-Pietro d'Arena for that purpose; but, finding that he was not seriously disquieted, he again dispersed his troops through the mountains, nearly in the positions they held before the battle. St-Cyr

25.  
Moreau  
continues  
to maintain  
himself on  
the Appen-  
ines, and  
the victori-  
ous army is  
broken up.

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Aug. 20.  
1 Jom. xii.  
127, 128.  
Dum. i. 334,  
335, St-Cyr,  
ii. 1, 3.

was intrusted with the right, where a serious attempt was chiefly apprehended; and an attack which Klenau made on that part of the position, with five thousand men, was repulsed with the loss of seven hundred men to the Imperialists. Suwarroff himself, informed of the successes of the French in the small cantons of Switzerland, immediately detached Kray, with twelve thousand men, to the Tessino; while he himself, in order to keep an eye on Championnet, whose force was daily accumulating on the Maritime Alps, encamped at Asti, where he covered at once the blockade of Coni and the siege of Tortona.<sup>1</sup>

26.  
Operations  
of Cham-  
pionnet in  
the Alps dur-  
ing this time.  
Fall of  
Tortona.  
Aug. 10.

During the concentration of the Allied forces for the battle of Novi, this active commander so ably disposed his little army, which only amounted to sixteen thousand combatants, instead of thirty thousand, as he had been promised by the Directory, that he succeeded in forcing the passage of the Little St Bernard, and driving the Imperialists back to Suza. These successes continued even after the Russian commander took post at Asti; and in

Aug. 14, 15.

a variety of affairs of posts in the valleys of the Alps, he succeeded in taking fifteen hundred prisoners and four pieces of cannon. But these advantages were more than counterbalanced by the fall of Tortona, which capitulated on the 25th August, on condition that, if not relieved by

Sept. 11.

the 11th September, the place should be surrendered to the Allies. This conquest was the only trophy which they derived from the bloody battle of Novi. Moreau made an ineffectual attempt to relieve the blockade, and, finding it impossible to effect the object, retired into the fastnesses of the Apennines; while Suwarroff, who had received orders to collect the whole Russians in the Alps, set out, agreeably to the plan fixed on, with seventeen thousand men, for the canton of the Tessino.<sup>2</sup>

2 Jom. xii.  
129, 133.  
138. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 74, 77.  
Dum. i. 336,  
337.

While these great events were passing to the south of the Alps, events of still more decisive importance occurred



to the north of those mountains. Immediately after the capture of Zurich and the retreat of Massena to Mount Albis, the Archduke established the bulk of his forces on the hills which separate the Glatt from the Limmat, and placed a chain of posts along the whole line of that river and the Aar, to observe the movements of the Republicans. Each of the opposing armies in Switzerland numbered about seventy-five thousand combatants; but the French had acquired a decided superiority on the Upper Rhine, where they had collected forty thousand men, while the forces of the Imperialists amounted in that quarter only to twenty-two thousand. Both parties were anxiously waiting for reinforcements; but as that expected by the Archduke, under Korsakoff, was by much the most important, Massena resolved to anticipate his adversary, and strike a decisive blow before that auxiliary arrived. For this purpose he commenced his operations by means of his right wing in the higher Alps, hoping, by the advantage which the initiative always gives in mountainous regions, to dispossess the Imperialists from the important position of the St Gothard, and separate their Italian from their German armies by the acquisition of these elevated ridges, which were universally at that period deemed the key to the seat of war.<sup>1</sup>

At the very time when the French general was making preparations for these important movements, the Aulic Council gave every possible facility to their success, by compelling the Archduke to depart with his experienced troops for the Rhine, and make way for the Russians under Korsakoff, equally unskilled in mountain warfare, and unacquainted with the French tactics. In vain that able commander represented that the line of the Rhine, with its double barrier of fortresses, was equally formidable to an invading as advantageous to an offensive army; that nothing decisive, therefore, could be expected from the operations of the Imperialists in that quarter, while the chances of success were much greater from a combined

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27.

Situation of  
Massena and  
the Arch-  
duke at  
Zurich.<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 77, 81.  
Jom. xii. 55,  
58. Dum. i.  
296.

28.

Insane dis-  
location of  
the Allied  
forces at this  
period by  
the Aulic  
Council.

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<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 80, 91.  
Th. x. 407,  
408.

29.  
Description  
of the thea-  
tre of war.

attack of the Russians and Austrians on the frontier of the Jura, where no fortresses existed to impede an invading force; that fifty thousand Russians in Switzerland could not supply the place of seventy thousand Austrians, and the chances, therefore, were that some serious disaster would occur in the most important part of the line of operations; and that nothing could be more hazardous than to make a change of troops and commanders in presence of a powerful and enterprising enemy, at the very time that he was meditating offensive operations. These judicious observations produced no sort of effect, and the court of Vienna ordered "the immediate execution of its will, without further objections."<sup>1</sup>\*

To understand the important military operations which followed, it is indispensable to form some idea of the ground on which they took place. The St Gothard, though inferior in elevation to many other mountains in Switzerland, is nevertheless the central point of the country, and from its sides some of the greatest rivers in Europe take their rise. On the east, the Rhine, springing from

\* The relative situation and strength of the two armies, at this period, is thus given by the Archduke Charles:—

French.		Infantry.	Cavalry.
From Huningen to the mouth of the Aar,	-	10,991	3,208
From the mouth of the Aar to Mount Uetli,	-	23,792	3,239
From Mount Albis to the lake of Luzern,	-	11,761	564
From the lake of Luzern to the valley of Oberrhasli,	-	7,732	
In the Valais, from Brieg to St Maurice,	-	10,886	554
In the interior of Switzerland,	- - -	2,088	1,126
Total,		67,250	8,691
		—75,941	
Allies.			
Between Weiss and Wutach,	- - -	4,269	1,329
From the mouth of the Aar to the Lake of Zurich,	-	37,053	10,458
Between the lake of Zurich and Luzern,	-	8,722	834
From the lake of Luzern to the St Gothard,	-	4,184	175
On the St Gothard, the Grimsel, and the Upper Valais,	-	5,744	150
In the Grisons,	- - -	1,188	355
Swiss,	- - -	3,453	
Total,		64,613	13,301
		—77,914	

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the glaciers of Disentis and Hinter-Rhein, carries its waters, by a circuitous course, through the expanse of the lake of Constance to the German Ocean; on the north, the Reuss and the Aar, descending in parallel ravines, through rugged mountains, feed the lakes of Luzern, Thun, and Brientz, and ultimately contribute their waters to the same majestic stream. On the west, a still greater river rises in the blue and glittering glacier of the Rhone, and descending through the long channel of the Valais, expands into the beautiful lake of Geneva; while to the south, the snows of the St Gothard nourish the impetuous torrent of the Tessino, which, after foaming through the rocks of Faïdo, and bathing the smiling shores of the Italian bailiwicks, swells out into the sweet expanse of the Lago Maggiore, and loses itself in the classic waves of the Po. The line of the Limmat, which now separated the hostile armies, is composed of the Linth, which rises in the snowy mountains of Glarus, and, after forming in its course the Lake of Zurich, issues from that great sheet of water, under the name of the Limmat, and throws itself into the Aar at Bruick. Hotze guarded the line of the Linth; the Archduke himself that of the Limmat. Korsakoff was considerably in the rear, and was not expected at Schaffhausen till the 19th August.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Personal observation, Th. x. 409, 410. Arch. Ch. i. 96.

One road, practicable for cavalry, but barely so for artillery at that period, crossed the St Gothard from Bellinzona to Altdorf.\* Ascending from Bellinzona on the southern side, it passed through a narrow defile close to the Tessino, between immense walls of rock between Faïdo and Airole; climbed the steep ascent above Airole to the inhospitable summit of the St Gothard; descended, by a torrent's edge, its northern declivity, to the elevated mountain valley of Unsern, from whence, after traversing the dark and humid gallery of the Unnerloch, it crossed the foaming cascade of the Reuss by the celebrated Devil's

80.  
The roads  
through it.

\* The magnificent chaussée which now traverses this mountainous and romantic region was not formed till the year 1819.

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Bridge, and descended, through the desolate and rugged valley of Schollenen, to Altdorf on the lake of Luzern. But there all vestige of a practicable road ceased, and must ever cease; the sublime lake of Uri lies before the traveller, the sides of which, formed of gigantic walls of rock, defy all attempt at the formation of a path, and the communication with Luzern is carried on by water along the beautiful lake of the Four Cantons. The only way in which it is possible to proceed on land from this point, is either on the left by shepherd's tracks towards Stanz and the canton of Unterwalden, or on the right by the rugged and almost impracticable pass of the Schächenthal, by which the traveller may reach the upper extremity of the canton of Glarus. From the valley of Unsern, in the heart of the St Gothard, a difficult and dangerous path leads over the Furka and the Grimsel, across steep and slippery slopes, where the most experienced traveller can with difficulty keep his footing, to Meyringen, in the valley of Oberhasli.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Personal observation.

31.  
Plan of the  
Allies, and  
of Massena.

The plan of the Allies was, that Hotze, with twenty-five thousand Austrians, should be left on the Linth; and at the end of September a general attack should be made on the French position along the whole line. Korsakoff was to lead the attack on the left with his Russian forces; Hotze in the centre with the Austrians; while Suwarroff, with seventeen thousand of his best troops, flushed with the conquest of Italy, was to assail the right flank of the Republicans, and by the St Gothard throw himself into the rear of their position on the Limmat. This design might have been attended with success, if it had been undertaken with troops already assembled on the theatre of operations; but when they were to be collected from Novi and Bavaria, and undertaken in presence of a general perfectly master of the ground, and already occupying a central position in the midst of these converging columns, it was evidently attended with the most imminent hazard. If any of the columns did not arrive at the appointed

time, the whole weight of the enemy might be expected to fall on the first which appeared. Massena intrusted to Lecourbe, whose skill in mountain warfare had already been amply evinced, the important duty of throwing forward his right wing, and expelling the Imperialists from the higher Alps; while he himself, by a false attack along the whole line, and especially upon Zurich in the centre, distracted the attention of the enemy, and prevented him from perceiving the accumulation of force which was brought to bear on the St Gothard.<sup>1</sup>

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Aug. 14.<sup>1</sup>Th. x. 411.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 100, 103.

Early on the morning of the 14th August, the French troops were everywhere in motion. On the left, the Allied outposts were driven in along the whole line; and in the centre the attack was so impetuous that the Austrians were forced back almost to Zurich, where the Archduke rapidly collected his forces to resist the inroad. After considerable bloodshed, as the object was gained, the Republicans drew off, and resumed their positions on the Limmat. The real attack of Lecourbe was attended with very different results. The forces at his disposal, including those of Thurreau in the Valais, were little short of thirty thousand men, and they were directed with the most consummate ability. General Gudin, with five battalions, was to leave the valley of the Aar, force the ridge of the Grimsel, and, forming a junction with General Thurreau in the Valais, drive the Austrians from the source of the Rhone and Mount Furka. A second column of three battalions, commanded by Loison, received orders to cross the Steinerberg between Oberhasli and the valley of Schollenen, and descend upon Wasen; while a third marched from Engelberg upon Erstfeld, on the lake of Luzern; and a fourth moved direct by the valley of Issi upon Altdorf. Lecourbe himself was to embark from Luzern on board his flotilla, make himself master of Brunen and Schwytz on its eastern shore, and combine with the other corps for the capture of Altdorf and all the posts occupied by the enemy in the valley of the Reuss.<sup>2</sup>

32.  
Commence-  
ment of the  
attack by  
Lecourbe  
on the St  
Gothard.  
Aug. 14.<sup>2</sup>Dum. i.  
299, 304,  
305. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 100,  
103. Jom.  
xii. 77, 78.

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33.

The Imperialists are forced back at all points. Aug. 14.

These attacks all proved successful. The Republican parties, under Lccourbe and Oudinot, advanced by land and water against Schwytz, and, after an obstinate combat, the united Swiss and Imperialists were driven from that canton into the Muttenthal. From Brunen, the harbour of Schwytz on the lake, Lecourbe conducted his flotilla under Tell's Chapel, through the sublime scenery of the lake of Uri, beneath precipices fifteen hundred feet high, to Fluelen, where he landed with great difficulty, under a heavy fire from the Austrian troops; and, after a warm engagement, forced General Simbschen, who defended Altdorf, to retire farther up the valley of the Reuss. Meanwhile Loison, after encountering incredible difficulties, had crossed the Steinerberg and the glaciers of Susten, and not only forced the enemy back into the valley of Reuss, but, after five assaults, made himself master of the important elevated post of Wasen, in the middle of its extent, so as to expose the troops who had been driven up from Altdorf to be assailed in rear as well as front. In this extremity they had no resource but to retire by the lateral gorge of the Madaranerthal, from whence they reached by Tavätsch the valley of the Rhine.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch. ii. 107, 108. Jom. xii. 78, 80. Dum. i. 305, 307.

34.

They are driven from the Grimsel and the Furen.

Meanwhile successes still more decisive were achieved by the Republicans in the other part of their mountain line. General Thurreau at the same hour attacked Prince Rohan, who was stationed in the Valais, near Brig, to guard the northern approach to the Simplon; and defeated him with such loss that he was constrained to evacuate the valley of the Rhone, and retired by the terrific gorges of the Simplon to Duomo d'Ossola, on the Italian side of the mountains.\* This disaster obliged Colonel Strauch,

\* The magnificent road which now crosses the Simplon, and awakens the admiration of every traveller from the skill with which it is executed, and the splendid scenery which it reveals, was not then made; and the only passage from the Valais to Duomo d'Ossola was by a break-neck path, highly dangerous during winter in the upper parts, and practicable, even in summer, only for foot passengers.

who guarded, amidst snow and granite, the rugged sides of the Grimsel and the Furka with eight battalions, to fly to the relief of the Imperialists in the Upper Valais, leaving only fifteen hundred to guard the summit of that mountain. He succeeded in stopping the advance of the Republicans up the Valais ; but during his absence the important posts of the Grimsel and Furka were lost. General Gudin, at the head of three thousand men, set out from Guttanen, in the valley of the Aar, and after climbing up the valley, and surmounting with infinite difficulty the glaciers of Ghelmen, succeeded in assailing the corps who guarded, amidst ice and snow, the rugged summit of the Grimsel, from a higher point than that which they occupied. After a desperate conflict, in which a severe loss was experienced on both sides, the Imperialists were driven down the southern side of the mountain into the Valais ; and Colonel Strauch, finding himself now exposed on both flanks, had no alternative but to retire by the dangerous pass called the Nufenen, over a slippery glacier, to Faïdo on the Tessino, from whence he rejoined the scattered detachments of his force, which had made their escape from the Valais, by paths known only to chamois hunters, through the Val Formazza at Bellinzona.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
il. 105, 107.  
Jom. xii. 80.  
81. Dum. i.  
308, 309.  
EbelManuel  
du Voyageur  
en Suisse,  
325.

Lecourbe, ignorant of the successes of his right wing, on the succeeding day pursued his career of victory in the valley of the Reuss. Following the retiring columns of the Imperialists up the dark and shaggy pass of Schollenen, he at length arrived at the Devil's Bridge, where a chasm thirty feet wide, formed by the blowing up of the arch, and a murderous fire from the rocks on the opposite side of the ravine, arrested his progress. But this obstacle was not of long duration. During the night the Republicans threw beams over the chasm ; and the Austrians, finding themselves menaced on their flank by General Gudin, who was descending the valley of Unsern from the Furka by Realp, were obliged to evacuate that almost

35.  
And the St  
Gotthard.

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Aug. 16.  
 1 Arch. Ch.  
 ii. 108, 110.  
 Jom. xii. 81.  
 82. Dum. i.  
 308, 309.

impregnable post, and retire to the heights of the Crispalt, behind the Oberalp, near the source of the Rhine. There they maintained themselves, with great resolution, against the Republican grenadiers till the evening; but on the following day, being assailed by the united forces of Lecourbe and Gudin, they were finally broken and driven back to Ilanz, in the Grisons, farther down that river, with the loss of a thousand prisoners and three pieces of cannon. At the same time, a detachment took possession of the summit of the St Gothard, and established itself at Airolo, on the southern declivity of the mountain.<sup>1</sup>

36.  
 Successes of  
 the French  
 left, who  
 drive the  
 Imperialists  
 into Glarus.

While Lecourbe was gaining these great successes on the right, his left, between the lakes of Luzern and Zurich, was equally fortunate. General Chabran, on the extreme left, cleared the whole western bank of the lake of Zurich as far as Wiggis; the central columns drove the Imperialists from Schwyz into the Muttenthal, and defeated Jellachich at Ensiedeln; and on the following day, aided by Chabran, who moved against his flank by the Waggithal, they totally routed the Austrians, who fell back, with the loss of twelve hundred prisoners, by the Klonthal, into the canton of Glarus. Thus, by a series of operations as ably executed as they were skilfully conceived, was the whole left wing of the Imperialists routed and driven back in less than forty-eight hours, with the loss of ten pieces of cannon, four thousand prisoners, and two thousand in killed and wounded; while the important post of the St Gothard, with all its approaches and lateral valleys, was wrested from their hands.<sup>2\*</sup>

\* Arch. Ch.  
 ii. 212, 213.  
 Jom. xii. 82.  
 84. Dum. i.  
 305.

These brilliant successes, however, were only gained by Massena through the great concentration of his forces on the right wing. To accomplish this he was obliged to

\* Many readers will recognise, in the theatre of these operations, the scenes indelibly engraven on their memory by the matchless sublimity of their features. The author traversed them on foot in 1816, and again in 1821; the lapse of twenty years has taken nothing from the clearness of the impressions left on his mind during these delightful excursions.



weaken his left, which, lower down in the plain, guarded the course of the Aar. The Archduke resolved to avail himself of this circumstance to strike a decisive blow against that weakened extremity; in which he was the more encouraged by the arrival of twenty thousand Russians of Korsakoff's corps at Schaffhausen, and the important effect which success in that quarter would have in threatening the communications of the Republican army with the interior of France. For this purpose thirty thousand men were assembled on the banks of the river, and the point selected for the passage at Gross Dettingen, a little below the junction of the Reuss and the Aar. Hotze was left in Zurich with eight thousand men, with which he engaged to defend it to the last extremity; while Korsakoff promised to arrive at Ober Endingen, in the centre of the line, with twenty-three thousand men. The march of the columns was so well concealed, and the arrangements made with such precision, that this great force reached the destined point without the enemy being aware of their arrival, and everything promised a favourable issue to the enterprise, when it proved abortive from the difficulties of the passage, and the want of skill and due preparation in the Austrian engineers. The bridges for the crossing of the troops were commenced under such a violent fire of artillery as speedily cleared the opposite banks, but it was found impossible to anchor the pontoons in the rocky bed of the stream, and the rapidity of the current rendered it hopeless to construct the bridges in any other manner. Thus, from the want of a little foresight and a few precautions on the part of the engineers, did a project fail, as ably conceived as it was accurately executed by the military officers, and which promised to have altered the fate of the campaign, and perhaps of the war. Had the passage been effected, the Archduke, with forty thousand men, would have cleared all the right bank of the Aar, separated the French left wing on the Rhine from their centre and right in Switzerland, com-

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37.

Unsuccessful attempt of the Archduke to cross the Limmat below Zurich.

Aug. 16  
and 17.

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<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 119, 126.  
Dum. i. 311,  
312. Jom.  
xii. 87, 92.

pelled Massena to undertake a disastrous retreat into the canton of Berne, exposed to almost certain destruction the small corps at Bâle, and opened the defenceless frontier of the Jura to immediate invasion from the united troops of the Archduke, Korsakoff, and Suwarroff. The want of a few grappling-irons defeated a project on which perhaps the fate of the world depended. Such is frequently the fortune of war.<sup>1</sup>

38.  
Being foiled,  
he marches  
to the Upper  
Rhine. The  
Austrian  
left defeated  
in Glarus.  
Aug. 19.

Desirous still of achieving something considerable with his veteran soldiers before leaving the command in Switzerland, the Archduke, after his troops had resumed their position, again concentrated his left under Hotze. But the usual jealousies between the troops and commanders of rival nations prevented his projects from being carried into execution; and before the end of the month the Austrians, under their able commander, were in full march for the Upper Rhine, leaving twenty-five thousand men under Hotze, as an auxiliary force to support Korsakoff until the arrival of Suwarroff from the plains of Piedmont. This change of commanders, and weakening of the Allied forces, presented too great chances of success to escape the observation of so able a general as Massena, whose army was now augmented, by reinforcements from the interior, to above eighty thousand men. He instantly resolved on a general attack along the whole line. The movement commenced with an attack by Soult, with the right wing of the Republicans, upon Hotze, who occupied the canton of Glarus; and, after several sharp skirmishes, a decisive action took place near Näfels, in which the Austrians were defeated, and compelled to fall back to a defensive line in their rear, extending from the lake of Zurich by Wesen through the Wallenstätter See, by Sarganz, to Coire in the Grisons. It was at this critical moment that the Archduke, yielding to the pressing commands of the Aulic Council, was compelled to abandon the army with the great body of his troops, leaving the united force of Korsakoff and Hotze,<sup>2</sup> fifty-six thousand

<sup>2</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 129, 135,  
139. Th. x.  
412, 413.  
Jom. xii.  
227, 231,  
284.

strong, scattered over a line forty miles in length, to sustain the weight of Massena, who, without weakening his force at other points, could bring sixty-five thousand to bear upon the decisive point around the ramparts of Zurich.

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The arrival of the Archduke was soon attended with important effects upon the Upper Rhine. The French had crossed that river at Mannheim on the 26th August with twelve thousand men, and driving General Muller, who commanded the Imperialists, before them, laid siege to Philippsburg, on which they had commenced a furious bombardment. But the approach of the Austrian prince speedily changed the state of affairs. The columns of that commander, rapidly approaching, threatened to cut off their retreat to the Rhine, and they were obliged hastily to raise the siege and retire to Mannheim. The insufficient state of defence of that important place inspired the Archduke with the design of carrying it by a *coup-de-main*. Its fortifications had, some months before, been levelled by the Republicans; but since that time they had been indefatigable in their endeavours to restore them, and they were already in a respectable state of defence. On the 17th, the Austrians in two columns, one of fourteen thousand men, the other of seven thousand, with a reserve of eight thousand, moved towards Mannheim, and on the following day gave the assault. A thick fog favoured the enterprise; the Austrians got into the redoubts almost before the French were aware of their approach, and drove them over the Rhine, with the loss of eighteen hundred prisoners, and twenty-one pieces of cannon. This success threw a momentary lustre over the expedition, for which the Allies were about to pay dear by the disasters experienced before Zurich.<sup>1</sup>

39.  
Successful  
expedition  
of the Arch-  
duke against  
Mannheim.

Aug. 26.

Sept. 6.

Sept. 14.

Sept. 18.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
238, 241.  
Arch. Ch. ii.  
149, 161.

After the departure of the Archduke, it was concerted between Suwarroff, Korsakoff, and Hotze, that the former of these commanders should set out from Bellinzona on the 21st September, and attack the Republican positions

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40.

Plan of the  
Allies for a  
combined  
attack, by  
Suwarroff  
and Korsakoff, on  
Massena.

near Airolo on the Tessino. On the 25th, he expected to be at Altdorf, after having made himself master of the St Gothard. From thence he was to form a junction with Korsakoff at Zurich, and with their united forces assail the position of Massena on the Limmat in front, while Hotze attacked it in flank. By this means they flattered themselves that they would be able to march on the Aar with the mass of their forces, and drive the French back upon the frontier of the Jura and their own resources. This project was well conceived, in so far as the turning the French position by the St Gothard was concerned; and if it had been executed as vigorously and accurately by all the commanders engaged as it was by Suwarroff, the result might have been very different from what actually occurred. But it presented almost insurmountable difficulties in the execution, from the rugged nature of the country in which the principal operations were to be conducted, the difficulty of communicating between one valley, or one part of the army and another, and the remote distances from which the corps which were to combine in the operation were to assemble. It would have been more prudent, with such detached bodies, to have chosen the Misocco and the Bernardine for the Russian field-marshal's march to the theatre of war from the Italian plains, as that would have brought him down, by roads practicable for artillery, through the Via-Mala into the heart of the Austrian army, under cover of the posts which they still occupied in the Grisons. But it did not promise such brilliant results in the outset as that which he adopted; and it was more suitable to the impetuous character of the Russian veteran to throw himself at once through the narrow ravines of the St Gothard, upon the flank of his adversary's line.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. ii.  
58, 61.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 172, 178.  
Jom. xii.  
241, 242.

Meanwhile Korsakoff collected the greater part of his forces in the neighbourhood of Zurich, where they were encamped between the ramparts of the town and the banks of the Sill. The position which they occupied, and

the necessity of striking a decisive blow before the arrival of Suwarroff, suggested to Massena a plan which he conceived and executed with the most consummate ability. He had a superiority, until the arrival of Suwarroff, of six thousand over the Allies; but the corps which that commander brought with him would turn the balance still farther the other way.\* Now, therefore, was the moment, by a decisive blow in the centre, to ruin the Allied army before the junction of that dreaded commander. But the distribution of these troops rendered this superiority still more important; for Massena could assemble thirty-nine thousand on the decisive line of the Limmat, while Korsakoff could only collect twenty-five thousand, the bulk of whom were grouped together under the cannon of Zurich, where their numbers were of no avail, and their crowded state in a narrow space only impeded any military movements.<sup>1</sup>

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41.  
Relative  
situations of  
the French  
and Russian  
centres at  
Zurich.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
245, 246.  
Arch. Ch. ii.  
183, 185.

The temper and feeling of the Russian troops, even more than their defective position, rendered them the ready victims of a skilful and daring adversary. Justly proud of their long series of victories over the Turks, and of the decisive impression which Suwarroff had made in the Italian campaign, they had conceived both an unreasonable confidence in their own strength, and an unfounded contempt for their enemies. This feeling was not the result of a course of successes over an antagonist with whom they had repeatedly measured their strength, but of a blind idea of superiority, unfounded either in reason or experience, and likely to lead to the most disastrous consequences. In presence of the first general then in Europe, at the head of a greatly superior force, Korsakoff thought it unnecessary to adopt other measures, or take greater precautions, than if he had been on the banks of the Dniester, in front of an undisciplined horde of barbarians. Thus everything, both on the French and Allied

42.  
Unfounded  
confidence  
of the latter.

\* The French army in the field was 76,000; that of the Allies, without Suwarroff, 70,000; with him, 88,000.—JOMINI, xii. 245.

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<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 181, 182.  
Hard. vii.  
287.

side, prepared the great catastrophe which was approaching. The presumption and arrogance of Korsakoff were carried to such a pitch, that, in a conference with the Archduke Charles, shortly before the battle, when that great general was pointing out the positions which should in an especial manner be guarded, and said, pointing to the map, "Here you should place a battalion."—"A company, you mean," said Korsakoff. "No," replied the Archduke, "a battalion."—"I understand you," rejoined the other; "*an Austrian battalion, or a Russian company.*"<sup>1</sup>

43.  
Massena's  
able plan of  
attack. The  
passage is  
surprised  
below  
Zurich.

Having minutely reconnoitred the position of the enemy, Massena resolved to make only a feigned attack on Zurich, and to cross with the bulk of his forces farther down the river at Closter-Fahr, where it was slenderly guarded; and thus to turn the position under the ramparts of that town, and attack Korsakoff both in front and rear, at the same time that the Republicans had cut him off from his right wing farther down the river, and the lake of Zurich separated him from his left in the mountains. The execution of this plan was as able as its conception was felicitous, on the part of the French commander. By great exertions the French engineers collected, by land-carriage, twelve pontoons and thirty-seven barks at Dietikon, on the evening of the 24th September, where they were concealed behind an eminence and several hedges, and brought down to the margin of the river at daybreak on the following morning. The French masked batteries then opened their fire; by the superiority of which the opposite bank was speedily cleared of the feeble detachments of the enemy who occupied it, and the passage commenced. Six hundred men, in the first instance, were ferried over, and the French artillery, directed by General Foy, protected this gallant band against the attacks of the increasing force of the enemy, till the boats returned with a fresh detachment. Meanwhile the pontoons arrived at a quick trot from Dietikon; the bridge began to be formed,

Sept. 24.

and the troops ferried over attacked and carried the height on the opposite side, from whence seven pieces of cannon had hitherto thundered on their crossing columns, though defended with the most obstinate valour by three Russian battalions. By seven o'clock the plateau of Closter-Fahr, which commanded the passage, was carried, with the artillery which crowned it, and before nine the bridge was completed, and Oudinot, with fifteen thousand men, firmly established on the right bank of the river.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 190, 193.  
Th. x. 414,  
416. Jom.  
xii. 247,  
250, 252.

While this serious attack was going on in the centre, General Menard, on the left, had by a feigned attack induced the Russian commander, Durassoff, to collect all his forces to resist the threatened passage on the lower Limmat; and Mortier, by a vigorous demonstration against Zurich, retained the bulk of the Russian centre in the neighbourhood of that city. His troops were inadequate to produce any serious impression on the dense masses of the Russians who were there assembled; but while he was retiring in confusion, and Korsakoff was already congratulating himself on a victory, he was alarmed by the increasing cannonade in his rear, and intelligence soon arrived of the passage at Closter-Fahr, and the separation of the right wing under Durassoff from the centre, now left to its own resources at Zurich. Shortly after, he received the most alarming accounts of the progress of Oudinot: he had made himself master of Hongg, and the heights which surround Zurich on the north-west; and, in spite of a sally which the Russian general made towards evening, at the head of five thousand men, which compelled the enemy to recede to the foot of the heights to the north of the town, they still maintained themselves in force on that important position, barred the road of Winterthur, the sole issue to Germany, and all but surrounded the Allied army within the walls of the city. Before nightfall, Massena, fully sensible of his advantages, summoned the Russian commander to surrender, a proposal to which no answer was returned.<sup>2</sup>

44.  
Feigned  
attacks on  
Zurich and  
the Lower  
Limmat.

<sup>2</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 194, 196.  
Th. x. 416,  
418. Jom.  
xii. 254, 256.

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45.

Dreadful  
confusion in  
the town of  
Zurich.

During these disasters the confusion in Zurich rose to the highest pitch. The immense confluence of horsemen, artillery, and baggage-waggon, suddenly thrown back upon the city, and by which its streets were soon completely blocked up; the cries of the wounded brought in from all quarters; the trampling of the cavalry and infantry, who forced their way through the dense mass, and mercilessly trod under foot the wounded and the dying, to make head against the enemy threatening to break in from all sides, formed a scene hitherto unexampled in the war, and for which a parallel can only be found in the horrors of the Moscow retreat. When night came, the extensive watch-fires on all the heights to the north and west of the city showed the magnitude of the force with which they were threatened in that quarter; while the unruffled expanse of the lake offered no hope of escape on the other side; and the bombs, which already began to fall in the streets, gave a melancholy presage of the fate which awaited them if they were not speedily extricated from their perilous situation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
254, 256.  
Arch. Ch. ii.  
195, 196.  
Th. x. 417,  
418.

46.  
Brave resolution of  
Korsakoff  
to force  
his way  
through.

In these desperate circumstances, Korsakoff evinced a resolution as worthy of admiration as his former presumptuous confidence had been deserving of censure. Disdaining the proposal to surrender, he spent the night in making arrangements for forcing, sword in hand, a passage on the next morning through the dense masses of the Republicans. Fortunately, considerable reinforcements arrived during the night; two strong battalions detached by Hotze, and the whole right wing under Durassoff, successively made their appearance. The latter had been detained till late in the evening by the feigned attacks of Menard; but having at length learned the real state of affairs, he lost no time in rejoining his commander at Zurich, by a long circuit which enabled him to avoid the French outposts. Strengthened by these reinforcements, Korsakoff resolved to attempt the passage through the enemy on the following day.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 197. Th.  
x. 418, 419.



At daybreak on the 28th the Russian columns were formed in order of battle, and attacked with the utmost impetuosity the division Lorges and the brigade Bontems, which had established themselves on the road to Winterthur, the sole line of retreat which remained to them. The resistance of the French was obstinate, and the carnage frightful; but the Russians fought with the courage of despair, and at length succeeded in driving the Republicans before them and opening a passage. The whole army of Korsakoff was then arranged for a retreat; but, contrary to every rule of common sense, as well as the military art, he placed the infantry in front, the cavalry in the centre, and the *artillery and equipages in the rear*, leaving only a slender rearguard, to defend the ramparts of Zurich until the immense mass had extricated itself from the city.\* Massena, perceiving his intention, collected his forces to prevent or distress his retreat; but the intrepidity of the Russian infantry overthrew all his efforts, and the head of the column cut its way through all the troops which could be collected to oppose its progress. But the efforts of the Republicans against the cavalry in the centre were more successful. The divisions Lorges and Gazan, by reiterated charges on the moving mass, at length succeeded in throwing it into confusion; the disorder soon spread to the rear; all the efforts of the generals to arrest it proved ineffectual; the brave SACKEN, destined to honourable distinction in a more glorious war, was wounded and made prisoner; and amidst a scene of unexampled confusion, a hundred pieces of cannon, all the ammunition, waggons, and baggage of the army, and the military chest, fell into the hands of the victors. Meanwhile the fire approached Zurich on all sides. Mortier

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47.

He cuts his way through the enemy, but loses all his baggage and artillery.  
Sept. 28.

\* Cæsar's principle was just the reverse: "Quum ad hostes appropinquabat, consuetudine sua, Cæsar sex legiones expeditas ducebat; *post eas totius exercitus impedimenta collocarat*; inde duæ legiones, quæ proxime conscriptæ erant, totum agmen claudebant, præsidioque impeditis erant."—CÆSAR *de Bell. Gall.* ii. 19. The *principles of war* are the same in all ages, whatever may be the difference of the arms with which the combatants engage: Cæsar's rule would have saved Korsakoff's defeat.

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<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 419,  
420. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 199,  
201. Jom.  
xii. 257, 258.  
Hard. vii.  
292.

was thundering from the other side of the Limmat, while Oudinot, carrying everything before him, pressed down from the heights on the north; the garrison defiled after the main army in confusion; soon the gates were seized; a mortal struggle ensued in the streets, in the course of which the illustrious Lavater, seeking to save the life of a soldier threatened with death, was barbarously shot. At length all the troops which remained at Zurich laid down their arms; and Korsakoff, weakened by the loss of eight thousand killed and wounded, and five thousand prisoners, besides his whole artillery and ammunition, was allowed to retire without farther molestation by Eglisau to Schaffhausen.<sup>1</sup>

48.  
Success of  
Soult  
against  
Hotze above  
the lake, and  
death of the  
latter.

While Zurich was immortalised by these astonishing triumphs, the attack of Soult on the Imperial right, on the upper part of the line above the lake, was hardly less successful. Hotze had there retained only two battalions at his headquarters of Kaltbrunn; the remainder were dispersed along the vast line, from the upper end of the lake of Zurich, by Sarganz, to Coire in the Grisons. Accumulating his forces, Soult skilfully and rapidly passed the Linth, at three in the morning of the 25th. One hundred and fifty volunteers first swam across the river, with their sabres in their teeth, during the darkness of the night, and, aided by the artillery from the French side, speedily dispersed the Austrian posts on the right bank, and protected the disembarkation of six companies of grenadiers, who soon after made themselves masters of Schenis.

Sept. 26.

Wakened by the sound of the cannon, Hotze ran, with a few officers and a slender escort, to the spot, and fell dead by the first discharge of the Republican videttes. This calamitous event threw the Austrians into such consternation that they fell back from Schenis to Kaltbrunn, from which they were also dislodged before the evening. At the same time the French had succeeded in crossing a body of troops over the river,<sup>2</sup> a little lower down, at Schmerikoon, and advanced to the bridge of Grynau, where

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xii.  
259, 263.  
Arch. Ch. ii.  
203, 209.  
Dum. ii. 61,  
63.

a desperate conflict ensued. These disasters compelled the Austrians to retreat to their position at Wescott, where they were next day assaulted by Soult, and driven first behind the Thur, and at length over the Rhine, with the loss of three thousand prisoners, twenty pieces of cannon, all their baggage, and the whole flotilla, constructed at a great expense, on the lake of Wallenstädt.

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While these disasters were accumulating upon the Allied force, which he was advancing to support, Suwarroff, who was entirely ignorant of them, was resolutely and faithfully performing his part of the general plan. He arrived at Taverne on the 15th August, and, despatching his artillery and baggage, by Como and Chiavenna, towards the Grisons, set out himself, with twelve thousand veterans, to ascend the Tessino and force the passage of the St Gothard; while Rosenberg, with six thousand, was sent round by the Val Blegno, to turn the position by the Crispalt and Disentis, and so descend into the valley of Unsern by its eastern extremity. On the 21st September the Russian main body arrived at Airolo, at the foot of the mountain, where General Gudín was strongly posted, with four thousand men, covering both the direct road over the St Gothard and the path which led diagonally to the Furka. Two days after, the attack was commenced with the utmost resolution by the Russian troops; but in spite of all their efforts, they were arrested in the steep zigzag ascent above Airolo by the rapid and incessant fire of the French tirailleurs. In vain the Russians, marching boldly up, answered by heavy platoons of musketry; their fire, however sustained, could produce little impression on detached parties of sharpshooters, who, posted behind rocks and scattered fir-trees, caused every shot to tell upon the dense array of their assailants. Irritated at the unexpected obstacles, the old marshal advanced to the front, lay down in a ditch, desired his soldiers to dig a grave, and declared his resolution "to be buried there, where his children had retreated

49.  
Operations  
of Suwar-  
roff on the  
Tessino.  
Forcing of  
the St  
Gothard.

Sept. 23.

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1799.

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 421,  
422. Jom.  
xii. 265, 266.  
Dum. i. 51.  
Arch. Ch. ii.  
227, 228.  
Personal  
observation.

50.  
Dreadful  
struggle at  
the Devil's  
Bridge.

Sept. 26.  
<sup>2</sup> Jom. xii.  
267, 269.  
Th. x. 422.  
Dum. ii. 52,  
53. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 229,  
235. Per-  
sonal obser-  
vation.

for the first time." Joining generalship to resolution, however, he despatched detachments to the right and left to turn the French position; and, when their fire began, putting himself at the head of his grenadiers, he at length drove the Republicans from their position, and pursued them, at the point of the bayonet, over the rugged summit of the St Gothard to the valley of Unsern. At the same time, Rosenberg had assailed the French detachment on the summit of the Crispalt, and, after destroying the greater part, driven them down in great disorder into the eastern extremity of the same valley; while a detachment under Auffenberg, despatched from Disentis, was proceeding through the Maderanerthal to Amsteg, to cut off their retreat by the valley of Schollenen.<sup>1</sup>

Assailed by such superior forces, both in front and flank, Lecourbe had no alternative but a rapid retreat. During the night, therefore, he threw his artillery into the Reuss, and retired down the valley of Schollenen, breaking down the Devil's Bridge to impede the progress of the enemy, while Gudin scaled the Furka by moonlight, descended by the glacier of the Rhone, and, again ascending, took post on the inhospitable summit of the Grimsel. On the following morning the united Russian forces approached the Devil's Bridge; but they found an impassable gulf, two hundred feet deep, surmounted by precipices above a thousand feet high, which stopped the leading companies, while a dreadful fire from all the rocks on the opposite side swept off all the brave men who approached the edge of the abyss. Hearing the firing in front, the column of Bagrathion pressed on, in double quick time, through the dark passage of the Unnerloch, and literally, by their pressure, drove the soldiers in front headlong over the rocks into the foaming Reuss. At length the officers, tired of the fruitless butchery, despatched a few companies across the Reuss to scale the rocks on the left, by which the post at the bridge was turned, and beams being hastily thrown across,<sup>2</sup> the Russian troops, with loud shouts,

passed the terrific defile, and pressing hard upon the retiring column of the Republicans, effected a junction with Auffenberg at Wasen, and drove the enemy beyond Altdorf to take post on the sunny slopes where the Alps of Surenen descend into the glassy lake of Luzern.

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The capture of the St Gothard by the Russians, and the expulsion of the French from the whole valley of the Reuss, was totally unexpected by Massena, and would have been attended with important results upon the general fate of the campaign, if it had not been simultaneous with the disaster of Korsakoff at Zurich, and the defeat of Hotze's corps by the Republicans on the Linth. But, coming as it did in the midst of these misfortunes, it only induced another upon the corps whose defeat was about to signalise the Republican arms. Arrived at Altdorf, Suwarroff found his progress in a direct line stopped by the lake of Luzern, while the only outlet to join the Allied forces on his right lay through the horrible defile of the Shächenthal, in which even the audacious Lecourbe had not ventured to engage his troops, however long habituated to mountain warfare. There was now, however, no alternative. Advance he could not, for the lake of Luzern, without a bark on its bosom, lay before him; inaccessible precipices shut in its banks on either side: to move to the left towards Stanz was to plunge into the midst of the French army; and Suwarroff, with troops exhausted with fatigue, and a heart boiling with indignation, was compelled to commence the perilous journey by the right through the Shächenthal towards the canton of Glarus. No words can do justice to the difficulties experienced by the Russians in this terrible march, or the heroism of the brave men engaged in it. Obligated to abandon their artillery and baggage, the whole army advanced in single file, dragging the beasts of burden after them, up rocky paths, where even an active traveller can with difficulty find a footing. Numbers slipped down

51.  
Arrived at  
Altdorf,  
Suwarroff  
is forced to  
ascend the  
Shächenthal. Diffi-  
cult passage  
of the ridge  
of Mutton.

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1799.

Sept. 28.

<sup>1</sup> Personal  
observation.  
Jom. xii.  
269, 270,  
271. Th.  
x. 423. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 236,  
237. Dum.  
ii. 54, 55.

the precipices and perished miserably ; others, worn out with fatigue, lay down on the track, and were trodden under foot by the multitude who followed after them, or fell into the hands of Lecourbe, who hung close upon their rear. So complete was the dispersion of the army, that the leading files had reached Mitten before the last had left Altdorf ; the precipices beneath the path were covered with horses, equipages, arms, and soldiers unable to continue the laborious ascent. At length the marshal reached Mitten, where the troops, in a hospitable valley, abounding with cottages and green fields, hoped for some respite from their fatigues ; and where, in conformity to the plan agreed on, they were to have met the Austrian corps of Jellachich and Linken, to threaten the right of the Republicans.<sup>1</sup>

52.  
He finds  
none of the  
expected  
reinforce-  
ments there.

But it was too late : the disasters of the Imperialists deprived them of all hope of relief from this quarter. Jellachich, faithful to his instructions, had broken up from Coire and the valley of the Rhine on the 25th with eight battalions, made himself master of the village of Mollis, and driven the Republicans back to Näfels, at the bridge of which, however, they resolutely defended themselves. But on the following day, the French, issuing from Wesen, menaced the retreat of the Austrians by the side of the Wallenstätter See ; and Jellachich, informed of the disasters at Zurich, the death of Hotze, and the retreat of his corps, made haste to fall back behind the Rhine. On the same day, Linken, who had crossed from the valley of the Rhine by the Sernft-thal and the sources of the Linth, after making prisoners two battalions whom he encountered, appeared in the upper part of the valley of Glarus, so as to put Molitor between two fires. The situation of the latter now appeared all but desperate, and by a little more vigour on the part of the Allies might have been rendered so.<sup>2</sup> But the retreat of Jellachich having enabled Molitor to accumulate his forces against this new adversary, he was obliged to retreat, and, after

<sup>2</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 212, 220.  
Jom. xii.  
271, 272.  
Dum. ii. 68,  
69.

remaining inactive for three days at Schwanden, recrossed the mountains, and retired behind the Rhine.

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53.

And is there  
surrounded  
on all sides,  
and reluctantly  
forced to  
retreat.

Suwarroff thus found himself in the Muttenthal in the middle of the enemy's forces, having the whole of Massena's forces on one side, and that of Molitor on the other. Soon the masses of the Republicans began to accumulate round the Russian marshal. Molitor occupied Mont Bragel and the Klonthal, the summit of the pass between the Muttenthal and Glarus; while Mortier entered the mouth of the valley towards Schwyz, and Massena himself arrived at Flüelen, to concert with Lecourbe a general attack on the Russian forces. In this extremity, Suwarroff having, with the utmost difficulty, assembled his weary troops in the Muttenthal, called a council of war, and, following only the dictates of his own impetuous courage, proposed an immediate advance to Schwyz, threatening the rear of the French position at Zurich, and wrote to Korsakoff, that he would hold him answerable with his head for one step further that he continued his retreat. The officers, however, perceiving clearly the dangerous situation in which they were placed, after Korsakoff's defeat, strongly urged the necessity of an immediate retreat into Glarus and the Grisons, in order to strengthen themselves by that wing of the Allied army which alone had escaped a total defeat. At length, with the utmost difficulty, the veteran conqueror was persuaded to alter his plans, and, for the first time in his life, he ordered a retreat—weeping with indignation at thus finding the reputation of invincibility, which his marvellous successes had won for him, lost in the close of his career by the absurd combinations of the Aulic Council, and the faults of the generals placed under his command.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 239, 240.  
Jom. xii.  
273, 275.  
Dum. ii.  
67, 68.

Preceded by the Austrian division under Auffenberg, the Russians ascended Mont Bragel, and chasing before them the detachment of Molitor, great part of whom were made prisoners near the Klonthal lake, threw back that general upon the banks of the Linth. It was now the

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54.  
He crosses  
the moun-  
tains into  
Glarus.  
Desperate  
struggle at  
Näfels.  
Sept. 30.  
Oct. 1.

turn of the French general to feel alarm ; but, calm in the midst of dangers which would have overturned the resolution of an ordinary commander, he made the most resolute defence, disputing every inch of ground, and turning every way to face the adversaries who assailed him. Determined to block up the passage to the Russians, he ultimately took post at Näfels, already immortalised in the wars of Swiss independence, where he was furiously attacked for a whole day by Prince Bagrathion. Both parties fought with the most heroic courage, regardless of ten days' previous combats and marches, in which they had respectively been engaged. But all the efforts of the Russian grenadiers could not prevail over the steady resistance of the Republicans ; and towards evening, having received reinforcements from Wessen, they sallied forth, and drove the assailants back to Glarus. On the same day Massena, with a large force, attacked the rearguard of the Russians, which was winding, encumbered with wounded, along the Muttenthal, in its descent from the Schächenthal to Glarus ; but Rosenberg, halting, withstood their attack with such firmness that the Republicans were compelled to give way, and then, breaking suddenly from a courageous defensive to a furious offensive, he routed them entirely, and drove them back as far as Schwyz, with the loss of five pieces of cannon, a thousand prisoners, and as many killed and wounded.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
276, 277.  
Arch. Ch. i.  
48.

55.  
Dreadful  
passage of  
the Alps  
from  
Glarus to  
Ilanz on  
the Rhine.

Unable to force the passage at Näfels, the Russian general, after giving his troops some days' repose at Glarus, which was absolutely indispensable after the desperate fatigues they had undergone, resolved to retreat over the mountains into the Grisons by Engi, Matt, and the Sernft-thal. To effect this in presence of a superior enemy, pressing on his footsteps both from the side of Näfels and the Klonthal, was an enterprise of the utmost hazard, as the path over the arid summits of the Alps, which divide the canton of Glarus from the valley of the Rhine, was even more rugged than that through



the Shächenthal, and the horses and beasts of burden had nearly all perished under the fatigues of the former march. Nothing could exceed the difficulties which presented themselves. Hardships, tenfold greater than those which all but daunted the Carthaginian conqueror in the outset of his career in the Pennine Alps, awaited the Russians, at the close of a bloody and fatiguing campaign among mountains to which they were entire strangers. On the morning on which the army set out from Glarus, a heavy fall of snow obliterated all traces of a path, and augmented the natural difficulties of the passage. With incredible difficulty the weary column wound its painful way amongst inhospitable mountains in single file, without either stores to sustain its strength, or covering to shelter it from the weather. The snow, which, in the upper parts of the mountains, was two feet deep, and perfectly soft from being newly fallen, rendered the ascent so fatiguing, that the strongest men could with difficulty advance a few miles in a day. No cottages were to be found in these dreary and sterile mountains; not even trees were to be met with to form the cheerful fire of the bivouacs; vast gray rocks starting up amongst the snow alone broke the mournful uniformity of the scene, and under their shelter, or on the open surface of the mountain, without any covering or fire, were the soldiers obliged to lie down, and pass a long and dreary autumnal night. Great numbers perished of cold, or sank down precipices, or into crevices, from which they were unable to extricate themselves, and where they were soon choked by the drifting of the snow.<sup>1</sup>

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Oct. 5.

<sup>1</sup> Personal observation. Arch. Ch. ii. 249. Jom. xii. 277.

With incredible difficulty the head of the column, on the following day, at length reached, amidst colossal rocks, the summit of the ridge; but it was not the smiling plains of Italy which there met their view, but a sea of mountains, wrapped in the snowy mantle which seemed the winding-sheet of the army, interspersed with cold gray clouds which floated round their higher peaks.

<sup>56.</sup> Terrible descent into the Grisons. Oct. 6.

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Winter, in all its severity, had already set in on those lofty solitudes. The mountain sides, silent and melancholy even at the height of summer, when enamelled with flowers and dotted with flocks, presented then an unbroken sheet of snow; the blue lakes, which are interspersed over the level valley at their feet, were frozen over, and undistinguishable from the rest of the dreary expanse; and a boundless mass of snowy peaks arose on all sides, presenting apparently an impassable barrier to their further progress. The Alps of the Grisons and Tyrol, whose summits stretched as far as the eye could reach in every direction, seemed a vast wilderness, in the solitudes of which the army was about to be lost; while not a fire nor a column of smoke was to be seen in the vast expanse to cheer the spirits of the soldiers. The path, long hardly visible, now totally disappeared; not a shrub or a bush was to be met with; the naked tops of the rocks, buried in the snow, no longer served to indicate the position of the precipices, or rest the exhausted bodies of the troops. On the southern descent the difficulties were still greater; the snow, hardened by a sharp freezing wind, was so slippery that it became impossible for the men to keep their footing; whole companies slipped together into the abysses below, and numbers were crushed by the beasts of burden rolling down upon them from the upper parts of the ascent, or the masses of snow which became loosened by the incessant march of the army, and fell down with irresistible force upon those beneath. All the day was passed in struggling with these difficulties, and with the utmost exertions the advanced-guard reached the village of Panix, in the Grisons, at night, where headquarters were established. The whole remainder of the columns slept upon the snow, where the darkness enveloped them without either fire or covering. But nothing could overcome the unconquerable spirit of the Russians.<sup>1</sup> With heroic resolution and incredible perseverance they struggled on, through

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 249, 251.  
Jom. xii.  
277, 279.  
Personal  
observation.

hardships which would have daunted any other soldiers; and at length the scattered stragglers were rallied in the valley of the Rhine, and headquarters established at Ilanz on the 10th, where the troops obtained some rest after the unparalleled difficulties which they had experienced.

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Meanwhile Korsakoff, having reorganised his army, and recovered in some degree from his consternation, halted his columns at Busingen, and turning fiercely on his pursuers, drove them back to Trullikon; but the enemy having there received reinforcements, the combat was renewed with the utmost obstinacy, and continued, without any decisive result on either side, till nightfall. On the same day, a body of Russian and Austrian cavalry, three thousand strong, posted in the vineyards and gardens which form the smiling environs of Constance, were attacked by a superior body of Republicans, under the command of General Gazan; a furious combat commenced, in the course of which the town was three times taken and retaken, barricades were thrown up in the streets, and the unhappy citizens underwent all the horrors of a fortress carried by assault. The Archduke Charles, informed of these circumstances, hastened with all his disposable forces from the environs of Mannheim. From the 1st to the 7th of October, twenty-seven battalions and forty-six squadrons arrived in the neighbourhood of Villingen, and the prince himself fixed his headquarters at Donaueschingen, in order to be at hand to support the broken remains of Korsakoff's army. The Allies were withdrawn from the St-Gothard, and all the posts they yet occupied in Switzerland, to the Grisons, and the Rhine formed the boundary between the hostile armies, the Russians being charged with its defence from Petershausen to Diesenhofen, and the Austrians with the remainder of the line.<sup>1</sup>

57.  
Bloody conflict with  
Korsakoff  
near Con-  
stance.  
Archduke  
hastens to  
his aid.

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 259, 264.  
Jom. xii.  
283, 286.

While these desperate conflicts were going on in the

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58.

Treaty  
between  
Russia and  
England for  
an expedi-  
tion to Hol-  
land.  
22d June  
1799.

south of Europe, England, at length rousing its giant strength from the state of inactivity in which it had so long been held by the military inexperience and want of confidence in its prowess on the part of government, was preparing an expedition more proportionate than any it had yet sent forth to the station which it occupied in the war. Holland was the quarter selected for attack, both as being the country in the hands of the enemy nearest the British shores, and most threatening to its maritime superiority, and as the one where the most vigorous co-operation might be expected from the inhabitants, and the means of defence within the power of the Republicans were most inconsiderable. By a treaty, concluded on the 22d June, between England and Russia, it was stipulated that the former of these powers was to furnish twenty-five thousand, and the latter seventeen thousand men, towards a descent in Holland, and that £44,000 a-month should be paid by England for the expenses of the Russian troops, and her whole naval force be employed to support the operations. To re-establish the Stadtholder in Holland, and terminate the revolutionary tyranny under which that opulent country groaned; to form the nucleus of an army which might threaten the northern provinces of France, and restore the barrier which had been so insanely destroyed by the Emperor Joseph; to effect a diversion in favour of the great armies now combating on the Rhine and the Alps, and destroy the ascendancy of the Republicans in the maritime provinces and naval arsenals of the Dutch, were the objects proposed in this expedition; and these, by efforts more worthy of the strength of England, might unquestionably have been attained.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
178, 179.  
Ann. Reg.  
301, and  
State Papers,  
216, 217.  
Dum. ii. 348,  
349.

59.

Vigorous  
preparations  
for the expe-  
dition in  
England.

The preparations for this expedition, both in England and the Baltic, were pushed with the utmost vigour; and the energy and skill with which the naval armaments and arrangements for disembarkation were made in the British harbours, were such as to extort the admiration

of the French historians. In the middle of July, Sir Home Popham sailed for the Baltic to receive on board the Russian contingent; while twelve thousand men, early in August, were assembled on the coast of Kent, and twelve thousand more were preparing for the same destination. All the harbours of England resounded with the noise of preparation; it was openly announced in the newspapers that a descent in Holland was in contemplation; and the numerous British cruisers, by reconnoitring every river and harbour along the Channel, kept the maritime districts in constant alarm from Brest to the Texel. The best defensive measures which their circumstances would admit were adopted by the Directory, and Brune, the French general, was placed at the head of the forces of both nations; but he could only collect fifteen thousand French and twenty thousand Dutch troops to resist the invasion.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Jom. xii.*  
180, 182,  
183. *Ann.*  
*Reg. 301.*  
*Dum. ii.*  
349, 351.  
352.

On the 13th August, the fleet, with the first division of the army, twelve thousand strong, set sail from Deal, and joined Lord Duncan in the North Sea. Tempestuous weather, and a tremendous surf on the coast of Holland, prevented the disembarkation from being effected for a fortnight; but at length, on the 26th, the fleet was anchored off the Helder, in North Holland, and preparations were immediately made for a descent on the following morning. At daylight on the 27th the disembarkation began, the troops led with equal skill and resolution by Sir RALPH ABERCROMBY,\* and the landing covered

60.  
The expedition sails,  
and lands on  
the Dutch  
coast.  
Action at  
the Helder.  
Aug. 27.

\* Ralph Abercromby, afterwards Sir Ralph, was born in the year 1743, the eldest son of George Abercromby, Esq. of Tullibody, head of an old and respectable family in Stirlingshire. He first entered the army as a cornet, in the 3d regiment of guards, in 1766. In that regiment he gradually rose, and in 1773 was its lieutenant-colonel. In 1781 he was made colonel of the 103d regiment of infantry; in 1787 was promoted to the rank of major-general, and next year obtained the command of the 69th foot. Subsequently, in 1797, he was moved to the command of the 7th dragoons, which he held to his death. He served with distinction in the campaign of 1794, in Flanders, especially at the brilliant affair of Catteau, on 16th April of that year, when the French general Chapuy, and thirty pieces of cannon, were taken by the British. The masterly manoeuvres which followed, on the part of Abercromby, who was second in command, more than once saved the English army from destruction: and in the

Early biography of Abercromby.

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by the able exertions of the fleet under Admiral Mitchell; and never was the cordial co-operation of the land and sea forces more required than on that trying service. The naval strength of England was proudly evinced on this occasion; fifteen ships of the line, forty-five frigates and brigs, and one hundred and thirty transport vessels, covered the sea, as far as the eye could reach, with their sails. General Daendels, who was at the head of a division of twelve thousand men in the neighbourhood, marched rapidly to the menaced point; and when the first detachment of the British, two thousand five hundred strong, was landed, it found itself assailed by a much superior force of Batavian troops. But the fire from the ships carried disorder into their ranks, and they were driven back to the sandhills on the beach, from which, after an obstinate conflict, they were expelled before six in the evening; and the debarkation of the remaining divisions was effected without molestation. In the night, the enemy evacuated the fort of the Helder, which was taken possession of next day by the English troops. In this affair the loss of the different parties was singularly at variance with what might have been expected; that of the British did not exceed five hundred, while that of the Dutch was more than thrice that number.<sup>1</sup>

This success was soon followed by another still more important. The position at the Helder having been fortified, and a reinforcement of five thousand fresh troops arrived from England, the British fleet entered

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
302. Jom.  
xii. 188, 189.  
Dum. ii.  
365, 369.

61.  
Capture of  
the Dutch  
fleet at the  
Texel.

dreadful retreat through Holland in the winter 1794-5, his coolness, intrepidity, and indomitable resolution were of the most essential service. In 1796 he did good service in the command of the expedition which effected the reduction of Stc Lucie, St Vincent, and Grenada, as well as of Guiana, Demerara, and Berbice. In February 1797, he commanded the land forces in an important expedition which effected the reduction of Trinidad and the destruction of four Spanish sail of the line in that island; and soon after made an unsuccessful attack on Puerto Rico. Nearly all these important colonies still remain to Great Britain, and these great services led to Abercromby being made a knight of the bath, and employed in 1799 in the command of a division in the expedition to Holland.—CHAMBERS' *Scottish Biography*, i. 5, 6, and *Biog. Univ.* i. 77.

the Texel—of the batteries defending which they had now the command by the occupation of the Helder—and summoned the Dutch fleet, under Admiral Story, consisting of eight ships of the line, three of fifty-four guns, eight of forty-four, and six smaller frigates, who had retired into the Vlietich canal, to surrender. At the sight of the English flag, symptoms of insubordination manifested themselves in the Dutch fleet, who had never become reconciled to the Republican yoke, which was ruining their country; the admiral, unable to escape, and despairing of assistance, surrendered without firing a shot; and immediately the Orange flag was hoisted on all the ships, and on the towers and batteries of the Helder and Texel. By this important success the Dutch fleet was finally extricated from the grasp of the Republicans—a circumstance of no small moment in after times, when England had to contend, single-handed, with the combined maritime forces of all Europe.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. ii.  
369, 372.  
Ann. Reg.  
303. Jom.  
xii. 190.

The Russian troops not having yet arrived, the British commander, who was only at the head of twelve thousand men, remained on the defensive, which gave the Republicans time to assemble their forces; and having soon collected twenty-four thousand, of whom seven thousand were French, under the orders of VANDAMME,\* General Brune, who had assumed the command-in-chief, resolved to anticipate the enemy, and resume the offensive. On the 10th of September all the columns were in motion; Vandamme, who commanded the right, was

62.  
The British  
are attacked  
by the Re-  
publicans,  
but repulse  
them with  
great loss.

\* Dominique Vandamme was born of humble parents at Cassel, in the department of the North, in 1771. He early took to the profession of arms as a private soldier, and served several years in that capacity, in one of the colonial regiments, but returned to France in 1789 at the time of the meeting of the States-General. He then formed in his native town a company of volunteers, known under the name of the chasseurs of Mount Cassel, of which he was elected captain. It was at the head of this company that he went through the campaign of 1792; and so rapid was military promotion in those days of popular election of officers, to those who were favourites with the soldiers, that before the end of the campaign he had already risen to the rank of general of brigade. In 1793 he served with the army of the North, and was engaged both in the capture of Furnes and the blockade of Nieuport in that campaign. In spring 1794 he gained some success with the same army in conjunction with

Early his-  
tory of  
Vandamme.

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directed to move along the Langdyke, and make himself master of Ennsginberg; Dumonceau, with the centre, was to march by Schorldam upon Krabbenham, and there force the key of the position; while the left was charged with the difficult task of chasing the enemy from the Sand-dyke, and penetrating by Kampto Petten. The contest, like all those which followed, was of the most peculiar kind. Restricted to dikes and causeys, intersecting in different directions a low and swampy ground, it consisted of detached conflicts at insulated points rather than any general movements; and, like the struggle between Napoleon and the Austrians in the marshes of Arcola, was to be determined chiefly by the intrepidity of the heads of columns. The Republicans advanced bravely to the attack, but they were everywhere repulsed. All the efforts of Vandamme were shattered against the intrepidity of the English troops who guarded the Sand-dyke; Dumonceau was defeated at Krabbenham, and Daendels compelled to fall back in disorder from before Petten. Repulsed at all points, the French resumed their position at Alkmaer, with a loss of two thousand men, while that of the British did not exceed three hundred.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. ii.  
378, 380.  
Jom. xii.  
192, 195.  
Ann. Reg.  
303. Personal  
observation.

63.  
The English,  
joined by the  
Russians, at  
length ad-  
vance.

Instructed by this disaster as to the quality of the troops with which he had to deal, General Brune remained on the defensive at Alkmaer, while the remainder of the expedition rapidly arrived to the support of the British army. Between the 12th and 15th September,

General Moreau, and having been afterwards transferred to the army of the Sambre and Meuse, served under Jourdan the whole campaign in that quarter. In the memorable campaign of 1796 he was attached to the army of the Upper Rhine under Moreau; and distinguished himself in several affairs, especially at the passage of the Lech and the attack on the heights of Friedberg. In the opening of the campaign of 1797 he displayed undaunted gallantry at the celebrated passage of the Rhine by Moreau, and not less so in the subsequent combats of Hanau and Diersheim. In February 1799 he was raised to the rank of general of division, and in that capacity commanded in the left wing of the army of the Danube, till the invasion of Holland by the English caused him to be transferred to the defence of the Batavian plains.—See *Biographie des Contemporains*, (VANDAMME,) xx. 134, 135.



the Russian contingent, seventeen thousand strong, and seven thousand British, arrived, and the Duke of York took the command. The English general, finding himself now at the head of thirty-five thousand men, and being aware that extensive reinforcements were advancing to the support of the Republicans from the Scheldt and the Meuse, resolved to move forward and attack the enemy. As the nature of the ground precluded the employment of large masses, the attacking force was divided into four columns. The first, under the command of General Hermann, composed of eight thousand Russians and a brigade of English, was destined to advance by the Sand-dyke and the Slapper-dyke against the left of Brune, resting on the sea; the second, under the orders of General Dundas, consisting of seven thousand men, of whom five thousand were English, was charged with the attack on Schorldam and the French centre; the third, under Sir James Pulteney, which required to advance along the Langdyke, which was defended by powerful intrenchments, was intended rather to effect a diversion than make a serious attack, and was not to push beyond Oude Scarpell, at its head, unless in the event of unlooked-for success; while the fourth, consisting of ten thousand choice troops, under Sir Ralph Abercromby, was destined to turn the enemy's right on the Zuyder Zee.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
304. Journ.  
xii. 198, 199.  
Dum. ii.  
384, 385.

The action commenced at daybreak on the 19th September with a furious attack by the Russians, under Hermann, who speedily drove in the advanced-guard of the Republicans at Kamp and Groot, and pressing forward along the Sand-dyke, made themselves masters of Schorldam and Bergen, and forced back Vandamme, who commanded in that quarter, to within half a league of Alkmaer. But the assailants were not supported with equal vigour by the British; they fell into disorder in consequence of the rapidity of their advance, and Brune, having speedily moved up the division of Daendels and

64.  
Disaster of  
the Russians  
on the right.

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1799.

considerable reinforcements from his centre to the support of his left, Vandamme was enabled to resume the offensive. Thus the Russians were attacked at once in front and both flanks in the village of Bergen, from whence, after a murderous conflict, they were driven at the point of the bayonet. Their retreat, which at first was conducted with some degree of order, was soon turned into a total rout by the sudden appearance of two French battalions on the flank of their column. Hermann himself was taken prisoner, with a considerable part of his division; and General Essen, his second in command, who had advanced towards Schorlham, was obliged to seek shelter, under cover of the English reserve, behind the Allied intrenchments of Zype.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
209, 303.  
Dum. ii. 337,  
383. Ann.  
Reg. 301,  
365.

65.  
Success of  
the British  
in the centre  
and left.  
But the  
Russians  
continue  
their retreat,  
and the British  
are at  
length re-  
pulsed.

While the Russians were undergoing these disasters on the right, the Duke of York was successful in the centre and left. Dundas carried the villages there, after an obstinate resistance; Dumonceau was driven back from Schorlham, and two of his best battalions were compelled to surrender. At the same time Sir James Pulteney, having been encouraged, by the imprudence of Daendels in pursuing too warmly a trifling advantage, to convert his feigned attack into a real one, not only drove back the Dutch division, but made a thousand prisoners, and forced the whole line, in utter confusion, towards St Pancras, under the fire of the English artillery. Abercromby had not yet brought his powerful division into action; but every thing promised decisive success in the centre and left of the Allies, when intelligence was brought to the Duke of York of the disaster on the right, and the rapid advance of the Republicans in pursuit of the flying Russians. He instantly halted his victorious troops in the centre, and marched with two brigades of English and three Russian regiments, upon Schorl, which was speedily carried, and if Essen could have rallied his broken troops, decisive success might yet have been attained. But all the efforts of that brave general could not restore order or rescue the

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
305, 306.  
Jom. xii.  
199, 205.  
Dum. ii.  
387, 389.

soldiers from the state of discouragement into which they had fallen ; and the consequence was, that as they continued their retreat to the intrenchments of Zype, the Republicans were enabled to accumulate their forces on the Duke of York, who, thus pressed, had no alternative but to evacuate Schorl, and draw back his troops to their fortified line. In this battle the Republicans lost 3000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners ; but the British lost 500 killed and wounded, and as many prisoners, while the Russians were weakened by 3500 killed and wounded, twenty-six pieces of cannon, and seven standards.<sup>1</sup>

While these events were in progress, the Dutch fleet was conveyed to the British harbours. It is remarkable that this measure gave equal dissatisfaction to the sailors on both sides. The Dutch loudly complained that their ships, instead of being employed in their own country, under Orange colours, should be taken as prizes to Great Britain ; while the English sailors lamented, that a fleet which could not escape had not fallen into their hands as glorious trophies, like those at St Vincent or Camperdown. The officers on both sides were anxious to preserve a good understanding between their respective crews ; but the sailors kept up a sullen distrust ;—so much more easy is it to accommodate differences between rival cabinets than to heal the national animosity which centuries of warfare have spread among their subjects. Holland, however, had no reason in the end to complain of British generosity ; after a decided, though unwilling hostility of twenty years, she obtained a lavish accumulation of gifts in Flanders and Java from her ancient rival, such as rarely rewards even the steadiest fidelity of an allied power.<sup>2</sup>

66.  
Removal of  
the Dutch  
fleet to Eng-  
land.

<sup>2</sup> Dum. ii.  
381, 382.

The Duke of York was not discouraged by the issue of the attack on the 19th September. Having been reinforced, a few days after, by a fresh brigade of Russians and some English detachments, he arranged his army, as before, in four columns ; and although the heavy rains for long prevented the projected operation from taking place, yet

67.  
The Duke  
of York  
renews the  
attack, and  
is successful.

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XXVIII.

1799.

Oct. 2.

he was enabled to resume the offensive on the 2d October. The recollection of the success which had everywhere crowned their efforts in the preceding action, animated the English troops; while the Russians burned with anxiety to wash out the stain which their disasters on that occasion had cast on the Imperial eagles. The Allied army on this occasion was about thirty thousand strong, and the Republicans nearly of equal force. At six in the morning the attack was commenced at all points. The Russian division of Essen, anxious to efface its former disgrace, supported by the English division of Dundas, advanced to the attack in the centre with such impetuosity, that the villages of Schorl and Schorldam were quickly carried, and the Republicans driven in confusion to the downs above Bergen. An attack was there projected by the Duke of York; but Essen, who recollected the consequence of the former eagerness of the Russians on the same ground, refused to move till the advance of Abercromby on the right was ascertained; a circumstance which paralysed the success of the Allies in that quarter. Meanwhile Abercromby, who commanded nine thousand men, advanced gallantly at the head of his troops along the Sand-dyke which adjoined the sea; and notwithstanding a hot fire of musketry and grape, by which he had two horses shot under him, succeeded in forcing the French left, and expelling them from the sandhills and downs on which they rested. On the left, Sir James Pulteney had made little progress, and his measures were confined to demonstrations; but as the Allied centre and right were victorious, and they had completely turned the French left, Brune retired in the night from the field of battle, and took up a fresh position, abandoning Alkmaar and all his former line. The loss sustained by the Republicans in this contest was above three thousand men and seven pieces of cannon; that of the Allies about fifteen hundred.<sup>1</sup> Already the attention of the French was attracted by the courage and address of the Highland regiments, arrayed

<sup>1</sup> Dum. ii.  
85, 86. *Jom.*  
xii. 207, 211.  
*Ann. Reg.*  
308.

in the tartan and plumes of their mountain land, who bravely fought up to the knees in water, and rapidly overcame the strongest obstacles, in their attack on the flank of the Republicans.

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But although he had gained this success, the situation of the Duke of York's army was far from encouraging. The enemy's force was daily increasing, while for his own no further reinforcements could be expected; the autumnal rains, which had set in with more than usual severity, rendered the roads almost impassable for artillery or chariots; the insalubrity of the climate at that period of the year was already beginning to affect the health of the soldiers; and none of the expected movements of the inhabitants or Batavian troops in favour of the house of Orange had taken place. In these circumstances it was evident that, unless some important place could be captured, it would be impossible for the Allies to retain their footing in North Holland, and Haarlem was pitched on as most likely to furnish the necessary supplies. To achieve the conquest of this important city, the Allied forces were put in motion to attack the French position, which occupied the narrow isthmus between Beverwick and the Zuyder Zee, by which it was necessary to pass to approach Haarlem, which was not more than three leagues distant.<sup>1</sup>

68.  
His critical  
situation  
notwith-  
standing.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
308, 309.  
Dum. ii. 308,  
309. Journ.  
xii. 211, 212.

The action commenced at seven in the morning, and was obstinately contested during the whole day. In the centre the Allies were, in the first instance, successful; Essen bore down all opposition, and Pacthod, who commanded the Republicans, was on the point of succumbing, when Brune strengthened him with the greater part of a fresh division, and a vigorous charge threw back the Allies in confusion towards their own position. In their turn, however, the victorious Republicans were charged, when disordered with success, by an English regiment of cavalry, thrown into confusion, and driven back with great loss to Kastricam, where they were with difficulty rallied by

69.  
Indecisive  
action.  
Oct. 6.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

1799.

<sup>1</sup> *Jom.* xii.  
212, 216.  
*Ann. Reg.*  
309. *Dum.*  
ii. 89.

Vandamme, who succeeded in checking the advance of the pursuers. The action was less obstinately contested on the right, as Abercromby, who commanded in that quarter, was obliged to detach a considerable part of his troops to reinforce Essen; while on the left the immense inundations which covered the front of the Republican position, prevented Pulteney from reaching the French right under Daendels. The loss on both sides was nearly equal, amounting to about two thousand in killed, wounded, and prisoners. That of the English alone was twelve hundred men.<sup>1</sup>

70.  
Which leads  
to the re-  
treat of the  
British.

The barren honours of this well-contested field belonged to the Allies, who had forced back the French centre to a considerable distance from the field of battle; but it is with an invading army as an insurrection—an indecisive success is equivalent to a defeat. Haarlem was the object of the English general, without the possession of which he could not maintain himself in the country during the inclement weather which was approaching, and Haarlem was still in the hands of the Republicans. The enemy's force was hourly increasing; two days after the action, six thousand infantry arrived to strengthen their already formidable position on the isthmus, by which alone access could be obtained to the interior of the country; and the total absence of all the necessary supplies in the corner of land within which the army was confined, rendered it impossible to remain there for any length of time. In these circumstances, the Duke of York, with the unanimous concurrence of a council of war, resolved to fall back to the intrenchments at Zype, there to await reinforcements or further commands from the British cabinet; a resolution which was strengthened by the intelligence which arrived, at the same time, of the disasters which had befallen the Russians at Zurich. On the day after the battle, therefore, the Allies retired to the position they had occupied before the battle of Bergen.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Jom.* xii.  
215, 217.  
*Dum.* ii. 90.  
91. *Ann.*  
*Reg.* 310.

Brune lost no time in following the retreating army.

On the 8th the Republicans resumed their position in front of Alkmaar, and several sharp skirmishes ensued between the British rearguard and the advanced posts of their pursuers. The situation of the Duke of York was now daily becoming more desperate: his forces were reduced by sickness and the sword to twenty thousand men; the number of those in hospital was daily increasing; there remained but eleven days' provisions for the troops, and no supplies or assistance could be looked for from the inhabitants for a retreating army. In these circumstances, he rightly judged that it was necessary to lose no time in embarking the sick, wounded, and stores, with such of the Dutch as had compromised themselves by their avowal of Orange principles, and proposed a suspension of arms to General Brune, preparatory to the evacuation of Holland by the Allied troops. Some difficulty was at first experienced from the French insisting, as a *sine quâ non*, that the fleet captured at the Texel should be restored; but this the British commander firmly resisted, and at length the conditions of the evacuation were agreed on. The principal articles were, that the Allies should, without molestation, effect the total evacuation of Holland by the end of November; that eight thousand prisoners, whether French or Dutch, should be restored; and that the works of the Helder should be given up entire, with all their artillery. A separate article stipulated for the surrender of the brave de Winter, made prisoner in the battle of Camperdown. Before the 1st of December all these conditions were fulfilled on both sides: the British troops had regained the shores of England, and the Russians were quartered in Jersey and Guernsey.<sup>1</sup>

Such was the disastrous issue of the greatest expedition which had yet sailed from the British harbours during the war, and the only one at all commensurate to the power or the character of England. Coming, as it did, after the hopes of the nation had been highly excited by its early

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71.  
The British  
first retire,  
and at last  
agree to  
evacuate  
Holland.

Oct. 17.

1 Ann. Reg.  
218, 219.  
Dum. ii. 94,  
96. Jom.  
xii. 216,  
219.72.  
Effects of  
this disaster  
on the na-  
tion.

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1799.

successes, and when the vast conquests of the Allies in the first part of the campaign had led to a very general expectation of the fall of the Jacobin power in France, it produced the most bitter disappointment, and contributed, in a signal degree, both on the Continent and at home, to confirm the general impression that the English soldiers had irrecoverably declined from their former renown; that the victors of Cressy and Azincour were never destined to revive; and that it was at sea alone that any hope of successful resistance against the power of the Republic remained to Great Britain. The Opposition, as usual, magnified the public disasters, and ascribed them all to the rashness and imbecility of the Administration; while the credulous public, incapable of just discrimination, and ever governed by the event, overlooked the important facts that the naval power of republican Holland had been completely destroyed by the expedition; and that in every encounter the English soldiers had asserted their ancient superiority over those of France. Instead, therefore, of ascribing the failure of the expedition to its real causes, inadequacy of the means employed, want of vigour in the commanders, and the jealousies incident to an allied force unaccustomed to act together, they joined the general chorus, and loudly proclaimed the utter madness of any attempts, by land at least, to resist the overwhelming power of France.<sup>1</sup> The time was not yet arrived when a greater commander, wielding the resources of a more determined and excited nation, was to wash out these stains on the British arms, and show to the astonished world that England was yet destined to take the lead, even on the Continent, in the deliverance of Europe, and that the blood of the victors of Poitiers and Blenheim yet flowed in the veins of their descendants.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
312. Jom.  
xii. 221, 222.

While the campaign was thus chequered with disaster to the north of the Alps, the successes of the Allies led to more durable consequences on the Italian plains. The



Directory, overwhelmed by the calamitous result of the battle of Novi, gave the command of both the armies of Italy and Savoy to General Championnet, who could only assemble fifty-four thousand men under his banners, exclusive of six thousand conscripts, who guarded the summits of the Alps. On the other hand, General Melas, who, after the departure of Suwarroff, had assumed the chief command, had sixty-eight thousand men under his orders, independent of fifteen thousand in garrisons in his rear, and seven thousand who marched towards the Arno and the Tiber. In despair at the unpromising condition of his troops, occupying the circular ridge of mountains from the sources of the Trebbia to the Great St Bernard, the French general at first proposed to repass the Alps, and, after leaving such a force in the Maritime Alps as might secure the south of France from insult, proceed, with the bulk of his forces, to join General Thurreau in the Valais. But the Directory refused to accede to this wise proposition ; and instead, prescribed to the French general to maintain his position, and exert his utmost efforts for the preservation of Coni, which was evidently threatened by the Imperialists.<sup>1</sup>

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1799.

73.

Affairs of  
Italy after  
the battle  
of Novi.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
313, 317.  
Dum. ii. 262,  
263. Arch.  
Ch. ii. 307.  
308. St-Cyr,  
ii. 10, 11.

The cautious and minute directions of the Aulic Council having completely fettered the Austrian general, his operations were confined to the reduction of this fortress, the last bulwark in the plain of Italy still held by the Republicans, and justly regarded as an indispensable preliminary to the conquest of Genoa, from its commanding the chief communication of that city with the plain of Piedmont. With this view, both generals drew their troops towards Coni ; the Austrians encircling its walls with a chain of posts in the plain, and the French accumulating their forces in the mountains which overlook it. In the desultory warfare which followed, the Imperialists were ultimately successful. Melas, with the centre, twenty thousand strong, defeated Grenier at Savigliano, while Kray threw back their left through the valley of Suza to

74.

The Imperialists draw round Coni.

Sept. 17.

Sept. 25.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.1799.  
Sept. 29.<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 309, 310.  
Jom. xii.  
318, 322.  
Dum. ii. 263,  
264. St-Cyr,  
ii. 12, 15.

the foot of Mont Cenis. At the same time the Republicans were equally unsuccessful in the valley of Aosta, where the united forces of Kray and Haddick expelled them successively from Ivrea and Aosta, and forced them to retire over the Great St Bernard to Martigny in Switzerland. Relieved by these successes from all disquietude for his right flank, Melas gradually drew nearer to Coni, and began his preparations for the siege of that place.<sup>1</sup>

75.  
Championnet is com-  
pelled to  
attempt its  
relief, and  
his measures  
for that pur-  
pose.

Pressed by the reiterated orders of the Directory, Championnet now resolved to make an effort for the relief of the menaced fortress. His disposable force for this enterprise, even including the troops in the Alps under Grenier, did not exceed forty-five thousand men; but by a vigorous and concentric effort, there was some reason to hope that the object might be effected. St-Cyr in vain represented to the Directory that it was the height of temerity to endeavour to maintain themselves in a mountainous region, already exhausted of its resources, and that the wiser course was to fall back, with the army yet entire, to the other side of the Alps, and there assemble it in a central position. How clear soever may have been the justice of this opinion, they had not strength of mind sufficient to admit the loss of Italy in a single campaign; and the French general, finding his counsel overruled, bravely set about the difficult task of keeping his ground, with an inferior and dispirited army, on the Italian side of the mountains. With this view, the divisions of Victor and Lemoine, forming the centre of the army, sixteen thousand strong, were directed to move upon Mondovi; while St-Cyr, with the right, received orders to descend from the Bochetta, and effect a diversion on the side of Novi. The movement commenced in the end of September.<sup>2</sup> Vico was taken by a brigade of the Republicans; but, finding the Imperialists too strongly posted at Mondovi to be assailed with success, Championnet contented himself with placing his troops in observation on the ad-

Sept. 28.  
<sup>2</sup> St-Cyr, ii.  
15, 17.  
Dum. ii.  
266, 267.

jacent heights ; while St-Cyr gained a trifling advantage in the neighbourhood of Novi.

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XXVIII.

1799.

76.

Actions  
around  
Coni.

But intelligence having at this time been received of the decisive victory of Massena in Switzerland, more vigorous operations were undertaken. St-Cyr, abandoning the route of Novi, threw himself towards Bosco on the rear of the Austrians, and attacked them with such celerity, that he made twelve hundred prisoners, and spread consternation through their whole line. Melas, thus threatened, concentrated the forces under his immediate command, consisting of thirty thousand men, in the finest condition, on the Stura ; upon which a variety of Oct. 12. affairs of posts took place around Coni, with checkered success, which gradually consumed the strength of the Republican forces. There was an essential error in these measures on the part of Championnet ; for the Imperialists, grouped around the fortress where they occupied a central position, could at pleasure accumulate masses sufficient to overwhelm any attack made by the Republicans, whose detached columns, issuing from the mountains, and separated by a wide distance, were unable to render any effectual assistance to each other. Nevertheless, the great abilities of St-Cyr on the right wing obtained some brilliant advantages. On the 23d of October he put himself in motion, at the head of twelve thousand men, with only a few pieces of cannon and no cavalry, defeated the Austrians at Pozzolo-Formigaro, and occupied Marengo, taking a thousand prisoners and three pieces of cannon. Alarmed at these repeated checks on his left, Melas withdrew the division of Haddick from the valley of Aosta, where the possession of the fort of Bard and the fall of snow in the Great St Bernard, relieved him from all St-Cyr, ii. 15, 19, 25, 28. disquietude, and with that reinforcement strengthened his left wing on the Bormida.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. ii. 266, 268, 273. Arch. Ch. ii. 312, 313. Jon. xii. 326, 335.

Meanwhile both parties gradually accumulated their forces for the important object which the one strove to effect, the other to prevent—the relief of Coni. The

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

1799.

77.

Prepara-  
tions for a  
decisive  
battle.

Oct. 31.

French had assembled thirty-five thousand men for that purpose ; but the central position of Melas long prevented them from obtaining any advantage ; and in an attack of Grenier on the Austrian centre, he was repulsed with the loss of a thousand men. Having at length resolved on a decisive action, Championnet made his dispositions. One column was to descend from Mont Cenis by the valley of Perouse ; another to advance by the left of the Stura ; and a third to assail the enemy in front. By this means the French general hoped that, while he engaged the attention of the Austrians in front, he would, at the same time, turn both their flanks ; forgetting that, in such an attempt, with columns converging from such remote and divided quarters, the chances were that the Imperialists, from their central position, would be able to defeat one column before another could arrive to its assistance.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 313, 315.  
Jom. xii.  
337, 341.  
Dum. ii. 273,  
275. St-Cyr,  
ii. 39, 41.

78.

Battle of  
Genola, in  
which the  
French are  
defeated.

Nov. 4.

Perceiving that the plan of his adversary was to attack him on all sides, Melas wisely resolved to anticipate his movement, and with his concentrated masses assail one of the French divisions before the others could come up. By a rapid accumulation of force, he could in this way bring above thirty thousand men, of whom six thousand were cavalry, to bear on the French centre, under Victor, who could not assemble above sixteen thousand to resist them. His dispositions were rapidly and ably made, and on the morning of the 4th November, the Republicans were attacked at all points. Championnet was so far from anticipating any such event, that his troops were already in march to effect a junction with the right wing under St-Cyr, when they were compelled, by the sudden appearance of the Imperialists in battle array, to halt and look to their own defence. Assailed by greatly superior forces, Victor, notwithstanding, made a gallant resistance ; and such was the intrepidity of the French infantry, that for long the advantage seemed to lie on their side, until at noon, Melas, by bringing up fresh troops, succeeded in throwing them into confusion, and drove them back

towards Valdigi. Hardly was this success gained when news arrived that General Duhesme, with the Republican left, had carried the village of Savigliano in his rear; but, wisely judging that this was of little importance, provided he followed up the advantage he had gained, the Austrian general merely detached a brigade to check their advance, and continued to press on the retiring centre of the enemy. Having continued the pursuit till it was dark, he resumed it at daybreak on the following morning. The enemy, discouraged by the check on the preceding day, did not make a very vigorous opposition. Grenier and Victor, driven from a post they had taken up near Murazzo, were forced to seek safety in flight; a large part of their rearguard were made prisoners, and great numbers drowned in endeavouring to cross the Stura and regain their intrenched camp. In this decisive battle the loss of the Republicans was seven thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, while that of the Imperialists did not exceed two thousand; and Championnet, with his army cut into two divisions—one of which retired towards Genoa and the other to the Col de Tende—was obliged to seek safety in the mountains, leaving Coni to its fate.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Jom.* xii.  
340, 348.  
*Dum.* ii. 282,  
285. *Arch.*  
*Ch.* ii. 314,  
317.

While Championnet was thus defeated in the centre by the superior skill and combinations of his opponent, the talents of St-Cyr again gave him an advantage on the Bormida. The Imperialists being there restored to an equality with the Republicans, Kray attacked St-Cyr near Novi, and drove him back to the plateau in the rear of that city, so lately the theatre of a bloody and desperate conflict; but all the efforts of the Austrians were shattered against the invincible resistance of the French infantry in that strong position, and, after a bloody conflict, they were forced to retire, leaving five pieces of artillery in the hands of the enemy. St-Cyr upon this resumed his position in front of Novi, and Kray fell back towards Alessandria, to be nearer assistance from the centre of the army. But this success was more than

79.  
Success of  
St-Cyr near  
Novi, and  
siege and  
fall of Coni.

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Nov. 10.

counterbalanced by fresh disasters in the centre and on the left. On the 10th, the division Ott attacked Richepanse at Borgo San-Dalmazzo, and, after a gallant resistance, drove him into the mountains; while the other division of the Republicans was assailed at Mondovì, and after an obstinate combat, which lasted the whole day, forced to take refuge in the recesses of the Appenines. The French were now driven back, on the one side, to the foot of the Col de Tende, and in the valley of the Stura to their own frontiers; while, on the other, Victor's division was perched on the summits of the Appenines at San Giacomo and San Bernardo. Nothing remained to interrupt the siege of Coni. The investment of this fortress was completed on the 18th November, and the trenches opened on the 27th. The governor made a brave defence; but the ignorance and inexperience of the garrison were soon conspicuous; and a tremendous fire on the 2d of December having destroyed great part of the town, and seriously injured the works, he at length yielded to the solicitations of the miserable inhabitants, and, to preserve the city from total destruction, agreed to a surrender. The garrison, 3000 strong, with 500 sick and wounded, who had been left in the place, were marched into the interior of Austria.<sup>1</sup>

Dec. 4.  
<sup>1</sup> Dum. ii.  
285, 287,  
304, 305.  
Jom. xii.  
348, 354.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 319, 323.  
St-Cyr, ii.  
42, 47.

80.  
Gallant conduct of St-Cyr in the Bochetta Pass.  
Dec. 6.

Meanwhile St-Cyr maintained himself with extreme difficulty in the Appenines in front of Genoa. The city was in the utmost state of agitation: the supplies of provisions from the country were all intercepted by the Austrian posts; the British fleet blockaded them by sea; famine began to be felt within its walls; and the French army, encamped on the higher ridges of the mountains which encircled it on the north, already suffered extremely from cold, want, and the tempests of autumn. For long their rations had been reduced to a fourth part of their usual amount; but even this miserable pittance, it was foreseen, could not last many days longer. Encouraged by their pitiable condition, Kray made an attack on their

advanced posts at Novi and Acqui, expelled them from these stations, formed the blockade of Gavi, and forced back the Republicans to their old position on the inhospitable summits of the mountains at the Bochetta and Campo-Fredde. Such was the panic which then seized the soldiers, that they could not be retained by their officers in that important pass, but, abandoning the intrenchments on its summit, rushed down in tumultuous crowds to Genoa, exclaiming, "What can we do here? we shall soon perish of cold and famine on these desert mountains; we are abandoned, sacrificed. To France! to France!" In this extremity St-Cyr presented himself at the gates of the city alone before the mutinous soldiery. "Whither do you fly, soldiers?"—"To France! to France!" exclaimed a thousand voices. "Be it so," exclaimed he, with a calm voice and serene air; "if a sense of duty no longer retains you, if you are deaf to the voice of honour, listen at least to that of reason, and attend to what your own interest requires. Your ruin is certain if you persist in your present course; the enemy who pursues you will destroy you during the confusion of a tumultuous retreat. Have you forgotten that you have made a desert between your present position and France? No, your sole safety is in your bayonets; and if you indeed desire to regain your country, unite with me in repelling far from the gates of this harbour the enemy, who would take advantage of your disorder to drive you from the walls where alone the necessary convoys or security can be found." Roused by these words to a sense of their duty, the soldiers fell back into their ranks and loudly demanded to be led against the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. ii.  
297, 298.  
St-Cyr, ii.  
68, 74.  
Hard. vii.  
321.

It was high time that some steps should be taken to arrest the progress of the Imperialists; for they were now at the gates of Genoa, and threatened the Republicans with immediate destruction. The Austrians, under Klenau, had penetrated by the route of the Corniche as far as St Martin d'Albaro and Nervi, within sight of that

81.  
Unsuccessful attempt of the Imperialists upon Genoa, who go into winter quarters.

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city, while from the Bochetta another column threatened to descend upon it. A heavy fall of snow, however, having prevented the Imperialists from crossing the pass when it was deserted by the French, the rebellious troops resumed their position, and re-occupied the intrenchments; and St-Cyr, now secure on that side, having turned all his forces against Klenau, the Austrians, assailed at once in front and flank, with difficulty cut their way through by Torriglia, and regained the banks of the Taro, leaving twelve hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy, and they soon after went into winter quarters. Returned to Genoa, St-Cyr had still a difficult task to perform in quieting the discontents of the troops, whom long-continued privation had almost driven to desperation; but at length the long-wished-for sails whitened its splendid bay, and the Republicans, as the reward of their heroic exertions, tasted the enjoyments of plenty and repose.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
355, 356.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 324, 325.  
Dum. ii.  
300, 302.  
St-Cyr, ii.  
76, 84, 99.  
Hard. vii.  
321.

82.  
Fall of  
Ancona.

While these great events were passing in the basin of Piedmont, operations of minor importance, but still conducive, upon the whole, to the expulsion of the French from the peninsula, took place in the south of Italy. The castle of St Angelo surrendered, in the end of October, to the Neapolitan forces, whom the retreat of Macdonald left at liberty to advance to the Eternal City; and the garrison of Ancona, after a gallant defence of six weeks, four of which were with open trenches, capitulated on the 13th November to the Russians, on condition of being sent to France, and not serving till regularly exchanged. By this success the Allies were made masters of 585 pieces of cannon, 7000 muskets, three ships of the line, and seven smaller vessels. The whole peninsula of Italy, with the exception of the intrenched camp at Genoa, and the mountain roads leading to it from France, was now wrested from the Republican arms.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xii.  
356, 361.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 326.

The fall of Ancona terminated this campaign in Italy, the most disastrous ever experienced by the French in



that country. In the respective positions which they occupied might be seen the immense advantages gained by the Allied arms during its continuance. The Imperialists, whose headquarters were at Turin, occupied the whole plain of Lombardy and Piedmont, from the stream of the Trebbia to the torrent of the Tessino: the left, under Kray, being so cantoned as to cover the valleys of the Bormida and Scrivia; the right, under Haddick and Rohan, occupying the valleys of Duomo d'Ossola and Aosta; and the centre, under Kaim, guarding the passes over the Alps and the important position of Mondovi. The Republicans, on the other hand, on the exterior of this immense circle, were perched on the snowy and inhospitable summits of the mountains, which stood the native guardians of the plains. The left, consisting of the divisions Grenier and Duhesme, occupying the Little St Bernard, the Mont Cenis, and the passes of the higher Alps; the centre, under Lemoine and Victor, the Col de Fenestrelles, and Col de Tende, and the passes of the Maritime Alps; while on the right, Laboissière and Watrin held the Bochetta and other passes leading into the Genoese states.<sup>1</sup>

Wider still was the difference between the comforts and resources of the two armies. Cantoned in the rich plains of Italy, on the banks of the Po, the Imperialists were amply supplied with all the comforts and luxuries of life; while its navigable waters incessantly brought up to the army the stores and supplies necessary to restore the losses of so active a campaign. On the side of the Republicans, again, thirty-eight thousand men, without magazines or stores of provisions, were stationed on the desolate summits of the Alps and the Appenines, shivering with cold, exhausted with fatigue, and almost destitute of clothing. For five months they had received hardly any pay; the soldiers were without cloaks; their shoes were worn out, and even wood was wanting to warm their frigid bivouacs. Overwhelmed with the horrors of his situation, Cham-

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83.

Position of  
the respec-  
tive parties  
at the con-  
clusion of  
the cam-  
paign.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
363, 365.  
Arch. Cl.  
ii. 327, 329.  
Dum. ii.  
307, 311.

84.

Contrast be-  
tween the  
comforts of  
the Imperi-  
alists and  
privations of  
the French.  
Death of  
Champion-  
net.

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<sup>1</sup> *Dunn*, ii.  
310, 311.  
*Jom.* xii.  
363, 365.  
*Arch. Ch.*  
ii. 327, 329.  
*St-Cyr*, ii.  
98, 100.

pionnet retired to Nice, where he died of an epidemic disorder, which soon broke out among the troops, and swept off great multitudes. His death dissolved the small traces of discipline which remained in the army. The soldiers tumultuously broke up their cantonments; crowds of deserters left their colours and covered the roads to France; and it was only by one of those nervous flights of eloquence which touch, even in the greatest calamities, every generous heart, that St-Cyr succeeded in stopping the return of a large body which had left Genoa, and was proceeding on the road to Provence. Alarmed at the representations which he drew of the disastrous state of the army, the government, which had now passed from the feeble hands of the Directory into the firm grasp of Napoleon, took the most active steps to administer relief; several convoys reached the troops, and Massena, sent to assume the supreme command, succeeded in some degree in stopping the torrent of desertion, and restoring the confidence of the army.<sup>1</sup>

85.  
Jealousy between the  
Russians  
and Austrians.

At the same time, the campaign on the Rhine was drawing to a close, and the most ruinous divisions had arisen between the Allied commanders. Notwithstanding the brilliant successes of the Republicans at Zurich, their forces in that quarter were not so numerous as to enable them, in the first instance, to derive any considerable fruit from their victory. But no sooner were they relieved, by the failure of the Allied expedition to North Holland, from all apprehension in that quarter, than they resolved to concentrate all their disposable force on the lower Rhine, of which the command was given to General Lecourbe, who had so distinguished himself in the mountain warfare of Switzerland. But that which the strength of the Republicans could not effect, the dissensions of their enemies were not long in producing. The Russians and Austrians mutually threw upon each other the blame of the late disasters: the latter alleging that the catastrophe at Zurich

was all owing to the want of vigilance and skill in Korsakoff; and the former replying, that if Suwarroff had been supported by Hotze, as he had a right to expect, when he descended from the St Gothard, all the misfortunes of the centre would have been repaired, and a brilliant victory over his right wing have dispossessed Massena from his defensive position on the line of the Limmat. In this temper of mind on both sides, and with the jealousy unavoidable between cabinets of equal power and rival pretensions, little was wanting to fan the discontent into a flame.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 272, 274.  
Jom. x. 367,  
370.

A trivial incident soon produced this effect. Suwarroff, after he had rested and reorganised his army, proposed to the Archduke that they should resume offensive operations against the enemy, who had shown no disposition to follow up his successes at Zurich. His plan was to abandon the Grisons, blow up the works of Fort St Lucie, and advance with all his forces to Winterthur, where he was to form a junction with Korsakoff, and attack the enemy in concert with the Imperialists. The Archduke apprehended with too much reason that the assembling of all the Russian troops on the banks of the Thur, in the centre of the enemy's line, which extended from Sargans to the junction of the Aar and Rhine, would be both difficult and perilous; and therefore he proposed instead, that the corps of Korsakoff should march by Stockach to join the marshal behind the lake of Constance, and that he himself should detach a strong Austrian column to second the operations of the Russians in Switzerland. Irritated at any alteration of his plans by a younger officer, the old marshal, already soured by the disastrous termination of the campaign in Switzerland, replied in angry terms, on the following day, that his troops were not adapted for any further operations in the mountains, and that he himself would march to join Korsakoff,\* and concert measures with him for the projected operations in

86.  
Suwarroff  
retires into  
Bavaria.

Oct. 13.

Oct. 14.

\* This letter Suwarroff terminated with the following expressions:—"I am

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Oct. 30.

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.

ii. 272, 274,

284, 285.

Jom. xii.

367, 379.

Switzerland. On the following day, however, he changed his resolution; for, declaring that his troops absolutely required repose, and that they could find it only at a distance from the theatre of war, he directed them to winter-quarters in Bavaria, between the Lech and the Iller, where they were soon after joined by the artillery, which had come round by Verona and the Tyrol.<sup>1</sup>

87.  
Which leads  
to a rupture  
between the  
cabinets of  
Vienna and  
St Petersburg.

This secession of the Russian force was not produced merely by jealousy of the Austrians, or irritation at the ill success of the Allied arms in Switzerland. It had its origin also in motives of state policy, and as such was rapidly communicated from the field-marshal's headquarters to the cabinet of St Petersburg. The alliance between Russia and Austria, even if it had not been dissolved by the mutual exasperation of their generals, must have speedily yielded to the inherent jealousy of two monarchies, equal in power and discordant in interest. The war was undertaken for objects which, at that time at least, appeared to be foreign to the immediate interests of Russia; the danger to the balance of power by the preponderance of France seemed to be removed by the conquest of Italy; and any further successes of Austria, it was said, were only likely to weaken a power too far removed to be of any serious detriment to the influence of Russia, in order to enrich one much nearer, and from whom serious resistance to its ambitious projects might be expected. The efforts for the preceding campaign, moreover, had been extremely costly, and in a great degree, notwithstanding the English subsidies, had exhausted the Imperial treasury. In these circumstances, the exasperation of the generals speedily led to a rupture between the cabinets, and the Russian troops took no further share in the war.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xii.  
370, 371.  
Arch. Ch.  
ii. 272, 274.  
Dum. ii. 317.

field-marshal as well as you; commander, as well as you, of an Imperial army; old, while you are young; it is for you to come and seek me." He was so profoundly mortified by the defeat of the Russians at Zurich, that when he reached his winter-quarters, he took to bed, and became seriously ill; while the Emperor Paul gave vent to his indignation against the Austrians in an angry article published in the Gazette of St Petersburg.—HARD. vii. 297, 298.

Left to its own resources, however, the Austrian cabinet was far from being discouraged. The Archduke Charles had collected eighty thousand men between Offenbourg and Feldkirch ; but great as this force was, it hardly appeared adequate, after the departure of the Russians, to a renewal of active operations in the Alps, and therefore he kept his troops on the defensive. Massena, on his side in Switzerland, was too much exhausted by his preceding exertions to make any offensive movement. On the other hand, Lecourbe, whose forces on the Lower Rhine had been raised by the efforts of the Directory to twenty thousand men, passed that river in three columns, at Worms, Oppenheim, and Mayence, and moved forward against Prince Schwartzberg, who commanded the advanced-guard of the right wing of the Austrians, which occupied the line of the Bergstrass from Frankfort to Darmstadt. As the French forces were greatly superior, the Austrian general was compelled to retire, and, after evacuating Heidelberg and Mannheim, to concentrate his troops to cover Philippsburg, which, however, he was soon obliged to abandon to its own resources. The Archduke, though grievously embarrassed at the moment by the rupture with the Russians, turned his eyes to the menaced point, and, by rapidly causing reinforcements to defile in that direction, soon acquired a superiority over his assailants. The Republican advanced-guard was attacked and worsted at Erligheim ; in consequence of which the blockade of Philippsburg was raised ; but the French having been reinforced, it was again invested. The Archduke, however, having at length terminated his correspondence with Suwarroff, turned his undivided attention to the menaced quarter, and directed a large part of the Imperial army to reinforce his right. These columns soon overthrew the Republicans, and Lecourbe was placed in a situation of such danger, that he had no means of extricating himself from it but by proposing an armistice to Starray, who commanded the Imperialists,

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88.

Positions  
assumed by  
the Aus-  
trians when  
so abandon-  
ed, and ope-  
rations on  
the Lower  
Rhine.  
Oct. 10.

Oct. 31.

Nov. 7.

Dec. 2.

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<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 292, 305.  
Jom. xii.  
376, 385.  
Dum. ii. 332,  
348.

on the ground of negotiations being on foot between the two powers for peace. Starrray accepted it, under a reservation of the approbation of the Archduke. But his refusal to ratify it was of no avail; in the interval the stratagem had succeeded; three days had been gained, during which the Republicans had leisure to defile without molestation over the Rhine.<sup>1</sup>

89.  
Reflections  
on the vast  
successes  
gained by  
the Allies  
in the cam-  
paign.

This closed the campaign of 1799, one of the most memorable of the whole revolutionary war. Notwithstanding the disasters by which its latter part had been checkered, it was evident that the Allies had gained immensely by the results of their operations. Italy had been regained as rapidly as it had been lost; Germany, freed from the Republican forces, had rolled back to the Rhine the tide of foreign invasion, and the blood of two hundred thousand French soldiers had expiated the ambition and weakness of the Republican government. Not even in the glorious efforts of 1796, had the French achieved successes so important, or chained victory to their standards in such an unbroken succession of combats as the Allies had done during this campaign. The conquest of all Lombardy and Piedmont; the reduction of the great fortresses which they contained; the liberation of Naples, Rome, and Tuscany, were the fruits of a single campaign. Instead of a cautious defensive on the Adige, the Imperialists now assumed a menacing offensive on the Maritime Alps; instead of trembling for the Tyrol and the Hereditary States, they threatened Switzerland and Alsace. The Republicans, weakened and disheartened, were everywhere thrown back upon their own frontiers; the oppressive system of making war maintain war could no longer be carried on; and a revolutionary state, exhausted by the sacrifices of nine years, seemed about to feel in its own territory a portion of the evils which it had so long inflicted upon others.

The internal situation of France was even more discouraging than might have been inferred from the exter-

nal aspect of its affairs. In truth, it was there that the true secret of its reverses was to be found ; the bravery and skill of the armies on the frontier had long concealed, but could no longer singly sustain, the internal weakness of the state. The prostration of strength which invariably succeeds the first burst of revolutionary enthusiasm, had now fallen upon France ; and if an extraordinary combination of circumstances had not intervened to extricate her from the abyss, there can be no doubt she would have permanently sunk. The ardour of the Revolution had totally subsided. Distrust and despondency had succeeded to the enthusiasm of victory ; instead of the patriotism of generous, had arisen the cupidity of selfish minds. "The radical vice," says General Mathieu Dumas, "of a government without a chief was now apparent. The courage and talents of the generals, the valour and intelligence of the soldiers, who, during this dreadful campaign, had sustained this monstrous species of authority, sapped by every species of abuse and the exhaustion arising from the excess of every passion, could no longer repair or conceal the faults of those at the head of affairs. Public spirit was extinguished ; the resources of the interior were exhausted ; the forced requisitions could no longer furnish supplies to assuage the misery of the soldiers ; the veteran ranks had long since perished, and the young conscripts, destined to supply their place, deserted their standards in crowds, or concealed themselves to avoid being drawn ; more than half the cavalry was dismounted : the state was in greater danger than it had ever been since the commencement of the war."<sup>1</sup> The losses sustained by the French during the campaign had been prodigious ; they amounted to above a hundred and seventy thousand men, exclusive of those who had been cut off by sickness and fatigue, who were a hundred thousand more.\* In these circumstances, nothing was wanting to have enabled the coalition to triumph over the exhausted and discordant population of

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1799.

90.

Deplorable  
internal  
situation of  
the Republic.<sup>1</sup> Dum. ii.  
335.

\* See "Etat des Pertes de l'Armée Française en 1799."—HARD, vii. 473.

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France, but union, decision, and a leader of paramount authority. Nothing could have saved the Republicans from the grasp of the Allies but their own divisions. These were not slow, however, in breaking out; and, amidst the ruinous jealousies of the Allies, that mighty conqueror arose who was destined to stifle the democracy and tame the passions of France, and bring upon her guilty people a weight of moral retribution, which could never have been inflicted till the latent energies of Europe had been called forth by his ambition.

91.  
Causes of  
the rupture  
of the Al-  
liance.

"The alliance between Austria and Russia," says the Archduke Charles, "blew up, like most coalitions formed between powers of equal pretensions. The idea of a common interest, the illusion of confidence based on the same general views, prepares the first advances; difference of opinion as to the means of attaining the desired objects, soon sows the seeds of misunderstanding; and that envenomed feeling increases in proportion as the events of the war alter the views of the coalesced powers, derange their plans, and undeceive their hopes. It seldom fails to break out openly when the armies are destined to undertake any operation in concert. The natural desire to obtain the lead in command, as in glory, excites the rival passions both of chiefs and nations. Pride and jealousy, tenacity and presumption, spring from the conflict of opinion and ambition; continual contradictions daily inflame the mutual exasperation, and nothing but a fortunate accident can prevent such a coalition from being dissolved before one of the parties is inclined to turn his arms against the other. In all the varieties of human events, there are but two in which the co-operation of such unwieldy and heterogeneous masses can produce great effects; the one is, when an imperious necessity, and an insupportable state of oppression, induces both sovereigns and their subjects to take up arms to emancipate themselves, and the struggle is not of sufficient duration to allow the ardour of their first enthusiasm



to cool; the other, when a state, by an extraordinary increase of power, can arrogate to itself and sustain the right to rule the opinion of its allies, and make their jealousies bend to its determination. Experience has proved that these different kinds of coalitions produce different results: almost all oppressive conquerors have been overthrown by the first; the second has been the chief instrument in the enthralling of nations.”<sup>1</sup> In these profound remarks is to be found the secret both of the long disasters attending the coalition against France, of the steady rise and irresistible power of the alliance headed by Napoleon, and of his rapid and irretrievable overthrow. They should never be absent from the contemplation of the statesman in future times, either in estimating the probable result of coalitions in which his own country takes a part, or in calculating on the chances of its resisting those which may be formed for its subjugation.

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<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 273.

With regret the author must now bid adieu to the Memoirs of the Archduke Charles, so long the faithful guide in the German campaigns, as his invaluable annals do not come further down than the close of the campaign of 1799. Military history has few more remarkable works of which to boast. Luminous, sagacious, disinterested; severe in judging of himself, indulgent in criticising others; liberal of praise to all but his own great achievements, profoundly skilled in the military art, and gifted with no common powers of narrative and description, his work is a model of candid and able military disquisition. Less vehement and forcible than Napoleon, he is more circumspect and consistent; with inferior genius, he is distinguished by infinitely greater candour, generosity, and trustworthiness. On a fact stated by the Archduke, whether favourable or adverse to his reputation, or a criticism made by him on others, the most perfect reliance may be placed. To a similar statement in the St Helena Memoirs implicit credit cannot be

92.  
Comparison of the  
military  
writings of  
Archduke  
Charles and  
Napoleon.

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given, unless its veracity is supported by other testimony, or it is borne out, as is often the case, by its own self-evident justice and truth. In the military writings of these two great antagonists may be seen, as in a mirror, the opposite principles and talents brought into collision during the revolutionary war. On the one side, judgment, candour, and honesty, without the energy requisite to command early advantage in the struggle; on the other, genius, vigour, invention, but none of the moral qualities essential to confer lasting success. Or, perhaps, a more profound or fanciful observer may trace in the German chief the fairest specimens of the great and good qualities which, in every age, have been the characteristic of the blue-eyed children of the Gothic race; in the French, the most brilliant assemblage that ever occurred of the mental powers of the dark-haired Celtic family of mankind.

93.  
Character of  
the Arch-  
duke.

<sup>1</sup> D'Abr. iv.  
384.

"Prince Charles," said Napoleon, "is a man whose conduct will ever be irreproachable. His soul belongs to the heroic age, but his heart to that of gold. More than all, he is a good man, and that includes everything when said of a prince."<sup>1</sup> The whole career of the Archduke, from first to last, justifies this beautiful eulogium. More, perhaps, than any commander of the age, he was "without fear and without reproach." Uniting the courtesy and dignified manners of the days of chivalry to the patriotic spirit of ancient Rome, and the upright heart of the Gothic blood, he was the general of all others, in those days of glory, who approached nearest to the standard of ideal perfection. Inferior to Napoleon in genius, to Suwarroff in daring, he was superior to either in cautious combination, scientific foresight, and the power of repairing disaster. His deliverance of Germany in 1796 was achieved by ability in strategy equal to that which gave Napoleon in the same year the empire of Italy: his able retreat through the Alps in 1797 procured for his defeated country an advantageous

peace ; but for the errors of the Aulic Council he would in 1799 have accomplished the subversion of the Republic.

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When opposed to Napoleon himself, at the head of a colossal army in 1809, he retrieved the overthrow on the Bavarian plains; defeated the French Emperor in a pitched battle under the walls of Vienna; and, but for the neglect of his orders by the Archduke John, would have crushed him by an overthrow as decisive as that of Waterloo, on the field of Wagram.

Four commanders, and four only, in the age of the French Revolution, have risen to the highest eminence: Napoleon, Wellington, Suwarroff, and the Archduke Charles. The two last offered a striking contrast to each other, and, like the two first, were types of the nations at the head of whose armies they respectively combated. The Archduke had more science, Suwarroff greater daring; the former was superior in combination, the latter in execution. Fearless, vehement, and impassioned, the strokes of the Russian conqueror fell like the burning thunderbolt; but he frequently relaxed his efforts when victory was gained, and did not always reap that fruit from his victories which might have been anticipated from their brilliancy. Profound, cautious, unwearied, the conqueror of Aspern rose with the difficulties with which he was surrounded, and extracted from them the means of again recalling victory to his standards; but by carrying too far the principle of avoiding risk, he not unfrequently lost the opportunity of achieving decisive success. Suwarroff, by the vehemence of his onset, reft in a few weeks from the Republicans the whole fruit of Napoleon's victories in Italy, while, by an undue delay of eight days at Milan, he missed the opportunity of destroying their army in its retreat. The Archduke reduced the conqueror of Echmuhl to the last straits on the shores of the Danube, but, by afterwards suspending his attack on the island of Lobau, lost the chance of finishing the war at a blow. The former was greater on the field, the latter in the council. In

94.  
Parallel between the  
Archduke  
and Suwarroff.

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tactics the Muscovite commander was unrivalled, the Austrian in strategy. Both were subject to the grievous bondage from which Napoleon and Frederick were happily exempt,—of a council, composed of men inferior in ability to themselves, far removed from the scene of action, and who not unfrequently marred their best-laid enterprises. Yet did each, notwithstanding this disadvantage, worthily discharge the important duty he was called to by Providence and intrusted with by his country: the conqueror of Ismael, in bearing the Russian standards, conquering and to conquer, through every adjoining state; the saviour of Germany in stemming the torrent of revolutionary invasion, and preserving unscathed for happier times the strength and fortitude of his country.

95.  
Comparison  
of the pas-  
sage of the  
St Gothard  
by Suwar-  
roff, and the  
St Bernard  
by Napo-  
leon.

The passage of the St Bernard by Napoleon has been the subject of unmeasured eulogium by almost all the French historians; but nevertheless, in the firmness with which it was conducted, the difficulties with which it had to contend, and the resolution displayed in its execution, it must yield to the Alpine campaign of the Russian hero. In crossing from Martigny to Ivrea, the First Consul had no enemies to overcome, no lakes to pass, no hostile army to vanquish, after the obstacles of nature had been surmounted; the difficulty of the ascent and the roughness of the road constituted the only serious impediments to the march. But in passing from Bellinzona to Altdorf by the St Gothard, Suwarroff had to encounter not merely a road of greater length and equal difficulty, but to force his way, sword in hand, through columns of the enemy, long trained to mountain warfare, intimately acquainted with the country, under a leader of pre-eminent skill in that species of tactics; and to do this with troops as ignorant of Alpine geography as those of France would have been of the passes of the Caucasus. When he descended, like a mountain torrent, to the lake of Uri, overthrowing everything in his course, he found his progress stopped by a deep expanse of water, shut in by precipices

on either side, without roads on its shores, or a bark on its bosom, and received the intelligence of the total defeat of the army with which he came to co-operate under the walls of Zurich. Obligated to defile by the rugged paths of the Schächenthal to the canton of Glarus, he was ere long enveloped by the victorious columns of the enemy, and his front and rear assailed at the same time by superior forces, flushed by recent conquest. It was no ordinary resolution which in such circumstances could disdain to submit, and, after fiercely turning on his pursuers, and routing their bravest troops, prepare to surmount the difficulties of a fresh mountain passage, and, amidst the horrors of the Alps of Glarus, brave alike the storms of winter and the pursuit of the enemy. The bulk of men in all ages are governed by the event; and to such persons the passage of the St Bernard, followed as it was by the triumph of Marengo, will always be the highest object of interest. But without detracting from the well-earned fame of the French general, it may safely be affirmed that those who know how to separate just combination from casual disaster, and can appreciate the heroism of valour when struggling with misfortune, will award a still higher place to the Russian hero, and follow the footsteps of Suwarroff over the snows of the St Gothard and the valley of Sernft with more interest than either the eagles of Napoleon over the St Bernard, or the standards of Hannibal from the shores of the Rhone to the banks of the Po.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Personal comparison of the three passages.

Suwarroff did not long survive his final ill success against the arms of the Republicans. Accustomed to a long train of victory, undefeated in a single battle during his long career when acting unfettered, he became the prey of unbounded vexation, at seeing his deserved reputation for invincibility reft from him in the close of his career, by the absurd combinations or selfish jealousy of the Aulic Council. Shortly after he arrived in St Petersburg, he fell under the displeasure of the Emperor Paul, whose

96.  
Last illness and death of Suwarroff.

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1799.

head, never very strong, was now exhibiting unequivocal proofs of aberration. His great ground of complaint against Suwarroff was not the ill success of his later operations, but his not having informed him of the astute and selfish policy of the cabinet of Vienna, in time to have prevented the disasters from which the Muscovite arms had suffered so severely; as if it was the duty of a general to sow discord between his master and the allied sovereigns with whom he was acting. Grief for this estrangement so preyed upon the mind of the illustrious general, that his complaint resisted all the efforts of art, and he was soon on the verge of death. He awaited its approach with calm composure, but sent a message to the Emperor to say he had a last favour to request at his hands.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Laverne,  
Vie de Sou-  
varoff, 430,  
432.

97.  
His last re-  
quest and  
funeral.

The Emperor declined to visit him, but sent his grandsons, Alexander, afterwards Emperor, and Constantine, to console the last moments of the dying hero, accompanied by an assurance that his last request should be granted. When the message was delivered, he spoke long and warmly on the past lustre and present decline of his country's glory, and broke out in passionate exclamation on his eternal attachment to the great Catherine. "I was only a soldier," said he, with his last breath, "and she felt the inclination I had to serve her. I owe her more than life; she has given me the means of making it illustrious. Tell her son that I receive with gratitude his Imperial word. Here is the portrait of Catherine; it has never since I received it left my bosom: the favour I ask is, that it should be buried with me in my tomb, and remain for ever attached to my heart." With these words he expired. His last favour was granted; he was laid in the tomb with the portrait of Catherine placed on his bosom. The enmity of Paul, however, continued beyond the grave; not a Russian attended him to his place of sepulture, and the whole Continental corps diplomatique, influenced by his known hostility, kept aloof from the mournful ceremony.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Laverne,  
Vie de Sou-  
varoff, 434,  
435.

The English ambassador\* alone, with a spirit worthy of the representative of a free people, braved the wrath of the Czar in the plenitude of his power, and followed the remains of the immortal hero to his grave.

The expedition to Holland was ably conceived, and failed only from the inadequacy of the force employed, and the inherent weakness incident to an enterprise conducted by allied forces. It was the greatest armament which had been sent from Great Britain during the war, but was yet obviously inadequate both to the magnitude of the enterprise and the resources of the state mainly interested in its success. In truth, the annals of the earlier years of the war incessantly suggest regret at the parsimonious expenditure of British force, and the great results which, to all appearance, would have attended a more vigorous effort at the decisive moment. "Any person," says Mr Burke, "who was of age to take a part in public affairs forty years ago, if the intermediate space were expunged from his memory, would hardly credit his senses when he should hear, from the highest authority, that an army of two hundred thousand men was kept up in this island, and that in Ireland there were at least eighty thousand more. But how much greater would be his surprise, if he were told again that this mighty force was retained for the mere purpose of an inert and passive defence, and that, by its very constitution, the greater part was disabled from defending us against the enemy by one preventive stroke or one operation of active hostility! What must his reflections be on learning further, that a fleet of five hundred men-of-war, the best appointed that this country ever had upon the sea, was for the greater part employed in the same system of unenterprising defence? What must be the feelings of any one who remembers the former energy of England, when he is given to understand that these two islands, with their extensive sea-coast, should be considered as a garrisoned sea-town; that its garrison

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98.  
Deplorable  
insignifi-  
cance of the  
part which  
England  
took in the  
Continental  
struggle.

\* Lord Whitworth.

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1799.

<sup>1</sup> Burke on  
a Regicide  
Peace,  
Works,  
viii. 374.

99.  
Great re-  
sults which  
might have  
followed a  
more vigor-  
ous warfare  
at hand by  
England.

<sup>2</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 165.

was so feebly commanded as never to make a sally; and that, contrary to all that has been hitherto seen in war, an inferior army, with the shattered relics of an almost annihilated navy, may with safety besiege this superior garrison, and, without hazarding the life of a man, ruin the place merely by the menaces and false appearances of an attack?"<sup>1</sup>

If this was true in 1797, when the indignant statesman wrote these cutting remarks, how much more was it applicable in 1799, when France was reduced to extremities by the forces of Austria and Russia, and the extraordinary energy of the Revolution had exhausted itself? The Archduke Charles, indeed, has justly observed, that modern history presents few examples of great military operations executed in pursuance of a descent on the sea-coast; and that the difficulties of the passage, and the uncertainty of the elements, present the most formidable obstacles in the way of the employment of considerable forces in such an enterprise.<sup>2</sup> But experience in all ages has demonstrated that they are not insurmountable, and that from a military force, thus supported, the greatest results may reasonably be expected, if sufficient energy is infused into the undertaking. The examples of the overthrow of Hannibal at Zama, of the English at Hastings, of the French at Cressy and Azincour, and of Napoleon in Spain and at Waterloo, prove what can be effected, even by a maritime expedition, if followed up with the requisite vigour. And, unquestionably, there never was an occasion when greater results might have been anticipated from such an exertion than in this campaign. Had sixty thousand native British, constantly fed by fresh supplies from the parent state, been sent to Holland, they would have borne down all opposition, hoisted the Orange flag on all the fortresses of the United Provinces, liberated Flanders, prevented the accumulation of force which enabled Massena to strike his redoubted blows at Zurich, hindered the formation of the army of



reserve, and intercepted the thunder-strokes of Marengo and Hohenlinden.

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100.

Cause of the  
rapid fall of  
the French  
power in  
1799.

The rapid fall of the French military power in 1799 was the natural result of the sudden extension of the frontiers of the Republic beyond its strength, and affords another example of the truth of the maxim, that the more the ambition of a nation in a state of fermentation leads to its extension, the more does it become difficult for it to preserve its conquests.<sup>1</sup> Such a state as France then was, with a military power extending from the mouth of the Ems to the shores of Calabria, and no solid foundation for government but the gratification of ambition, has no chance of safety but in constantly advancing to fresh conquests. The least reverse, by destroying the charm of its invincibility, and compelling the separation of its armies to garrison its numerous fortresses, leaves it weak and powerless in the field, and speedily dissolves the splendid fabric. This truth was experienced by the Directory in 1799; it was evinced on a still greater scale, and after still more splendid triumphs, by Napoleon in 1813. It is power slowly acquired and wisely consolidated, authority which brings the blessings of civilisation and protection with its growth, victories which array the forces of the vanquished states in willing and organised multitudes under the standards of the victor, which alone are durable. Such were the conquests of Rome in the ancient world, such are the conquests of Russia in Europe, and Britain in India, in modern times. The whirlwinds of an Alexander, a Timour, or a Napoleon, are in general as short-lived as the genius which creates them. The triumphs flowing from the transient ebullition of popular enthusiasm sink with the decay of the passion from which they spring. Nothing is durable in nature but what has arisen by slow degrees; nothing in the end obtains the mastery of nations but the power which protects and blesses them.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
386.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

CIVIL HISTORY OF FRANCE, FROM THE REVOLUTION OF THE  
18TH FRUCTIDOR TO THE SEIZURE OF SUPREME POWER BY  
NAPOLEON. SEPTEMBER 1797—NOVEMBER 1799.

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XXIX.

1798.

1.

Apathy of  
the public  
mind after  
the revolution  
of 18th  
Fructidor.

THE Revolution of France had now run through the usual course of universal enthusiasm, general suffering, plebeian revolt, bloody anarchy, democratic cruelty, and military despotism. There remained a last stage to which it had not yet arrived, but which, nevertheless, was necessary to tame the passions of the people, and reconstruct the fabric of society out of the ruined fragments of former civilisation. This stage was that of a SINGLE DESPOT, and to this final result the weakness consequent on exhausted passion was rapidly bringing the country. To the fervour of democratic license there invariably succeeds in a few years a period of languor and listlessness, of blighted hope and disappointed ambition, of despair at the calamitous results of previous changes, and heedlessness to everything but the gratification of selfish passion. The energetic, the ardent, the enthusiastic, have for the most part sunk under the contests of former factions. Few remain but the base and calculating, who, by stooping before the storms under which their more elevated rivals perished, have contrived to survive their fall. This era is that of public degradation, of external disaster and internal suffering, and, in the despair of all classes, it prepares the way for the return to a more stable order of things.

The external disasters which had rapidly accumulated upon the Republic since the commencement of hostilities, the loss of Italy, and refluxence of the war to the frontiers of France, could hardly have failed to overturn a government so dependent on the fleeting gales of popular favour as that of the Directory, even if it had not been tainted by the inherent vice of having been established by the force of military power, in opposition to the wishes of the nation and the forms of the constitution. But this cause had for long been preparing its downfall; and the removal of the armies to the frontier, upon the resumption of hostilities, rendered it impossible any longer to stifle the public voice. That inevitable scourge of all revolutionary states, *embarrassment of finance*, had, since the revolution of the 18th Fructidor, impeded all the operations of the government. Notwithstanding the confiscation of two-thirds of the public debt, it was found impossible, in the succeeding season, to pay the interest on the third which remained, without having recourse to fresh expedients. The deficit on the year was announced by the minister of finance as amounting to at least 63,000,000 francs, or £2,520,000; it was known to amount to nearly 100,000,000; and the taxes were levied slowly, and with extreme difficulty. To meet the deficiency, the duty on doors and windows was doubled; that on carriages raised tenfold, and the effects of the Protestant clergy were, as already noticed, confiscated, putting them, like the Catholics, on the footing of payment from government. Thus the Revolution, as it advanced, was successively swallowing up the property even of the humblest in the community.<sup>1</sup>

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1799.

2.

Extreme  
difficulties  
of govern-  
ment since  
that event.<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 214,  
215. Mig.  
ii. 442.

The new elections of a third of the legislature, in March 1799, were conducted with greater order and freedom than any which had preceded them; because the army, the great support of the Directory, was for the most part removed, and the violence used on previous occasions to secure the return could not so easily be put in force. A large pro-

3.

Universal  
dissatisfac-  
tion after  
the new  
elections.

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1799.

portion of representatives, accordingly, were returned adverse to the government established by the bayonets of Augercau, and waited only for an opportunity to displace it from the helm. It fell to Rowbell's lot to retire from the Directory, and Sièyes was chosen by the two councils in his stead. The people were already dissatisfied with the administration of affairs, when the disasters at the commencement of the campaign came to fan the flame into a conflagration. After these events, the public indignation could no longer be restrained. Complaints broke out on all sides; the conduct of the war, the management of the finances, the tyranny exercised over the elections, the arbitrary dispersion of the Chambers, the iniquitous removal of nearly one-half of the deputies, the choice of the generals, the direction of the armies, all were made subjects of vehement and impassioned invective. The old battalions, it was said, had been left in the interior to overawe the elections; the best generals were in irons; Championnet, the conqueror of Naples, had been dismissed for striving to repress the rapacity of the inferior agents of the Directory; Moreau, the commander in so glorious a retreat, was reduced to the rank of a general of division, and Scherer, unknown to fame, had been invested with the command of the army of Italy. Even measures which had formerly been the object of general praise, were now condemned in no measured terms. The expedition to Egypt, it was discovered, had given an eccentric direction to the best general and bravest army of the Republic, and provoked the hostility at once of the Sublime Porte and the Emperor of Russia; while the attack on Switzerland was an unjustifiable invasion of neutral rights, which necessarily aroused the indignation of all the European powers, and brought on a war which the government had made no preparations to meet. These complaints were, in a great degree, well founded; but they would never have been heard if the fortune of war had proved favourable,<sup>1</sup> and the Republican armies, instead of being

<sup>1</sup> Lac. xiv.  
352, 353.  
Th. x. 260,  
261. Dum.  
i. 220, 221.

thrown back on their own frontier, had been following the career of victory into the Imperial states. But the Directory now experienced the truth of the saying of Tacitus :—"Hæc est bellorum pessima conditio : prospera omnes sibi vindicant, adversa uni solo imputantur." \*

In the midst of this general effervescence, the restraints imposed on the liberty of the press after the revolution of the 18th Fructidor, could no longer be maintained. The armed force which had imposed and kept them on was wanting; the soldiers were almost all combating on the frontiers. These restraints were, accordingly, no longer enforced against the daily journals, and the universal indignation speedily spoke out in the periodical press. In every quarter, in the newspapers, the tribune, the pamphlets, the clubs, nothing was to be read or heard but declamations against the government. The parties who had alternately felt the weight of their vengeance, the royalists and the Jacobins, vied with each other in inveighing against their imbecility and want of foresight; while the soldiers, hitherto their firmest support, gave open vent to their indignation at the "Advocates" who had brought back the Republican standards to the Alps and the Rhine.<sup>1</sup>

4.  
Restoration  
of the liber-  
ty of the  
press.

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 268.  
Lac. xiv.  
354. Goh.  
i. 96.

A league was speedily formed against the government, at the head of which were Generals Joubert and Augereau. Barras, though a Director, entered into the plan, and gave it the weight of his reputation, or rather his revolutionary audacity and vigour. It was agreed that no questions should be brought forward, until the obnoxious Directors were removed, as to the form of government which should succeed them; and the three Directors, La Révellière-Lépaulx, Treilhard, and Merlin de Douai, were marked out for destruction. The conspiracy was far advanced, when the misfortunes in Italy and on the Rhine gave tenfold force to the public discontent, and deprived the government of all means of resistance. The departments

5.  
Formation  
of a league  
against the  
government.

\* "This is the worst condition of wars: all claim credit for prosperous—adverse events are imputed to one alone."

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1799.

in the south, now threatened with invasion from the Allied army, were in a state of extreme fermentation, and sent deputations to the Councils, who painted in the most lively colours the destitute state of the troops, the consternation of the provinces, the vexations of the people, the injustice done to the generals, and the indignation of the soldiers. The nomination of Sièyes to the Directory was the most convincing proof of the temper of the Councils, as he had always and openly expressed his dislike at the constitution and the Directorial government. To elect him, was to proclaim, as it were, that they desired a revolution.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mign. ii.  
442, 443.  
Lac. xiv.  
353, 355.  
Th. x. 268,  
274, and  
310.

6.  
Measures  
of the Op-  
position.

Sièyes soon became the head of the conspirators, who thus numbered among their ranks two Directors, and a great majority of both Councils. It was no longer their first object to remodel the constitution, but to gain immediate possession of the reins of power, in order to extricate the country from the perilous situation in which it was placed. For this purpose they refused all accommodation or consultation with the three devoted Directors, while the most vehement attacks were made on them in both Councils. The disastrous state of the finances afforded too fair an opportunity for invective. Out of 400,000,000 francs already consumed in the public service for the year 1799, not more than 210,000,000 francs had been received by the treasury, and the arrears were coming in very slowly. Various new taxes were voted by the Councils; but it was apparent to every one that their collection, under the present system, was impossible. A still more engrossing topic was afforded by the discussions on the proposed alteration of the law on the liberty of the press and the popular societies, in order to take away from the Directory the arbitrary power with which they had been invested by the law of the 19th Fructidor. The democrats exclaimed that it was indispensable to electrify the public mind; that the country was in the same danger as in 1793, and that the same

means must be taken to meet it; that every species of patriotism would speedily expire if the clubs were not reopened, and unlimited freedom allowed to the press. Without joining in this democratic fervour, the royalists and Constitutionals concurred with them in holding that the Directory had made a bad use of the dictatorial power given to them by the revolution of 18th Fructidor, and that the restoration of the popular clubs had become indispensable. So general a concord among men of such dissimilar opinions on all other subjects, announced the speedy fall of the government.<sup>1</sup>

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1799.

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 313,  
317. Mign.  
ii. 417. Lac.  
xiv. 355.

The first measures of the conspirators were opened by a message from the different committees of the Councils, presented by Boulay de la Meurthe, in which they insisted upon being informed of the causes of the exterior and interior dangers which threatened the state, and the means of averting them which existed. The Directory, upon receiving this message, endeavoured to gain time, by promising to give an answer in detail, which required several days to prepare. But this was by no means what the revolutionists intended. After waiting a fortnight without receiving any answer, the Councils, on the recommendation of their committees of war, expenditure, and finance, agreed to declare their sittings permanent, till an answer to the message was obtained, and the three committees were constituted into a single commission of eleven members,—in other words, a provisional government. The Directory on their part also declared their sittings permanent, and everything seemed to pre-  
 sage a fierce conflict. The commission dexterously-availed themselves of the circumstance that Treilhard, who for thirteen months had been in the Directory, had been appointed four days before the legal period, and instantly proposed that his nomination should be annulled. La Révellière-Lépaux, who was gifted with great political firmness, in vain strove to induce Treilhard to resist; he saw his danger, and resolved to yield to the storm.<sup>2</sup> He accord-

7.  
Prepara-  
tions for a  
revolution.  
May 12.

<sup>2</sup> Th. x. 322.  
Mign. ii.  
443.

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8.  
Revolution  
of the 30th  
Prairial.

May 25.

30th Prai-  
rial.

ingly sent in his resignation, and Gohier, a vehement republican, but a man of little political capacity, though an able writer, was named by the Councils in his stead.

The victory was gained, because this change gave the Councils a majority in the Directory, but La Révellière-Lépaux was still firm in his refusal to resign. After exhausting every engine of flattery, threats, entreaties, and promises, Barras at length broke up the conference by declaring, "Well, then, it is all over; sabres must be drawn."—"Wretch!" exclaimed La Révellière, "do you speak of sabres? There is nothing here but knives, and they are all directed against those virtuous citizens whom you wish to murder, because you cannot induce them to degrade themselves." But a single individual could not withstand the legislature; he yielded at length to the entreaty of a deputation from the Councils, and sent in his resignation during the night. His example was immediately followed by Merlin; and Generals Moulins and Roger Ducos were appointed as successors to the expelled Directors. Thus, the government of the Directory was overturned in less than four years after its first establishment, and in twenty months after it had, by a violent stretch of illegal force, usurped dictatorial powers. The people of Paris took no part in this subversion of their rulers, which was effected by the force of the national assemblies illegally directed. Revolutionary fervour had exhausted itself; and an event which, six years before, would have convulsed France from one extremity to the other, passed over with hardly more agitation than a change of ministers causes in a constitutional monarchy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lac. xiv.  
326, 359.  
Th. x. 326,  
330. Staël,  
ii. 223, 224.  
Mign. ii. 443.

<sup>2</sup>  
Character  
of the new  
Directory.

The violent measures, however, which had dispossessed the government, were far from bringing to the helm of affairs any accession either of vigour or ability. The new Directory, composed, like the Councils, of men of opposite principles, was even less qualified than that which had preceded it to make head against the tempest, both without and within, which assailed the state. Sièyes, the



only man among them of superior intellect, dreamed of nothing but a new political organisation of society, and had none of the qualities fitted to struggle with the misfortunes of a sinking state. Roger Ducos, an old Girondist, was merely his creature, and unfit to direct any department of the Republic. Moulin, an obscure general, but a vehement republican, had been nominated by the Jacobin party to uphold their interests in the government, and, being unknown to the armies, possessed none of the influence with the military so necessary to revive their former spirit. Barras was the only man capable of giving any effectual assistance to the administration; but he was so much under the influence of his passions and his vices, and had taken so many and such contradictory parts in the course of the Revolution, that no reliance could be placed on his assistance. After having been a violent Jacobin after the revolution of 31st May, a leading Thermidorian after the fall of Robespierre, a revolutionary Director on the 18th Fructidor, and a vehement enemy of his ancient colleagues on the 30th Prairial, he now became a royalist Director, elected to withstand the principles of democracy which had so often elevated him to power. Gohier was sincere and honest in his intentions, but he was an infatuated republican, who, amidst the general wreck of the institutions of the country, was dreaming only of the social compact, and the means of averting a counter-revolution. From the moment of their installation, their sentiments on most subjects were found to be so much at variance, that it was evident no cordial co-operation could be expected amongst them.<sup>1</sup>

The first and most pressing necessity was to stem the torrent of disaster which had overwhelmed the armies of the Republic. Immediately after the change in the government, news arrived of the forcing of the lines of Zurich; and, before the consternation which this occasioned had subsided, it was followed by intelligence of the battle of the Trebbia, and the evacuation of the ridge of the

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 331,  
332. Lac.  
xiv. 358,  
360, 361.  
Mign. ii. 446.  
Goh. Mém.  
i. 104.

10.  
New ministerial appointments.

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XXIX.

1799.

Appenines. These misfortunes rendered it absolutely necessary to take some steps to restore the public confidence; and, for this purpose, a great change was made in the military commanders of the Republic. Championnet, who had been thrown into prison for evading the orders of the Directory regarding the pillage of the Neapolitan dominions, was liberated from his fetters, and received the command of an army which it was proposed to establish along the line of the higher Alps; Bernadotte, from whose activity great results were justly expected, was appointed minister at war; and Joubert, whose exploits in the Tyrol had gained for him a brilliant reputation, nominated to the command of the shattered army of Italy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 333.  
Jom. Vie de  
Nap. i. 361.

## 11.

Efforts of  
the Jacobins  
to revive the  
revolution-  
ary spirit,  
which totally  
fail.

The overthrow of the government was the signal for the issuing of the Jacobins from their retreats, and the recommencement of revolutionary agitation, with all the perilous schemes of democratic ambition. Everywhere the clubs were reopened; the Jacobins took possession of the Riding-school hall, where the debates of the Constituent Assembly had been held, and began again to pour forth those impassioned declamations in consequence of which such streams of blood had already flowed. Taught by former disasters, however, they abstained from demanding any sanguinary proceedings, and confined themselves to a strenuous support of an agrarian law, and those measures for the division of property, to the advocacy of which Babœuf had fallen a victim. The leading members of the Councils attended their meetings, and swelled the ardent multitudes who already crowded their assemblies, flattering themselves, even in the decrepitude of the revolutionary fervour, with the hopeless idea that they would succeed in directing the torrent. But the times were no longer the same, and it was impossible in 1799 to revive the general enthusiasm which ten years before had intoxicated every head in France. The people had not forgotten the Reign of Terror, and the dreadful calamities which had followed the ascendant of the Jacobins; they

received their promises without joy, without illusion, and listened with undisguised anxiety to the menaces which they dealt out to all who opposed their designs. Their apathy threw the Jacobins into despair, as they were well aware that, without the aid of the populace, they would be unable to overturn what yet remained of the fabric of society. "We cannot twice," said the citizens, "go through the same fiery ordeal: the Jacobins have no longer the power of the assignats at their command; the illusion of the people has been dispelled by their sufferings; the army regards their rule with horror." The respectable citizens, worn out with convulsions, and apprehensive beyond everything of a return to the yoke of the multitude, sighed for the restoration of a stable government, and were prepared to rally round any leader who would subject the passions of the Revolution to the yoke of despotic power.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lac. xiv.  
358, 359.  
Th. x. 332,  
333. Mign  
ii. 445.

To supply the enormous and daily increasing deficit in the public treasury, the revolutionists maintained that it was indispensable to recur to the energy and patriotic measures of 1793; to call into active service all classes of the state, and levy a forced loan of 120,000,000 of francs, or £4,800,000, upon the opulent classes, increasing in severity with the fortunes of those from whom it was to be exacted. After long debates, this arbitrary measure was adopted, and at the same time a conscription of two hundred thousand men ordered to recruit the armies. These vigorous measures promised, in the course of time, to procure a great supply for the public necessities: but in the meanwhile the danger was imminent; and it was much to be feared that the frontiers would be invaded before any efficient support could be afforded to the armies intrusted with their defence.<sup>2</sup>

12.  
Forced loan,  
and con-  
scription of  
200,000 men  
decreed by  
the Coun-  
cils.

<sup>2</sup> Th. x. 336,  
337. Jom.  
Vie de Nap.  
i. 362.

What rendered every measure for the supply either of the army or the treasury difficult of execution, was the complete state of anarchy into which the provinces had fallen, and the total absence of all authority from the

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13.

Anarchy of  
the provin-  
ces. Cruel  
law of the  
hostages.

time that the troops had been removed to the frontier. The Vendéans and Chouans had, in the west, broken into fearful activity ; the Companies of the Sun renewed their excesses in the south ; and everywhere the refractory conscripts, forming themselves into bands of robbers, occupied the forests, and pillaged travellers and merchandise of every description along the highways. To such a height had these disorders, the natural and inevitable consequence of a revolution, arisen, that in most of the departments there was no longer any authority obeyed, or order maintained, but the strong pillaged the weak with impunity, as in the rudest ages. In these circumstances a law, named the law of the hostages, was proposed and carried in the Councils, and remains a singular and instructive monument of the desperate tyranny to which those are in the end reduced, who adventure on the perilous course of democratic innovation. Proceeding on the supposition, at once arbitrary and unfounded, that the relations of the emigrants were the sole cause of the disorders, they enacted, that whenever a commune fell into a notorious state of anarchy, the relations of emigrants, and all those known to have been at all connected with the ancient regime, should be seized as hostages, and that four of them should be *transported* for every assassination that was committed in that district, and their property be rendered liable for all acts of robbery which there occurred. But this law, inhuman as it was, proved wholly inadequate to restore order in this distracted country ; and France was menaced with an anarchy, so much the more terrible than that of 1793, as the Committee of Public Salvation was wanting, whose iron arm, supported by victory, had then crushed it in its grasp.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 337,  
338. Mign.  
ii. 446.  
Goh. i. 62,  
66. Jom.  
Vie de Nap.  
i. 364.

14.

Insurrection  
in Brittany  
and la Ven-  
dée.

The disturbances in the western provinces, during this paralysis of the authority of government, had again risen to the most formidable height. That unconquerable band, the Vendéans and Chouans, whom the utmost disasters could never completely subdue, had yielded only a tempo-

rary submission to the energetic and able measures of General Hoche; and with the arrival of less skilful leaders of the republican forces, and the increasing weakness of government, their activity again led them to insurrection. This fresh outbreak of the insurrection was chiefly owing to the cruel and unnecessary persecutions which the Director La Révellière-Lépaux kept up against the priests; and it soon rose to the most formidable height. In March 1799, the spirit of Chouanism, besides its native departments in Brittany, had spread to la Vendée, and the Republic beheld with dismay the fresh breaking out of that terrible volcano. Chollet, Mortagne, Herbiers, names immortalised in those wonderful wars, were again signalised by the successes of the royalists; and the flame, spreading further than the early victories of the Vendéans, menaced Touraine. BOURMONT, afterwards conqueror of Algiers, a chief of great ability, revenged in Mans the bloody catastrophe of the royalist army; and Godet de Châtillon, after a brilliant victory, entered in triumph into Nantes, which had six years before defeated the utmost efforts of the grand army under Cathelineau.<sup>1</sup>

Nor did the financial measures of government inspire less dread than the external disasters and internal disorders which overwhelmed the country. The forced loan was levied with the utmost severity; and as all the fortunes of the royalists had been extinguished in the former convulsions, it now fell on those classes who had been enriched by the Revolution, and thus spread a universal panic through its most opulent supporters. They now felt the severity of the confiscation which they had inflicted on others. The ascending scale, according to which it was levied, rendered it especially obnoxious. No fixed rule was adopted for the increase according to the fortune of the individual, but everything was left to the tax-gatherers, who proceeded on secret and frequently false information. In these circumstances, the opulent found their whole income disappearing under a single exaction.

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<sup>1</sup> Lac. xiv.  
366, 369.  
Beauch. iii.  
120, 349.  
Goh. i. 6.

15.  
Great severity in the collection of the forced loan, and success of the military conscription.

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<sup>1</sup> Lac. xiv.  
399, 400.  
Goh. i. 73,  
75, 78.

The tax voted was 120,000,000 francs, or £4,800,000 ; but in the exhausted state of the country, it was impossible to raise this sum ; and specie, under the dread of arbitrary exactions, entirely disappeared from circulation. Its collection took three years, and then only realised three-fourths of that amount.<sup>1</sup> The three-per-cents consolidated, that melancholy relic of former bankruptcy, had fallen to six per cent on the remnant of a third, which the great confiscation of 1797 had left—a little more than a *sixtieth* part of the former value of the stock at the commencement of the Revolution. The executive were more successful in their endeavours to recruit the military forces of the Republic. Soldiers are as easily obtained during public suffering as money is hard to find. Under the able and vigorous management of Bernadotte, the conscription proceeded with great activity ; and soon a hundred thousand young men were enrolled and disciplined at the dépôts in the interior of the country. These conscripts were no sooner instructed in the rudiments of the military art, than they were marched off to the frontier, where they rendered essential service to the cause of national independence. It was the reinforcements thus obtained which enabled Massena to extricate the Republic from extreme peril at the battle of Zurich ; and it was in their ranks that Napoleon, in the following year, found the greater part of those dauntless followers who scaled the barrier of the Great St Bernard, and descended like a thunderbolt on the plain of Marengo.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Goh. i. 73,  
78, 90. Lac.  
xiv. 399,  
400.

16.  
Increased  
violence of  
the Jacobins.

While the Republic, after ten years of convulsions, was fast relapsing into that state of disorder and weakness which is at once the consequence and punishment of revolutionary violence, the hall of the Jacobins resounded with furious declamations against all the members of the Directory, and the whole system which in every country has been considered as the basis of social union. The distribution of property was in an especial manner the object of invective ; and the agrarian law, which Babœuf

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had bequeathed to the last democrats of the Revolution, was universally extolled as the perfection of society. Felix Lepelletier, Arena, Drouet, and all the furious revolutionists of the age, were there assembled, and the whole atrocities of 1793 were soon held up for applause and imitation. They celebrated the manes of the victims shot on the plain of Grenelle; demanded in loud terms the instant punishment of all "the leeches who lived on the blood of the people," the general disarming of the royalists, a levy *en masse*, the establishment of manufactures of arms in the public places, and the restoration of their cannon and pikes to the inhabitants of the faubourgs. These ardent feelings were roused into a perfect fury, when the news arrived of the battle of Novi, and the retreat of the army of Italy to the Alps. Talleyrand became in an especial manner the object of attack. He was accused of having projected the expedition to Egypt, the cause of all the public disasters; Moreau was overwhelmed with invectives, and Sièyes, the president of the Council of Ancients, stigmatised as a perfidious priest, who was about to belie in power all the patriotic resolutions of his earlier years.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Th. x. 360,  
361. Lac.  
xiv. 359,  
360. Jom.  
Vie de Nap.  
i. 364.

In these perilous circumstances, the Directory named FOUCHÉ minister of police. This celebrated man, who under Napoleon came to play so important a part in the government of the empire, early gave indication of the great abilities and versatile character which enabled him so long to maintain his influence, not only with many different administrations, but under so many different governments. An old member of the Jacobin Club, and thoroughly acquainted with all their designs; steeped in the atrocities of Lyons; a regicide and atheist; bound neither by affection nor principle to their cause, and seeking only in the shipwreck of parties to make his own fortune, he was eminently qualified to act as a spy upon his former friends, and to secure the Directory against their efforts. He perceived at this critical period that the

17.  
Fouché is  
appointed  
Minister of  
Police. His  
character,  
and conser-  
vative de-  
signs.

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ascendant of the revolutionists was on the wane; and having raised himself to eminence by their passions, he now resolved to attach himself to that conservative party who were striving to reconstruct the elements of society, and establish regular authority by their subversion. The people beheld with dismay the associate of Collot d'Herbois, and a regicide member of the Convention, raised to the important station of head of the police: but they soon found that the massacres of Lyons were not to be renewed; and that the Jacobin enthusiast, intrusted with the direction of affairs, was to exhibit, in combating the forces of anarchy, the spirit he had imbibed in gaining its victories, and a vigour and resolution on the side of order, unknown in the former stages of the Revolution. His accession to the administration at this juncture was of great importance; for he soon succeeded in confirming the wavering ideas of Barras, and inducing him to exert all his strength in combating those principles of democracy which were again beginning to dissolve the social body.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Goh. i. 110.  
Th. x. 364.  
Lac. xiv.  
362.

18.  
He closes  
the Jacobin  
Club.

Under the auspices of so vigorous a leader, the power of the Jacobins was speedily put to the test. He at once closed the Riding-school hall, where their meetings were held; and, supported by the Council of the Ancients, within whose precincts it was placed, prohibited any further assemblies in that situation. The democrats, expelled from their old den, reassembled in a new place of meeting in the Rue du Bac, where their declamations were renewed with as much vehemence as ever. But public opinion had changed; the people were no longer disposed to rise in insurrection to support their ambitious projects. Fouché resolved to follow up his first blow by closing their meetings altogether. The Directory were legally invested with the power of taking this decisive step, as the organisation of the society was contrary to law; but there was a division of opinion among its members as to the expediency of adopting it—Moulins and Gohier insisting that it was only by favouring the clubs, and



reviving the revolutionary spirit of 1793, that the Republic could make head against its enemies. However, the majority, consisting of Sièyes, Barras, and Roger Ducos, persuaded by the arguments of Fouché, resolved upon the decisive step. The execution of the measure was postponed till after the anniversary of the 10th August; but it was then carried into effect without opposition, and the Jacobin Club, which had spread such havoc through the world, at last and for ever closed.<sup>1</sup>

Deprived of their point of rendezvous, the democrats had recourse to their usual engine—the press: and the journals were immediately filled with the most furious invectives against Sièyes, who was stigmatised as the author of the measure. This able, but speculative man, the author of the celebrated pamphlet, “*What is the Tiers Etat?*” which had so powerful an effect in promoting the Revolution in 1789, was now held up to public execration as a perfidious priest who had sold the Republic to Prussia. In truth, he had long ago seen the pernicious tendency of the democratic dogmas with which he commenced political life, and never hesitated to declare openly that a strong government was indispensable to France, and that liberty was utterly incompatible with the successive tyranny of different parties, which had so long desolated the Republic. These opinions were sufficient to point him out as the object of republican fury; and, aware of his danger, he was already beginning to look round for some military leader who might execute the *coup d'état*, which he foresaw was the only remaining chance of salvation to the country. In the meanwhile, the state of the press required immediate attention; its license and excesses were utterly inconsistent with any stable or regular government. The only law by which it could be restrained, was one which declared that all attempts to subvert the Republic should be punished with death: a sanguinary regulation, the offspring of democratic apprehensions, the severity of which prevented it, in the present

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Aug. 12.  
1 Th. x. 366,  
367. Lac.  
xiv. 363.  
Mign. ii. 447.  
Goh. i. 125,  
130.

19.  
Violence of  
the daily  
press, and  
attack on  
them by the  
Directory.

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1 Art. 141.

Sept. 3.

2 Th. x. 360,  
363. Lac.  
xiv. 363.  
Mign. ii.  
448.

20.  
Their con-  
tinued vigo-  
rous mea-  
sures against  
the Jaco-  
bins.  
Sept. 11.

Sept. 17.

state of public feeling, from being carried into execution. In this extremity, the three Directors declared that they could no longer carry on the government; and France was on the point of being delivered over to utter anarchy, when the Directory thought of the expedient of applying to the press the article of the constitution which gave the executive power the right to arrest all persons suspected of carrying on plots against the Republic. Nothing could be more forced than such an interpretation of this clause,<sup>1</sup> which was obviously intended for a totally different purpose; but the necessity and the well-known principle, *salus populi suprema lex*, seemed to justify, on the ground afterwards taken by Charles X., a stretch indispensable for the existence of regular government, and an *arrêt* was at length resolved on, which authorised the apprehension of the editors of eleven journals, and the immediate suppression of their publications.<sup>2</sup>

This bold step produced an immediate ebullition among the democrats; but it was confined to declamations and threats, without any hostile measures. The tribune resounded with "dictators," "the fall of liberty," and all the other overflowings of revolutionary zeal; but not a sword was drawn. The three resolute Directors, continuing their advantage, succeeded in throwing out, by a majority of 245 to 171, a proposal of Jourdan to declare the country in danger, which was supported by the whole force of the Jacobin party; and they soon after successfully ventured on the bold step of dismissing Bernadotte, the minister at war, whose attachment to democratical principles was well known. All thoughts were already turned towards a military chief capable of putting an end to the distractions of the Republic, and extricating it from the perilous situation in which it was placed, from the continued successes of the Allies. "We must have done with declaimers," said Sièyes; "what we want is a head and a sword." But where to find that sword was the difficulty. Joubert had recently been killed at Novi; Moreau, not-

withstanding his consummate military talents, was known not to possess the energy and moral resolution requisite for the task; Massena was famed only as a skilful soldier; while Augereau and Bernadotte, both violent democrats, had openly thrown themselves into the arms of the opposite party. In this emergency, all eyes were already turned towards that youthful hero who had hitherto chained victory to his standards, and whose early campaigns, splendid as they were, had been almost thrown into the shade by the romantic marvels of his Egyptian expedition. The Directory had, in the preceding spring, assembled an immense fleet in the Mediterranean, to bring back the army from the shores of the Nile; but it had been broken up without achieving anything. But Lucien and Joseph Buonaparte had conveyed to Napoleon full intelligence of the disastrous state of the Republic, and it was by their advice that he resolved to brave the English cruisers and return to France. The public mind was already in that uncertain and agitated state which is the general precursor of some great political event; and the journals, a faithful mirror of its fleeting changes, were filled with conjectures as to the future revolutions he was to achieve in the world.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 375,  
377. Mign.  
ii. 448, Lac.  
xiv. 362,  
363. Goh. i.  
140, 155.

In truth, it was high time that some military leader of commanding talents should seize the helm, to save the sinking fortunes of the Republic. Never since the commencement of the war had its prospects been so gloomy, both from external disaster and internal oppression. A contemporary republican writer, of no common talent, has drawn the following graphic picture of the internal state of France at this period:—"Merit was generally persecuted; all men of honour were chased from public situations; robbers were everywhere assembled in their infernal caverns; the wicked were in power; the apologists of the system of terror thundering in the tribune; spoliation re-established under the name of forced loans; assassinations prepared; thousands of victims already marked out, under the name of hostages; the signal for pillage, mur-

21.  
Deplorable  
state of  
France at  
this period.

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1 Prem.  
Ann. du  
Consulat de  
Bonaparte,  
7. Dum. ii.  
335. Th. x.  
429. Bour.  
iii. 27.

der, and conflagration, anxiously looked for, couched in the words, the 'country is in danger;' the same cries, the same shouts, were heard in the clubs as in 1793; the same executioners, the same victims; liberty, property, could no longer be said to exist; the citizens had no security for their lives—the state for its finances. All Europe was in arms against us; America even had declared against our tyranny; our armies were routed, our conquests lost, the territory of the Republic menaced with invasion. Such was the situation of France before the revolution of the 18th Brumaire." And such is the picture of the ultimate effect of democratic convulsions, drawn by those who had urged them on; such the miseries which compelled the nation, instead of the mild sceptre of Louis, to receive the dreaded sword of Napoleon!<sup>1</sup>

22.  
Arrival of  
Napoleon at  
Fréjus, and  
universal  
enthusiasm  
which it ex-  
cited.

The despatches, containing the account of the expedition into Syria, and of the marvellous victories of Mont Thabor and Aboukir, arrived at this time, and spread far and wide the impression that the conqueror of Rivoli was the destined saviour of the state, for whom all classes were so anxiously looking. His name was in every mouth. Where is he? What will he do? What chance is there that he will escape the English cruisers? were the questions universally asked. Such was the anxiety of the public mind on the subject, that rumour had twice outstripped the hopes of his friends, and announced his return; and when at length the telegraph gave the official intelligence that he had arrived on the coast of Provence, the public transports knew no bounds. When the people at Fréjus heard that the conqueror of Egypt was on the coast, their enthusiasm broke through all the restraints of government. The quarantine laws were in a moment forgotten. A multitude, intoxicated with joy and hope, seized the first boats, and rushed on board the vessels. Napoleon, amidst universal acclamations, landed, and immediately set out for Paris. The telegraph, with the rapidity of the winds, announced his arrival, and the im-

portant intelligence speedily spread over the capital. The entrancement was universal, the joy unanimous. All wishes had been turned towards a hero who could restore peace to desolated France—and here he was, dropt from the clouds: a fortunate soldier presented himself, who had caused the French standards to float on the summit of the Capitol and at the foot of the Pyramids; in whom all the world recognised both civil and military talents of the very highest order. His proclamations, his negotiations, his treaties, bore testimony to the first; his astonishing victories afforded irrefragable evidence of the second. So rare a combination might suggest alarm to the friends of liberty, were it not that his well-known principles and disinterestedness precluded the idea that he would employ the dictatorship to any other end than the public good, and the termination of the misfortunes of the country. Discourses of this sort, in every mouth, threw the public into transports—so much the more entrancing as they succeeded a long period of disaster. The joyful intelligence was announced, amidst thunders of applause, at all the theatres; patriotic songs again sent forth their heart-stirring strains from the orchestra; and more than one enthusiast expired of joy at the advent of the hero who was to terminate the difficulties of the Republic.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bour. iii.  
28, 29. Th.  
x. 429, 432.  
Nap. i. 56.  
Mign. ii.  
449.

The conqueror was greeted with the most enthusiastic reception the whole way from Fréjus to Paris. At Aix, Avignon, Vienne, and Lyons, the people came forth in crowds to meet him; his journey resembled a continual triumph. The few bells which the Revolution had left in the churches were rung on his approach; his course at night was marked by bonfires on all the eminences. On the 16th of October he arrived unexpectedly at Paris; his wife and brothers, mistaking his route, had gone out to meet him by another road. Two hours after his arrival he waited on the Directory; the soldiers at the gate of the palace, who had served under him at Arcola; recognised his figure, and loud cries of "Vive Buonaparte!"

23.  
His journey,  
and arrival  
at Paris.

Oct. 16.

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Oct. 17.

<sup>1</sup> Bour. iii.  
38, 39. Th.  
x. 433. Nap.  
i. 55, 56.  
Goh. i. 197,  
202.

24.  
His recep-  
tion there  
by the  
Directory,  
and state of  
their gov-  
ernment.

announced to the government that the dreaded commander had arrived. He was received by Gohier, and it was arranged that he should be presented in public on the following day. His reception then was, to external appearance, flattering; and splendid encomiums were pronounced on the victories of the Pyramids, Mount Thabor, and Aboukir: but mutual distrust prevailed on both sides, and a vague disquietude already pervaded the Directory at the appearance of the renowned conqueror, who at so critical a moment had presented himself in the capital.<sup>1</sup>

Though convinced that the moment he had so long looked for had arrived, and resolved to seize the supreme authority, Napoleon landed in France without any fixed project for carrying his design into execution. The enthusiasm, however, with which he had been received in the course of his journey to Paris, and the intelligence which he there obtained of the state of the country, made him at once determine on the attempt. The circumstances of the time were singularly favourable to such a design. None of the Directory were possessed of any personal consideration, except Sièyes; and he had long revolved in his mind the project of substituting, for the weak and oppressive government which was now desolating France, the firm hand of a vigorous and able military leader. Even so far back as the revolt of the sections, on the 13th Vendémiaire, he had testified his opinion of the weakness of his colleagues to Napoleon. At the most critical moment of the day, when the Committees of Government had lost their heads, Sièyes approached Napoleon, and, taking him into the embrasure of a window, said—"You see how it is, general: they are haranguing when the moment for action has arrived. Large bodies are unfit for the lead of armies: they never know the value of time. You can be of no use here. Go, general, take counsel only of your own genius, and the dangers of the country: the sole hope of the Republic is in you." These words were not lost on Napoleon; they pointed out the

speaker as the fit associate in his designs; and to these was soon added M. Talleyrand, who was too clear-sighted not to perceive that the only chance of safety was in the authority of a dictator, and who had also private grievances of his own to induce him to desire the overthrow of the government.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 57,  
59. Jom.  
xii. 392, 393.  
Bour. iii. 32.

Indeed, so general was the impression, at that period, of the impossibility of continuing the government of France under the republican form, that, previous to Napoleon's arrival, various projects not only had been set on foot, but were far advanced, for the restoration of monarchical authority. The brothers of Napoleon, Joseph and Lucien, were deeply implicated in these intrigues. The Abbé Sièyes at one time thought of placing the Duke of Brunswick on the throne; Barras was not averse to the restoration of the Bourbons, and was engaged in negotiations with Louis XVIII. for that purpose.<sup>2</sup> These had even gone so far that the terms of the Director were fixed for playing the part of General Monk; twelve millions of livres were to have been his reward, besides two millions to divide among his associates.<sup>3</sup> But, in the midst of these intrigues, Joseph and Lucien Buonaparte were in a more effectual way advancing their brother's interests, by inducing the leaders of the army to co-operate in his elevation. They had already engaged Macdonald, Leclerc, Lefebvre, Angereau, and Jourdan, to favour his enterprise; but Moreau hung back, and all their efforts had failed in engaging Bernadotte, whose republican principles were proof against their seductions.<sup>4</sup>

25.  
Previous intrigues of the Directory with Louis XVIII.

<sup>2</sup> Bour. iii. 45. Capetigue, Hist. de la Restauration, i. 120.

<sup>3</sup> Capetigue, Hist. de la Restauration, i. 129, 135. Nap. i. 66.

<sup>4</sup> Th. x. 431. Bour. iii. 41, 45.

No sooner had Napoleon arrived at his unassuming dwelling in the Rue Chantereine, than the whole generals who had been sounded hastened to pay their court to him, and with them all who had been dismissed or conceived themselves ill used by the Directory. His saloon soon resembled rather the court of a monarch than the rendezvous of the friends of any private individual, how eminent soever. Besides Lannes, Murat, and Berthier,

26.  
Junction of the malcontents of all parties to support Napoleon.

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who had shared his fortunes in Egypt, and were warmly attached to him, there were now assembled Jourdan, Augereau, Macdonald, Beurnonville, Leclerc, Lefebvre, and Marbot, who, notwithstanding their many differences of opinion on other subjects, had been induced, by the desperate state of the Republic, to concur in offering the military dictatorship to Napoleon. Although Moreau at first appeared undecided, he was at length won by the address of his great rival, who made the first advances, and affected to consult him on his future designs. In addition to this illustrious band of military chiefs, many of the most influential members of the legislature were also disposed to favour the enterprise. Roederer, the old leader in the municipality; Regnault St-Jean-d'Angely, long known and respected for his indomitable firmness in the most trying scenes of the Revolution, and a great number of the leading deputies in both Chambers, had paid their court to him on his arrival. Nor were official functionaries, and even members of the administration, wanting. Sièyes and Roger Ducos, the two Directors who chiefly superintended the civil concerns; and Moulines, who was at the head of the military department of the Republic; Cambacérès, the minister of justice; Fouché, the head of the police, and Réal, a commissary in the department of the Seine—an active and intriguing partisan—were assiduous in their attendance. Eight days had hardly elapsed, and already the direction of government seemed to be insensibly gliding into his hands. The ideas of these different persons, however, were far from being unanimous as to the course which should be adopted. The republican generals offered Napoleon a military dictatorship, and agreed to support him with all their power, provided he would maintain the principles of the Riding-school Club, where their meetings were now held.<sup>1</sup> Sièyes, Talleyrand, Roger Ducos, and Regnier, proposed simply to place him at the head of affairs, and change the constitution, which experience had proved to be so miserably defective;

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 435,  
436, 437.  
Nap. i. 64.  
65, 74. Gob.  
i. 211, 212,  
213.



while the Directors Barras and Gohier vainly endeavoured to rid themselves of so dangerous a rival, by offering and anxiously pressing upon him the command of the armies.

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In the midst of this flattering adulation, the conduct of Napoleon was influenced by that profound knowledge of human nature, and thorough dissimulation, which formed such striking features of his character. Affecting to withdraw from the eager gaze of the multitude, he seldom showed himself in public; and then only in the costume of the National Institute, or in a gray surtout, with a Turkish sabre suspended by a silk ribbon—a dress which, under seeming simplicity, revealed the secret pride of the conqueror of the Pyramids. He postponed from day to day the numerous visits of distinguished individuals who sought the honour of being presented to him; and when he went to the theatre, frequented only a concealed box, as if to avoid the thunders of applause which always attended his being recognised.\* When obliged to accept an invitation to a sumptuous repast, given in his honour by the minister of justice, he requested that the leading lawyers might be invited: and selecting M. Tronchet, the eloquent defender of Louis XVI., conversed long with him and Treilhard on the want of a simple code of criminal and civil jurisprudence, which might be adapted to the intelligence of the age. To private dinners in his own house, he invited only the learned men of the Institute, and conversed with them entirely on scientific subjects; if he spoke on politics at all, it was only to express his profound regret at the misfortunes of France. In vain the Directors exaggerated to him the successes of Massena in Switzerland, and Brune in Holland;<sup>1</sup> he appeared inconsolable for the loss of Italy, and seemed to consider

27.  
Profound  
dissimula-  
tion of his  
conduct.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 60.  
Gl. Lac.  
xiv. 401.  
Th. x. 437.

\* "Nec Agricola, prosperitate rerum in vanitatem usus, expeditionem aut victoriam vocabat, victos continuisse: ne laureatis quidem gesta prosecutus est. Sed ipsa dissimulatione famæ famam auxit, æstimantibus, quanta futuri spe, tam magna tacuisset."—TACITUS, *Agricola*, 18. How identical is human nature in all ages!

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28.

His efforts  
to gain Gohier and  
Moulins,  
who refuse.

every success of no moment till that gem was restored to the coronet of the Republic.

Napoleon's first attempt was to engage in his interest Gohier, the president of the Directory, and Moulins, who were both strongly attached to the republican side; and, with this view, he not only paid them in private the greatest attention, but actually proposed to them that he should be taken into the government instead of Sièyes, though below the age of forty, which the constitution required for that elevated function. "Take care," said he, "of that cunning priest Sièyes; it is his connexion with Prussia, the very thing which should have excluded him from it, which has raised him to the Directory; unless you take care, he will sell you to the coalesced powers. It is absolutely necessary to get quit of him. It is true, I am below the legal age required by the constitution; but, in the pursuit of forms, we must not forget realities. Those who framed the constitution did not recollect that the maturity of judgment produced by the Revolution is often far more essential than the maturity of age, which in many is much less material. Ambition has no share in these observations; they are dictated alone by the fears which so dangerous an election could not fail to inspire in all the friends of real freedom." Gohier and Moulins, however, agreed in thinking that the Republic had more to fear from the young general than the old metaphysician; and therefore replied, that though, if of the legal age, he would doubtless have secured all suffrages, yet nothing in their estimation could counterbalance a violation of the constitution, and that the true career which lay before him was the command of the armies.<sup>1</sup> \*

<sup>1</sup> Goh. i.  
205, 210.

\* At this period, Sièyes's indignation at Napoleon knew no bounds. "Instead," said he, "of lamenting his inactivity, let us rather congratulate ourselves upon it. Far from putting arms into the hands of a man whose intentions are so suspicious—far from giving him a fresh theatre of glory—let us cease to occupy ourselves more about his concerns, and endeavour, if possible, to cause him to be forgot."—GOHIER, i. 216.

Meanwhile all Europe was resounding with the return of Napoleon, and speculation, with its thousand tongues, was everywhere busied in anticipating the changes which he was to effect in the fate of France and of the world. "What will Buonaparte do? Is he to follow the footsteps of Cromwell, or Monk, or Washington? What change is he likely to make in the fate of the war?" were the questions asked from one end of Europe to the other. But the general himself was for a short time undecided as to the course which he should pursue. To avail himself of the support of the Jacobins and the Riding-school Club seemed the plan most likely to disarm all opposition, because they were the only efficient or energetic body in the state; but he well knew that the Jacobins were jealous of every leader, and were at once exclusive and violent in their passions. To make use of them for his own elevation, and immediately break the alliance and persecute them, would be a dangerous course. Sièyes, on the other hand, was at the head of a numerous body of leading men in the Chambers. His character precluded him from becoming an object of jealousy to the dictator; and although many of his party were firm republicans, they were not of such an impetuous and energetic kind as to be incapable of employment under a regular government, after the struggle was over; and, besides, their strife with the Riding-school Club was too recent to leave room for apprehension as to any coalition between such opposite bodies. Influenced by these considerations, Napoleon resolved to attach himself to Sièyes and his party, and to enter into none of the projects of the Jacobins. Though political considerations, however, led to this alliance, there were no two men in France who hated each other more cordially than Napoleon and Sièyes. They had lately met at dinner at the Director Gohier's: the former, though he had made the first advances to Moreau, thought it unworthy of him to do the same to the veteran of the Revolution, and the day passed over without their address-

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1799.

29.

After much  
hesitation,  
he at length  
resolves to  
join Sièyes.

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<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 67,  
68. Th. x.  
436, 439,  
443. Bour.  
iii. 39, 61,  
62. Goh.  
i. 202.

30.  
Measures  
resolved on.

ing each other. They separated mutually exasperated. "Did you see that little insolent fellow?" said Sièyes; "he would not even condescend to notice a member of the government, who, if they had done right, would have caused him to be shot."—"What on earth," said Napoleon, "could have made them put that priest into the Directory? He is sold to Prussia, and unless you take care, he will deliver you up to that power." Yet these men, stimulated by ambition, acted cordially together in the revolution which so soon approached. Such is the friendship of politicians!<sup>1</sup>

On the 30th October, Napoleon dined with Barras. "The Republic is perishing," said the Director; "nothing can be in a more miserable state; the government is destitute of all force. We must have a change, and name Hédouville President of the Republic. Your intention, you know, is to put yourself at the head of the army. As for me, I am ill, my popularity is gone, and I am fit only for private life." Napoleon looked at him steadily, without making any answer. Barras cast down his eyes, and remained silent; they had divined each other. Hédouville was a man of no sort of celebrity; his name had been used merely as a cover to the searching question. The conversation here dropped; but Napoleon saw that the time for action had arrived, and a few minutes after he called on Sièyes, and agreed to make the change between the 15th and 20th Brumaire (6th to 11th November). On returning home, he recounted to Talleyrand, Fouché, and others, what had passed; they communicated it during the night to Barras, and at eight the following morning the Director was at his bedside, protesting his devotion, and that he alone could save the Republic. But Napoleon declined his open assistance, and turned the conversation to the difference between the humid climate of Paris and the burning sands of Arabia.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Nap. i. 69,  
70. Th. x.  
448, 449.  
Lac. xiv.  
407, 408.

Notwithstanding his utmost efforts, however, Napoleon was unable to make any impression on Bernadotte. That

general, partly from republican principles, partly from jealousy, resisted all his advances. "You have seen," said he to Bourrienne, "the enthusiasm with which I was received in France, and how evidently it springs from the general desire to escape out of a disastrous predicament. Well! I have just seen Bernadotte, who boasts, with a ridiculous exaggeration, of the great success of the Republic: he spoke of the Russians beat, and Genoa saved; of the innumerable armies which were about to be raised. He even reproached me with not having brought back my soldiers from Egypt. 'What!' I answered, 'you tell me that you are overflowing with troops—that two hundred thousand infantry, and forty thousand cavalry, will soon be on foot. If that is so, to what purpose should I have brought back the remains of my army?' He then changed his tone: he confessed that he thought us all lost. He spoke of external enemies, of *internal* enemies—and at that word he looked steadily in my face. I also gave him a glance. But patience; the pear will soon be ripe." Soon after, Napoleon expressed himself with his wonted vehemence against the agitation which reigned among the Jacobins, and of which the Riding-school hall had so recently been the centre. "Your own brothers," replied Bernadotte, "were its principal founders, and yet you accuse me of having favoured that club: it is to the instructions of some one, *I know not who*, that we are to ascribe the agitation that now prevails." At these words Napoleon could no longer contain himself. "True, general," he replied with the utmost vehemence, "and I would rather live in the woods than in a society which presents no security against violence." Their conversation only augmented the breach, and soon after they separated in sullen discontent.<sup>1</sup>

Though a few of the military, however, held out, the great proportion of them were gained. Berthier, Lannes, and Murat, were daily making converts of such as were backward in sending in their adhesion. The officers of

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1799.

31.

He tries in  
vain to gain  
Bernadotte.<sup>1</sup> Bour. iii.  
46, 51.

32.

Progress of  
the conspi-  
racy.

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the garrison, headed by Moreau, demanded that they should be presented to Napoleon. The forty adjutants of the national guard of Paris made the same request; his brothers, Lucien and Joseph, daily augmented his party in the Councils; the 8th and 9th regiments of dragoons, who had served under him in Italy, with the 21st chasseurs, who had been organised by him, were devoted to his service. Moreau said, "He did not wish to be engaged in any intrigues, but that, when the moment for action arrived, he would be found at his post."\* The people of Paris, who awaited in anxious expectation the unfolding of the plot, could no longer conceal their impatience. "Fifteen days have elapsed," said they, "and nothing has been done. Is he to leave us, as he did on his return from Italy, and let the Republic perish, tormented by the factions who dispute its remains?" Everything announced the approach of the decisive moment.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 451,  
452. Nap. i.  
71, 72.

33.  
Great banquet in the  
Hall of the  
Ancients.  
Nov. 6.

By the able and indefatigable efforts of Lucien Buonaparte, a banquet, at which he himself was president, was given at the Council of the Ancients, in honour of Napoleon. It passed off with sombre tranquillity. Every one spoke in a whisper, anxiety was depicted on every face, a suppressed agitation was visible even in the midst of apparent quiet. Napoleon's own countenance was disturbed; his absent and preoccupied air sufficiently indicated that some great project was at hand. He rose soon from table and left the party, which, although gloomy, had answered the object in view, which was—to

\* An interesting conversation took place between Napoleon and Moreau, when they met, for the first time in their lives, at a dinner party at Gohier's. When first introduced, they looked at each other a moment without speaking. Napoleon was the first to break silence, and testify to Moreau the desire which he had long felt to make his acquaintance. "You have returned victorious from Egypt," replied Moreau, "and I from Italy after a great defeat. It was the month which his marriage induced Joubert to spend at Paris which caused our disasters, by giving the Allies time to reduce Mantua, and bring up the force which besieged it to take a part in the action. It is always the greater number which defeats the less."—"True," replied Napoleon, "it is always the greater number which beats the less."—"And yet," said Gohier, "with small

bring together six hundred persons of various political principles, and thus engage them to act in unison in any common enterprise. It was on that night that the arrangements for the conspiracy were finally made between Sièyes and Napoleon. It was agreed that the government should be overturned; that, instead of the five directors, three consuls should be appointed, charged with a dictatorial power which was to last for three months; that Napoleon, Sièyes, and Roger Ducos, should fill these exalted stations; and that the Council of the Ancients should pass a decree on the 18th Brumaire, (9th Nov.,) at seven in the morning, transferring the legislative body to St Cloud, and appointing Napoleon commander of the guard of the legislature, of the garrison of Paris, and the national guard. On the 19th, the decisive event was to take place.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. iii. 57, 59. Goh. i. 226. Nap. i. 73. Mien. ii. 450. Th. x. 452, 455.

During the three critical days which followed, the secret, though known to a great number of persons, was faithfully kept. The preparations, both civil and military, went on without interruption. Orders were given to the regiments, both infantry and cavalry, which could be relied on, to parade in the streets of Chantierine and Mont Blanc, at seven o'clock in the morning of the 18th. Moreau, Lefebvre, and all the generals, were summoned to attend at the same hour, with the forty adjutants of the national guard. Meanwhile the secret council of the Ancients laboured, with shut doors and closed windows, to prepare the decree which was to pass at seven in the morning;<sup>2</sup> and as it forbade all discussion, and the Coun-

<sup>34.</sup>  
Preparations of the conspirators in the Council of the Ancients.

<sup>2</sup> Th. x. 456, 457. Nap. i. 73, 75.

armies you have frequently defeated large ones."—"Even then," rejoined he, "it was always the inferior force which was defeated by the superior. When with a small body of men I was in presence of a large one, collecting my little band, I fell like lightning on one of the wings of the enemy and defeated it; profiting by the disorder which such an event never failed to occasion in their whole line, I repeated the attack with similar success in another quarter, still with my whole force. I thus beat it in detail; and the general victory, which was the result, was still an example of the truth of the principle, that the greater force defeats the lesser."—See GOHIER, i. 203, 204. Two days after, Napoleon made Moreau a present of a dagger set with diamonds, worth 10,000 francs.—*Moniteur*, 1799, p. 178.

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35.  
Efforts of  
Napoleon  
with all  
parties.

cil of Five Hundred were only summoned to meet at eleven, it was hoped the decree would pass at once—not only without any opposition, but before its opponents could be aware of its existence.

Meanwhile Napoleon, in his secret intercourse with the different leaders, was indefatigable in his endeavours to disarm all opposition. Master of the most profound dissimulation, he declared himself, to the chiefs of the different parties, penetrated with the ideas which he was aware would be most acceptable to their minds. To one he protested that he certainly did desire to play the part of Washington, but only in conjunction with Sièyes—the proudest day of his life would be that when he retired from power; to another, that the part of Cromwell appeared to him ignoble, because it was that of an impostor. To the friends of Sièyes, he professed himself impressed with the most profound respect for that mighty intellect, before which the genius of Mirabeau had prostrated itself; that, for his own part, he could only head the armies, and leave to others the formation of the constitution. To all the Jacobins who approached him, he spoke of the extinction of liberty, the tyranny of the Directory, and used terms which sufficiently recalled his famous proclamation which had given the first impulse to the Revolution of the 18th Fructidor.\* In public he announced a review of the troops on the morning of the 18th Brumaire, after which he was to set off to take the command of the army on the frontier.<sup>1</sup>

All the proposed arrangements were made with the

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 457.  
Lac. xiv.  
408, 409.

\* At a small dinner party, given by Napoleon at this time, where the Director Gohier was present, the conversation turned on the turquois used by the Orientals to clasp their turbans. Rising from his chair, Napoleon took out of a private drawer two brooches, richly set with those jewels, one of which he gave to Gohier, the other to Desaix. "It is a little toy," said he, "which *we republicans* may give and receive without any impropriety."—Soon after, the conversation turned on the prospect of an approaching pacification. "Do you really," said Napoleon, "advocate a general peace? You are wrong, president. A republic should never make any but *partial accommodations*; it should always *contrive to have some war on hand to keep alive the military spirit*."—GOHIER, i. 214, 215.



utmost precision. By daybreak on the 18th Brumaire (9th Nov.) the boulevards were filled with a numerous and splendid body of cavalry, and all the officers in and around Paris repaired, in full dress, to the Rue Chantier. The Deputies of the Ancients who were not in the secret assembled, with surprise at the unwonted hour, in their place of meeting, and already the conspirators were there in sufficient strength to give them the majority. The president of the commission, charged with watching over the safety of the legislative body, opened the proceedings: he drew, in energetic and gloomy colours, a picture of the dangers of the Republic, and especially of the perils which menaced their own body, from the efforts of the anarchists. "The Republic," said he, "is menaced at once by the anarchists and the enemy; we must instantly take measures for the public safety. We may reckon on the support of General Buonaparte; it is under the shadow of his protecting arm that the Councils must deliberate on the measures required by the interests of the Republic." The uninitiated members were startled, and considerable agitation prevailed in the Assembly; but the majority were instant and pressing, and at eight o'clock the decree was passed, after a warm opposition, transferring the seat of the legislative body to St Cloud, appointing them to meet there on the following day at noon, charging Napoleon with the execution of the decree, authorising him to take all the measures necessary for its due performance, and appointing him to the command of the garrison of Paris, the national guard, the troops of the line in the military divisions in which it stood, and the guard of the two Councils. This extraordinary decree was ordered to be instantly placarded on the walls of Paris, despatched to all the authorities, and obeyed by all the citizens. To lull the suspicions of Gohier, Napoleon invited himself to dine with him on *that very day*, (the 18th Brumaire,) and sent that director a pressing invitation, carried by Eugene Beauharnais,<sup>1</sup> to breakfast

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36.

The 18th  
Brumaire,  
Nov. 9.

<sup>1</sup> Goh. i. 228,  
234. Nap. i.  
75, 77. Lac.  
xiv. 411,  
412. Th.  
x. 459.

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37.Meeting of  
the conspi-  
rators in the  
Rue Chante-  
reine.

with him in the Rue Chantereine on the succeeding morning.

Napoleon was in his own house in the Rue Chantereine when the messenger of state arrived : his levee resembled rather the court of a powerful sovereign than the dwelling of a general about to undertake a perilous enterprise. No sooner was the decree received than he opened the doors, and, advancing to the portico, read it aloud to the brilliant assemblage, and asked if he might rely on their support ? They all answered with enthusiasm in the affirmative, putting their hands on their swords. He then addressed himself to Lefebvre, the governor of Paris, who had arrived in ill-humour at seeing the troops put in motion without his orders, and said, " Well, Lefebvre, are you, one of the supporters of the Republic, willing to let it perish in the hands of lawyers ? Unite with me to save it. Here is the sabre which I bore at the battle of the Pyramids : I give it you as a pledge of my esteem and confidence." The appeal was irresistible to a soldier's feelings. " Yes," replied Lefebvre, strongly moved, " let us throw the advocates into the river." Joseph Buonaparte had brought Bernadotte ; but, upon seeing what was in agitation, he quickly retired to warn the Jacobins of their danger. Fouché, at the first intelligence of what was going forward, had ordered the barriers to be closed, and all the usual precautions taken which mark a period of public alarm, and hastened to the Rue Chantereine to receive his orders ; but Napoleon ordered them to be opened, and the usual course of things to continue, as he marched with the nation and relied on its support. A quarter of an hour afterwards he mounted on horseback, and, putting himself at the head of his brilliant suite and fifteen hundred horsemen, rode to the Tuileries. Names since immortalised in the rolls of fame were there assembled : Moreau and MacDonald, Berthier and Murat, Lannes, Marmont, and Lefebvre.<sup>1</sup> The dragoons, assembled as they imagined for a review, joyfully followed in the rear of so splendid a

<sup>1</sup> Luc. xiv.  
413. Nap. i.  
78. Th. x.  
461, 462.  
Goh. i. 254.

*cortège*; while the people, rejoicing at the termination of the disastrous government of the Directory, saw in it the commencement of the vigour of military, instead of the feebleness of legal ascendant, and rent the air with their acclamations.

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38.  
Napoleon's  
speech at the  
bar of the  
Ancients.

The military chief presented himself at the bar of the Ancients, attended by that splendid staff. "Citizen representatives," said he, "the Republic was about to perish when you saved it. Woe to those who shall attempt to oppose your decree! Aided by my brave companions in arms, I will speedily crush them to the earth. You are the collected wisdom of the nation; it is for you to point out the measures which may save it. I come surrounded by all the generals, to offer you the support of their arms. I name Lefebvre my lieutenant: I will faithfully discharge the duty you have intrusted to me. Let none seek in the past examples to regulate the present; nothing in history has any resemblance to the close of the eighteenth century; nothing in the eighteenth century resembles this moment. *We are resolved to have a Republic*; we are resolved to have it founded on true liberty and a representative system. I swear it in my own name, and in that of my companions in arms."—"We swear it," replied the generals. A deputy attempted to speak: the president stopped him, upon the ground that all deliberation was interdicted till the Council met at St Cloud. The assembly immediately broke up; and Napoleon proceeded to the gardens of the Tuileries, where he passed in review the regiments of the garrison, addressing to each a few energetic words, in which he declared that he was about to introduce changes which would bring with them abundance of glory. The weather was beautiful; the confluence of spectators immense; their acclamations rent the skies: everything announced the transition from anarchy to despotic power.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 461,  
463. Nap. i.  
79. Lac.  
xiv. 413,  
414.

During these events, the anxiety of all classes in Paris regarding the approaching revolution had risen to the highest

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39.

Curious  
pamphlet  
published in  
support of  
Napoleon.

pitch. A pamphlet, eagerly circulated at the doors of the Councils, contains a curious picture of the ideas of the moment, and the manner in which the most obvious approaching events are glossed over to those engaged in them. The dialogue ran as follows:—" *One of the Five Hundred*. Between ourselves, my friend, I am seriously alarmed at the part assigned to Buonaparte in this affair. His renown, his consideration, the just confidence of the soldiers in his talents, his talents themselves, may give him the most formidable ascendant over the destinies of the Republic. Should he prove a Cæsar, a Cromwell!—*The Ancient*. A Cæsar, a Cromwell! Bad parts; stale parts; unworthy of a man of sense, not to say a man of honesty. Buonaparte has declared so himself, on several occasions. 'It would be a sacrilegious measure,' said he, on one occasion, 'to make any attempt on a representative government in this age of intelligence and liberty.' On another—'There is no one except a fool who would attempt to make the Republic lose the gauntlet it has thrown down to the royalty of Europe, after having gone through so many perils to uphold it.'"<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. iii.  
76, 77.40.  
Proceedings  
of the Council  
of Five  
Hundred,  
and resignation  
of  
Barras.

While all was thus proceeding favourably at the Tuileries, the Council of Five Hundred, having received a confused account of the revolution which was in progress, tumultuously assembled in their hall. They were hardly met, when the message arrived from the Ancients, containing the decree removing them to St Cloud. No sooner was it read than a host of voices burst forth at once; but the president, Lucien Buonaparte, succeeded in reducing them to silence, by appealing to the decree which interdicted all deliberation till they were assembled at that place. At the same moment an aide-de-camp arrived from Napoleon to the guard of the Directory, communicating the decree, and enjoining them to take no orders but from him. They were in deliberation on the subject, when an order of an opposite description arrived from the Directory. The soldiers, however, declared for

their comrades in arms, and ranged themselves round the standard of Napoleon. Soon after, a part of the Directory sent in their resignation. Sièyes and Roger Ducos were already in the plot, and did so in concert with Napoleon. Barras was easily disposed of. Boutot, his secretary, waited on Napoleon. He bitterly reproached him with the public disasters. "What have you made of that France," exclaimed he, "which I left so brilliant? I left you in peace, I find you at war: I left you victorious, I find only disasters: I left you the millions of Italy, and in their stead I find only acts of spoliation! What have you made of the hundred thousand men, my companions in glory? They are dead! This state of things cannot continue; in less than three years it would lead to despotism." The Director yielded; and, accompanied by a guard of honour, set out for his villa of Gros Bois.<sup>1</sup>

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The two Directors who remained, however, were not disposed of without considerable difficulty. These were Gohier and Moulins, brave republicans; but their powers of acting according to the constitution, which required a majority of the Directory for every legal act, were paralysed by the resignation or desertion of their brethren. Napoleon waited upon them, and said that he believed they were too good citizens to attempt to oppose a revolution which appeared inevitable; and that he therefore expected they would quietly send in their resignations. Gohier replied with vehemence, that, with the aid of his colleague Moulins, he did not despair of saving the Republic. "With what?" said Napoleon: "By means of the constitution which is falling to pieces?" At this instant a messenger arrived with the intelligence that Santerre was striving to raise the faubourgs. "General Moulins," said Napoleon, "you are the friend of Santerre. I understand he is rousing the faubourgs; tell him, that at the first movement, I will cause him to be shot." Moulins replied with equal firmness. "The Republic is

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 468,  
469. Goh. i.  
243, 258,  
261. Luc.  
xiv. 416.

41.  
Arrest of  
Gohier and  
Moulins.

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in danger," said Napoleon, "and we must save it; *it is my will*. Sièyes and Roger Ducos have sent in their resignations; you are two individuals insulated and without power. I recommend you not to resist." The Directors replied, that they would not desert their post. Upon that they were sent back to the Luxembourg, separated from each other, and put under arrest, by orders of Napoleon transmitted to Moreau. Meanwhile Fouché, minister of police, Cambacérès, minister of justice, and all the public authorities, hastened to the Tuileries to make their submission. Fouché, in the name of the Directory, provisionally dissolved the twelve municipalities of Paris, so as to leave no rallying-point to the Jacobins. Before night the government was annihilated, and there remained no authority in Paris but what emanated from Napoleon.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 461.  
466. Lac.  
xiv. 414.  
415. Nap. i.  
81, 82. (Folh.  
i. 254.

42.  
Napoleon,  
Sièyes, and  
Roger  
Ducos are  
named  
Consuls.

A council was held in the evening at the Tuileries, to deliberate on the course to be pursued on the following day. Sièyes strongly urged the necessity of arresting forty leaders of the Jacobins, who were already fomenting opposition in the Council of Five Hundred, and by whom the faubourgs were beginning to be agitated; but Napoleon declared that he would not violate the oath which he had taken to protect the national representatives, and that he had no fear of such contemptible enemies. At the same time a provisional government was formed. Napoleon, Sièyes, and Roger Ducos were named First Consuls, and it was agreed that the Councils should be adjourned for three months. Murat was appointed to the command of the armed force of St Cloud—Pensard to that of the guard of the legislative body—Serrurier, of a strong reserve stationed at Point-du-Jour. The gallery of Mars was prepared for the Council of the Ancients, the Orangery for the Five Hundred.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Mign. ii.  
454. Th. x.  
467. Nap. i.  
83, 85. Lac.  
xiv. 419.

On the morning of the 19th Brumaire (10th November) a formidable military force, five thousand strong, surrounded St Cloud: the legislature were not to deliberate, as on 2d June, under the daggers of the populace, but the

bayonets of the soldiery. The Five Hundred, however, mustered strong in the gardens of the palace. Formed into groups, while the last preparations were going on in the hall which they were to occupy, they discussed with warmth the extraordinary position of public affairs, mutually sounded and encouraged each other, and succeeded, even during that brief space, in organising a very formidable opposition. The members of the Five Hundred demanded of the Council of the Ancients what they really proposed to themselves as the result of the proceedings of the day. "The government," said they, "is dissolved." "Admitted," replied the others; "but what then? Do you propose, instead of weak men, destitute of renown, to place there Buonaparte?" Those of the Ancients who were in the secret ventured to insinuate something about the necessity of a military leader; but the suggestion was ill received, and the opposition in the Five Hundred was every moment becoming stronger, from the rumours which were spread of the approaching dictatorship. The Ancients were violently shaken at the unexpected resistance they had experienced, and numbers in the majority were already anxious to escape from the perilous enterprise on which they had adventured. The opinions of the Five Hundred were already unequivocally declared; everything seemed to indicate that there, at least, the legislature would triumph over the conspirators.

It was in the midst of this uncertainty and disquietude that the Councils opened. Lucien Buonaparte was in the chair of the Five Hundred. Gaudin ascended the tribune, and commenced a set speech, in which he dwelt in emphatic terms on the dangers which threatened the country, and concluded by proposing a vote of thanks to the Ancients for having transferred their deliberations to St Cloud, and the formation of a committee of seven persons to prepare a report upon the state of the Republic. Had this been carried, it was to have been immediately followed up by the appointment of the consuls and an

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43.

The 19th  
Brumaire at  
St Cloud.  
Nov. 10th.

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 469,  
472. Nap. i.  
86, 87. Lac.  
xiv. 419,  
420. Jom.  
xii. 403.  
Goh. i. 272,  
273.

44.

Excessive  
vehemence  
in the Five  
Hundred.

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adjournment. But no sooner had Gaudin concluded, than the most violent opposition arose. "The winds," says Napoleon, "suddenly escaping from the caverns of Æolus, can give but a faint idea of that tempest." The speaker was violently dragged from the tribune, and a frightful agitation rendered any further proceedings impossible. "Down with the dictators! long live the constitution!" resounded on all sides. "The constitution or death!" exclaimed Delbrel; "bayonets shall not deter us: we are still free here." In the midst of the tumult, Lucien in vain endeavoured to exert his authority. After a long scene of confusion, one of the deputies proposed that the assembly should swear fidelity to the constitution; this proposal was instantly adopted, and the roll called for that purpose. This measure answered the double purpose of binding the Council to support its authority, and giving time for the Jacobin leaders to be sent for from the capital. In fact, during the two hours that the calling of the roll lasted, intelligence of the resistance of the Five Hundred circulated in Paris with the rapidity of lightning; and Jourdan, Augereau, and other leaders of the Jacobin party, believing that the enterprise had miscarried, hastened to the scene of action. The Five Hundred, during this delay, hoped they would have time to communicate with the Directory; but before it terminated, the intelligence arrived that the government was dissolved, and no executive authority remaining but in the person of Napoleon.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 87.  
Lac. xiv.  
420, 422.  
Th. x. 473,  
474. Goh.  
i. 273, 276.

45.  
Imminent  
danger of  
Napoleon,  
who enters  
the Hall of  
the An-  
cients.

The danger was now imminent to that audacious general. The Five Hundred were so vehement in their opposition to him, that the whole members, including Lucien, were compelled to take the oath to the constitution; and in the Ancients, although his adherents had the majority, the contest raged with the utmost violence, and the strength of the minority was every instant increasing. The influential Jacobins were rapidly arriving from Paris; they looked on the matter as already decided. Every-



thing depended on the troops, and although their attachment to Napoleon was well known, it was extremely doubtful whether they would not be overawed by the majesty of the legislature. "Here you are," said Augereau to him the moment he had arrived, "in a happy position!"—"Augereau," replied Napoleon, "recollect Arcola; things then appeared much more desperate. Take my word for it; remain tranquil, if you would not become a victim. Half an hour hence you will thank me for my advice." Notwithstanding this seeming confidence, however, Napoleon fully felt the danger of his situation. The influence of the legislature was sensibly felt on the troops; the boldest were beginning to hesitate; the zealous had already become timid; the timid had changed their colours. He saw that there was not a moment to lose; and he resolved to present himself, at the head of his staff, at the bar of the Ancients. "At that moment," said Napoleon, "I would have given two hundred millions to have had Ney by my side."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 474,  
475. Lac.  
xiv. 423,  
424. Nap. i.  
87, 88. Las  
Cas. vii.  
235.

In this crisis, Napoleon was strongly agitated. He never possessed the faculty of powerful extempore elocution—a peculiarity not unfrequently the accompaniment of the most profound and original thought; and on this occasion, from the vital interests at stake, and the vehement opposition with which he was assailed, he could hardly utter anything intelligible.<sup>2</sup> So far as his meaning could be gathered, amidst the frightful tumult which prevailed when he made his appearance accompanied by his armed followers in the Hall of the Ancients, his speech was to the following purpose:—"You are on the edge of a volcano. Allow me to explain myself: you have called me and my companions in arms to your aid \* \* \* but you must now take a decided part. I know they talk of Caesar and Cromwell, as if anything in antiquity resembled the present moment. And you, grenadiers, whose feathers I perceive already waving in the hall, say, have I ever failed in performing the promises I made to you in

46.  
Napoleon's  
agitation,  
and speech  
to the An-  
cients.

<sup>2</sup> Bour. iii.  
83, 84, 112,  
114.

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the camps?" The soldiers replied by waving their hats, and loud acclamations; but this appeal to the military, in the bosom of the legislature, wrought up to a perfect fury the rage of the Opposition. One of their number, Linglet, rose, and said, in a loud voice, "General, we applaud your words; swear, then, obedience and fidelity to the constitution, which can alone save the Republic." Napoleon hesitated, then replied with energy,—“The constitution does not exist; you yourselves violated it on the 10th Fructidor, when the government assailed the independence of the legislature; you violated it on the 30th Prairial, when the legislative body overthrew the independence of the executive; you violated it on the 22d Floreal, when, by a sacrilegious decree, the government and legislature sacrificed the sovereignty of the people by annulling the elections which they had made. Having subverted the constitution, new guarantees, a fresh compact, are required. I declare, that as soon as the dangers which have invested me with these extraordinary powers have passed away, I will lay them down. I desire only to be the arm which executes your commands. If you call on me to explain what are the perils which threaten our country, I have no hesitation in answering, that Barras and Moulins have proposed to me to place myself at the head of a faction, the object of which is to effect the overthrow of all the friends of freedom.” The energy of this speech, the undoubted truths and audacious falsehoods which it contained, produced a great impression: three-fourths of the assembly rose and loudly testified their applause. His party, recovering their courage, spoke in his behalf, and he concluded with these significant words,—“Surrounded by my brave companions in arms, I will second you. I call you to witness, brave grenadiers, whose bayonets I perceive, whom I have so often led to victory; I can bear witness to your courage: we will unite our efforts to save our country.<sup>1</sup> And if any orator,” added he, with a menacing voice, “paid by the enemy, shall venture to propose to

<sup>1</sup> Th. x. 477.  
Bour. iii. 85.  
Goh. i. 281,  
283.

put me *hors la loi*, I shall instantly appeal to my companions in arms to exterminate him on the spot. Recollect that I march accompanied by the god of fortune and the god of war."

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Hardly was this harangue concluded when intelligence arrived that, in the Council of Five Hundred, the calling of the roll had ceased; that Lucien could hardly maintain his ground against the vehemence of the Assembly; and that they were about to force him to put to the vote a proposal to declare his brother *hors la loi*. It was a similar proposal which had proved fatal to Robespierre; the cause of Napoleon seemed wellnigh desperate, for if it had been passed, there could be little doubt it would be obeyed by the soldiers. In truth, the Council had gone so far as to declare, that the oath of 18th Brumaire should receive a place as distinguished in history as that of the *Jeu de Paume*, "the first of which created liberty, while the second consolidated it," and had decreed a message to the Directory to make them acquainted with their resolution. This decree was hardly passed, when a messenger arrived with a letter from Barras, containing his resignation of the office of Director, upon the ground, "that now the dangers of liberty were *all surmounted*, and the interests of the armies secured." This unlooked-for communication renewed their perplexity; for now it was evident that the executive itself was dissolved. Napoleon, who clearly saw his danger, instantly took his resolution. Boldly advancing to the Hall of the Five Hundred, whose shouts and cries already resounded to a distance, he entered alone, uncovered, and ordered the soldiers and officers of his suite to halt at the entrance. In his passage to the bar he had to pass one half of the benches. No sooner did he make his appearance, than half of the assembly rose up, exclaiming, "Death to the tyrant! down with the dictator!" The scene which ensued baffles all description. Hundreds of deputies rushed down from the benches, and surrounded the general, exclaiming, "Your laurels are all withered ;

47.  
He enters  
the Hall of  
the Five  
Hundred.  
Frightful  
disorders  
there.

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<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 91.  
Th. x. 477,  
478. Lac.  
xiv. 428.  
Goh. i. 291,  
295, 298.

your glory is turned into infamy; is it for this you have conquered? Respect the sanctuary of the laws; retire, retire." Two grenadiers left at the door, alarmed by the danger of their general, rushed forward, sword in hand, seized him by the middle, and bore him, almost stupified, out of the hall: in the tumult, one of them had his clothes torn. Nothing was to be heard but the cries, "No Cromwell! down with the dictator! death to the dictator!"<sup>1</sup>

48.  
Intrepid  
conduct of  
Lucien.

His removal increased rather than diminished the tumult of the assembly. Lucien, alone, and unsupported in the president's chair, was left to make head against the tempest. All his efforts to justify his brother were in vain. "You would not hear him," he exclaimed. "Down with the tyrant! *hors la loi* with the tyrant!" resounded on all sides. With rare firmness he for long resisted the proposal. At length, finding further opposition fruitless, he exclaimed, "You dare to condemn a hero without hearing him in his defence. His brother has but one duty left, and that is to defend him. I renounce the chair, and hasten to the bar to defend the illustrious accused." With these words, laying down his insignia of president, he mounted the tribune. At that instant an officer, despatched by Napoleon, with ten grenadiers, presented himself at the door. It was at first supposed that the troops had declared for the Council, and loud applause greeted their entrance. Taking advantage of the mistake, the leader approached the tribune and laid hold of Lucien, whispering at the same time in his ear, "By your brother's orders;" while the grenadiers exclaimed, "Down with the assassins!" At these words a mournful silence succeeded to the cries of acclamation, and he was conducted without opposition out of the hall.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Goh. i.  
298, 308.

Meanwhile Napoleon had descended to the court, mounted on horseback, ordered the drums to beat the order to form circle, and thus addressed the soldiers:—"I was about to point out the means of saving the country, and they answered me with strokes of the poniard.

They desire to fulfil the wishes of the Allied Sovereigns—what more could England do? Soldiers, can I rely on you?” Unanimous applause answered the appeal; and soon after the officer arrived, bringing out Lucien from the Council. He instantly mounted on horseback, and with Napoleon rode along the ranks; then halting in the centre, said, with a voice of thunder which was heard along the whole line, “Citizen-soldiers! the President of the Council of Five Hundred declares to you, that the immense majority of that body is enthralled by a factious band, armed with stilettos, who besiege the tribune, and interdict all freedom of deliberation. General, and you soldiers, and you citizens, you can no longer recognise any as legislators but those who are around me. Let force expel those who remain in the Orangery; they are not the representatives of the people, but the representatives of the poniard. Let that name for ever attach to them, and if they dare to show themselves to the people, let all fingers point to them as the representatives of the poniard.”—“Soldiers,” added Napoleon, “can I rely on you?” The soldiers, however, appeared still to hesitate, when Lucien, as a last resource, turned to his brother, and raising his sword in his hand, swore to plunge it in his breast if ever he belied the hopes of the republicans, or made an attempt on the liberty of France. This final appeal was decisive. “Vive Buonaparte!” was the answer. He then ordered Murat and Leclerc to march a battalion into the Council, and dissolve the assembly. “Charge bayonets,” was the word given. They entered slowly in, and the officer in command notified to the Council the order to dissolve. Jourdan and several other deputies resisted, and began to address the soldiers on the enormity of their conduct. Hesitation was already visible in their ranks, when Leclerc entering with a fresh body, in close column, instantly ordered the drums to beat and the charge to sound.<sup>1</sup> He exclaimed, “Grenadiers, forward!” and the soldiers, slowly advancing with fixed bayonets,

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49.

Dissolution  
of the Five  
Hundred by  
an armed  
force.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 93.  
Mign. ii.  
458, 459.  
Th. x. 479,  
480. Lac.  
xiv. 431.  
Jom. xii.  
406, 408.  
Bour. iii. 95,  
97. (Feb. i.  
309, 11.

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50.  
Nocturnal  
meeting of  
the conspi-  
rators in the  
Orangery.  
Their de-  
crees.

speedily cleared the hall, the dismayed deputies throwing themselves from the windows, and rushing out at every aperture, to avoid the shock.

Intelligence of the violent dissolution of the Five Hundred was conveyed by the fugitives to the Ancients, who were thrown by this event into the utmost consternation. They had expected that that body would have yielded without violence, and were thunderstruck by the open use of bayonets on the occasion. Lucien immediately appeared at their bar, and made the same apology he had done to the troops for the *coup-d'état* which had been employed,—viz. that a factious minority had put an end to all freedom of deliberation by the use of poniards, which rendered the application of force indispensable; that nothing had been done contrary to forms; that he had himself authorised the employment of the military. The Council were satisfied, or feigned to be so, with this explanation; and at nine at night the remnant of the Five Hundred who were in the interests of Napoleon—five-and-thirty only in number—under the direction of Lucien, assembled in the Orangery, and voted a resolution, declaring that Buonaparte and the troops under his orders had deserved well of their country. “Representatives of the people,” said that audacious partisan, in his opening speech, “this ancient palace of the Kings of France, where we are now assembled, attests that *power is nothing*, and that *glory is everything*.” At eleven at night, a few members of the two Councils, not amounting in all to sixty persons, assembled, and unanimously passed a decree abolishing the Directory, expelling sixty-one members from the Councils as demagogues, adjourning the legislature for three months, and vesting the executive power in the mean time in Napoleon, Sièyes, and Roger Ducos, under the title of Provisional Consuls. Two commissions, of twenty-five members each, were appointed, one from each Council, to combine with the Consuls in the formation of a new constitution.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 94,  
95. Jom.  
xii. 409.  
Th. x. 431.  
Goh. i. 314,  
334.

During these two eventful days, the people of Paris, though deeply interested in the issue of the struggle, and trembling with anxiety lest the horrors of the Revolution should be renewed, remained perfectly tranquil. In the evening of the 18th, reports of the failure of the enterprise were generally spread, and diffused the most mortal disquietude; for all ranks, worn out with the agitation and sufferings of past convulsions, passionately longed for repose, and it was generally felt that it could be obtained only under the shadow of military authority. But at length the result was communicated by the fugitive members of the Five Hundred, who arrived from St Cloud, loudly exclaiming against the military violence of which they had been the victims; and at nine at night the intelligence was officially announced by a proclamation of Napoleon, which was read by torch-light to the agitated groups.<sup>1\*</sup>

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51.

Joy in Paris  
at these  
events.<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 98.  
Th. x. 482.  
Jom. xii.  
410.

With the exception of the legislature, however, all parties declared for the revolution of 18th Brumaire. Violations of the laws and *coups-d'état* had been so common during the Revolution, that the people had ceased to regard them as illegal; and they were judged of entirely by their consequences, and above all by their success. To such a height had the anarchy and distresses of the country arisen, in the latter years of the Revolution, that repose and a regular government had become the object of uni-

52.

General  
satisfaction  
which the  
revolution  
diffused  
through the  
country.

\* This proclamation is chiefly remarkable for the unblushing effrontery with which it set forth a statement of facts, utterly at variance with what above a thousand witnesses, only five miles from the capital, had themselves beheld, and which Napoleon himself has subsequently recorded in his own Memoirs, from which the preceding narrative has in part been taken. He there said, "At my return to Paris I found division among all the authorities, and none agreed except on this single point, that the constitution was half destroyed, and could no longer save the public liberty. All parties came to me, and unfolded their designs; but I refused to belong to any of them. The Council of the Ancients then summoned me; I answered their appeal. A plan for a general restoration had been concerted among the men in whom the nation had been accustomed to see the defenders of its liberty, its equality, and property; but that plan demanded a calm and deliberate investigation, exempt from all agitation or control, and therefore the legislative body was transferred by the Council of the Ancients to St Cloud." After narrating the events of the morning of the 18th, it proceeded thus—"I presented myself to the Council of the Five Hundred, alone and unarmed, in the same manner as I

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versal desire at any price, even that of the extinction of the very liberty, to attain which all these misfortunes had been undergone. The feeling, accordingly, not only of Paris, but of France, was universal in favour of the new government. All parties hoped to see their peculiar tenets forwarded by the change. The Constitutionals trusted that rational freedom would at length be established; the Royalists rejoiced that the first step towards a regular government had been made, and secretly indulged the hope that Buonaparte would play the part of General Monk, and restore the throne. The great body of the people, weary of strife, and exhausted by suffering, passionately rejoiced at the commencement of repose; the numerous exiles and proscribed families exulted in the prospect of revisiting their country, and drawing their last breath in that France which was so dear to them. Ten years had wrought a century of experience: the nation was as unanimous in 1799 to terminate the era of Revolution, as in 1789 it had been to commence it.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Mign. ii.  
462. Lac.  
xiv. 433,  
434.

53.  
Clemency of  
Napoleon  
after his  
victory.

Napoleon rivalled Cæsar in the clemency with which he used his victory. No proscriptions or massacres, few arrests or imprisonments, followed the triumph of Order over Revolution. On the contrary, numerous acts of mercy, as wise as they were magnanimous, made illustrious the rise of the Consular throne. The law of hostages and the forced loans were abolished; the priests and persons pro- had been received with transport by the Ancients. I was desirous of rousing the majority to an exertion of its authority, when *twenty assassins precipitated themselves on me*, and I was only saved from their hands by the brave grenadiers, who rushed to me from the door. The savage cry of 'Hors la loi!' arose; the howl of violence against the force destined to repress it. The assassins instantly surrounded the president; I heard of it, and sent ten grenadiers, who extricated him from their hands. The factious, intimidated, *left the hall and dispersed*. The majority, relieved from their strokes, re-entered peaceably into its hall, deliberated on the propositions submitted to it in the name of the public weal, and passed a salutary resolution, which will become the basis of the provisional constitution of the Republic." Under such colours did Napoleon veil one of the most violent usurpations against a legislature recorded in history. When such falsehood was employed in matters occurring at St Cloud, it renders probable all that Bourrienne has said of the falsehood of the bulletins in regard to more distant transactions.—See NAPOLEON, i. 98, 101.



scribed by the revolution of 18th Fructidor were permitted to return ; the emigrants who had been shipwrecked on the coast of France, and thrown into prison, where they had been confined for four years, were set at liberty. Measures of severity were at first put in force against the violent republicans ; but they were gradually relaxed, and finally given up. Thirty-seven of this obnoxious party were ordered to be transported to Guiana, and twenty-one to be put under the observation of the police ; but the sentence of transportation was soon changed into one of *surveillance*, and even that was shortly abandoned. Nine thousand state prisoners, who at the fall of the Directory languished in the prisons of France, received their liberty. Their numbers, two years before, had been sixty thousand. The elevation of Napoleon was not only unstained by blood, but not even a single captive long lamented the progress of the victor : a signal triumph of the principles of humanity over those of cruelty, glorious alike to the actors and the age in which it occurred ; and a memorable proof how much more durable the victories gained by moderation and wisdom are, than those achieved by violence and stained by blood.<sup>1</sup>

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1799.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. in  
Month. i.  
178. Mign.  
ii. 463. Lac.  
xiv. 434,  
440.

The revolution of the 18th Brumaire had established a provisional government, and overturned the Directory ; but it still remained to form a permanent constitution. In the formation of it a rupture took place between Sièyes and Napoleon. The views of the former, long based on speculative opinions, and strongly tinged with republican ideas, were little likely to accord with those of the young conqueror, accustomed to rule everything by his single determination, and whose sagacity had already discovered the impossibility of forming a stable government out of the institutions of the Revolution. He allowed Sièyes to mould, according to his pleasure, the legislature, which was to consist of a Senate or Upper Chamber ; a Legislative body, without the power of debate ; and a Tribunate, which was to discuss the legislative

54.  
Formation  
of a consti-  
tution.

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measures with the Council of State ; but opposed the most vigorous resistance to the plan which he brought forward for the executive, which was so absurd that it is hardly possible to imagine how it could have been seriously proposed by a man of ability. The plan of this veteran constitution-maker, who had boasted to Talleyrand ten years before, that "politics was a science which he flattered himself he had brought to perfection," was to have vested the executive in a single *Grand Elector*, who was to inhabit Versailles, with a salary of 600,000 francs a year, and a guard of six thousand men, and represent the state to foreign powers. This singular magistrate was to be vested with no immediate authority ; but his functions were to consist in the power of naming two consuls, who were to exercise all the powers of government, the one being charged with the interior, the finances, police, and public justice ; the other with the exterior, including war, marine, and foreign affairs. He was to have a council of state, to discuss with the Tribunate all public measures. He was to be irresponsible, but liable to removal at the pleasure of the senate.—It was easy to perceive that, though he imagined he was acting on general principles, Sièyes in this project was governed by his own interests ; that the situation of grand elector he destined for himself, and the military consulship for the conqueror of Arcola and Rivoli.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
413, 415.  
Mign. ii.  
464, 465.  
Dum. 64.

55.  
Napoleon's  
objection to  
Sièyes'  
plan.

Napoleon, who saw at once that this senseless project, besides presenting insurmountable difficulties in practice, would reduce him to a secondary part, exerted all his talents to combat the plan of Sièyes. "Can you suppose," said he, "that any man of talent or consideration will submit to the degrading situation assigned to the grand elector ? What man, disposing of the national force, would be base enough to submit to the discretion of a senate which, by a simple vote, could send him from Versailles to a second flat in Paris ? Were I grand elector, I would name as my consul of the exterior Ber-

thier; and for the interior some other person of the same stamp. I would prescribe to them their nominations of ministers; and the instant that they ceased to be my staff-officers, I would overturn them." Sièyes replied, "that in that case the grand elector would be *absorbed* by the senate." This phrase got wind, and threw such ridicule over the plan in the minds of the Parisians, that even its author was compelled to abandon it. He soon found that his enterprising colleague would listen to no project which interfered with the supreme power, which he had already resolved to obtain for himself, and which, in truth, was the only form of government capable at that period of arresting the disorders, or terminating the miseries, of France.<sup>1</sup>

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XXIX.

1789.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xii.  
417, 418.  
Nap. ii. 1-41,  
143. Mign.  
ii. 468.

The ideas of Napoleon were unalterably fixed; but he was too clear-sighted not to perceive that time, and a concession, in form at least, to public opinion, were necessary ere he could bring them into practice. "I was convinced," says he, "that France could not exist but under a monarchical form of government; but the circumstances of the times were such, that it was thought, and perhaps was, necessary to disguise the supreme power of the president. All opinions were reconciled by the nomination of a FIRST CONSUL, who alone should possess the authority of government, since he singly disposed of all situations, and possessed a deliberative voice, while the two others were merely his advisers. That supreme officer gave the government the advantage of unity of direction: the two others, whose names appeared to every public act, would soothe the republican jealousy. The circumstances of the times would not permit a better form of government." After long discussion, this project was adopted. The government was in fact exclusively placed in the hands of the First Consul; the two other Consuls had a right to enlighten him by their counsels, but not to restrain him by their vote. The Senate, itself nominated by the Consuls, selected out of the list of candidates who had been chosen

56.  
Napoleon's  
appointment  
as First  
Consul.

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XXIX.

1790.

<sup>1</sup> Mign. ii.  
464, 465.  
Const. Tit.  
iii. Nap. i.  
363, 364.  
Bignon, i.  
27, 28.

by the nation those who were to be the members of the Tribune and Legislative. Government alone was invested with the right of proposing laws. The Legislative Body was interdicted the right of speaking; it was merely to deliberate and decide upon the questions discussed before it by the Tribune and the Council of State nominated by the Consuls: the first being understood to represent the interests of the people, the second that of the government. The Legislative Body was thus transformed from its essential character in a free state, that of a deliberative assembly, into a supreme court, which heard the state pleadings, and by its decision formed the law.<sup>1</sup>

57.  
Total abro-  
gation of the  
power of  
the people.

The people no longer were permitted to choose deputies for themselves, either in their primary assemblies or electoral colleges. They were allowed only to choose the *persons eligible* to these offices, and from the lists thus furnished, government made its election. The whole citizens first chose a tenth of their number in each arrondissement, who formed the electors of the *commune*. This body, composed of the electors, again chose out of the list of eligible persons for the *department* a tenth, who were to form the departmental electors, and they again a tenth of their body, who formed the list out of which the legislature was to be chosen. The Senate, in the close of all, selected such as it chose out of the last list, thus trebly purified, to form the Legislative Body. The senators being nominated by the First Consul, and, holding their situations for life, the whole legislature was subjected to the control of the executive. Its duty was strictly conservative, to watch over the maintenance of the fundamental laws, and the purification of the other branches of the legislature. All public functionaries, civil and military, including the whole judges, instead of being chosen, as heretofore, by the people, were appointed by the First Consul, who thus became the sole depository of influence.<sup>2</sup> The lowest species of judges, called *juges de paix*, were

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xii.  
420, 421.  
Mign. ii.  
464, 468,  
469. Const.  
Tit. iv. sec.  
41. Bign.  
i. 27, 28.

alone left to the choice of the people. By means of the Senate, chosen from his creatures; he regulated the legislature, and possessed the sole initiative of laws; by the appointment to every office, he wielded the whole civil force of the state; by the command of the military, he overawed the discontented, and governed its external relations.

The departmental lists were the most singular part of the new constitution. Every person born and residing in France, above twenty-one, was a *citizen*; but the rights of citizenship were lost by bankruptcy, domestic service, crime, or foreign naturalisation. But the *electors* were a much more limited body. "The citizens of each *arrondissement* chose by their suffrages those whom they deemed fit to conduct public affairs, amounting to not more than a *tenth* of the electors. The persons contained in this first list were alone eligible to official situations in the *arrondissement* from which they were chosen. The citizens embraced in this list chose a tenth of their number for each *department*, which formed the body alone eligible for departmental situations. The citizens chosen by the departmental electors again selected a tenth of their number, which formed the body alone capable of being elected for national situations."<sup>1</sup> The persons on the first list were only eligible to the inferior situations, such as *juges de paix*, a species of arbiters to reconcile differences and prevent lawsuits; those on the second were the class from whom might be selected the prefects, the departmental judges, tax-gatherers and collectors; those on the third, who amounted only to *six thousand* persons, were alone eligible to public offices,—as the Legislature, any of the Ministries of State, the Senate, the Council of State, the Tribunal of Cassation, the ambassadors at foreign courts. Thus, the whole offices of state were centred in six thousand persons, chosen by a triple election from the citizens. The lists were to be revised, and all the vacancies filled up every three years. These

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58.  
Outlines of  
the new con-  
stitution,  
and forma-  
tion of the  
lists of eli-  
gibility.

<sup>1</sup> Const. Tit.  
i. sec. 78, 79.

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lists of eligibility, as Napoleon justly observed, formed a limited and exclusive nobility, differing from the old noblesse only in this, that it was elective, not hereditary; and it was, from the very first, subject to the objection, that it excluded from the field of competition many of the most appropriate persons to hold public situations. The influence of the people in the legislature was, by these successive elections, completely destroyed, and the whole power of the state, it was early foreseen, would centre in the First Consul. The changes introduced, however, diffused general satisfaction. All the members of the legislature received pensions from government: that of the senators was 25,000 francs, or £1000 a-year; that of the Tribunate, 15,000 francs, or £650 yearly; that of the Legislative Body, 10,000 francs, or £400 a-year. The Senate was composed of persons above forty years of age; the Legislative Body, above thirty. A senator remained in that high station for life, and was ineligible to any other situation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Const. Tit. ii. and iii. Nap. i. 139, 141, 361, 362.

59.  
Appoint-  
ments in ad-  
ministration  
made by Na-  
poleon.

On the 24th December 1799, the new constitution was proclaimed; and the whole appointments were forthwith filled up, without waiting for the lists of the eligible, who were, according to its theory, to be chosen by the people. Two consuls, eighty senators, a hundred tribunes, three hundred legislators, were forthwith nominated and proceeded to the exercise of all the functions of government. In the choice of persons to fill such a multitude of offices, ample means existed to reward the moderate, and seduce the republican party; and the consuls made a judicious and circumspect use of the immense influence put into their hands. Sièyes, discontented with the rejection of his favourite ideas, retired from the government; received as a reward for his services 600,000 francs and the estate of Crosne, afterwards changed for the more valuable domain of la Faisanderie in the park of Versailles; and the democratic fervour of the author of the pamphlet—“*What is the Tiers Etat?*” sank into the interested apathy of

the proprietor of fifty thousand pounds. Roger Ducos also withdrew, perceiving the despotic turn which things were taking; and Napoleon appointed in their stead Cambacérès and Lebrun, men of moderation and probity, who worthily discharged the subordinate functions assigned to them in the administration. "In the end," said Napoleon, "you must come to the government of boots and spurs; and neither Sièyes nor Roger Ducos were fit for that."<sup>1</sup> Talleyrand was made minister of foreign affairs, and Fouché retained in the ministry of the police; the illustrious La Place received the portfolio of the interior. By the latter appointments Napoleon hoped to calm the fears and satisfy the ambition of the republican party. Sièyes was very averse to the continuance of Fouché in office; but Napoleon was resolute. "We have arrived," said he, "at a new era; we must recollect in the past only the good, and forget the bad. Age, the habits of business, and experience, have formed or modified many characters." High salaries were given to all the public functionaries, on condition only that they should live in a style of splendour suitable to their station: a wise measure, which both secured the attachment of that powerful body of men, and precluded them from acquiring such an independence as might enable them to dispense with employment under government.<sup>2</sup>

A curious incident occurred on occasion of the resignation of Sièyes, highly characteristic of the disposition of that veteran of the Revolution, as well as of the preceding governments. At the first meeting which Napoleon had with him in the apartments of the Directory, Sièyes, after cautiously shutting the doors, and looking round to see that he was not overheard, said, in a low voice, to Napoleon, pointing to a bureau, "Do you see that piece of furniture? You will not easily guess what it is worth. It contains 800,000 francs. During our magisterial duties, we came to perceive that it would be unseemly for a Director to leave office without being worth

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<sup>1</sup> Las Cas.  
ii. 353.<sup>2</sup> Mign. ii.  
468, 469.  
Jom. xii.  
422, 423.  
Nap. i. 113.  
Goh. ii. 6, 8.60.  
Gross cupidity of  
Sièyes.

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a farthing; and we therefore fell upon the expedient of getting this depot, from whence every one who retired might take a suitable sum. But now the Directory is dissolved, what shall we do with it?"—"If I had been officially informed of it," said Napoleon, "it must have been restored to the public treasury; but as that is not the case, I am not supposed to know anything of the matter. Take it, and divide it with Ducos; but make haste, for to-morrow it may be too late." Sièyes did not require a second bidding; that very day he took out the treasure, "but appropriated," says Napoleon, "600,000 francs to himself, and gave only 200,000 to poor Ducos." In truth Ducos got only 100,000; the Grand Elector *absorbed* all the rest.<sup>1</sup> This treasure, however, was far from satisfying Sièyes. One day, soon after, he said to Napoleon, "How fortunate you are! all the glory of the 18th Brumaire has fallen to your lot, while I shall probably incur only blame for my share in the attempt."—"What!" exclaimed Napoleon, "have not the consular commissaries passed a resolution that you have deserved well of your country? Tell me honestly, what do you want?" Sièyes, with a ridiculous grimace, replied, "Do you not think, citizen-consul, that some *national domain*, a monument of the national gratitude, would be a fit recompense to one who has co-operated with you in your great designs?"—"Oh! I understand you now," said Napoleon; "I will speak with Ducos on the subject." Two days afterwards appeared a decree of the commission of the Councils, awarding to Sièyes the national domain of Crosne, in "name of national recompense." But Sièyes soon found out that the nation had not the right to dispose of the estate of Crosne; and it was exchanged for the superb Hotel del Infantado in Paris, and the rich lands of la Faisanderie in the park of Versailles.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 146.  
Las Cas. ii.  
350. Goh.  
ii. 5, 8.

Such was the exhaustion of the French people, occasioned by revolutionary convulsions, that this constitution,



destroying, as it did, all the objects for which the people had combated for ten years, was gladly adopted by an immense majority of the electors. It was approved of by 3,011,007 citizens; while that of 1793 had obtained only 1,801,918 suffrages, and that in 1795, which established the Directory, 1,057,390.<sup>1</sup> These numbers are highly instructive. They demonstrate, what so many other considerations conspire to indicate, that even the most vehement changes are brought about by a factious and energetic minority, and that it is often more the supineness than the numerical inferiority of the better class of citizens which subjects them to the tyranny of the lowest. In 1789, indeed, the great majority of all classes were carried away by the fever of innovation; but these transports were of short duration; and from the time that the sombre days of the Revolution began, their numerical superiority was at an end. It was the terrors and disunion of the class of proprietors, which, by leaving no power in the state but the populace and their demagogues, delivered the nation over to the horrors of Jacobin slavery.

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61.

Immense majority of the people who approved of the new constitution.

<sup>1</sup> Mign. ii. 469.

Such was the termination of the changes of the French Revolution; and such the government which the people brought upon themselves by their sins and their extravagance. On the 23d June 1789, before one drop of blood had been shed or one estate confiscated, Louis offered the states-general a constitution containing all the elements of real freedom, with all the guarantees which experience has proved to be necessary for its continuance—the security of property, the liberty of the press, personal freedom, equality of taxation, provincial assemblies, the voting of taxes by the states-general, and the vesting of the legislative power in the representatives of the three estates in their separate chambers.<sup>2</sup> The popular repre-

62.  
Reflections on the accession of Napoleon to the consular throne.<sup>2</sup> See chap. iv. § 66.

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powers of sovereignty, and with relentless rigour pursued their victory, till they had destroyed the clergy, the nobles, and the throne. France waded through an ocean of blood: calamities unheard of assailed every class, from the throne to the cottage; for ten long years the struggle continued, and at length it terminated in the establishment, by universal consent, of a government which swept away every remnant of freedom, and consigned the state to the tranquillity of military despotism. So evidently was this result the punishment of the crimes of the Revolution, that it appeared in that light even to some of the principal actors in that convulsion. In a letter written by Sièyes to Riouffe at that period, he said, "It is then for such a result that the French nation has gone through its Revolution! The ambitious villain! He marches successfully through all the ways of fortune and crime — all is vanity, distrust, and terror. There is here neither elevation nor liberality. *Providence wishes to punish us by the Revolution itself.* Our chains are too humiliating; on all sides nothing is to be seen but powers prostrated, leaden oppression: military despotism is alone triumphant. If anything could make us retain some esteem for the nation, it is the luxury of perfidy of which it has been the victim. But the right of the sabre is the weakest of all; for it is the one which is soonest worn out."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sièyes to Riouffe, Jan. 17, 1800; Hurd. vii. 371.

63.  
Durable freedom had been rendered impossible by the destruction of the aristocracy and clergy.

Had this been merely a temporary result, the friends of freedom might have found some consolation in the reflection, that the elements at least of ultimate liberty were laid, and that the passing storm had renovated, not destroyed, the face of society. But the evil went a great deal deeper. In their democratic fervour, the people had pulled down the bulwarks not only of order, but of liberty; and when France emerged from the tempest, the classes were extinct whose combined and counteracting influence are necessary for its existence. "The principle of the French Revolution," says Napo-

leon, "being the absolute equality of all classes, there resulted from it a total want of aristocracy. If a republic is difficult to construct on any durable basis without an order of nobles, much more so is a monarchy. To form a constitution in a country destitute of any species of aristocracy, is like *attempting to navigate in a single element*. The French Revolution has attempted a problem as insoluble as the direction of balloons."<sup>1</sup> "A monarchy," says Lord Bacon, "where there is no nobility at all, is ever a pure and absolute tyranny, as that of the Turks; for nobility attempers sovereignty, and draws the eyes of the people somewhat aside from the line royal."<sup>2</sup> In these profound observations is to be found the secret of the subsequent experienced impossibility of constructing a durable free government in France, or preserving anything like a balance between the different classes of society. The Revolution had left only the government, the army, and the people; no intermediate rank existed to counteract the influence of the former, or give durability to the exertions of the latter. Left to themselves, the people were no match in the long run for an executive wielding the whole military force of the kingdom, and disposing in offices and appointments, ere long even in pacific periods, of above £40,000,000 a-year.

In moments of excitement, the democratic spirit may become powerful, and, by infecting the military, give a momentary triumph to the populace; but, with the cessation of the effervescence, the influence of government must return with redoubled force, and the people be again subjected to the yoke of servitude, either under the old government or the new one which they have installed in its stead. In such a state of society all convulsions, though effected by the physical force of the people, must be revolutions of the palace only. Casual bursts of democratic passion cannot maintain a long contest in a corrupted age with the steady efforts of a regular govern-

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<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 145,  
146.<sup>2</sup> Bacon, ii.  
282.

64.

All revolutions after this were revolutions of the palace only.

ment; and if they could, they would lead only to the transference of despotic power from one set of rulers to another. It is hard to say whether liberty has most to dread, in such circumstances, from its friends or its enemies. Durable freedom is to be secured only by the steady, persevering efforts of an aristocracy, supported, when necessary, by the enthusiasm of the people, and hindered from running into excess by the vigour of the executive. In all ages of the world, and under all forms of government, it is in the equipoise of these powers that freedom has been formed, and from the fall of one of them that the commencement of servitude is to be dated. The French Revolution, by totally destroying the whole class of the aristocracy, and preventing, by the abolition of primogeniture, its reconstruction, has rendered this balance impossible, and, instead of the elements of European freedom, left in society only the instruments and the victims of Asiatic despotism. It is as impossible to construct a durable free government with such materials, as it would be to form glass or gunpowder with two only of the three elements of which they are composed. And the result has completely established the truth of these principles. The despotism of Napoleon was, till his fall, the most rigorous of any in Europe: and although France enjoyed fifteen years of liberty under the Restoration, when the swords of Alexander and Wellington had righted the balance, and the recollection of subjugation had tamed for a time the aspirations of democracy; yet, with the rise of a new generation and the oblivion of former disaster, the scales were anew subverted, the constitutional monarchy was overturned, and from amidst the smoke of the Barricades, the awful figure of military power again emerged.

Grievous as has been the injury, however, to the cause of freedom, which the ruin of the French aristocracy has occasioned, it is not so great or so irreparable as has resulted from the destruction of the Church, and the conse-

quent irreligion of the most energetic part of the population. This evil has spread to an unparalleled extent, and produced mischiefs of incalculable magnitude. If it be true, as the greatest of their philosophers has declared, that it was neither their numbers, nor their talent, nor their military spirit, which gave the Romans the empire of the world, but the religious feeling which animated their people,\* it may be conceived what consequences must have resulted from the extinction of public worship over a whole country, and the rising up of a generation ignorant of the very elements of religious belief. It is the painful duty of the moralist to trace the consequences of so shocking an act of national impiety, in the progressive profligacy of manners, the growth of selfishness, and the unrestrained career of passion, by which so large a portion of the French people have since been distinguished; but its effects upon public freedom are, in a political point of view, equally important.

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1799.

65.

Disastrous  
effects of the  
irreligion of  
France.

Liberty is essentially based on the generous feelings of our nature. It requires often the sacrifice of private gratification for the public good; it can never subsist for any length of time without that heroic self-denial, which can only be founded on the promises and the belief of religion. We must not confound with this generous and elevated spirit the desire for licentiousness, which chafes against every control, whether human or divine: the one is the burst of vegetation in its infancy, and gives promise of the glories of summer and the riches of harvest; the other, the fermentation which precedes corruption. By destroying the Church, and educating a whole generation without any religious principles, France has given a blow to her freedom and her prosperity, from which she can never recover. The fervour of democracy, the extension of

66.

Its lasting  
alliance with  
the selfish  
passions.

\* "Nec numero Hispanos, nec robore Gallos, nec calliditate Pœnos, nec artibus Græcos, nec denique hoc ipso hujus gentis et terræ domestico nativæ sensu, Italos ipsos et Latinos; sed pietate ac religione, atque hac una sapientiâ, quod Deorum immortalium numine omnia regi gubernarique perpeximus, omnes gentes nationesque superavimus."—CICERO.

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knowledge, will give but a transient support to liberty, when deprived of that perennial supply which is derived from the sense of duty that devotion inspires. "As Atheism," says Lord Bacon, "is in all respects hateful, so in this, that it depriveth human nature of the means of exalting itself above human frailty; and as it is in particular persons, so it is in nations." Passion will find as many objects of gratification under a despotism as under a republic; seduction is as easy from private as from public desires; pleasure is as alluring in the palace of opulence as in the forum of democracy. The transition is in general slow from patriotic principle or public spirit to private gratification, because they spring from the opposite motives to human conduct; but it is rapid from rebellion against the restraints of virtue, to thralldom under the chains of vice, for the former is but the commencement of the latter.

67.  
Identity of  
courtiers and  
democrats.

<sup>1</sup> Arist. de  
Pol. iv. § 4.

"The character of democracy and despotism," says Aristotle, "is the same. Both exercise a despotic authority over the better class of citizens; decrees are in the one what ordinances and arbitrary violence are in the other. In different ages, the democrat and court-favourite are not unfrequently *the same men*, and always bear a close analogy to each other; they have the principal power in their respective forms of government; favourites with the absolute monarch—demagogues with the sovereign multitude."<sup>1</sup> "Charles II.," says Chateaubriand, "threw republican England into the arms of women:" but, in truth, it was not the amorous monarch who effected the change; it was the easy transition from democratic license to general corruption, which debased the nation at the Restoration. Mr Hume has observed, that religious fanaticism during the Civil Wars disgraced the spirit of liberty in England; but, in truth, it was the only safeguard of public virtue during those critical times; and but for the unbending austerity of the Puritans, public freedom would have irrecoverably perished in the flood of licentiousness

which overwhelmed the country on the accession of Charles II. "Knowledge," says Lord Bacon, "is power;" he has not said it is either wisdom or virtue. It augments the influence of opinion upon mankind; but whether it augments it to good or evil purpose, depends upon the character of the information which is communicated, and the precautions against corruption which are simultaneously taken. As much as it enlarges the foundations of prosperity in a virtuous, does it extend the sources of corruption in a degenerate age. Unless the moral and religious improvement of the people extends in proportion to their intellectual cultivation, the increase of knowledge is but an addition to the lever by which vice dissolves the fabric of society.

The revolutionary party have frequently said, that it was Napoleon who constructed with so much ability the fabric of despotism in France; but, in truth, it was not he that did it, nor was his power, great as it was, ever equal to the task. It was the Constituent Assembly who broke up the fabric of society in that great country, and left only a disjointed, misshapen mass, an easy prey to the first despotism which should succeed it. By destroying the parliaments, provincial assemblies, and courts of law; by annihilating the old divisions and rights of the provinces; by extinguishing all corporations and provincial establishments, at the same time that they confiscated the property of the Church, drove the nobles into exile, and soon after seized upon their estates, they took away for the future all elements of resistance to the power of the metropolis. Everything was immediately centralised in its public offices; the lead in all public matters taken by its citizens; and the direction of every detail, however minute, assumed by its ministers. France, ever since, has fallen into a state of subjection to Paris, to which there is nothing comparable even in the annals of Oriental servitude. The ruling power in the East is frequently shaken, sometimes overturned, by tumults originating in

68.  
Prodigious effects of the centralisation of power introduced by the Revolution.

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the provinces ; but there has been no example, since the new regime was fully established by the suppression of the la Vendée rebellion, of the central authority in France being shaken except by movements originating in the capital. The authority of Robespierre, Napoleon, Louis, Louis Philippe, and the Republic of 1848, were successively acknowledged by thirty millions over the country, as soon as a faction in Paris had obtained the ascendancy ; and the obedient departments waited for the announcement of the telegraph, or the arrival of the mail, to know whether they should salute an emperor, a king, a consul, or a decemvir. This total prostration of the strength of a great nation before the ruling power in the metropolis could never have taken place under the old government ; and, accordingly, nothing of the kind was experienced under the monarchy. It was the great deeds of democratic despotism perpetrated by the Constituent Assembly which destroyed all the elements of resistance in the provinces, and left France a helpless multitude, necessarily subject to the power which had gained possession of the machinery of government. Despotic as the old government of France was, it could never have attempted such an arbitrary system ; even the power of the Czar Peter, or the Sultaun Mahmoud, would have been shattered, on attempting such an invasion of established rights and settled interests. A memorable instance of the extreme danger to which the interests of freedom are exposed from the blind passions of democracy ; and of the fatal effect of the spring-flood which drowns the institutions of a state, when the opposing powers of the people and the government are brought for a time to draw in the same direction.

To all human appearance, therefore, the establishment of permanent freedom is hopeless in France ; the bulwarks of European liberty have disappeared in the land, and over the whole expanse is seen only the level surface of Asiatic despotism. This grievous result is the consequence and the punishment of the great and crying sins of the



Revolution ; of the irreligious spirit in which it was conceived ; the atheistical measures which it introduced ; the shedding of noble blood which characterised it ; the overthrow of private rights which it accomplished ; the boundless confiscations which it perpetrated. But for these offences, a constitutional monarchy, like that which for a century and a half has given glory and happiness to England, might have been established in its great rival ; because, but for these offences, the march of the Revolution would have been unstained by crime. In nations, as in individuals, a harvest of prosperity never yet was reaped from seed sown in injustice. But nations have no immortality ; and that final retribution which in private life is often postponed, to outward appearance at least, to another world, is brought with swift and unerring wings upon the third and fourth generation in the political delinquencies of mankind.

Does, then, the march of freedom necessarily terminate in disaster ? Is improvement inevitably allied to innovation, innovation to revolution ? And must the philosopher, who beholds the infant struggles of liberty, ever foresee in their termination the blood of Robespierre, or the carnage of Napoleon ? No ! The distinction between the two is as wide as between day and night—between virtue and vice. The simplest and rudest of mankind may distinguish, with as much certainty as belongs to erring mortals, whether the ultimate tendency of innovations is beneficial or ruinous—whether they are destined to bring blessings or curses on their wings. This test is to be found in the character of those who support them, and the moral justice or injustice of their measures. If those who forward the work of reform are the most pure and upright in their private conduct ; if they are the foremost in every moral and religious duty ; most unblemished in their intercourse with men, and most undeviating in their duty to God ; if they are the best fathers, the best husbands, the best landlords, the most charitable and humane of

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69.  
Hopeless  
state of the  
cause of  
freedom in  
France.

70.

Distinction  
between the  
safe and  
dangerous  
spirit of  
freedom.

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1799.

society, who take the lead ; if their proceedings are characterised by moderation, and they are scrupulously attentive to justice and humanity in all their actions ; then the people may safely follow in their steps, and anticipate blessings to themselves and their children from the measures they promote. But if the reverse of all this is the case ; if the leaders who seek to rouse their passions are worthless or suspicious in private life ; if they are tyrannical landlords, faithless husbands, negligent fathers ; if they are sceptical or indifferent in religion, reckless or improvident in conduct, ruined or tottering in fortune ; if they are selfish in their enjoyments, and indifferent to the poor ; if they care not for their sufferings, provided they serve as a scaffolding to their own elevation ; if their liberty is a cloak for licentiousness, and their patriotism an excuse for ambition ; if their actions are hasty and inconsiderate, and their measures calculated to do injustice or create suffering to individuals, on the plea of state necessity : then the people may rest assured that they are leading them to perdition ; that the fabric of liberty never yet was reared by such hands, or on such a basis ; that, whatever temporary triumph may attend their steps, the day of reckoning will come, and that an awful retribution awaits them or their children.

71.  
Immense  
impulse  
given by the  
changes of  
the Revolution,  
to the  
spread of  
Christianity  
over the  
world.

The final result of the irreligious efforts of the French people is singularly illustrative of the moral government to which human affairs are subject, and of the vanity of all attempts to check that spread of religion which has been decreed by Almighty power. When the Parisian philosophers beheld the universal diffusion of the spirit of scepticism which they had produced ; when a nation was seen abjuring every species of devotion, and a generation rising in the heart of Europe ignorant of the very elements of religious belief, the triumph of infidelity appeared complete, and the faithful trembled and mourned in silence at the melancholy prospects which were opening upon the world. Yet in this very spirit were preparing,

by an unseen hand, the means of the ultimate triumph of civilised over barbaric belief, and of a greater spread of the Christian faith than had taken place since it was embraced by the tribes who overthrew the Roman empire. In the deadly strife of European ambition, the arms of civilisation acquired an irresistible preponderance; with its last convulsions, the strength of Russia was immensely augmented; and that mighty power, which had been organised by the genius of Peter and matured by the ambition of Catherine, received its final development through the invasion of Napoleon. The Crescent, long triumphant over the Cross, has now yielded to its ascendant; the barriers of the Caucasus and the Balkan have been burst by its champions; the ancient war-cry of Constantinople, "Victory to the Cross!" has, after an interval of four centuries, been heard on the Ægean Sea; and that lasting triumph, which all the enthusiasm of the Crusaders could not effect, has arisen from the energy infused into what was then an unknown tribe, by the infidel arms of their descendants. In such marvellous and unforeseen consequences, the historian finds ample grounds for consolation at the temporary triumph of wickedness: from the corruption of decaying, he turns to the energy of infant civilisation; while he laments the decline of the principles of prosperity in their present seats, he anticipates their resurrection in those where they were first cradled; and traces, through all the vicissitudes of nations, the incessant operation of those general laws which provide, even amidst the decline of present greatness, for the final improvement and elevation of the species.

## CHAPTER XXX.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF NAPOLEON TO THE CONSULATE TO  
THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.

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1.  
Napoleon's  
letter, pro-  
posing peace  
to the  
British gov-  
ernment.  
Dec. 25.

THE first step of Napoleon upon arriving at the consular throne was to make proposals of peace to the British government. The debate on that subject in Parliament is the most important that occurred during the war, and forms the true introduction to the political history of Europe during the nineteenth century. The letter of Napoleon, which, contrary to all diplomatic usage, was addressed directly to the King of England, couched in his usual characteristic language, was in these terms: "Called by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the first station in the Republic, I think it proper on entering into office to make a direct communication to your Majesty. The war which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the globe, must it be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an understanding? How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, powerful and strong beyond what their independence and safety require, sacrifice to ideas of vain greatness the benefits of commerce, internal prosperity, and domestic happiness? How has it happened that they do not feel that peace is of the first necessity as well as the truest glory? These sentiments cannot be foreign to the heart of your Majesty, who reign over a free nation with the sole view of rendering it happy. You will see in this overture only the

effect of a sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to a general pacification, by a step speedy, implying confidence, and disengaged from those forms which, however necessary to disguise the dependence of feeble states, prove only in those which are strong the mutual desire of deceiving each other. France and England may, by the abuse of their strength, continue for a time, to the misfortune of nations, to retard the period of their being exhausted; but I will venture to say, the fate of all civilised nations is attached to the termination of a war which involves the whole world."

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To this letter the following answer was returned by Lord Grenville, the English minister of foreign affairs:—"The King has given frequent proofs of his sincere desire for the re-establishment of secure and permanent tranquillity in Europe. He neither is, nor has been, engaged in any contest for a vain and false glory. He has had no other view than that of maintaining against all aggression the rights and happiness of his subjects. For these he has contended against an unprovoked attack; and for the same objects he is still obliged to contend. Nor can he hope that this necessity could be removed by entering, at the present moment, into negotiation with those whom a fresh revolution has so recently placed in the exercise of power in France; since no real advantage can arise from such negotiation to the great and desirable object of a general peace, until it shall distinctly appear that those causes have ceased to operate which originally produced the war, and by which it has been since protracted, and in more than one instance renewed. The same system, to the prevalence of which France justly ascribes all her present miseries, is that which has also involved the rest of Europe in a long and destructive warfare, of a nature long since unknown to the practice of civilised nations. For the extension of this system, and for the extermination of all established governments, the resources of France have, from year to year, and in the midst of the most

2.  
Lord Gren-  
ville's an-  
swer.

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3.  
His state-  
ment of the  
grounds on  
which peace  
is impos-  
sible.

unparalleled distress, been lavished and exhausted. To this indiscriminate spirit of destruction, the Netherlands, the United Provinces, the Swiss Cantons, his Majesty's ancient allies, have successively been sacrificed. Germany has been ravaged; Italy, though now rescued from its invaders, has been made the scene of unbounded rapine and anarchy. His Majesty has himself been compelled to maintain an arduous and burdensome contest for the independence and existence of his kingdom.

"While such a system continues to prevail, and while the blood and treasure of a numerous and powerful nation can be lavished in its support, experience has shown that no defence, but that of open and steady hostility, can be availing. The most solemn treaties have only prepared the way for fresh aggression; and it is to a determined resistance alone that is now due whatever remains in Europe of security for property, personal liberty, social order, or religious freedom. For the security, therefore, of these essential objects, his Majesty cannot place his reliance on the mere renewal of general professions of pacific dispositions. Such dispositions have been repeatedly held out by all those who have successively directed the resources of France to the destruction of Europe, and whom the present rulers have declared to have been, from the beginning, and uniformly, incapable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity. Greatly, indeed, will his Majesty rejoice whenever it shall appear that the dangers to which his own dominions and those of his allies have so long been exposed have really ceased: whenever he shall be satisfied that the necessity for resistance is at an end; that, after the experience of so many years of crimes and miseries, better principles have ultimately prevailed in France; and that all the gigantic projects of ambition, and all the restless schemes of destruction, which have endangered the very existence of civil society, have at length been finally relinquished: but the conviction of such a change, however agreeable to his Majesty's wishes,

can result only from experience and the evidence of facts.

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4.

Terms on  
which the  
government  
could alone  
treat.

"The best and most natural pledge of its reality and permanence would be the restoration of that line of princes, which for so many centuries maintained the French nation in prosperity at home and consideration and respect abroad. Such an event would at once have removed, and will at any time remove, all obstacles in the way of negotiation or peace. It would confirm to France the unmolested enjoyment of its ancient territory; and it would give to all the other nations in Europe, in tranquillity and peace, that security which they are now compelled to seek by other means. But, desirable as such an event must be, both to France and the world, it is not to this mode exclusively that his Majesty limits the possibility of secure and solid pacification. His Majesty makes no claim to prescribe to France what shall be the form of her government, or in whose hands she shall vest the authority necessary for conducting the affairs of a great and powerful nation. He looks only to the security of his own dominions and those of his allies, and to the general safety of Europe. Whenever he shall judge that such security can in any manner be attained, as resulting either from the internal situation of that country, from whose internal situation the danger has arisen, or from such other circumstances, of whatever nature, as may produce the same end, his Majesty will eagerly embrace the opportunity to concert with his allies the means of a general pacification. Unhappily, no such security hitherto exists; no sufficient evidence of the principles by which the new government will be directed; no reasonable ground by which to judge of its stability."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxiv.

To this it was replied by M. Talleyrand, the French minister for foreign affairs:—"Very far from France having provoked the war, she had, it must be recollected, from the very commencement of her Revolution, solemnly proclaimed her love of peace and her disinclination for

5.

Talleyrand's  
reply. His  
statement of  
the conduct  
of France.

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XXX.

1799.

conquests, her respect for the independence of all governments; and it is not to be doubted that, occupied at that time entirely with her own internal affairs, she would have avoided taking any part in those of Europe, and would have remained faithful to her declarations. But from an opposite disposition, as soon as the French Revolution had broken out, almost all Europe entered into a league for its destruction. The aggression was real, long before it was public; internal resistance was excited, its opponents were favourably received, their extravagant declamations were supported, the French nation was insulted in the person of its agents, and England particularly set this example, by the dismissal of the minister accredited to her; finally, France was in fact attacked in her independence, in her honour, and in her safety, long before war was declared. Thus it is to the projects of dismemberment, subjection, and dissolution, which were prepared against her, and the execution of which was several times attempted and pursued, that France has a right to impute the evils which she has suffered, and those which have afflicted Europe. Such projects, for a long time without example with respect to so powerful a nation, could not fail to bring on the most fatal consequences. Assailed on all sides, the Republic could not but extend universally the efforts of her defence, and it is only for the maintenance of her own independence that she has made use of those means which she possessed in her own strength and the courage of her citizens.

G.  
And of her  
inclination  
to peace.

“As long as she saw that her enemies obstinately refused to recognise her rights, she counted only upon the energy of her resistance, but as soon as they were obliged to abandon the hope of invasion, she sought for means of conciliation, and manifested pacific intentions; and if these have not always been efficacious—if, in the midst of the critical circumstances of her internal situation, which the Revolution and the war have successively brought on, the former depositaries of the executive power in France



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1799.

have not always shown as much moderation as the nation itself has shown courage—it must, above all, be imputed to the fatal and persevering animosity with which the resources of England have been lavished to accomplish the ruin of France. But if the wishes of his Britannic Majesty, in conformity with his assurances, are in unison with those of the French Republic for the re-establishment of peace, why, instead of attempting the apology of the war, should not attention be rather paid to the means of terminating it? The First Consul of the French Republic cannot doubt that his Britannic Majesty must recognise the right of nations to choose the form of their government, since it is from the exercise of this right that he holds his crown; but he cannot comprehend how, after admitting this fundamental principle, upon which rests the existence of political societies, he could annex insinuations which tend to an interference in the internal affairs of the Republic, and which are not less injurious to the French nation and its government, than it would be to England and his Majesty, if a sort of invitation were held out in favour of that republican form of government of which England adopted the forms about the middle of the last century, or an exhortation to recall to the throne that family whom their birth had placed there, and whom a Revolution compelled to descend from it.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist,  
xxxiv.1199,  
1202.

These able state papers are not only valuable as exhibiting the arguments advanced by the opposite parties in this memorable contest, but as containing an explicit and important declaration of the object uniformly pursued by Great Britain throughout its continuance. The English ministry never claimed a right to interfere in the internal affairs of France, or dictate to her inhabitants the form of government or race of sovereigns they were to choose; the object of the war is there expressly declared to have been, what it always was, defensive. It was undertaken, not to impose a government upon France, but

7.  
Reflections  
on this nego-  
tiation.

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XXX.

1799.

to prevent its imposing one upon other nations; not to partition or circumscribe its territory, but to oppose a barrier to the inundation of infidel and democratical principles, by which the Republic first shook the opinions of the multitude in all the adjoining states, and then, having divided their inhabitants, overthrew their independence. The restoration of the Bourbons was held forth as the mode most likely to remove these dangers; but by no means as an indispensable preliminary to a general pacification, if adequate security against them could in any other way be obtained. Of the reality of the peril, the existence of the Batavian, Ligurian, Cisalpine, Helvetian, Roman, and Parthenopeian republics, most of whom had been revolutionised in a state of profound peace, afforded ample evidence; and it was one which increased rapidly during any interval of hostilities, because it was then that the point of the wedge was most readily inserted by the revolutionary propagandists among an unsuspecting people.

8.  
Arguments  
of the Oppo-  
sition for an  
immediate  
peace.  
Speech of  
Mr Fox.

The debates, however, which followed in both Houses of Parliament on this momentous subject were still more important, as unfolding the real views of the contending parties, and forming the true key to the grounds on which it was thereafter rested on both sides. On the part of the Opposition, it was urged by Mr Fox and Mr Erskine: "Now is the first time when the House are assembled in a new epoch of the war. Without annexing any epithet to it, or adverting to its unparalleled calamities, it cannot be denied that a new era in any possible war, or one which leads to a nearer prospect of peace, is a most critical and auspicious period. The real question is, whether the House of Commons can say, in the face of a suffering nation and a desolated world, that a lofty, imperious, declamatory, insulting answer to a proposition professing peace and conciliation, is the answer which should have been sent to France, or to any human government? Though they might not be able to determine what answer, in the

circumstances of the country, should have been sent, they could, without the possibility of being mistaken, pronounce that the answer given was odiously and absurdly wrong. As a vindication of the war, it was loose, and in some parts unfounded; but as an answer to a specific proposition, it was dangerous as a precedent to the best interests of mankind. It rejected the very idea of peace, as if it were a curse, and held fast to war, as an inseparable adjunct to the prosperity of nations.

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1799.

"The French Revolution was undoubtedly, in its beginning, a great and awful event, which could not but extend its influence more or less to other nations. So mighty a fabric of despotism and superstition, after having endured for ages, could not fall to the ground without a concussion which the whole earth should feel; but the evil of such a revolution was only to be averted by cautious internal policy, and not by external war, unless it became impossible, from actual and not speculative aggression, to maintain the relations of peace. The question was not, whether the tendency of the Revolution was beneficial or injurious, but what was our own policy and duty as connected with its existence? In Mr Burke's words, applied to the American Revolution, the question is not, whether this condition of human affairs deserves praise or blame, but what, in God's name, are you to do with it?

9.  
His general  
argument  
against the  
war.

"When war was first proclaimed by this country, after the death of Louis, it was rested on the 'late atrocious act perpetrated at Paris.' Then, as now, it was provoked, and peace rejected upon general and unjustifiable objections—speculative dangers to religion and government, which, supposing them to have existed, with all their possible consequences, were more likely to be increased than diminished by the bitterness of war. At that time, ministers were implored not to invite war upon principles which made peace dependent upon systems and forms of government, instead of the conduct of nations—upon theories which could not be changed, instead of aggressions

10.  
And against  
the principles  
on  
which it was  
first ground-  
ed.

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which might be adjusted. France had then, and for a long time after, a strong interest in peace; she had not then extended her conquests: but Europe combined to extinguish France, and place her without the pale of the social community; and France, in her turn, acted towards Europe on the same principles. She desolated and ravaged whatever countries she occupied, and spread her conquests with unexampled rapidity. Could it be expected that so powerful a nation, so assailed, should act merely on the defensive, or that, in the midst of a revolution which the confederacy of surrounding nations had rendered terrible, the rights of nations would be respected? Ambitious projects, not perhaps originally contemplated, followed their steps; and the world was changed with portentous violence, because the government of Great Britain had resolved, that, if changed at all, it should revert to establishments which had reached their period and expired.

11.  
Argument  
from the  
proposals  
for peace  
in 1795.

“In 1795, without any pacific proposition from France, when the government of France was not a month old, at a time when the alarm was at its height in England, and the probable contagion of French principles,\* by the intercourse of peace, was not only the favourite theme of ministers, but made the foundation of a system by which some of our most essential liberties were abridged—even these ministers invited the infant, democratic, Jacobin, regicide Republic of France to propose a peace. On what principle, then, can peace now be refused when the danger was so much diminished, because the resistless fury of that popular spirit which had been the uniform topic of declamation had not only subsided, from time and expansion, but was curbed, or rather extinguished, by the forms of the new government which invited us to peace? If Buonaparte found that his interests were served by an arrangement with England, the same interests would lead him to continue it. Surrounded with perils, at the head of an untried government, menaced by a great confederacy, of which England was the head, compelled to press

heavily upon the resources of an exhausted people, it was not less his interest to propose than it was ours to accept peace.

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1799.

"It is impossible to look without the most bitter regret on the enormities which France has committed. In some of the worst of them, however, the Allies have joined her. Did not Austria receive Venice from Buonaparte? and is not the receiver as bad as the thief? Has not Russia attacked France? Did not the Emperor and the King of Prussia subscribe a declaration at Pilnitz which amounted to a hostile aggression? Did they not make a public declaration, that they were to employ their forces, in conjunction with the other kings of Europe, 'to put the King of France in a situation to establish, in perfect liberty, the foundations of a monarchical government equally agreeable to the rights of sovereigns and the welfare of the French?' and, whenever the other princes should co-operate with them, did they not 'then, and in that case, declare their determination to act promptly, and, by mutual consent, to obtain the end proposed by all of them?' Can gentlemen lay their hands on their hearts, and not admit that the fair construction of this is, that whenever the other powers should concur, they would attack France, then at peace with them, and occupied only in domestic and internal regulations?"

12.  
Errors of the  
Allies.

"The decree of 19th November 1792, is alleged as a clear act of aggression, not only against England, but against all the sovereigns of Europe. Much weight should not be attached to that silly document, and it has been sufficiently explained by M. Chauvclin, when he declared that it never was meant to proclaim the favour of France for insurrection, but that it applied to those people only who, after having acquired their liberty by conquest, should demand the assistance of the Republic. Should not a magnanimous nation have been satisfied with this explanation? and where will be the end of wars, if idle and intemperate expressions are to be made the groundwork

13.  
Remarks on  
the revolution-  
ary decree of Nov.  
19, 1792.

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XXX.

1799.

of bitter and never-ending hostilities? Where is the war, pregnant with so many horrors, next to be carried? Where is it to stop? Not till you establish the House of Bourbon!—and this you cherish the hope of doing, because you have had a successful campaign. But is the situation of the Allies, with all they have gained, to be compared with what it was after Valenciennes was taken? One campaign is successful to you; another may be so to them: and in this way, animated by the vindictive passions of revenge, hatred, rancour, which are infinitely more flagitious than those of ambition and the thirst of power, you may go on for ever, as, with such black incentives, no end can be foreseen to human misery. And all this without an intelligible motive, merely that you may gain a better peace a year or two hence. Is then peace so dangerous a state, war so enviable, that the latter is to be chosen as a state of probation, the former shunned as a positive evil?"<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxiv. 1291,  
1398.

14.  
And of Mr  
Pitt and the  
government  
for refusing  
to treat.

On the other hand it was contended by Mr Pitt and Lord Grenville: "The same necessity which originally existed for the commencement and prosecution, still calls for perseverance in the war. The same proneness to aggression, the same disregard to justice, still actuate the conduct of the men who rule in France. Peace with a nation by whom war was made against all order, religion, and morality, would rather be a cessation of resistance to wrong than a suspension of arms in the nature of an ordinary warfare. To negotiate with established governments was formerly not merely easy, but in most circumstances safe; but to negotiate with the government of France now would be to incur all the risks of an uncertain truce, without attaining the benefits even of a temporary peace. France still retains the sentiments, and is constant to the views which characterised the dawn of her Revolution. She was innovating, she is so still; she was Jacobin, she is Jacobin still; she declared war against all kings, and she continues to this hour to seek their destruc-

tion. Even the distant commonwealth of America could not escape that ravaging power, and bordering on a state of active and inveterate war were the relations of those two states for a long time. The Republic, indeed, has frequently asserted her disinclination to conquest; but has she followed up that declaration by any acts indicating a corresponding disposition? Have we not seen her armies march to the Rhine, seize the Netherlands, and annex them to her dominions? Have we not witnessed her progress in Italy? Are not the wrongs of Switzerland recent and marked? Even into Asia she has carried her lust for dominion; severed from the Porte, during a period of profound peace, a vast portion of its empire; and stimulated 'Citizen Tippoo' to engage in that contest which ultimately proved his ruin.

"The Republic has proclaimed her respect for the independence of all governments. How have her actions corresponded with this profession? Did not Jacobin France attempt the overthrow of every government? Did she not, whenever it suited her purpose, arm the governors against the governed, or the governed against the governors? How completely has she succeeded, during a period of profound peace which had been unbroken for centuries, in convulsing the population, and so subverting the independence of Switzerland! In Italy, the whole fabric of civil society has been changed, and the independence of every government violated. The Netherlands, too, exhibit to mankind monuments of the veneration with which the Republic has regarded the independence of other states. The memorable decree of November 1792, has not slept a dead letter in their statute-book. No: it has ever since been the active energetic principle of their whole conduct, and every nation is interested in the extinction of that principle for ever.

"Every power with whom the Republic has treated, whether for the purpose of armistice or peace, could furnish melancholy instances of the perfidy of France, and of

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1799.

15.  
The aggressions of France on Switzerland, &c.

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1799.

16.

Her general  
faithlessness  
to treaties.

the ambition, injustice, and cruelty of her rulers. Switzerland concluded a truce with the Republic; her rulers immediately excited insurrections among her cantons, overthrew her institutions, seized her fortresses, robbed her treasures, the accumulation of ages, and, to give permanence to her usurpations, imposed on her a government new alike in form and substance. The Grand-duke of Tuscany was among the earliest sufferers by a treaty of peace with the Republic. In everything he strove to conform to the views of France; her rulers repeated to him their assurances of attachment and disinclination to conquest; but at the very time that the honour of the Republic was pledged for the security of his states, he saw the troops of his ally enter his capital, and he himself was deposed and a democracy given to the Florentines. The King of Sardinia opened the gates of his capital to the Republican arms, and, confiding in the integrity of the French government, expected to be secured in his dominions by the treaty which guaranteed his title and his rights, and communicated to France equal advantages. He was, however, in a state of peace, invaded in his dominions, forced to fly to his insular possessions, and Turin treacherously taken possession of by the Republican troops. The change in the Papal government was another part of the same system. It was planned by Joseph Buonaparte in his palace. He excited the populace to an insurrection; and effected a revolution in the capital at the head of the Roman mob. To Venice their conduct was still more atrocious. After concluding an armistice with the Archduke Charles, Buonaparte declared that he took the Venetians under his protection, and overturned the old government by the movements excited among the people; but no sooner was the national independence in this way destroyed, than he sold them to the very Imperial government, against whose alleged oppression he had prompted them to take up arms. Genoa received the French as friends; and the debt of gratitude was repaid by the



government being revolutionised; and, under the authority of a mock constitution, the people plundered, and the public independence subverted.

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1799.

"It is vain to allege that these atrocities are the work of former governments, and that Buonaparte had no hand in them. The worst of these acts of perfidy have been perpetrated by himself. If a treaty was concluded and broken with Sardinia, it was concluded and broken by Buonaparte. If peace was entered into and violated with Tuscany, it was entered into and violated by Buonaparte. If Venice was first seduced into revolutionary revolt, and then betrayed and sold to Austria, it was by Buonaparte that the treachery was consummated. If the Papal government was first terrified into submission, and then overturned by rebellion, it was Buonaparte who accomplished the work. If Genoa was convulsed in a state of profound peace, and then sacrificed, it was by Buonaparte that the perfidious invasion was committed. If Switzerland was first seduced into revolution, and then invaded and plundered, it was by the deceitful promises and arts of Buonaparte that the train was laid. Even the affiliated republics and his own country have not escaped the same perfidious ability. The constitution which he forced on his countrymen, at the cannon's mouth, on the 13th Vendemiaire, he delivered up to the bayonets of Augereau on the 18th Fructidor, and overturned with his grenadiers on the 18th Brumaire. The constitution of the Cisalpine republic, which he himself had established, was overthrown by his lieutenant, Berthier. He gained possession of Malta by deceitful promises, and immediately handed it over to the Republic. He declared to the Porte that he had no intention to take possession of Egypt, and yet he avowed to his army that he conquered it for France, and instantly roused the Copts into rebellion against the Mamelukes. He declared to the Mussulmans that he was a believer in Mahomet,\*

17.  
Napoleon's  
share in  
these atrocities.

\* This was strictly true. "They will say I am a papist," said Napoleon;

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1799.

thus demonstrating that, even on the most sacred subjects, truth was set at naught when any object was to be gained by its violation. Nay, he has, in his official instructions, openly avowed this system; for in his instructions to Kleber, he declares,—‘You may sign a treaty to evacuate Egypt, but do not execute the articles; and you may find a plausible excuse for the delay in the observation, that they must be sent home to be submitted to the Directory.’ What reliance can be placed on a power which thus uniformly makes peace or truce a stepping-stone to further aggressions; and systematically uses perfidy as an allowable weapon for circumventing its enemies? And, what is especially worthy of observation, this system is not that of any one man; it has been the principle of all the statesmen, without exception, who have governed France during the Revolution :—a clear proof that it arises from the force of the circumstances in which they are placed, and the ruinous ascendancy of irreligious principles in the people; and that the intentions of the present ruler of the country, even if they were widely different from what they are, could afford no sort of security against its continuance.

18.  
Advantages  
of peace to  
France.

“ France would now derive great advantages from a general peace. Her commerce would revive; her seamen be renewed, her sailors acquire experience; and the power which hitherto has been so victorious at land, would speedily become formidable on another element. What benefit could it bring to Great Britain? Are our harbours blockaded, our commerce interrupted, our dock-yards empty? Have we not, on the contrary, acquired an irresistible preponderance on the seas during the war, and is not the trade of the world rapidly passing into the hands of our merchants? Buonaparte would acquire immense popularity by being the means of bringing about

“ I am no such thing. I was a Mahometan in Egypt. I would become a Catholic here for the good of the people. I am no believer in any particular religion; but as to the idea of a God, look up to the heavens, and say who made that.”—See THIBAUDEAU, *Sur le Consulat*, 153.

an accommodation with this country; if we wish to establish his power, and permanently enlist the energy of the Revolution under the banners of a military chieftain, we have only to fall into the snare which he has so artfully prepared. In turbulent republics, it has ever been an axiom to maintain internal tranquillity by external action; it was on that principle that the war was commenced by Brissot and continued by Robespierre, and it is not likely to be forgotten by the military chief who has now succeeded to the helm of affairs.

"It is in vain to pretend that either the Allied powers or Great Britain were the aggressors in the terrible contest which has so long desolated Europe. In investigating this subject, the most scrupulous attention to dates is requisite. The attack upon the Papal states by the seizure of Avignon in August 1791, was attended by a series of the most sanguinary excesses which disgraced the Revolution; and this was followed, in the same year, by an aggression against the whole Germanic empire, by the seizure of Porentrui, part of the dominions of the Bishop of Bâle. In April 1792, the French government declared war against Austria; and in September of the same year, without any declaration of their intention, or any cause of hostility, and in direct violation of their promises to abstain from conquest, they seized Savoy and Nice, upon the pretence that nature had destined them to form a part of France. The assertion that this war was rendered necessary by the threatening alliance formed at Pilnitz, is equally devoid of foundation. That celebrated declaration referred only to the state of imprisonment in which Louis XVI. was kept, and its immediate object was to effect his deliverance, if a concert among the European powers could be brought about for that purpose, leaving the internal state of France to be decided by the king when restored to his liberty, with the free consent of the states of the kingdom, without one word relative to its dismemberment. This was fully admitted

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1799.

19.  
France the  
aggressor in  
the war.

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1799.

in the official correspondence which took place between this country and Austria; and as long as M. Delessart was minister of foreign affairs in France, there was a great probability that the differences would be terminated amicably; but the war party excited a tumult in order to dispossess him—as they considered, in Brissot's words, that 'war was necessary to consolidate the Revolution.' Upon the King of France's acceptance of the constitution, the Emperor notified to all the courts of Europe that he considered it as his proper act, and thereby the convention of Pilnitz fell to the ground; and the event soon proved the sincerity of that declaration, for when war was declared by the French in 1792, the Austrian Netherlands were almost destitute of troops, and soon fell a prey to the Republicans.

20.  
Pacific con-  
duct of  
Great  
Britain.

"Great Britain at this time, and for long after, entertained no hostile designs towards France. So far from it, on 29th December 1792, only a month before the commencement of hostilities, a note was sent by Lord Grenville to the British ambassador at St Petersburg, imparting to Russia the principles on which we acted, and the terms on which we were willing to mediate for peace—which were, 'the withdrawing the French armies within the limits of their territory, the abandoning their conquests, the rescinding any acts injurious to the sovereignty or rights of other nations, and the giving, in some unequivocal manner, a pledge of their intention no longer to foment troubles or excite disturbances against other governments. In return for these stipulations, the different powers of Europe might engage to abandon all measures or views of hostility against France, or interference in its internal affairs.' Such were the principles on which we acted; and what, then, brought on the war with this country? The insane decrees of 19th November and 15th December 1792, which amounted to a declaration of war against all governments, and the attack on our Allies the Dutch, and the opening of the Scheldt, in

open prosecution of the new code of public law then promulgated by the Republic.

CHAP.  
XXX.

1800,  
21.

Principle of  
the Republic-  
ans which  
renders war  
inevitable.

“The fundamental principle of the revolutionary party in France always has been an insatiable love of aggrandisement, an implacable spirit of destruction against all the civil and religious institutions of every other country. Its uniform mode of proceeding has been to bribe the poor against the rich, by proposing to transfer into new hands, on the delusive notion of equality, and in breach of every principle of justice, the whole property of the country. The practical application of this principle has been to devote the whole of that property to indiscriminate plunder, and make it the foundation of a revolutionary system of finance, productive in proportion to the misery and desolation which it created. It has been accompanied by an unwearied spirit of proselytism, diffusing itself over all the nations of the earth; a spirit which can apply itself to all circumstances and all situations; hold out a promise of redress equally to all nations; which enables the teachers of French liberty to recommend themselves to those who live under the feudal code of the German empire, the various states of Italy, the old republicans of Holland, the new republicans of America, the Protestants of Switzerland, the Catholics of Ireland, the Mussulmans of Turkey, and the Hindoos of India; the natives of England, enjoying the perfection of practical freedom, and the Copts of Egypt, groaning under the last severity of Asiatic bondage. The last and distinguishing feature is a perfidy which nothing can bind; which no ties of treaty, no sense of the principles generally received among nations, no obligation, human or divine, can restrain. Thus qualified, thus armed for destruction, the genius of the French Revolution marched forth, the terror and dismay of the world. Every nation has in its turn been the witness, many have been the victims, of its principles;<sup>1</sup> and it is left now for us to decide whether we will enter into compromise with such a danger, while we

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxiv.1206,  
1349.

CHAP.  
XXX.

1800.

Feb. 3, 1800.

22.  
Napoleon's  
views on the  
necessity of  
conquest to  
his exis-  
tence.

have yet resources to supply the sinews of war, while the heart and spirit of the country is yet unbroken, and while we have the means of calling forth and supporting a powerful co-operation in Europe. 'Cur igitur pacem nolo?—quia infida est, quia periculosa, quia esse non potest.'\* The house, upon a division, supported the measures of administration by a majority of two hundred and sixty-five to sixty-four.

In judging of this decision of the British government, which formed the true commencement of the second period of the war, (that in which it was waged with Napoleon,) it is of importance to recollect the circumstances in which he was placed, and the nature of the government which he had assumed. France had *not ceased to be revolutionary*; but its energies were now, under a skilful and enterprising chief, turned to military objects. He was still, however, borne forward upon the movement, and the moment he attempted to stop he would have been crushed by its wheels. No one was more aware of this than the First Consul himself. "The French government," said Napoleon in 1800, "has no resemblance to those which surround it. Hated by all its neighbours, obliged to restrain many different classes of malcontents within its bosom, it stands in need of action, of *éclat*, and, by consequence of war, to maintain an imposing attitude against so many enemies."—"Your government," replied Thibaudeau, "has no resemblance to one newly established. It assumed the *toga virilis* at Marcngo; and, sustained by a powerful head and the arms of thirty millions of inhabitants, its place is already sufficiently prominent among the European powers."—"Do you really think that sufficient!" replied Napoleon: "*it must be first of all, or it will perish.*"—"And to obtain such a result, you see no

\* "Why, then, do I deprecate peace? Because it is faithless, because it is perilous, because it cannot be." It is impossible, in this abstract, to give any idea of the splendid and luminous speeches made on this memorable occasion in the British parliament. They are reported at large in Hansard, and throw more light on the motives and objects of the war than any other documents in existence.

other method than war?"—"None other, citizen."<sup>1</sup>—"His fixed opinion from the commencement," says Bourrienne, "was, that if stationary he would fall; that he was sustained only by continually advancing, and that it was not sufficient to advance, but he must advance rapidly and irresistibly. 'My power,' said he, 'depends on my glory, and my glory on the victories which I gain. My power would instantly fall, if it were not constantly based on fresh glory and victories. Conquest made me what I am: conquest alone can maintain me in that position. A government newly established has need to dazzle and astonish; when its *éclat* ceases, it perishes. It is in vain to expect repose from a man who is the concentration of movement.'"<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Thibaut-  
deau, Con-  
sulat, 393.

<sup>2</sup> Bour. iii.  
214.

Such were Napoleon's views; and that they were perfectly just, with reference to his own situation, is evident from the consideration that a revolutionary power, whether in civil or military affairs, has never yet maintained its ascendancy in any other way. But, these being his principles, and the independence of England forming the great stumblingblock in his way, it is evident that no permanent peace with him was practicable; that every accommodation could have been only a truce; and that it never would be proposed, unless in circumstances when it was for his interest to gain a short breathing-time for fresh projects of ambition.\* The event completely proved the justice of these views, and forms the best commentary on the prophetic wisdom of Mr Pitt. Every successive peace on the Continent only paved the way for fresh aggres-

23.  
Reflections  
on this sub-  
ject.

\* This accordingly was openly avowed by Napoleon himself. "England," said he in January 1800, "*must be overturned*. As long as my voice has any influence, it will never enjoy any respite. Yes! yes! war to the death with England for ever—ay, till its destruction."<sup>3</sup> He admits, in his own *Memoirs*, that when he made these proposals to Mr Pitt, he had no serious intention of concluding peace. "I had then," said he, "need of war; a treaty of peace which would have derogated from that of Campo Formio and annulled the creations of Italy,—would have withered every imagination. Mr Pitt's answer accordingly was impatiently expected. When it arrived, it filled me with a secret satisfaction. His answer could not have been more favourable. From that moment I foresaw that, with such impassioned antagonists, I would have no difficulty in reaching the highest destinies."—NAP. in MONTMOLON, i. 33, 34.

<sup>3</sup> D'Abr. ii.  
179, 180.

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24.  
St-Cyr's  
views on it.

sions ; and at length he was precipitated upon the snows of Russia, by the same invincible necessity of dazzling his subjects by the lustre of additional victories which was felt in the commencement of his career.

"His power, without and within," says Marshal St-Cyr, "was founded solely on the *éclat* of his victories. By intrusting himself without reserve to fortune, he imposed upon himself the necessity of following it to the utmost verge whither it would lead him. Unheard-of success had attended enterprises, the temerity of which was continually increasing ; but thence arose a necessity to keep for ever awake the terror and admiration of Europe, by new enterprises and more dazzling triumphs. The more colossal his power became, the more immeasurable his projects required to be, in order that their unexpected success should keep up the same stupor in the minds of the vulgar. Admiration, enthusiasm, ambition, the emotions on which his dominion was founded, are not durable in their nature ; they must be incessantly fed with fresh stimulants ; and to effect that, extraordinary efforts are requisite. These principles were well known to Napoleon ; and thence it is that he so often did evil, albeit knowing better than any one that it was evil, overruled by a superior power, from which he felt it was impossible to escape. The rapid movement which he impressed on the affairs of Europe was of a kind which could not be arrested ; a single retrograde step, a policy which indicated a stationary condition, would have been the signal of his fall. Far, therefore, from making it subject of reproach to Napoleon, that he conceived an enterprise so gigantic as the Russian expedition, he is rather to be pitied for being placed in a situation where he was overruled by necessity ; and this furnishes the true answer to those who would ascribe to chance, the rigour of the elements, or an excess of temerity, what was in truth but the inevitable consequence of the false position in which for fifteen years France had been placed."<sup>1</sup> It is this law of

<sup>1</sup> St-Cyr,  
Hist. Mil.  
iii. 3, 4.



the moral world which rendered durable peace with that country, when headed by a revolutionary power, impossible; and which was ultimately destined to inflict an awful retribution on its guilt and its ambition. Experience, therefore, has now proved that Mr Pitt's view of the character of the revolutionary war was well founded; and that the seizure of the consular throne by Napoleon, only gave a new and more dangerous direction to that restless and insatiable spirit which had arisen from the convulsions which the Revolution had produced.

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Justice requires that it should be declared, that, in espousing the cause of the enemy on this occasion, and uniformly palliating the crimes of the popular party in that country, the English Opposition were led, by the spirit of party, to forget equally the duties of patriotism and the dictates of reason. No hesitation need be felt by a British writer in expressing this opinion, because the ablest of the liberal party in France themselves admit that their partisans in this country fell into this enormous error. "Nothing," says Madame de Staël, "was more contrary to Buonaparte's nature, or his interest, than to have made peace in 1800. He could only live in agitation; and if anything could plead his apology with those who reflect on the influence of external circumstances on the human mind, it is, that he could only breathe freely in a volcanic atmosphere. It was absolutely necessary for him to present, every three months, a new object of ambition to the French, in order to supply, by the grandeur and variety of external events, the vacuum occasioned by the removal of all objects of domestic interest. At that epoch, unhappily for the spirit of freedom in England, the English Opposition, with Mr Fox at their head, took an entirely false view of Napoleon; and hence it was that that party, previously so estimable, lost its ascendant in the nation. It was already too much to have defended France under the Reign of Terror: but it was, if possible, a still greater fault to have considered Buonaparte as

25.  
Great error  
of the Eng-  
lish Oppo-  
sition at this  
period.

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<sup>1</sup> Mad. de  
Staël, Rév.  
Franc. ii.  
268, 270.

identified with the principles of freedom, when in truth he was their deadliest enemy.”<sup>1</sup>—“The eloquent declarations of Mr Fox,” says General Mathieu Dumas, “cannot invalidate the facts brought forward by Mr Pitt and Lord Grenville as to the origin of the war. The Girondists alone were the cause of its commencement. The names of those impostors who, to overturn the monarchical throne of France, prevailed on the King to declare that fatal war, should be consigned to an execrable celebrity; they alone brought down on Europe and their country a deluge of calamities.”<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Dum. iv.  
308, 312.

26.

The parliament  
resolved on war.  
Supplies  
voted by  
the British  
parliament.

War being thus resolved on, the most vigorous measures were taken, both by parliament and the executive, to meet the dangers with which it might be attended. Parliament voted the sum of £500,000 to the crown, for the purpose of immediately aiding Austria, in the armaments which she had in contemplation; and Mr Pitt stated that a loan of £2,500,000 to the Emperor would be advanced. The budget brought forward by the chancellor of the exchequer exhibited a most flattering picture of the public credit, and proved that, notwithstanding the immense expenditure of the eight preceding campaigns, the national resources were still unimpaired.\* The extraordinary fact which he mentioned, that, in the eighth year of the war, a loan of eighteen millions and a half had been obtained at the rate of four and three-fourths per cent, proved the enduring credit of the government, and the almost boundless extent of the wealth of England, sustained as it now was by an adequate and yet safe paper currency. But both that great financier and the British public, misled by the fallacious brilliancy of present appearances, overlooked the grievous burden which the contraction of debt in the three-per-cents,—in other words, the imposition of a burden of £100 for every £60 advanced,—was ultimately to produce upon the national resources.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxiv.1430,  
1442, and  
1515, and  
Ann. Reg.  
151, 152.  
App. to  
Chron.

The land forces of Great Britain in this year amounted

\* See Appendix A, chap. xxx.

to 168,000 men, exclusive of 80,000 militia; and for the service of the fleet, 120,000 seamen and marines were voted. The ships in commission were no less than 510, including 124 of the line. From a table laid before parliament in this year, it appeared that the whole troops, exclusive of militia, which had been raised for the service of the state during the eight years from 1792 to 1800, had been only 208,000; a force not greater than might have been easily levied in a single year, out of a population then amounting to nearly sixteen millions, in the three kingdoms; and which, if ably conducted, and thrown into the scale when it was nearly balanced between France and Austria, would unquestionably have terminated the war at the latest in two campaigns.<sup>1\*</sup>

Several domestic measures of great importance took place during this session of parliament. The bank charter was renewed for twenty-one years, there being twelve of the old charter still to run; in consideration of the advantages of which, the directors agreed to give the public a loan of £3,000,000 for six years without interest; the suspension of the Habeas Corpus act was continued by a great majority in both houses of parliament; and Mr Dundas brought forward a full and satisfactory account of the affairs of India.† The union of Ireland with Great Britain was, after great resistance from a numerous party in Ireland, and a stormy debate in both houses of parliament

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1800.

27.

Land and  
sea forces  
voted.

<sup>1</sup> James, ii.  
App. No. 8.  
Ann. Reg.  
160, and  
144. App.  
to Chron.

28.

Mr Dundas's  
India  
budget.  
The Union  
of Ireland.

\* The number of troops raised yearly from the commencement of the war, for the regular army, was as follows—a woful picture of the ignorance which then prevailed as to the means of combating a revolutionary power:

1793, . . .	17,038	1797, . . .	16,096
1794, . . .	38,561	1798, . . .	21,457
1795, . . .	40,460	1799, . . .	41,316
1796, . . .	16,336	1800, . . .	17,124

Total in eight years, 208,388

Lost in same time, 1350 officers, 60,000 men.

Whereas the French, with a population of 25,000,000, raised, in 1792, 700,000, and in 1793, 1,500,000 soldiers. Prussia, with a population of 4,000,000, raised in 1813 nearly 200,000 men.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, 144, *App. to Chronicle*: PELLEW's *Life of Lord Sidmouth*, i. 126. The population of Great Britain, according to the census of 1800, was 10,642,000, that of Ireland probably 5,000,000.

† See Appendix B, chap. xxx.

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in Dublin, carried by a large majority, chiefly through the powerful abilities, cool courage, and vigorous efforts of LORD CASTLEREAGH, who then gave the first specimen of that indomitable firmness and steady perseverance which were afterwards destined, on a greater stage, to lead the coalition against France to a glorious issue in the campaign of 1814. The burgher and mercantile class throughout the country were in general lukewarm on the subject; the citizens of Dublin vehemently opposed the change; and the great body of the peasantry were averse to it, as likely to extinguish the nationality to which they were fondly attached. Many persons wore, especially in Westmeath, the orange and green cockade, to indicate that any combination of parties was preferable to a union with the sister kingdom. This great measure, accordingly, was not carried without the most violent opposition, both in the Irish Peers and Commons; and it left the seeds of an animosity between the two islands, which, fostered by religious rancour and democratic passion, produced melancholy effects in after times upon the tranquillity and strength of the empire. "To any man of the least reflection," it was justly observed at the time, "there were additional reasons for a legislative union with England, as the only balm for the salvation of this distracted country: but such is the infatuation of the people, that the most sovereign remedy that can be proposed is rejected as their bane."<sup>1</sup>\*

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist. xxxiv. 1471; xxxv. 14, 15. Ann. Reg. 1801, 112, 116. Pellew's Life of Lord Sidmouth, i. 220, 221. Castl. Pap. ii. 360, 417.

<sup>29</sup>. Its leading provisions.

By the treaty of union, the peers for the United Imperial Parliament were limited, from Ireland, to twenty-eight temporal and four spiritual peers, the former elected for life by the Irish peerage, the latter by rotation; the commoners fixed at one hundred. The Churches of England and Ireland were united, and provision was made for their union, preservation, and the continuance of their

\* Colonel Littlehales, (private secretary to Lord Cornwallis, the Lord-Lieutenant,) to Mr Addington, January 16, 1799.—PELLEW'S *Life of Lord Sidmouth*, i. 220, 221.

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discipline, doctrine, and worship for ever. Commercial privileges were fairly communicated; the national debt of each country was imposed as a burden on its own finances, and the general expenditure ordered to be defrayed, for twenty years after the Union, in the proportion of fifteen parts for Great Britain and two for Ireland. The laws and courts of both kingdoms were maintained on their existing footing, subject to such alterations as the united parliament might deem expedient. This important step was carried in the British House of Commons by a majority of 208 to 26, and in the Lords by 75 to 7.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxv. 31,  
150, 195.

The debates on this subject in the British parliament—which, although highly important in English, are not of sufficient moment for quotation in European history—are chiefly remarkable for the complete blindness of all parties to the real and ultimate consequences of the measure which was adopted. Mr Pitt was most desirous to show that the influence of the *crown* would not be unduly augmented by the Irish members in the House of Commons; while Mr Grey contended that “ultimately at least, the Irish members will afford a certain accession of force to the party of every administration, and therefore forty of the most decayed boroughs should be struck off before the Union takes place. He accordingly moved, that it should be an instruction to the House to guard against the increase of the influence of the crown in the approaching Union.” To us, who know that by the aid of the Irish members, and their aid alone, even after the franchise had been raised from forty shillings to ten pounds by the Duke of Wellington, the great democratic change of 1832 on the British constitution was carried,\* these

30.  
Views of the  
leaders on  
both sides of  
parliament  
on this great  
change.

* English and Scotch members for the Reform Bill on its first	
division,	251
Against it,	206—15
Ireland, against it,	37
For it,	53—16

Thus it was the admission of the Irish members which effected that great alteration in the English constitution.

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speculations as to the ultimate consequences of the Union are singular monuments of the difficulty which even the greatest intellects experience in prognosticating the consequences of any considerable alteration in the frame of government. In truth, the decisive addition which the Irish members furnished to the democratic party of the empire, on the first great crisis which occurred, adds another to the numerous examples which history affords of the extreme peril of applying to one country the institutions or government of another, or of supposing that the system of representation which the habits of centuries have moulded to a conformity with the interests of one state, can be adopted without the utmost hazard by another in an inferior stage of civilisation, inheriting from its forefathers a more ardent temperament, or under the influence of more vehement passions.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 47,  
101.

31.  
Great prosperity of  
the British  
empire at  
this period,  
and prodigious rise  
of prices.

Ever since the great financial crisis of 1797, and the limitation of cash payments by the act of that year, followed by the issue of two and one pound notes by the Bank of England, which immediately ensued, the prosperity of the British empire had been steadily and rapidly increasing. The expenditure of above sixty millions a-year by government, either in the current expenses or the payment of interest on debt, and the increase of the issues by the bank from eleven millions to above fifteen during that period,\* had produced a most extraordinary effect on the national industry. Prices of every species of produce had rapidly and steadily risen: that of grain in 1800, exclusive of the effects of the scarcity of that year, was double what it had been in 1792, and every other article had advanced in a similar

\* Bank of England notes in circulation—last quarter of

	Five pounds.	Two and one pounds.	Totals.
1797,	£10,411,700	£1,230,700	£11,642,400
1798,	10,711,690	1,730,380	12,442,070
1799,	12,335,920	1,671,040	13,006,960
1800,	13,338,670	2,062,300	15,400,970

—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, p. 148, *App. to Chronicle.*

proportion.\* The consequence was, that the industrious classes were, generally speaking, in affluent circumstances; immense fortunes rewarded the efforts of commercial enterprise; the demand for labour, encouraged by the employment of nearly four hundred thousand soldiers and sailors in the public service, was unbounded; the numerous indirect taxes, heavy as they were, scarcely appeared a burden amidst the constant rise in the money price of the produce of industry; and even the increasing weight of taxation, and the alarming magnitude of the debt, were but little felt amidst the general rise of prices and incomes which resulted from the profuse expenditure and lavish issue of paper by government.†

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XXX.  
1300.

One class only, that of annuitants, and all others depending on a fixed income, underwent, during those years, a progressive decline of comfort, which was increased in many cases to the most poignant distress by

32.  
Bad harvest  
of 1799, and  
consequent  
scarcity in  
1800.

\* Highest and lowest price of grain in five years, ending respectively—

1790, from 51s. 11d. to 39s. 2d.

1795, ... 74s. 2d. ... 42s. 11d.

1800, ... 113s. 7d. ... 50s. 3d.

—See MUNDEL'S *Industrial Situation of Great Britain*, 53.

† According to Mr Pitt's statement in 1800, the British exports, imports, shipping, tonnage, and revenue in the under-mentioned years, stood as follows:—

*Imports.*

On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1793,	£18,685,000
On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1801,	25,259,000

*Exports.*

On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1793 :	
Manufactures,	£14,771,000
Foreign goods,	5,468,000
	£20,239,000
On an average of six years ending 5th Jan. 1801 :	
Manufactures,	£20,085,000
Foreign goods,	12,867,000
	£32,952,000

*Shipping, &c.*

	Ships.	Tonnage.	Seamen.
Shipping in 1788,	13,827	1,363,000	107,925
1792,	16,079	1,540,145	118,286
1800,	18,877	1,905,438	143,661

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33.  
Great efforts  
of govern-  
ment to re-  
lieve it, and  
noble pa-  
tience of the  
people.

the high prices and severe scarcity which followed the disastrous harvest of 1799. The attention of parliament was early directed to the means of alleviating the famine of that year. Six reports were made by the Commons and two by the Lords on the dearth of provisions; but the government, although severely pressed by the public suffering, steadily resisted all those harsh or violent measures which procure a present relief at the expense of future confidence in the cultivators. An act was passed to lower the quality of all the bread baked in the kingdom; the importation of rice and maize encouraged by liberal bounties; distillation from grain stopped: and by these and other means an additional supply, to the enormous amount of two million five hundred thousand quarters,\* nearly a tenth part of the annual consumption of the people

*Permanent taxes, exclusive of war taxes.*

Year ending 5th Jan.	1793,	. . . . .	£14,284,000
Do. do.	1794,	. . . . .	13,941,000
Do. do.	1795,	. . . . .	13,858,000
Do. do.	1796,	. . . . .	13,557,000
Do. do.	1797,	. . . . .	14,292,000
Do. do.	1798,	. . . . .	13,832,000
Do. do.	1799,	. . . . .	14,275,000
Do. do.	1800,	. . . . .	15,743,000

*Gross receipts from taxes.*

1797,	. . . . .	£23,076,000
1798,	. . . . .	30,175,000
1799,	. . . . .	31,750,000
1800,	. . . . .	33,535,000

— See *Parl. Hist.* xxxiv. 1563.

\* The resources obtained in this way are thus detailed in the sixth report of the Commons:—

	Quarters.
Importation of wheat from Jan. 1 to Oct. 1,	170,000
Do. of flour from America,	580,000
Do. of flour from Canada,	30,000
Do. of rice, equal to	630,000
Stoppage of starch, equal to	40,000
Do. of distilleries,	360,000
Use of coarse meal,	400,000
Retrenchment,	300,000
	<hr/> 2,510,000

Large as these importations were considered at that period, and unprecedented as they unquestionably were, they have been greatly exceeded in subsequent times. The grain imported, in twelve months subsequent to the Irish famine of 1846, exceeded 12,000,000 quarters.—*Porter's Parl. Tables*, 1847.



at that period, was procured for the use of the inhabitants. By these generous and patriotic efforts, joined to the admirable patience and forbearance of the people, this trying crisis was surmounted without any of those convulsions which might have been anticipated from so severe a calamity during a period of almost universal war; and in the latter part of the year, England, so far from being overwhelmed by its reverses, was enabled to present an undaunted front to the hostility of combined Europe.

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1800.

Deprived, by the secession of Russia, of the power from whom they had derived such efficacious assistance in the preceding campaign, Austria and Great Britain made the utmost efforts to prosecute the war with vigour. By their united influence, the German empire was prevailed upon to sign a treaty, binding the states who composed it to furnish a contingent of three hundred thousand men for the common cause; but very few of the electors obeyed the requisition, and the troops of the empire were of hardly any service in the succeeding campaign. To stimulate their languid dispositions, a vigorous circular was, in the beginning of December, sent by the Archduke Charles to the anterior circles of the empire, in which he strenuously urged the formation of new levies, and pointed out, in energetic terms, the futility of the idea that any durable peace was practicable with a country in such a state of revolutionary excitement as France, and the vanity of supposing that, by concentrating all the powers of government in the hands of a victorious chieftain, it was likely to be either less formidable or more pacific. But although that great general was indefatigable in his endeavours to put the Imperialists on a respectable footing, and rouse them to make the most active preparations for war, he was far from feeling any confidence in the issue of the approaching contest, now that Russia was withdrawn on the one side, and Napoleon was added on the other; and he earnestly counselled the Austrian

34.  
Measures of  
England and  
Austria for  
the prosecu-  
tion of the  
war.

Dec. 4, 1799.

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XXX.

1800.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. iii.  
14, 16. *Jom.*  
xiii, 12, 16.  
*Arch. Ch.*  
ii. 334. *Ann.*  
*Reg.* 1800,  
168, and  
*Martens*,  
vii. 82.

35.  
Treaties  
entered into  
for this pur-  
pose with  
Austria and  
Bavaria.  
April 30.

June 20.

cabinet to take advantage of the successes of the late campaign, and the recent change of government in France, by concluding peace with the Republic. The cabinet of Vienna, however, deemed it inadvisable to stop short in the career of success; and not only refused to treat with Napoleon, who had proposed peace on the basis of the treaty of Campo Formio, but deprived the Archduke, who had so candidly stated his opinion, of the command of the army in Germany, and conferred it on General Kray. Notwithstanding the great abilities of the latter general, this change proved extremely prejudicial to the Imperial fortunes: the Archduke was adored by the soldiers, and his retirement not only shook their confidence in themselves, but cooled the ardour of the circles in the south of Germany, to whom his great achievements in the campaign of 1796 were still the subject of grateful recollection. He retired to his government of Bohemia, from whence he had the melancholy prospect of a series of reverses, which possibly his talents might have prevented, and certainly his wisdom had foreseen.<sup>1</sup>

By a treaty signed on the 16th March, the Elector of Bavaria agreed to put twelve thousand men in the pay of Great Britain, to be employed in the common cause; and by another treaty with the Elector of Mayence and the Duke of Würtemberg, each of these petty states agreed to furnish six thousand men, paid by the same power, for the same purpose. These troops, however, could not be organised in sufficient time to take a part in the early operations of the campaign, and they formed at best but a poor substitute for the sturdy Russian veterans, who were retiring towards the northern extremity of Germany, equally exasperated at their allies and their enemies. By another and more important treaty, signed at Vienna on the 20th June, the Emperor agreed to raise his forces, both in Germany and Italy, to the greatest possible amount, and the two powers

bound themselves each not to make a separate peace without the consent of the other; in consideration of which England engaged not only to advance a subsidy of £2,000,000 sterling to the Imperial treasury, but to augment as much as practicable the German and Swiss troops in the British pay in the German campaign.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
240, 243.  
State  
Papers.  
Martens, vii.  
61, and 707.

Justly proud of the glorious successes of the preceding campaign, which, in so far as its troops were concerned, had been almost unchequered, and relying with confidence on its superb armies, two hundred thousand strong, in Germany and Italy, the cabinet of Vienna resolved on continuing the contest. But the military preparations which they made were not commensurate to the magnitude of the danger which was to be apprehended, since the First Consul was placed at the head of the French government. Their forces in Germany were raised to ninety-two thousand men, exclusive of the Bavarian and Würtemberg contingents; but this vast body was scattered over an immense line, from the source of the Rhine to the banks of the Maine, while the centre in the valley of the Danube, where the decisive blows were to be struck, was so weakened that no respectable force could be collected to make head against the French invasion. The army under Melas in Italy, was by great exertions augmented to ninety-six thousand men; the Aulic Council, seduced by the recent conquest of that country, having fallen into the great mistake of supposing that the vital point of the contest was to be found in the Maritime Alps or on the banks of the Var, whereas it lay nearer home, on the shores of the Danube and the plains of Bavaria. No levies in the interior were made; few points were fortified, the government sharing in the common delusion that the strength of France was exhausted, that a war of invasion alone awaited their armies,<sup>2</sup> and that the Republic would without difficulty be brought to reasonable terms of accommodation in the ensuing

36.

Military  
preparations  
of the Imperialists.

<sup>2</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 334.  
Dum. iii.  
14, 16. Jonn.  
xiii. 11, 12.  
Nap. i. 185.

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XXX.

1800.

37.  
Discontent-  
ed state of  
the French  
affiliated  
Republics.

campaign. The foresight of the Archduke Charles, however, had surrounded Ulm with a formidable intrenched camp, which proved of the most essential service after the first disasters of the campaign, and retarded for six weeks the tide of Republican conquest in the heart of Germany.

The republics with which France had encircled her frontier had either been conquered by the Allies, or were in such a state of exhaustion and suffering, as to be incapable of rendering any effectual aid to the parent state. The Dutch groaned in silence under a yoke which was every day becoming more oppressive. The democratic party looked back with unavailing regret upon the infatuation with which they had thrown themselves into the arms of a power which used them only as the instruments of its ambition; while the commercial aristocracy, finding the trade of the United Provinces destroyed, abandoned every species of enterprise, lived in the most economical way on the interest of their realised capital, and quietly awaited in retirement the return of more prosperous days. By a treaty, concluded on the 5th January 1800, Holland agreed to pay six millions of francs to France, and obtained in return only the restitution of the effects of the clergy and emigrants who had possessions in the United Provinces. So violent was the hatred at France among its inhabitants, that a loan of a million sterling, which Napoleon endeavoured to negotiate among the capitalists of Amsterdam, totally failed. Switzerland was in a still more discontented state. Without any regard to the rights of the allied republic, Massena had imposed a forced loan on Berne, Bâle, and Zurich; and as the Swiss magistrates courageously resisted this act of oppression, an intrigue was got up by the democratic party, and the councils were attempted to be dissolved by military force. The conspiracy failed, and Colonel Clavel, who had been appointed to execute it, was compelled to take refuge in France; but the violent party-spirit which these proceedings left in Switzerland,<sup>1</sup> deprived it of any weight in the

<sup>1</sup> *Jom.* xiii.  
19, 28.

approaching contest, and prepared the way for its total subjugation by Napoleon.

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XXX.

1800.

26.

Measures of  
Napoleon to  
restore public  
credit in  
France.

To make head with such feeble auxiliaries against the united force of Austria and England, with a defeated army, an exhausted treasury, and a disunited people, was the difficult task which awaited the First Consul; but he soon showed that he was equal to the attempt. The first step which he took to accomplish the gigantic undertaking, was to introduce some degree of order into the finances, which the cupidity and profligacy of the preceding administrations had reduced to the most deplorable state. A deficit of 600,000,000 francs, or £24,000,000 sterling, existed in the revenue of the preceding year; and recovery of arrears had become impossible from the universal penury and misery which prevailed. The remnant of the public funds, though deprived of two-thirds of their amount, was still selling at *eight* per cent,—not more than a thirty-eighth part of their value in 1789, at the commencement of the Revolution. The abolition of the indirect taxes, conceded by the Directory to the clamours of the populace, had deprived the state of a third of the public revenue. The public treasury was empty; sufficient funds were not to be found in it to fit out a courier. Payments of every description were made in bills or paper securities of some sort, which had already largely anticipated all the legal receipts of government. The armies were supported only by cruel requisitions of horses, food, and clothing, which had become as oppressive as during the Reign of Terror. To avoid the forced loans and arbitrary taxation of the wealthier classes, expenditure of every sort had altogether ceased among the better description of citizens; and in France, after ten years of revolution, the concealment of treasure had become as common as in the Pashalics of Turkey. Amidst the universal dismay, extortion, pillage, and corruption were general among the servants of government.<sup>1</sup> Places, clothing, provisions, stores,—everything, in short, was sold to satisfy their

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.

27, 29.

Bour. iii.

241. Nap.

i. 106.

Thiers'

Cons. et

l'Emp. i. 12.

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1800.

39.  
Dreadful  
injustice of  
the forced  
loans.

cupidity; and while every office was openly put up to sale, enormous fortunes were amassed by both the elevated and the inferior agents of corruption.

The injustice committed by these forced loans is one of the most striking instances of the monstrous effects of the democratic ascendancy which, by the Revolution of 18th Fructidor, had obtained in France. They were laid indiscriminately on all property, movable and immovable, and were founded—1. On the amount of the direct contribution; and 2. On an arbitrary base. Every one who paid 500 francs was taxed at four-tenths of his income; all who paid 4000 francs and upwards, at its *whole* amount. The arbitrary base was founded on the opinion of a jury, selected from the lowest classes, who were entitled to tax the relations of emigrants or any persons of noble birth at any sum they chose. The effects of so iniquitous a system may be conceived. Property disappeared, or was concealed as studiously as in the dynasties of the East. Every branch of the public revenue was drying up from the extinction of credit.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 107.40.  
Salutary  
effect of  
Napoleon's  
government.

The establishment of a firm and powerful government in a great degree arrested these disorders, and restored the finances as if by enchantment. The capitalists of Paris, long inaccessible to the demands for loans by the revolutionary government, came forward with 12,000,000 of francs; the sale of the estates of the house of Orange produced 24,000,000 more; national domains to a great extent found purchasers from the increasing confidence in government; and, instead of the forced loans from the opulent classes, which had utterly annihilated credit, and, by the flagrant injustice with which they were levied, recalled the worst days of the Reign of Terror, a new tax of twenty-five per cent on real property, though a burden that would be deemed intolerable in any state which had tasted of the sweets of real freedom, gave general satisfaction, and soon produced a large increase to the revenue. At the same time the foundations of a sinking fund and a

national bank were laid, the public forests put under a new and rigorous direction, monthly remittances from the collectors of taxes established, and the measures commenced, which were calculated to revive public credit after a prostration of ten years. Such was the effect of these measures, that in September 1800 the remaining third of the national debt had risen from eight to forty per cent. The public creditors received a half of their payments in silver—a change which, from the universal discredit to which paper had fallen, was looked upon as the first great step towards a return to a just system of administration.<sup>1</sup>

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1800.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 107.  
110. Jom.  
xiii. 28.  
Thiers, ii.  
153.

The pacification of la Vendée was the next object of the First Consul. The law of hostages and the forced requisitions had revived the civil war in that country, and sixty thousand men were in the field; but it was a different contest from the terrible burst which, seven years before, had proved so disastrous to the Republican arms. The devastation of the country, and destruction of the population by that bloody strife, had annihilated the elements of resistance on any considerable scale; and mere guerilla bands, seldom amounting to two thousand men, traversed the fields in different directions, levying contributions, and held together as much by the love of pillage as by indignation at oppression. Through the intervention of Hyde Neuville, an able young man of an ardent disposition, who nevertheless was not misled by the dictates of passion, a negotiation was opened with the leaders of the insurgents; and although they paid but little attention to the first proclamations of Napoleon, yet, being soon convinced by the tenor of his administration, that a more equitable system than that of the Revolution was about to commence, they gradually listened to his proposals. At the same time, the approach of formidable forces from all quarters convinced them that they had now a more difficult antagonist to deal with than the weak though tyrannical Directory.<sup>2</sup> Châtillon and d'Autichamp were the first to give the example of submission; and soon after

41.  
Pacification  
of la Ven-  
dée.

Jan. 17,  
1801.  
<sup>2</sup> Beauch.  
iv. 498, 502.  
Bour. iv. 8,  
9.

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XXX.

1800.

Suzanet and the Abbé Bernier concluded, at Mont-Luçon, a treaty highly honourable to themselves for the termination of hostilities.

42.  
Iniquitous  
execution of  
Count Louis  
de Frotté.

The able and heroic Count Louis de Frotté was not equally fortunate. He had written a letter to the Republican chief, proposing a general pacification of the Chouans, and was at the place of conference, when the negotiation was protracted beyond the time assigned for the acceptance of terms of peace by the Royalists. He was then perfidiously seized, along with all his followers, on the ground of a letter he had written to an aide-de-camp during the negotiation, and brought before a military tribunal, by which they were immediately ordered to be executed. They underwent the sentence next day, and met death with the most heroic courage, standing erect, with their eyes unbandaged. One of the aides-de-camp was only wounded by the first discharge; he calmly ordered the men to fire again, and fell pierced to the earth. The unhappy aide-de-camp whose unfortunate discovery of the letter had occasioned this catastrophe, was seized with such despair that he blew out his brains. This murder is a lasting stain on Napoleon's administration. Frotté was not taken in arms, but perfidiously seized by a company of Republicans, when under an escort of the national troops, and engaged in a negotiation for a final pacification. But he was deemed too able to be permitted to survive, even in that age of returning clemency. There were no just grounds for this piece of cruelty, for the intercepted letter, though imprudent, contained nothing which could warrant the captive's execution. It must be added, however, in justice to Napoleon, that it contained expressions extremely hostile to the First Consul; and that, at the earnest solicitation of his secretary Bourrienne, he had actually made out an order for his pardon, which, from some delay in the transmission, unfortunately arrived too late to save the hero's life.<sup>1</sup> About the same time he generously pardoned M.

<sup>1</sup> Bour. iv. 3,  
10. Beauch.  
iv. 498, 504.



Defeu, a brave emigrant officer taken in arms against the state, and doomed by the cruel laws of the Republic to instant death.

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XXX.

1800.

Georges, Bourmont, and some others, maintained for a few weeks longer in Brittany a gallant resistance; but, finding that the inhabitants were weary of civil war, and gladly embraced the opportunity of resuming their pacific occupations, they at length came into the measures of government, and were treated with equal clemency and good faith by the First Consul, to whom most of them ever after yielded a willing and useful obedience. In the end of January, General Brune announced by proclamation that the pacification of la Vendée was complete, and on the 23d of the following month a general and unqualified amnesty was published. The Vendean chiefs were received with great distinction by Napoleon at Malmaison, and generally promoted to important situations. The curé Bernier was made Bishop of Orleans, and intrusted afterwards with the delicate task of conducting the negotiation concerning the concordat with the Papal government. The rapid and complete pacification of this distracted province by Napoleon, proves how much the long duration of its bloody and disastrous war had been owing to the cruelty and oppression of the Republican authorities.<sup>1</sup>

43.  
Submission  
of Bour-  
mont and  
Georges.

Feb. 23,  
1801.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i.  
123, 133.  
Jom. xiii.  
29, 31.  
Dum. iii.  
19, 21.  
Ann. Reg.  
166.

The next important step of Napoleon was to detach Russia completely from the alliance of Great Britain; an attempt which was much facilitated by the angry feelings excited in the mind of the Emperor Paul and his generals by the disastrous issue of the preceding campaign, and the rising jealousy of the maritime power of Great Britain, which had sprung up from fortuitous events, in the minds of the Northern powers, and which in the following year led to the most important results. Aware of the favourable turn which affairs in the Baltic had recently taken, the First Consul lost no opportunity of cultivating a good understanding with the Russian Emperor; and,

44.  
Napoleon  
effects a  
reconcilia-  
tion with  
the Emperor  
Paul.

CHAP.  
XXX.

1800.

by a series of adroit acts of courtesy, succeeded at length, not only in obliterating all feelings of hostility, but in establishing the most perfect understanding between the two cabinets. Napoleon sent back all the Russian prisoners in France, seven thousand in number, who had been taken at Zurich and in Holland, not only without exchange, but equipped anew in the Russian uniform. This politic proceeding was not lost on the Czar, who had been already dazzled by the lustre of Napoleon's victories in Italy and Egypt. An interchange of civilities and courtesies ensued, which ere long terminated in the dismissal of Lord Whitworth from St Petersburg, and the arrival of Baron Springborton, as Russian ambassador, at Paris. The British vessels were soon after laid under embargo in the Russian harbours, and that angry correspondence began, which terminated in the array of all the powers of the North in open hostility against Great Britain.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
13, 14.  
Bour. iii.  
269, 270.  
Ann. Reg.  
234.

45.  
His energetic military measures, and revival of the military spirit in France.

The military measures of Napoleon were equally energetic. Upon the refusal of Great Britain to treat, he issued one of his heart-stirring proclamations, which were so well calculated to rouse the ardent spirit of the French people. He told them that the English minister had rejected his proposals of peace ; that, to command it, he had need of money, of iron, and soldiers ; and that he swore to combat alone for the happiness of France and the peace of the world. This animated address, coupled with the magic that encircled the name of Napoleon, produced an amazing effect. Victory seemed again about to attend the Republican standards, under the auspices of a leader to whom she had never yet proved faithless ; the patriotic ardour of 1793 was in part revived, with all the addition which the national strength had since received from the experience of later times. The first class of the conscription for the year 1800 was put in requisition, without any exemption either in favour of rank or fortune : this supply put at the disposal of government one hundred and twenty

thousand men. Besides this, a still more efficient force for immediate service was formed by a summons to all the veterans who had obtained furlough or leave of absence for the eight preceding years, and who, unless furnished with a valid excuse, were required again to serve. They joyfully rejoined their colours to serve under the conqueror of Rivoli, and this measure procured a supply of thirty thousand experienced soldiers. At the same time, the *gendarmerie* were put on a better footing; and various improvements effected, particularly in the artillery department, which greatly augmented the efficiency of that important arm of the public service. Twenty-five thousand horses, bought in the interior, were distributed among the artillery and cavalry on the frontier; and all the stores and equipments of the armies were repaired with a celerity so extraordinary, that it would have appeared incredible, if long experience had not proved, that confidence in the vigour and stability of government operates as rapidly in increasing, as the vacillation and insecurity of democracy, not obviated by extraordinary public excitement, or despotic powers in its leaders, does in withering the national resources. Far from experiencing the difficulty which had been so severely felt by the Directory in retaining the soldiers to their colours, the consular government was powerfully seconded by the patriotic efforts of all classes. Several brilliant corps of volunteers were formed; and the ranks rapidly filled up by veterans hastening to renew their toils under a leader to whom fortune had hitherto proved so propitious. In consequence, the government soon found itself at the head of two hundred and fifty thousand men, with whom to commence hostilities in Italy and Germany; while above one hundred thousand conscripts were rapidly learning the rudiments of war at the depots in the interior, and before six months might be expected to join the armies on the frontier.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *Jom.* xiii.  
33, 35.  
*Dum.* iii.  
23, 25.

But it was not merely in such praiseworthy efforts for the security and pacification of France, that the energies

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46.  
His mea-  
sures to ex-  
tinguish the  
revolution-  
ary fervour  
of the peo-  
ple.

of the First Consul were employed. He already meditated the re-establishment of the monarchy, and early commenced that system of misleading the people by false epithets, and dazzling them by splendid pageants, which was intended to prepare them for the lustre of the throne, and induce them to concur in the reconstruction of all the parts of the social edifice, which it had been the object of the Revolution to destroy. To accomplish this object, he applied himself to what he was well aware is at all times, but especially during the decline of revolutionary fervour, the ruling principle of human nature,—viz. self-interest. All the officers of state, all the members of the legislature, were endowed with ample salaries; even the tribunate, which professed to be the barrier of the people against the encroachments of government, received above £50,000 a-year among its eighty members, being at the rate of nearly £700 a-year to each individual who composed it; a very large allowance in a country where the highest civil functionaries, the heads of the law and church, received only from £300 to £600 annually; and the great body of the parochial clergy only £40 or £50.\* From the very first, he commenced the demolition of all those ensigns and expressions which recalled the idea of the liberty and equality, from the strife of which his redoubtable power had arisen. The image of the Republic, seated and holding a spear in her hand, which was at the top of all the official letters at the commencement of the consulship, was suppressed. Some doubt existed, in the first

\* The civil list under the First Consul was fixed at the following sums:—

Legislative Body,	. . . . .	2,400,000 francs, or	£96,000
Tribunate,	. . . . .	1,312,000	... 53,000
Archives,	. . . . .	75,000	... 3,000
Three Consuls,	. . . . .	1,800,000	... 72,000
Council of State,	. . . . .	675,000	... 27,000
Their Secretaries,	. . . . .	112,500	... 4,500
Six Ministers,	. . . . .	360,000	... 14,000
Minister of Foreign Affairs,	. . . . .	90,000	... 3,500

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6,824,500 francs, or £273,000

instance, as to which of the consuls should take the chair, and Sièyes openly asserted his pretensions to it, in virtue as well of his seniority as of his great services in the cause of freedom; but Napoleon cut the matter short by stepping into the chair himself. The jealousy of the elder consul was soon removed by the grant of the large property out of the park of Versailles, which has been already mentioned. At the same time, the habiliments and ensigns of authority were changed; the Greek and Roman costumes, which recalled the ideas of equality lately so much in vogue, were abolished and replaced by the military dress. The First Consul appeared on all occasions in uniform, with boots and spurs; and all the inferior military functionaries followed his example. The levees, which he held almost daily, were crowded with officers in full dress; and the court of the first magistrate of the Republic was noways distinguishable from the headquarters of its greatest general. At the same time, the institution of sabres and fusils of merit, as a testimony of reward to military distinction, already shadowed out to the discerning eye the Legion of Honour, and the re-establishment of titles of rank and a hereditary nobility; while the daily reviews, with all the pomp and splendour of war, in the Place Carrousel, accustomed the people to those magnificent pageants which were destined to conceal from their gaze the chains of the empire.<sup>1</sup>

These measures were all steps, and not unimportant ones, toward the re-establishment of monarchical authority. But they were the prelude only to greater changes. In December 1799, an important *arrêt* was published, which, on the preamble—"That a part of the journals printed at Paris are instruments in the hands of the enemies of the Republic; and that it is the first duty of the government to watch over its security," decreed, "That the minister of police should not *suffer to be printed*, during the continuance of the war, any journals but the following." Then followed a list of thirteen newspapers,

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1800.

Dec. 1799.

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 2, 3.  
Bour. iii.  
248, 255,  
256. Nap.  
i. 243.

47.  
He sup-  
presses the  
liberty of  
the press.  
Dec. 24,  
1799.

CHAP.  
XXX.

1800.

thus invested with the monopoly of Paris; and from those thus suppressed were only excepted "those *exclusively* devoted to science, the arts, literature, commerce, or advertisements." It was decreed, by a separate article, that "any journal among those retained which inserted anything contrary to the sovereignty of the people should be immediately suppressed." This clause, inserted to blind the people to the real tendency of the measure, received in the sequel, as was foreseen at the time, the most liberal interpretation, and was applied, contrary to its obvious meaning, to sanction the extinction of all newspapers opposed to the consular government. Thus early commenced the system of Napoleon for the coercion of the press—a system which received, during the remainder of his reign, such ample development; and which, as Madame de Stael justly remarks, converted that great engine, generally considered as the palladium of liberty, into the most powerful instrument of bondage, by perpetually exhibiting a series of false and delusive pictures to the human mind, and excluding all others from view.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> De Stael,  
ii. 284. Bour.  
iii. 254.

48.  
He fixes his  
residence at  
the Tuileries.

The next step of Napoleon was to fix his residence in the Tuileries, and sleep in the ancient apartments of the kings of France. This great change, however, required considerable caution in its accomplishment; it was so palpable an approach towards royalty, that it might shock the feeling of the people, and endanger the newly established authority. Slowly, and with profound dissimulation, therefore, he proceeded in his advances. A fine statue of Brutus was first placed in one of the galleries of the palace; it was thought the most ardent republicans could apprehend nothing from a change which commenced with honour done to the hero who had slain a tyrant. Orders were next given to repair and put in order the royal apartments in the Tuileries, and under the veil of these words great changes were effected. The *bonnets rouges* and republican emblems were all effaced; the statues which were to adorn the great gallery chosen by Napoleon

himself; he selected among the ancients, Demosthenes and Alexander, Brutus and Cæsar; among the moderns, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Condé, Prince Eugene, Marlborough, Marshal Saxe, Frederick, Washington, Dugommier, Dampierre, and Joubert. At length, the translation of the Consuls from the Luxembourg to the Tuileries took place; the royal apartments were destined for Napoleon, those in the pavilion of Flora for the other Consuls. The *cortège* set out from the Luxembourg, surrounded by a splendid train of officers and three thousand chosen troops, among whom the famous regiment of Guides was peculiarly conspicuous. Napoleon, with the two other Consuls, was drawn in a magnificent chariot by six white horses, the same which the Emperor of Austria had given him after the treaty of Campo Formio; he bore in his hand the splendid sabre presented to him by the same sovereign on that occasion. The cabinet ministers followed in their carriages, the only ones which were to be seen on the occasion; for such was the miserable destitution in which the Revolution had left the highest civil functionaries of France, that to transport the council of state they were obliged to have recourse to hackney-coaches! The real luxury of that period consisted in the splendour of the troops, whose brilliant uniforms and prancing chargers formed a painful contrast to the meanness and simplicity of the civil authorities. Last and sad effect of revolutionary convulsions, to cast to the earth everything but the ensigns of military prowess!<sup>1</sup>

From the opening into the Carrousel, from the quay of the Tuileries to the gate of the palace, the procession passed through a double line of guards—a royal usage, which offered a singular contrast to the inscription on the guard-house by which it passed—"10th August 1792—Royalty is abolished in France, and shall *never be re-established*." On entering the gates, he observed some clusters of pikes surmounted by *bonnets rouges* and tricolor flags. "Remove all that rubbish," said he, with characteristic impa-

<sup>1</sup> Bour. iii.  
320, 321.  
(Goh. ii. 15,  
19. Thib.  
Consulat, 2.

49.  
Splendid  
military  
pageant on  
this occa-  
sion.

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XXX.

1800.

tience.\* No sooner had he arrived at the foot of the great stair than Napoleon, allowing the other Consuls to ascend to the presence-chamber, mounted on horseback, and, amidst incessant cries of "Vive le Premier Consul!" passed in review above twenty thousand men. Murat was on his right, Lannes on his left; the brilliant staff who surrounded him bore on their visages the marks of the sun of Italy or the sands of Egypt. When the banners of the ninetieth, the forty-third, and thirtieth demi-brigades, which exhibited only bare poles riddled with shot and surmounted by tatters black with powder, were carried past, he bowed with respect to the monuments of military valour. Enthusiastic acclamations rent the skies; and such was the universal transport, that, when the review was concluded, and the First Consul ascended to the audience-chamber, and took his station in the centre of the room, his colleagues were reduced to the rank of pages following his train. On that day royalty was in truth re-established in France, somewhat less than eight years after it had been abolished by the revolt of the 10th August. On the night of his entry into the Tuileries, Napoleon said to his secretary—"Bourricone, it is not enough to be in the Tuileries; we must take measures to remain there. Who has not inhabited this palace? It has been the abode of robbers, of members of the Convention. Ah! there is 'your brother's house, from which, eight years ago, we saw the good Louis XVI. besieged in the Tuileries, and carried off into captivity. But you need not fear a repetition of the scene. Let them attempt it with me if they dare."<sup>1</sup>†

<sup>1</sup> Bour. iii.  
266, 267,  
318, 323.  
Thib. 2, 3.

50.  
Commence-  
ment of the  
etiquette  
and splen-  
dour of a  
court.

No sooner was the First Consul established at the Tuileries, than the usages, dress, and ceremonial of a court were at once resumed. The antechambers were filled with chamberlains, pages, and esquires; footmen in brilliant liveries filled the lobbies and staircases; the

\* "Otez-moi bien vite toutes ces cochonneries-là."—CAPEFIGUE, *Histoire de Louis Philippe*, v. 233.

† See *Ante*, chap. vii. § 73.



levees were conducted with as much splendour as the dilapidated state of most fortunes would permit; and a drawing-room, composed chiefly of the wives of the young generals who had been the companions of Napoleon, presided over by the grace and elegance, and embellished by the extravagance, of Josephine, already revived to a certain degree the lustre of a court. Napoleon was indefatigable in his attention to these matters. He deemed the colour of a livery, the cut of a court-dress, not beneath his notice; endeavouring in every way to dazzle the eyes of the vulgar, and efface all recollection of the Republic before it was formally abolished by the authority of government.\* For the same reason, he revived the use of silk stockings in dress, and re-established the balls of the opera—an event which was so great an innovation on the manners of the Republic, that it created quite a sensation at that period. But Napoleon, in pursuing these measures, knew well the character of the French. “While they are discussing these changes,” said he, “they will cease to talk nonsense about my politics; and that is what I want. Let them amuse themselves, let them dance; but let them not thrust their heads into the councils of government. Commerce will revive under the increasing expenditure of the capital. I am not afraid of the Jacobins; I never was so much applauded as at the last parade. It is ridiculous to say that nothing is right but what is new; we have had enough of such novelties. I would rather have the balls of the opera than the saturnalia of the Goddess of Reason.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bourr. iii.  
263, 264,  
319, 320,  
327. Thib.  
15. D'Abr.  
ii. 265, 280.

The condition of the emigrants next attracted the

\* The King of Prussia was among the first to recognise the consular government, and Napoleon was highly gratified when an aide-de-camp, whom he despatched to Berlin, was admitted to the honour of dining at the royal table. M. Lucchesini, in October 1800, was charged with a special mission to the court of the Tuileries from the Prussian government. The First Consul received him at St Cloud, and was at the balcony when he arrived. He was much struck with the decorations which he bore, and the rich livery of the servants who attended him; and he was heard to exclaim, “That is imposing: we must have things of that sort to dazzle the people.”—See THIBAudeau, 14-15.

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XXX.

1800.

51.

Recall of  
many emi-  
grants exiled  
since 18th  
Fructidor.

attention of the First Consul. No less than a hundred and forty-five thousand persons were on the lists of emigrants, banished either by the Convention or the Directory. This immense and miserable body was gradually and cautiously restored to France by his exertions. In the first instance, a decree was published, which took off the sentence of banishment against a great number of those who had been exiled by the result of the 18th Fructidor. It was only provided that they should be under the surveillance of the police, and reside at the places appointed for each respectively in the decree. Among the persons thus restored against an unjust sentence, were many of the most eminent citizens of the Republic: Carnot, Barthélemy, Boissy d'Anglas, Portalis, Villaret-Joyeuse, and above forty others. The First Consul immediately made use of the most eminent of them in the service of the state: Carnot was appointed minister at war in the absence of Berthier, and contributed in a powerful manner to the glorious issue of the succeeding campaign. Barère also was recalled, and was so desirous to receive employment, that he wrote a long letter justifying his conduct to Napoleon. But the latter never could be persuaded to take into his direct service that hardened republican. Those proscribed by the Directory were thus early admitted into favour; at a subsequent period he received with equally open arms the Royalists and the victims of the Revolution. The only faction against which to the last he was inveterate, was the remnant of the Jacobin party, who retained throughout all his reign the resolution of their character and the perversity of their opinions.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bour. iii.  
264, 267.  
Thiers, ii.  
168.

52.

Establish-  
ment of the  
secret police.

At the time when Napoleon was placed on the consular throne, he organised his *secret police*, intended to act as a check on the public one of Fouché. Duroc was at first at the head of this establishment, to which Junot, as governor of Paris, soon after succeeded. So early did this great leader avail himself of this miserable engine, unknown in

constitutional monarchies, the resource of despots, inconsistent with anything like freedom, but the sad legacy bequeathed to succeeding ages by the despotism of the monarchy, and the convulsions and devastations of the Revolution. The spies and agents of this police and counter-police soon filled every coffee-house and theatre in Paris; they overheard conversations, mingled in groups, encouraged seditious expressions, were to be found alike in saloons of palaces and in prisons, and rendered every man insecure, from the monarch on the throne to the captive in the dungeon. Lately appointed governor of Paris, Junot had a multitude of inferior agents in his pay to watch the motions of Fouché; and he, in his turn, carried corruption into the bosom of the consular family, and, by liberally supplying funds for her extravagance, obtained secret information from Josephine herself.<sup>1</sup> This miserable system has survived all the changes amid which it arose. The formidable engine, organised in the heart of Paris, with its arms extending over all France, is instantly seized upon by each successive faction which rises to the head of affairs; the herd of informers and spies is perpetuated from generation to generation, and exercises its prostituted talents for behoof of any government which the armed force of the capital has elevated to supreme power; the people, habituated to this unseen authority, regard it as an indispensable part of regular government; and a system, which was the disgrace of Roman servitude in the corrupted days of the empire, is ingrafted on a government which boasts of concentrating within itself all the lights of modern civilisation.

The circumstances of the Roman empire, as remodelled by Constantine, afford a striking analogy to those of France when Napoleon ascended the throne; and it is curious to observe how exactly the previous destruction of the nobility and higher classes in the two countries paved the way, by necessary consequence, for the same despotic institutions. "The patrician families," says Gibbon,

53.  
Comparison  
of his sys-  
tem of gov-  
ernment  
with that  
established  
by Constan-  
tine in the  
Byzantine  
empire.

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"whose original numbers were never recruited till the end of the commonwealth, either failed in the ordinary course of nature, or were extinguished in so many foreign or domestic wars. Few remained who could derive their genuine origin from the foundation of the city, when Cæsar and Augustus, Claudius and Vespasian, created a competent number of new patrician families. But these artificial supplies, in which the reigning house was always included, were rapidly swept away by the rage of tyrants, by frequent revolutions, the change of manners, and the intermixture of nations. Little more was left, when Constantine ascended the throne, than a vague and imperfect tradition that the patricians had once been the first among the Romans. To form a body of nobles whose influence may restrain, while it secures, the authority of the monarch, would have been very inconsistent with the character and policy of Constantine; but, had he seriously entertained such a design, it might have exceeded the measure of his power to ratify, by an arbitrary edict, an institution which must expect the sanction of time and opinion. He revived, indeed, the title of patricians; but he revived it *as a personal, not a hereditary distinction*. They yielded only to the transient authority of the annual consuls; but they enjoyed the pre-eminence over all the great officers of state. This honourable rank was bestowed on them for life; and as they were usually favourites and ministers at the imperial court, the true etymology of the word was perverted by ignorance and flattery, and the patricians of Constantine were revered as the adopted fathers of the emperor and the republic.

54.

Identity of  
the French  
and Byzantine  
police.

"The *police* insensibly assumed the license of reporting whatever they could observe of the conduct, either of magistrates or private citizens, and were soon considered as the *eyes* of the monarch and the scourge of the people. Under the warm influence of a feeble reign, they multiplied to the incredible number of ten thousand, disdained the mild though frequent admonitions of the laws, and

exercised, in the profitable management of the posts, a rapacious and insolent oppression. These official spies, who corresponded with the palace, were encouraged, with reward and favour, anxiously to watch the progress of every treasonable design, from the faint and latent symptoms of disaffection, to the actual preparation of open revolt. Their careless or criminal violation of truth and justice was covered by the consecrated mask of zeal; and they might securely aim their poisoned arrows at the breast either of the innocent or the guilty, who had provoked their resentment or refused to purchase their silence. A faithful subject of Syria, perhaps, or Britain, was exposed to the danger, or at least to the dread, of being dragged in chains to the court of Milan or Constantinople, to defend his life and fortune against the malicious charges of these privileged informers."<sup>1</sup> This might pass for a description of the Conservative Senate and the police of Napoleon.

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"Augustus knew well," says the same historian, "that mankind are governed by names; and that they will in general submit to real slavery, if they are told that they are in the enjoyment of freedom." No man understood this principle better than Napoleon. While he was preparing, by fixing his residence in the royal palace, the appointments of the legislature by the executive, the suppression of the liberty of the press, and the establishment of a vigilant police, for the overthrow of all the principles of the Revolution, he was careful to publish to the world proclamations which still breathed the spirit of democratic freedom. Shortly before his installation in the Tuileries, intelligence arrived of the death of Washington, the illustrious founder of American independence. He immediately issued the following order of the day to the army: "Washington is dead! That great man has struggled with tyranny; he consolidated the liberty of his country. His memory will be ever dear to the French people, as to all freemen in both hemispheres, who, like him and the

<sup>1</sup> Gibbon, c. xvii. vol. ii. 278, 279.

55.  
Napoleon's hypocritical eulogy on Washington, who died Dec. 14, 1799.

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<sup>1</sup> Thib. 2. 3.  
Bour. iii.  
276.

American soldiers, have fought for liberty and equality. As a mark of respect, the First Consul orders, that for ten days black crape shall be suspended from all the standards and banners of the Republic." Thus, by the skilful use of high-sounding names and heart-stirring recollections, did this great master of the art of dissimulation veil his advances towards absolute power, and engraft an enthusiastic admiration for his despotic government on the turbulent passions which had been nourished by the Revolution.<sup>1</sup>

56.  
Commence-  
ment of his  
great designs  
for the archi-  
tectural em-  
bellishment  
of Paris.

Notwithstanding many littlenesses, which would be inconceivable in ordinary men, the mind of Napoleon was fraught with many elevated ideas. In nothing did this appear in a more striking manner, than in the measures he undertook for the improvement of the metropolis. He had early conceived an admiration for architectural decoration, which his residence among the stately monuments of Egypt had converted into a chastened and elevated passion. His present situation, as chief of the French government, gave him ample room for the indulgence of this truly regal disposition, and he already began to conceive those great designs for the embellishment of Paris and the improvement of France, which have thrown such durable lustre over his reign. The inconceivable activity of his mind seemed to take a pleasure in discovering new objects for exertion; and at a time when he was conducting the diplomacy of Europe, and regulating all the armies of France, he was maturing plans for the construction of roads, bridges, and canals, through all its wide extent, and setting on foot those great works which have given such splendour to its capital. He early selected M. Fontaine and M. Perier as the instruments of his designs, and, aided by the suggestions of these able architects, the embellishment of the metropolis proceeded at an accelerated pace. The formation of a quay on the banks of the Seine, opposite to the Tuileries, near the Quai Voltaire, first removed a deformity which had long

been felt in looking from the windows of the palace ; and the clearing out of the Place Carrousel next suggested the idea of uniting the Louvre and Tuileries, and forming a vast square between these two sumptuous edifices. At first it was proposed to construct a building across the vacant area, in order to conceal the oblique position in which they stood to each other ; but this idea was soon abandoned, as Napoleon justly observed, that “no building, how majestic soever, could compensate for a vast open space between the Louvre and Tuileries.” The construction of a fourth side for the great square, opposite to the picture gallery, was therefore commenced, and the demolition of the edifices in the interior soon after began ; a great undertaking, which the subsequent disasters of his reign prevented him from completing, and which all the efforts of succeeding sovereigns have not been able as yet to bring to a conclusion. The Pont-des-Arts, between the Louvre and the Palace of the Institute, was commenced about the same time, and the demolition of the convents of the Feuillans and Capucines made way for the Rue de Rivoli, which now forms so noble a border to the gardens of the Tuileries. Malmaison at this time was the favourite country residence of the First Consul ; but he already meditated the establishment of his court at St Cloud, and the apartments of that palace began to be fitted up in that sumptuous style which has rendered their furniture unequalled in all the palaces of France.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 2, 3.  
Bour. iv. 46,  
56.

The First Consul did not as yet venture openly to break with the Republican party, but he lost no opportunity of showing in what estimation he held their principles. On occasion of the establishment of the Court of Cassation, the supreme tribunal of France, he said to Bourrienne,—“I do not venture as yet to take any decided step against the regicides ; but I will show what I think of them. To-morrow I shall be engaged with Abrial in the organisation of the Tribunal of Cassation. Target, who is its president, declined to defend Louis XVI.: whom

57.  
Suppression  
of the fête  
on 21st  
January,  
and elevation  
of  
Tronchet.

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1 Bour. iv.  
68, 70.58.  
Corres-  
pondence  
between  
Napoleon  
and Louis  
XVIII.

do you suppose I am about to name in his place? Tronchet, who so nobly discharged that perilous duty. They may say what they choose; my mind is made up." Tronchet accordingly received the appointment so richly deserved by his heroic conduct. The fete commemorating the murder of Louis XVI. was at the same time suppressed, and concerts of sacred music were permitted on Sundays at the Opera. Thus, though the Republican calendar was still observed, an approach was made to the ancient mode of measuring time in the public amusements.<sup>1</sup>

Louis XVIII. at this time wrote several letters to Napoleon, in which he expressed the high esteem in which he held his character, and offered him any situation which he chose to fix on under the government, if he would aid in re-establishing the throne of the Bourbons. Napoleon replied in firm but courteous terms, declining to have any connexion with the exiled family.\* He clearly foresaw, with admirable sagacity, all the difficulties which would attend the restoration of that unfortunate family, and felt no inclination to aid in such an event. "The

\* The letter of Louis XVIII. was in these terms :—

Feb. 4. "For long, General, you must have known the esteem in which I hold you. If you doubt my gratitude, fix upon the place you desire for yourself; point out the situations which you wish for your friends. As to my principles, they are those of the French character. Clemency on principle accords with the dictates of reason.

"No—the victor of Lodi, Castiglione, and Arcola, the conqueror of Italy and Egypt, can never prefer a vain celebrity to true glory. But you are losing the most precious moments. We could secure the happiness of France. I say *we*, for I require Buonaparte for such an attempt, and he could not achieve it without me. General, Europe observes you—glory awaits you, and I am impatient to restore peace to my people."

Napoleon replied :—

Sept. 24. "I have received, sir, your letter. I thank you for the obliging expressions which it contains regarding myself.

"You should renounce all hope of returning to France. You could not do so but over the bodies of one hundred thousand Frenchmen. Sacrifice your interest to the repose and happiness of France. History will duly appreciate your conduct in so doing.

"I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family, and shall learn with pleasure that you are surrounded with everything which can secure the tranquillity of your retreat."

This answer was not despatched for seven months after the receipt of the



partisans of the Bourbons," said he, "are much mistaken if they imagine that I am the man to play the part of Monk. I am not insensible to the hazard to which France may be one day exposed from my decease without issue, as my brothers are evidently unfit for such a throne; but consider the absurdity of the propositions which they have made to me. How could we secure so many new interests and vested rights against the efforts of a family returning with eighty thousand emigrants, and all the prejudices of fanaticism? What would become of the holders of national domains, and all those who had taken an active part in the Revolution? The Bourbons would conceive they had conquered by force; all their professions and promises would give way before the possession of power. My part is taken; no one but a fool would place any reliance upon them."<sup>1</sup> By such specious arguments did Napoleon veil the real motives of his conduct in this particular, which was jealousy of the legal heir to the throne.\*

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<sup>1</sup> Bourr. iv.  
72, 83.  
Capefigue,  
Hist. de la  
Restauration,  
i. 127,  
141.

Thus, on all sides, the prospects of France rapidly brightened under the auspices of Napoleon. To the insecurity, distrust, and terror which had paralysed all the efforts of patriotism under the Directory, succeeded

letter from Louis, and when the Congress of Lunéville was about to open.—See BOURRIENNE, iv. 77-79.

Not disconcerted with this repulse, the Bourbon family endeavoured to open a negotiation with Napoleon, through the Duchess of Guiche, a lady of great beauty and abilities, who found no difficulty in penetrating to Josephine, and conveying to her the propositions of the exiled family, which were, that he should, on restoring them, be made Constable of France, and receive the principality of Corsica. Napoleon no sooner heard of it than he ordered the fascinating duchess to leave Paris in twenty-four hours—an order which gave great satisfaction to Josephine, who already had become somewhat uneasy at the proximity of so charming a personage. It had been proposed that a splendid pillar should be erected on the Place Carrousel, surmounted by a statue of Napoleon crowning the Bourbons. "Nothing was wanting," said Napoleon, "to such a design, except that the pillar should be founded on the dead body of the First Consul."—LAS CASES, i. 289, 290; and CAPEFIGUE, i. 140.

\* "Son nom serait suspect à mon autorité:

On sait son droit au trône, et ce droit est un crime.

Du destin qui fait tout, tel est l'arrêt cruel—

Si j'eusse été vaincu je serais criminel."

VOLTAIRE'S *Zaire*, Act i. scene 5.

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59.

General im-  
provement  
in the pros-  
pects of  
France.

confidence, energy, and hope; genius emerged from obscurity to take an active part in public affairs; corruption and profligacy ceased to poison every branch of administration. There is nothing more striking in European history than the sudden resurrection of France under the government of this great man, or more descriptive of the natural tendency of human affairs to right themselves after a period of disorder. It evinces the general disposition of all classes, when taught wisdom by suffering, to resume that place in society for which they were destined by nature, and in which alone their exertions can add to the sum of the general felicity.

## CHAPTER XXXI.

## CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO.

IMMENSE was the addition which the vigour and popularity of Napoleon, and the termination of the imbecile government of the Directory, made to the effective forces of France at this period. They were disposed, previous to the commencement of hostilities, in the following manner:—The army of Italy, which occupied the crest of the Alps from the neighbourhood of Genoa to Mont Cenis, was thirty-six thousand strong, of which twenty-eight thousand were assembled in Liguria, from the Trebbia to the Col de Tende, to guard the passes of the Appenines and protect Genoa from the Imperial forces, which were grouped in the plain round the walls of Alessandria. These troops, however, were for the most part in the most miserable condition. Their spirits were depressed by a campaign of unprecedented disaster, their clothing was worn out, their feet bare, their artillery broken down, their cavalry dismounted, and it required all the efforts of St-Cyr and their other officers during the winter to retain them at their colours. The army of Germany, which was afterwards called the army of the Danube, was a hundred and twenty thousand strong, including sixteen thousand cavalry—of which immense force a hundred thousand men, including fourteen thousand horse, could be relied on for active operations. An army of reserve of fifty thousand men was at the same

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I.

Disposition  
of the  
French  
armies at  
the opening  
of the cam-  
paign, and  
formation  
of the army  
of reserve.

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time formed, the headquarters of which were nominally at Dijon, but the bulk of the force was in reality disposed at Geneva, Lausanne, and the other towns which lay between the Jura and the Alps. This reserve was destined either to support the army of Italy or that of Germany, as circumstances required, and it was formed of twenty thousand veteran soldiers, brought from Holland, under Brune, to la Vendée, which the pacification of that district rendered disposable for offensive operations, and thirty thousand conscripts, directed to that quarter from the central depots. These troops traversed France, with drums beating and colours flying, in the finest order, and their splendid appearance contributed much to revive the martial ardour of the people, which the disasters of the preceding campaign had seriously impaired. Berthier received the command of this army, and gave up the portfolio of minister of war to Carnot, whom Napoleon recalled from exile to fill that important situation.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
111. Dum.  
iii. 25, 27.  
St-Cyr, i.  
102.

2.  
Forces of  
the Imperialists.

On the other hand, the Imperialists had collected ninety-six thousand men in Piedmont and at the foot of the Maritime Alps, besides twenty thousand who were dispersed in garrisons in the states of Venice, Lombardy, and Tuscany. Their forces in Germany were nearly as considerable, amounting to ninety-two thousand men, including eighteen thousand superb cavalry, and they were followed by above four hundred pieces of artillery. This was independent of the troops of Bavaria and the minor states in the English pay, which amounted to twenty thousand more, making in all a hundred and twelve thousand men. This great force, however, was scattered over an immense line, two hundred miles long, from the Alps to the Maine, insomuch that in the valley of the Danube, which was the decisive point of the whole, as it led straight to the Hereditary States, Kray could only assemble forty-five thousand men to resist the seventy-five thousand whom Moreau could direct against that point. The great error of the Austrians in this campaign consisted in

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supposing that Italy was the quarter where the decisive attack was to be made, and collecting in consequence the greater part of their reserves in that country; whereas the valley of the Danube was the place where danger was really to be apprehended, and against which the principal forces of the Republicans were directed. But they were deceived by the great successes of the preceding campaign; they were ignorant or incredulous of the rapid change produced on the French armies by the seizure of supreme power by Napoleon; and were dreaming of conquests on the Var and in Provence, when their redoubtable adversary was already meditating strokes in the heart of Bavaria.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Ch.  
ii. 334. Nap.  
i. 185, 161.  
Jom. xiii.  
48, 52, 113.  
St Cyr, ii.  
84, 108, 137.

The plan of the Austrians was to resume the offensive vigorously in Italy, where the great numerical superiority of Melas, as well as the warlike and experienced quality of the troops he commanded, promised the most important results; to throw Massena back into Genoa, and capture that important city; drive the French over the Maritime Alps, and carry the war into the heart of Provence. To co-operate with this design, an English expedition, having twelve thousand troops on board, was to proceed to the Mediterranean, and aid the Imperialists either in the south of France or on the Maritime Alps. This being the quarter where active operations were to be undertaken, the war in Germany was intended to be merely defensive, and rather to occupy a considerable army of the enemy on the Rhine, than to make any serious impression on his territories in that quarter.<sup>2</sup>

3.  
Plan of the  
Austrians.

<sup>2</sup> Nap. i. 162.  
Jom. xiii.  
41, 42.

On his side, Napoleon determined to prosecute the contest vigorously where the Austrians proposed only to pursue defensive measures, and to liberate Italy by the blows struck at the Hereditary States in the heart of Germany. The possession of Switzerland, like a central fortress, gave the French the advantage of being able to take the line of the enemy's operations in rear, either in Italy or Suabia. Napoleon had intrusted the command

4.  
And of the  
First Con-  
sul.

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of the army of Germany to Moreau—a generous proceeding towards so formidable a rival, but one which his great military talents, and the unbounded confidence of the army of the Rhine in his capacity, as well as the important services which he had rendered to the First Consul on the 18th Brumaire, rendered indispensable. The plan which he proposed to his great lieutenant was to assemble all his forces in the neighbourhood of Schaffhausen, cross the Rhine by four bridges near that town, move directly in an imposing mass on Ulm, and thus turn the left of the Imperialists, and take in rear all the Austrians placed between the Rhine and the defiles of the Black Forest. By this means he hoped that the army, in a week after the opening of the campaign, would be at Ulm, and such of the Imperialists as escaped would have no alternative but to throw themselves into Bohemia, leaving Vienna and the Hereditary States to their fate. That these brilliant anticipations were not chimerical, is proved by the result of the campaigns of 1805 and 1809; and so strongly was Napoleon impressed with their importance, that he at one time entertained the project of putting himself at the head of the army of the Danube, and directing the army of reserve to its support, which would have brought a force of a hundred and eighty thousand men to bear upon the Austrian line in Germany.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 163, 164. St-Cyr, ii. 103, 104. Jom. xiii. 36, 37. Dum. iii. 84, 85. Bul. Feldzug, Marenge, 17.

5.  
Jealousy of the army of the Rhine of Napoleon.

But Moreau would not submit to the indignity of acting as second in command to his former rival;\* and the disposition of his troops was too republican, and their attachment to their general too strong, to render it prudent to run the risk of revolt in so powerful an army, even for the sake of the greatest external advantages. An angry discussion took place between the two generals, which terminated in the retention of the supreme com-

\* He said, "I have no notion of seeing a little Louis XIV. at the head of my army. If the First Consul takes the command, I will send in my resignation."—St-Cyr, ii. 103, *Histoire Militaire*.

mand by Moreau, and the adoption of a modified plan for the campaign in Germany, in lieu of the brilliant but hazardous one projected by the First Consul. In consequence, Napoleon resolved to direct the army of reserve to Italy, and in person renew the struggle on the scene of his former triumphs on the plains of Piedmont. The First Consul had no alternative in this determination; the relinquishment of the command of the army of the Rhine to Moreau had become a matter of necessity. At that period the soldiers of that army were far from cordially supporting the government of the First Consul. Independent of the republican principles with which, in common with all the other French troops, they were more or less imbued, they were in a peculiar manner jealous of the audacious general who had placed himself at the head of affairs, and seized the sceptre which they thought would have been more worthily held by his less interested rival. Any attempt to displace Moreau from the command of this great army would probably have led to a collision, which might have proved fatal to the infant authority of Napoleon.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> St-Cyr, ii.  
102. Dumm.  
iii. 84, 85,  
86.

Field-Marshal Kray had his headquarters at Donauschingen; but his chief magazines were in the rear of his army, at Stockach, Engen, Moeskirch, and Biberach. The right wing, twenty-six thousand strong, under the command of Starry, rested on the Maine; its headquarters were at Heidelberg, and it guarded the line of the Rhine from Renchen to the Maine. The left, under the orders of the Prince of Reuss, was in the Tyrol; it consisted of twenty-six thousand men, besides seven thousand militia, and occupied the Rheinthal and the shores of the lake of Constance. The centre, forty-three thousand strong, under the command of Kray in person, was stationed behind the Black Forest in the environs of Villingen and Donaueschingen; its advanced posts occupied all the passes of that woody range, and observed the course of the Rhine from the lake of

G.  
Positions  
of Kray's  
forces in  
Germany.

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<sup>1</sup> St-Cyr, ii.  
107, 108.  
Jom. xiii.  
112, 113.  
Nap. i. 161,  
162.

7.  
Positions  
of Moreau's  
troops.

Constance to the neighbourhood of Kehl; while fifteen thousand men, under Keimayer, guarded the passes from Renchen to the Valley of Hell, and formed the link which connected the centre and right wing. Thus, though the Imperialists were nearly one hundred and ten thousand strong, their detachments were stationed at such a distance from each other as to be incapable of rendering any effectual aid in case of need; and were rather to be regarded as three separate armies, the largest of which could not bring above forty thousand men into the field at any one point.<sup>1</sup>

The French army, at the opening of the campaign, was also divided into three corps. The right, thirty-two thousand strong, under Lecourbe, occupied the cantons of Switzerland from the St Gothard to Bâle, won from the Imperialists at the expense of so much blood in the preceding campaign; the centre, under St-Cyr, who had been transferred to that command from the army of Genoa, consisted of twenty-nine thousand men, and occupied the left bank of the Rhine, from New Brisach to Plobsheim; the left, under Sainte-Suzanne, twenty-one thousand strong, extended from Kehl to Haguenau. Independent of these, Moreau himself was at the head of a reserve, consisting of twenty-eight thousand men, which was assembled in the neighbourhood of Bâle, and which, if added to either of the divisions of the army, would give it a decided preponderance over that of the enemy to which it was opposed. Thus Moreau could, by uniting the reserve and centre, bring nearly sixty thousand men to bear upon the Austrian force of forty thousand in the same quarter; an immense advantage, which was speedily turned to the best account by that able commander. Besides these great forces, the French general had at his disposal the garrisons of the fortresses of Switzerland, Landau, and Spires;<sup>2</sup> the division of Mayence, commanded by Laval, and the troops of the fifth and twenty-sixth military

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xiii.  
110, 111.  
St-Cyr, ii.  
109, 110.



divisions, forming an aggregate of thirty-two thousand men additional, which might be termed the reserves of the army: while the possession of the bridges of Kehl, New Brisach, and Bâle, gave him the means of crossing the Rhine whenever he deemed it most advisable.

It was part of the plan of Napoleon to detach sixteen thousand men under Moncey, from Lecourbe's wing stationed in Switzerland, in order to take a share in the great operations which he meditated in the Italian plains; and therefore it was of importance that Moreau should early assume the offensive, both in order to take advantage of his numerical superiority before that detachment took place, and operate as a diversion to the army of Italy, which it was foreseen would soon be hard pressed by Melas in the mountains of Genoa. Orders, therefore, were transmitted to him to open the campaign without delay, and everything was ready for a forward movement by the 24th April. The plan finally arranged between Moreau and the First Consul was to make a feint on the left against the corps of Keinmayer and the enemy's right; and having thus drawn their attention to that quarter, to accumulate all his disposable forces against the Imperial centre, and overwhelm it by a concentration of the French left wing, centre, and reserve, upon his right, in the direction of Schaffhausen. By this means he hoped to break through the Austrian line of defence with a preponderating force, and, after a single battle, cut off their communication with the Tyrol and Italy, and force them back, after losing their magazines at Moeskirch and Engen, to a disadvantageous defensive on the banks of the Danube.<sup>1</sup>

The better to conceal this able design, Moreau, for some days before the army was put in motion, made the greatest demonstrations against the enemy's right. Everything was prepared for the headquarters at Colmar, and it was publicly announced that the reserve was to be directed against Keinmayer and the Valley of Hell.

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8.

First move-  
ments of  
the French  
general.<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 165.  
Jom. xiii.  
116, 117.  
Dum. iii.  
92, 94.

9.

Steps taken  
by Moreau  
to conceal  
his designs.  
April 25.

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April 27.

<sup>1</sup> St-Cyr, ii.  
120, 129.  
Dum. iii. 94,  
99. Journ.  
xiii. 120,  
125.

Meanwhile the columns moved to the different points assigned to them; and on the 25th, at daybreak, Sainte-Suzanne crossed the bridge of Kehl, at the head of sixteen thousand men, and drove in the advanced posts of Keimayer towards the entrance of the Black Forest, and the valley of Kinzig. On the same day, the centre crossed at New Brisach, under the orders of St-Cyr, and advanced towards Freiburg. Kray upon this moved a considerable part of his centre and reserves to the support of Keimayer; but Sainte-Suzanne having thus executed his feint, suddenly remeasured his steps, recrossed the Rhine at Kehl, and advanced by forced marches to New Brisach, where he crossed again and formed a second line in the rear of St-Cyr. On the 25th, Moreau also crossed at Bâle with the reserve, and moved in the direction of Laufenburg.<sup>1</sup>

10.  
Irresolution  
of the Aus-  
trian gene-  
rals in con-  
sequence.

April 28  
and 29.

May 1.  
<sup>2</sup> Nap. i. 106,  
Journ. xiii.  
125, 129.  
Dum. iii.  
98, 101. St-  
Cyr, ii. 131,  
137.

These different and apparently contradictory movements threw the Austrian generals into the greatest perplexity. Uncertain where the storm was likely to burst, they adopted the ruinous resolution of guarding equally every point; and still inclining to the belief that the right and the Valley of Hell were really threatened, they retained thirty thousand men, under Starray and Keimayer, on the right, and twenty-five thousand on the left in the rocks of the Voralberg, while their centre and reserve, now reduced to forty thousand men, were menaced by an attack from Lecourbe, Moreau, and St-Cyr, at the head of seventy thousand combatants. The two following days were employed by Moreau in concentrating his forces between Kehl and Freiburg; and the better to distract the enemy, Lecourbe soon after crossed the Rhine with the right wing at Paradis and Richlingen, and, after throwing a bridge over at Stein, advanced towards Engen and Stockach. On the same day, the inaccessible fort of Hohenstohel capitulated without firing a shot, and the left of Lecourbe entered into communication with Moreau and St-Cyr.<sup>2</sup> Thus the whole French army, with the

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exception of the left wing, under Sainte-Suzanne, which observed Keimayer and Starray, and was to advance through the Valley of Hell, were converging, by Laufenburg and Schaffhausen, towards the Imperial magazines at Engen and Moeskirch, which it was evident could not be saved but by a battle fought against most unequal odds.

Ably profiting by the great advantages already gained, Moreau directed Lecourbe to move towards Stockach, in order to turn the centre of the enemy and cut off their communication with the left wing under the Prince of Reuss; while he himself, with the centre, reserve, and part of Lecourbe's corps, moved directly upon the town of Engen, which it was anticipated would not be abandoned without a struggle, on account of the valuable magazines which it contained. Kray, on his part, assembled all the disposable force he could command in front of Engen, where he resolved to give battle, to gain time for the evacuation of his magazines upon Moeskirch. But while he was concentrating his forces in that central position, the Prince of Lorraine, who kept up the communication between the Austrian centre and left wing, and was retreating with inferior forces before Lecourbe, was suddenly assailed by the French advanced-guard, under Molitor and Montrichard, and the cavalry of Nantsouty, and entirely routed. Three thousand prisoners and eight pieces of cannon were the immediate results of this brilliant affair; but it became still more important by the capture of Stockach, with all its magazines, directly in rear of the position of Kray in front of Engen.<sup>1</sup>

11.  
Moreau  
advances  
against  
their  
centre.  
May 2.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 167.  
Jom. xiii.  
132, 133.  
Dum. iii.  
107, 109.  
St-Cyr, ii.  
157, 158.

On the same day on which this important success was gained on the right, the French centre, under Moreau in person, encountered the Austrian main body in the vast plain which lies before that town. Kray, with forty thousand men, was there in position, and the cavalry, above nine thousand strong, presented the most imposing spectacle, drawn up in echelon in front of its walls.

12.  
Battle of  
Engen.

Moreau's design was to attack in front himself, at the head of the reserve and part of the centre; while St-Cyr, with his division, was directed to turn the right of the enemy. But that general, being five leagues in the rear, could not come up till a late hour of the day; and Moreau, apprehensive lest, if the attack were delayed, the enemy would retreat, commenced the action himself at the head of thirty-two thousand men. The chief efforts of the French general were directed to gain possession of a plateau on the right of the Imperialists, which would both have commanded their line of retreat and facilitated his own junction with St-Cyr; but he encountered the most stubborn resistance. Kray had skilfully availed himself of all the advantages which the ground afforded him in that quarter; and for long all the efforts of the Republicans were unable to drive back their opponents from the vineyards and wooded heights, which they had occupied in force, and surmounted with a numerous artillery. At length the French carried the peak of Hohenhowen, the most elevated point on the field of battle; and Moreau, to distract the attention of the Imperialists from this important point, and gain time for St-Cyr to come up, commenced a vigorous attack on the village of Ehingen, on their left. To restore the combat, the Austrian general strongly reinforced that important post, while Moreau brought up his reserve to expel the enemy from it. At first the Republicans were successful, and the village was carried; but Kray having charged in person at the head of the Hungarian grenadiers, they were driven out with great slaughter, and fled to the plain in extreme confusion. Moreau, instantly advancing to the spot, succeeded in restoring a certain degree of order, and in part regained the ground which had been lost; but the Hungarians continued to hold the village, and at nightfall all the avenues to it were still in their possession.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum., iii.  
110, 114.  
Jom., xiii.  
134, 139.  
St-Cyr, ii.  
156, 161.

Meanwhile the division of Richepanse, which had established itself on the peak of Hohenhowen, was exposed to

a furious attack from the Austrian right ; the summit of the mountain resembled a volcano, which vomited forth fire in every direction ; and it was easy to see, from the intensity of the light, which, as the twilight approached, illuminated the heavens in that direction, that it was only by the greatest efforts that he could maintain his ground. At seven o'clock, however, the vanguard of the corps of St-Cyr, which had met with the greatest difficulties in the course of its march, and had been compelled to fight its way against Nauendorf's division through strong defiles, arrived in the field, and soon after began to take a part in the action. The combat now became more equal ; and though the fire of artillery on both sides continued extremely violent, it was evident that the enemy fought only to gain time to withdraw his stores and ammunition. In fact, at this hour the Austrian general received intelligence of the defeat of the Prince of Lorraine and the capture of Stockach, which threatened his line of communications. He therefore drew off his forces in the direction of Liptingen and Moeskirch, where he formed a junction with that prince, who had retreated with the remains of his division in the same direction.<sup>1</sup>

The loss of the Austrians in this battle was above seven thousand men, and that of the French was as great ; but the moral consequences of the success with which it terminated to the Republicans were incalculable. Like the victory of Stockach, gained by the Imperialists in the outset of the preceding campaign, it at once raised the spirit of the army, and produced that confidence in themselves which is the surest prelude to still greater success. Kray, finding that the intentions of the enemy were now fully proclaimed, and that he had on his hands the whole strength of the French army, made the utmost efforts when too late to concentrate his forces. Keinmayer, followed by the left wing of the French under Sainte-Suzanne, was advancing with the greatest expedition by the Valley of Hell ; while Starray had received orders to

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13.  
Victory of  
the French.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. iii.  
114, 116.  
Jom. xiii.  
139, 141.  
St-Cyr, ii.  
158, 179.

14.  
Its great  
results, and  
retreat of  
Kray.

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hasten to the decisive point, leaving only six thousand in the neighbourhood of Mannheim, to observe the enemy's forces in that quarter. Moreau, having received intelligence of this intended concentration of force, resolved to make the most of his present advantages, and attack the Austrians before they received any further reinforcements. On the 4th, the Imperialists retired to a strong position in front of Moeskirch; the whole front of their line was covered by a great ravine, which descends from Hendorf to Moeskirch, and its left by the Ablach—a stream which flows in a rapid and rocky course into the Danube: the cavalry, and a reserve of eight battalions of grenadiers, were stationed on the heights of Rohrdorf. Powerful batteries commanded the chaussée which approached Moeskirch, and by their concentric fire seemed to render all access impossible. In this formidable position were collected forty thousand foot-soldiers, and twelve thousand splendid cavalry, besides above two hundred pieces of cannon.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Jom.* xiii.  
144, 145.  
*Dum.* iii.  
124, 125.

15.  
Battle of  
Moeskirch.

Though Moreau had ordered Lecourbe to join him with all his disposable force, in order to take a part in the general action which was approaching, yet he had not contrived matters so as to bring all his forces into the field at the same time. The consequence was, that Lecourbe, with that portion of his corps which had not taken a part in the action of the preceding day, first commenced the attack. He advanced with the greatest intrepidity to the assault of his old antagonist the Prince of Lorraine; but he was received with so tremendous a fire, from the cross batteries which Kray had established on the heights, that his artillery was instantly dismounted, and he himself compelled to take refuge in the neighbouring woods to avoid the merciless storm. Moreau, upon this, brought forward the division Lorges, and attacked the position by its right and the village of Hendorf; but the attacking columns having been assailed by the enemy's masses, who suddenly debouched from behind their bat-

teries, were thrown into confusion and entirely routed. Encouraged by this success, Kray made a sally with his right wing, and advanced into the plain; but it was received in so resolute a manner by the French left, that he was not only compelled to retire, but the victorious Republicans recovered all the ground they had lost, and Hendorf was carried by their pursuing columns, who entered pell-mell with the fugitives. At the same time Vandamme, with the Republican right, advanced against the Imperial left, and attacked the village of Moeskirch. The Austrians defended it with the utmost resolution, and it was taken and retaken several times: at length Lecourbe formed one of his divisions into four columns, which advanced simultaneously to the attack. Nothing could resist their impetuosity; they rushed down the sides of the ravines and up the opposite banks, and chased the Imperialists from the plateau, while Molitor drove them out of Moeskirch, and the victorious columns met in the centre of the place.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
146, 150.  
Dum. iii.  
126, 130.  
St-Cyr, ii.  
190, 191.

Kray, seeing his left forced, skilfully executed a change of position in the very middle of the battle. He drew back his left from the plateau which had been so obstinately disputed, and took up a position parallel to the Danube, with his centre still resting on the plateau of Rohrdorf. This new position brought him on the flank of the division of Lorges, who was unsupported on that side. Kray instantly saw his advantage, and charged the exposed division, which was overthrown, and driven back in such confusion that nothing but the opportune arrival of Delmas with six fresh battalions prevented the French line being entirely broken through at that point. Both parties now made the utmost efforts—the Austrians to improve the advantage they had gained, the French to re-establish their line. Moreau executed a change of front, arranging his army parallel to that of the enemy; and, during the progress of this new formation, the French division Delmas was furiously assailed, but all the efforts

16.  
It at length  
terminates  
in the defeat  
of the Impe-  
rialists.

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<sup>1</sup> St-Cyr, ii.  
195, 197.  
Dum. iii.  
129, 131.  
Jom. xiii.  
150, 155.

of the Imperialists were unable to break his admirable infantry. Still, however, Kray redoubled his efforts, and charged himself at the head of his reserve against the division of Bastoul; Moreau also brought up reinforcements, and the combat continued for two hours with various success, till at length the arrival of Richepanse with a fresh division induced the Austrian general to retire, which was done before nightfall, in the best order, to the heights of Bucherni and Rohrdorf.<sup>1</sup>

17.  
Results of  
the battle.

In this action, so obstinately contested on both sides, the loss to the contending parties was nearly equal, amounting on each side to about six thousand men. The Austrians retained at the close of the day the plateau of Rohrdorf; the French slept on great part of the field of battle. But all the moral advantages of a victory were on the side of the latter; and as, on the following day, the Imperialists retired across the Danube, they in reality achieved the object for which they contended. The success was balanced chiefly in consequence of the non-arrival of St-Cyr with his division, who lingered at Liptingen: had he come up and taken a part in the action, it would probably have terminated in a total defeat, the more disastrous to the Imperialists that they fought with their backs to the Danube. The cause of this inactivity in so able an officer, is to be found in the nature of the first instructions he had received from Moreau, and the intercepting of the couriers which conveyed the second orders to hasten to the decisive point.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Mémoire  
du Dépôt de  
la Guerre, v.  
92. St-Cyr,  
ii. 199, 201.  
Dum. iii.  
129, 131.  
Jom. xiii.  
154, 156.

18.  
Perilous  
situation of  
St-Cyr on  
the follow-  
ing day.

Following out the directions he had received, St-Cyr, on the succeeding day, was leisurely moving parallel to the Danube, between that river and the Austrian army, when he came unawares upon their whole force drawn up in a small but strong position in front of the bridge of Sigmaringen. The ground they occupied would barely have sufficed for the deploying of a single division, being formed by a bend of the Danube, the base of which, fronting the enemy, was covered by a formidable array of



artillery, behind which the army was posted in seven lines, almost forming a close column, and protecting in this manner the passage of their stores over the river. Upon the approach of the French, the surprise was equal on both sides. Kray, much alarmed, and apprehending an immediate attack, drew up his rearguard in battle array, and disposed the artillery which had crossed, as well as that which remained in their front, in such a manner as to enfilade all the roads by which the position might be approached. St-Cyr also paused : with the half of his division, which alone had come up, he did not venture to attack the whole Austrian army, but he insulted them by a battery of twelve pieces, which was pushed forward within cannon-shot; and so weakened was the spirit of the Imperialists, that they replied to this fire only by a discharge from their numerous batterics, instead of issuing from their lines and sweeping the guns off by a charge of their powerful cavalry. There can be little doubt that if Moreau, instead of lingering at Moeskirch on the field of battle, had followed the traces of the enemy, joined St-Cyr, and attacked them when backed by the Danube in this extraordinary position, he would have succeeded in destroying a large part of their army. But that general, with all his great qualities, had not the vigour in following up a success, which formed a leading characteristic of his more enterprising rival.<sup>1</sup>

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May 6.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 169,  
170. Dum.  
iii. 131. St-  
Cyr. ii. 203,  
205.

At Sigmaringen the Austrian general was joined by Keimayer with his whole division; and with this augmented force he recrossed the Danube at Riedlingen, and moved towards Biberach. He had resolved to retire to the shelter of the intrenched camp at Ulm; but his object in this movement was to cover the evacuation of the great magazines at Biberach upon that fortress. Thither he was followed by the French army, and on the morning of the 9th May their advanced posts found eighteen thousand Austrians posted at the remarkable defile which leads to that town. This rearguard was posted for the most

19.  
Affair of  
Biberach,  
and retreat  
of the Aus-  
trians to  
Ulm.

May 9.

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part on a series of formidable heights behind Biberach, which could be approached only by passing through that town, and afterwards traversing a road which ran through a morass. An advanced guard, consisting of ten battalions, and as many squadrons, with eight pieces of cannon, was placed in front of Biberach, at the entrance of the defile. This position, apparently so hazardous, was necessary to cover the evacuation of the great magazines which that town contained, preparatory to the concentration of the whole army in the intrenched camp of Ulm. The advanced guard was attacked by St-Cyr with such superior forces that they were speedily routed, and driven in the utmost disorder across the morass. Biberach was so rapidly carried that the Austrians had not time to destroy their magazines, which fell in great part entire into the hands of the victors. Transported with ardour, the French dragoons and light troops traversed the town, and crossed the defile on the other side, notwithstanding a heavy and concentrated fire from the Austrian batteries. Such was the intimidation produced by their audacity, that the Imperialists fired by platoons upon the light troops, as they would have done against a regular line, instead of combating them with the same species of force. In this affair Kray lost fifteen hundred prisoners, besides a thousand killed and wounded, and five pieces of cannon; but he gained time by it for the evacuation of his magazines at Memmingen, which were transported in safety to the intrenched camp at Ulm. There his army was all collected in two days afterwards, numbering eighty thousand infantry and twelve thousand horse; and after a campaign of unexampled activity, though of only fifteen days' duration, the Republicans found their victorious columns on the banks of the Danube.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> St-Cyr, ii.  
222, 228.  
Jom. xiii.  
164, 169.  
Dum. iii.  
138, 142.  
Nap. i. 171.

20.  
Great advantages  
of that position.

In retiring to Ulm, Kray separated himself from his left wing, twenty-five thousand strong, in the Tyrol, and the detached corps on the Main; but the advantages of that central position were such as amply to counterbalance

these circumstances. The intrenched camp, occupying both banks of the Danube and the heights of St Michel, traced out by the prophetic wisdom of the Archduke Charles, and connected with the fortress, was of the most formidable description. The town and *tête-de-pont* on the river were armed with a hundred and forty pieces of heavy cannon; the redoubts of the camp were complete and lined with a proportional quantity of artillery: and not only were the magazines in the place most ample, but the extent of the works rendered all idea of a regular blockade out of the question. By remaining in this defensive position, the Austrian general not only preserved entire his own communications and line of retreat by Donauwörth and Ratisbon, but threatened those of his adversary; who, if he attempted to pass either on the north or south, exposed himself to the attack of a powerful army in flank. Securely posted in this central point, the Imperialists daily received accessions of strength from Bohemia and the Hereditary States; while the French, weakened by the detachments necessary to preserve their communications, and to observe the Prince of Reuss in the Tyrol, soon began to lose that superiority which, by the skilful concentration of their force, they had hitherto enjoyed in the campaign.<sup>1</sup>

The difficulty of dislodging the Imperialists from this formidable position, was much augmented by the necessity to which Moreau at this period was subjected, of sending off nearly twenty thousand men under Moncey to cross the Alps by the St Gothard, and take a share in the projected operations of the First Consul in Italy. This great detachment restored the balance between the contending parties, and the spirit of the Austrians was at the same time so much revived by the sight of their vast forces within the intrenched camp, and the great resources which they found in the place, that Kray no longer hesitated to keep the field; and even detached the corps of Starray and Keimayer, which had suffered least in the preceding

<sup>1</sup>Nap. i. 171,  
172. Jom.  
xiii. 310,  
313. Dum.  
iii. 145, 146  
St-Cyr, ii.  
234, 235.

21.  
Kray keeps  
the field  
with part of  
his force.

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
312. St-Cyr,  
ii. 235, 236.  
Nap. i. 172.

22.  
Great  
strength  
of the in-  
trenched  
camp.

operations, to the right bank of the Danube and the confluence of the Iller. Moreau accordingly found himself extremely embarrassed, and six weeks were employed in the vain attempt to dislodge a defeated army from this stronghold—a striking proof of the judgment evinced by the Archduke Charles in its formation, and the importance of central fortifications in arresting the progress of an invading army.<sup>1</sup>

As the efforts of Austria and Russia, during the Seven Years' War, were shattered against the intrenched camp of Frederick at Buntzelwitz, so this important position seemed to be the *ne plus ultra* of the Republican operations in this campaign. It was hopeless to attempt to conquer so strong a position by main force ; and it was no easy matter to see by what movement the Austrian general could be compelled to abandon it. For Moreau to move on, leaving eighty thousand men, supported by impregnable fortifications, in his rear, was impossible, as it would immediately have led to the intercepting his communications with France ; while to attempt the passage of the Danube in presence of such a force, would have been in the highest degree perilous. The Austrians soon reaped the benefits of this admirably chosen stronghold. The soldiers, lodged in excellent quarters, rapidly recovered their strength ; while the *morale* of the army, which had been extremely weakened by the continued disasters of the campaign, as quickly rose, when they perceived that a stop was at length put to the progress of the enemy.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xiii.  
314. Dum.  
iv. 12, 13.  
St-Cyr, ii.  
241.

23.  
Measures of  
Moreau to  
dislodge him  
from it, and  
vigorous  
stroke of the  
Austrian  
general on  
the French  
left.

With a view to dislodge Kray, Moreau advanced with his right in front ; headquarters passed the Gunz on the right bank of the Danube, St-Cyr followed with his division in echelon, while Sainte-Suzanne, who had advanced through the Valley of Hell to Sigmaringen, received orders to approach Ulm on the left bank. The Republicans were masters of no bridge over the river, so that Sainte-Suzanne, with his single corps, was exposed to the attack of the whole Austrian army. Finding that the distance

of Moreau with the centre and right wing precluded him from giving any effectual support to his left, Kray resolved to direct all his disposable forces against that general. On the 16th the Archduke Ferdinand, at the head of the splendid Imperial cavalry, followed by several columns of infantry, suddenly assailed this detached corps near Erbach. The attack was so impetuous, and the surprise so complete, that the Republicans were speedily routed; and the Austrians, pressing forward with great vigour, not only drove them back in disorder above two leagues, but interposed their victorious columns between the flying divisions. Nothing but the intrepidity and presence of mind of the French generals preserved their left wing from total destruction. But while Sainte-Suzanne did his utmost to retard the advance of the enemy, St-Cyr, alarmed by the violence and receding sound of the cannonade, which distinctly showed how much the left wing was losing ground, halted his corps, and moved it towards the scene of danger; at the same time, rapidly bringing up his artillery, he placed it in batteries on the right bank of the Danube in such a manner as to enfilade the road by which the Archduke Ferdinand had issued from Ulm. Alarmed at this apparition on his left, which he feared was preparatory to a passage of the river by the French centre, the Archduke drew back his victorious columns to the intrenched camp, and an action was terminated in which, if properly supported, the Imperialists might have achieved the destruction of the whole Republican left wing, and possibly changed the issue of the campaign.<sup>1</sup>

Confounded by this vigorous stroke on his left, and made sensible, by the firm countenance of the enemy, that they were resolved to risk a battle rather than relinquish the important position of Ulm, Moreau was thrown into a cruel perplexity. For several days he remained in a state of indecision, merely directing St-Cyr to cross the Danube, to the support of Sainte-Suzanne; so that, of the eleven

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May 16.

<sup>1</sup> St-Cyr, ii.  
245, 251.  
Jorn. xiii.  
315, 317.  
Nap. i. 173,  
174. Dum.  
iv. 16, 18.

24.  
Increasing  
perplexity  
of Moreau.  
He in vain  
moves round  
to Augs-  
burg.

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May 24.

May 28.

divisions of which his army was composed, six were on the right bank, and five on the left. At length he resolved to resume his operations on the right bank, and after moving St-Cyr again across the river, and also Sainte-Suzanne, advanced with his centre and right, followed by Sainte-Suzanne with the left, along the right bank towards Bavaria. Kray, upon this, made a sortie with ten thousand men on the moving mass. He attacked Souham's division with great vigour; but, after an obstinate conflict, the Imperialists retired to Ulm, after inflicting a severe loss on the enemy. Meanwhile, Moreau continued his advance towards Bavaria, and on the 28th occupied Augsburg, directly in the rear of the Austrian army, on the high-road between them and Munich. The intelligence of this event, however, had no effect in inducing the Imperial general to quit his stronghold; on the contrary, wisely judging that the advance of Moreau was only to excite alarm, or levy contributions, he wrote to the Aulic Council, that Moreau would never advance into the Hereditary States leaving his great army behind him, and that he would merely push forward his parties in all directions to disquiet the enemy in his advance, and intercept his communications. His firmness was completely successful; the French general did not venture to advance further into Germany, as long as the enemy remained in such force in his rear; while the lengthened stay of so immense a mass in one quarter speedily rendered provisions scarce in the French army, and induced such disorders as rendered necessary several severe examples, and a new organisation of great part of their army.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. iv. 31, 36. Jom. xiii. 319. 320. St-Cyr, ii. 258, 290. Nap. i. 174, 175.

25.  
He next proposes to advance on the left bank of the Danube. Imminent risk of the French left.

Finding that Kray had penetrated his design, and remained firm at Ulm, in such a position as to endanger his communications if he continued his present advance, Moreau conceived a new and more decisive project, which was to pass the Danube below Ulm, and cut the Austrian army off from its great magazines in Bohemia. With this view, the advanced guard, which had occupied Augsburg,

and levied a contribution of 600,000 florins (£60,000) on that flourishing city, was withdrawn, and the army was preparing to follow in this direction, when their movement was interrupted by a sudden irruption of the Austrians on the right bank. In effect, Kray, perceiving his adversary's design, collected thirty thousand men in the intrenched camp, with which, during the night, he crossed the bridge of Ulm, and assailed, at break of day, the flank of the French army. The tempest fell on the left wing, under the orders of Richepanse; it was speedily enveloped by superior forces, broken, and placed in a state of the greatest danger. From this almost desperate condition the Republicans were rescued by a seasonable and able attack by Ney, who, having received orders to support the menaced corps, flew to the scene of danger, and advanced with such vigour against the Austrian vanguard, posted on the plateau of Kerchberg, that it was defeated with the loss of a thousand prisoners. Emboldened by this success, Richepanse halted his retiring columns, faced about, and renewed the combat with Kray, who, finding superior forces of the enemy now accumulating, withdrew to his intrenchments. Seldom did the French army incur greater danger; the Austrians in half an hour would have gained the bridge over the Iller, cut through the middle of the Republicans, and possibly, by opening a communication with the Prince of Reuss in the mountains of Tyrol, have retrieved all the disasters of the campaign.<sup>1</sup>

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June 4.

<sup>1</sup> *Jom. xiii.*  
326, 328.  
*Dum. iv. 36,*  
*37. Nap. i.*  
174, 175.

Heavy rains, which fell at this time, precluded the possibility of active operations for nearly a week; but Moreau was still intent on prosecuting his movement upon the Lower Danube. With this view, he spread his troops along the whole line of the Upper Lech; Lecourbe made himself master of Landsberg, and continuing his march down the course of that river, entered a second time into Augsburg, directly in the rear of the Imperialists. At the same time, the centre and

26.  
At length  
Moreau cuts  
off his com-  
munica-  
tions.  
June 12.

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left descended the Kamlach, Gunz, and Minelel, towards Krumbach, Günzburg, and Burgau—thus accumulating almost all the Republican army between the Austrians and Bavaria. Threatened by such superior forces, Starray, who commanded the detached corps of the Austrians in that quarter, was obliged to cross to the left bank of the Danube. This able movement re-established the Republican affairs in that quarter: Kray, in his turn, now saw his connexions with the interior threatened, and himself reduced to the necessity of either abandoning his intrenchments, or making an effort with his whole disposable force to re-establish his communications.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
334, 335.  
Dum. iv. 40,  
44. Nap. i.  
176.

27.  
The passage  
of the  
Danube is  
effected by  
the French.  
June 19.

Finding his adversary still immovably fixed at Ulm, Moreau, after having concentrated his forces on the southern bank of the Danube, between Günzburg and Donauwörth, resolved to attempt the passage by main force. Far from penetrating his design, Starray, who commanded the Imperial forces on the opposite bank, sent all his troops, except eight battalions and a few squadrons, towards Ulm, where Kray lay inactive—neither attempting anything against the French under Richepanse, between him and the Tyrol, nor taking any steps to secure his last and most important communications with the rich and fertile plains of Bohemia. Moreau ably profited by the supineness of his antagonist. After several unsuccessful attempts, which distracted the enemy's attention, the passage was effected on the 19th at Blindheim, (Blenheim) with that romantic gallantry which so often in similar situations has characterised the French arms. The Austrians immediately hastened from all quarters to crush the enemy, before he was firmly established on the left bank; but Lecourbe, pushing on to Schwinningen, which lay between their detachments, prevented their junction; and, after a murderous conflict, not only succeeded in maintaining his position, but made prisoners three battalions of the enemy.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xiii.  
334, 338.  
Dum. iv. 44,  
51. Nap. i.  
178.



Both parties now hastened with all their disposable forces to the scene of action. Lecourbe speedily crossed over the remainder of his corps to the left bank, and advanced with fifteen thousand men to Höchstedt, while Kray detached the greater part of his cavalry and light artillery to the support of Starray. The Austrian general, not finding himself in sufficient strength to resist the increasing masses of the enemy, retired to Dillingen, severely harassed by the French cavalry, which made above a thousand men prisoners. Kray advanced two thousand cuirassiers to extricate his infantry, and a desperate mêlée took place between the Republican and Imperial cavalry, in which the Austrian horse maintained their high character, but could not bear up against the great superiority of the enemy. After a bloody conflict, in the course of which Moreau and Lecourbe repeatedly charged in person, the Imperialists retired behind the Brenz, leaving the enemy securely established on the left bank of the Danube. Thus the Republican cavalry gained a glorious success on the very plains where, a century before, the incapacity of Marshal Tallard had endangered the crown of Louis XIV., and brought an unheard-of disaster on the French arms.<sup>1</sup>\*

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28.

Severe  
action at  
Höchstedt.<sup>1</sup> Dum. iv.  
51, 55. Jom.  
xiii. 338,  
341. Nap. i.  
178.

The consequences of this victory were decisive. Twenty pieces of cannon, and four thousand prisoners, had been captured in these continued combats; but, what was of far more importance, Kray was cut off from his resources in Bohemia, and obliged to evacuate the intrenched camp of Ulm. Compelled to abandon that important position, he left a garrison of ten thousand men within its walls, and having stationed his cavalry on the Brenz so as to cover his movement, and despatched his grand park, consisting of one hundred and sixty pieces and eight hundred caissons, on the road to Neresheim and Nördlingen, he himself followed with the remainder of his army in three divisions, and after undergoing unpar-

29.

Kray is at  
length com-  
pelled to  
abandon  
Ulm, and  
reaches  
Nördlingen.  
June 19.

\* In the battle of Blenheim, gained by Marlborough in the year 1704.

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alleled fatigues and privations, during a continued forced march of four days, arrived on the 23d, late in the evening, at Nördlingen. This march of the Austrians, in a semicircle, of which the Republicans occupied the base, was performed with the greatest expedition, chiefly during the night, and was conducted with a degree of military talent which rescued them from their embarrassments, and reflects the highest honour on the capacity and determination of their commander. The opposing generals seemed to have changed places, during the eventful period from the 14th to the 23d June: the supineness of the Imperial commander during the first four days, when the able Republican movement was in preparation, exposed him to the greatest dangers, from which he was afterwards extricated not less by his own ability, when roused to a sense of the perils which surrounded him, than by the tardiness and irresolution which deprived the French general of the fruits of his movement, at the very moment when they were within his grasp. Had Moreau, with his victorious and concentrated army, fallen perpendicularly on the flank of the Imperialists, when performing their perilous march to regain their communications, the vanguard would probably have been separated from the rear, great part of the park taken, and the triumph of Hohenlinden been contemporary with that of Marengo.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 176,  
179. Jom.  
xiii. 342,  
345. Dum  
iv. 59, 61.

30.  
Moreau  
occupies  
Munich.

During the last day's march, before arriving at Nördlingen, the Imperial cavalry were severely pressed by the French, and the exhaustion of the troops was such that the Austrian general deemed it indispensable to give them a day's rest, to recover from their fatigues. Moreau, finding that the enemy had gained several marches upon him, and that he could not hope to force him to a general engagement, resolved to change his direction, and, by occupying Munich, and laying Bavaria under contribution, both separate Kray irretrievably from his left wing, under the Prince of Reuss, in the Tyrol, and secure for

himself all the consequences of the most brilliant victory. For this purpose he detached General Decaen with ten thousand men, who set out on the 25th from Dillingen, marched in the three following days forty leagues, and, after defeating the troops of Meerfelt stationed to protect the electoral capital, entered Munich on the 28th. The elector, taken by surprise, had hardly time to take refuge with his family behind the Iser, under the escort of the Austrian troops. At the same time, Richepanse with his corps invested Ulm on both sides of the Danube, and Kray leisurely continued his retreat towards the upper palatinate, abandoning the whole of Suabia and Franconia to the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

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XXXI.1800.  
June 25.

June 28.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. iv.  
61, 63. Jom.  
xiii. 350,  
355. Nap.  
i. 178.

Montrichard, with the Republican vanguard, came up with the Imperialists, who had crossed the Danube, and were posted in front of Neuburg. Carried away by an impetuous courage, he immediately commenced an attack; but Kray, who was at hand with twenty-five thousand men, made him repent his temerity, and suddenly assailing the French with greatly superior forces, threw them into disorder, and drove them back above two leagues in the utmost confusion. The approach of night, and the arrival of Lecourbe with great reinforcements, induced him to withdraw his victorious troops across the Danube, after this success; and, finding that he could not establish himself on the Lech before the enemy, he continued his march during the night, reached Ingolstadt, repassed the Danube, and, descending the right bank of that river, advanced towards Landshut. In this engagement the Republicans had to lament the loss of the brave Latour d'Auvergne, deemed the first grenadier of France. A model of every warlike virtue, this soldier, though a captain by rank, had taken a musket on his shoulder as a private grenadier. He perished from the stroke of a lance, while repulsing in the front rank a charge of Imperial cavalry. Such was the esteem in which he was held, that the whole army wore mourning for him

31.

Kray crosses  
the Danube,  
and descends  
the right  
bank to  
Landshut.  
June 29.

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<sup>1</sup> Fain, MS.  
de 1813, ii.  
431. Dum.  
iv. 63, 66.  
Jom. xiii.  
354, 355.

32.  
And falls  
back behind  
the Inn.  
July 7.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xiii.  
355, 357.  
Dum. iv. 66,  
71. Nap. i.  
179.

for three days; and a monument was erected on the spot where he fell, which, according to the noble expression of General Dessolles in his order of the day on the occasion, "consecrated to virtue and courage, was put under the protection of the brave of every age and country." It was not in vain that this touching appeal was made to German honour. The Archduke Charles at a subsequent period, when the fortune of war had restored the country where it stood to the power of the Imperialists, took it under his especial protection. It survived all the disasters which overwhelmed the throne of Napoleon, and still remains, in the midst of a foreign land, a monument honourable alike to the French who erected, and the Imperialists who protected it.<sup>1</sup>

Notwithstanding all his diligence, Kray could not reach Munich before the French; and he had the mortification, on reaching the neighbourhood of that city, of finding that it was already in the hands of the enemy, and that his communication with his left wing in the Tyrol was irrecoverably cut off. Continuing his retreat, therefore, he left the banks of the Iser for those of the Inn, and arrived in five marches by Wasserburg, Hohenlinden, and Haag, at the camp of Ampfing. He was there joined by the corps of Meerfeldt, which had retired from Munich; the corps of the Prince of Condé received orders to advance to his support from Salzbouurg; and as he approached the Hereditary States, the Imperial general began to receive those reinforcements, which the patriotism of their inhabitants never fails to afford to the Austrian monarchy when seriously menaced with danger.<sup>2</sup>

Both parties at this period received intelligence of the battle of Marengo and armistice of Alessandria, which shall immediately be noticed; and not doubting that it would speedily be followed by a suspension of arms in Germany as well as Italy, Moreau resolved to take advantage of the short period which remained to clear his

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33.

Operations  
against the  
Prince of  
Reuss in  
the Tyrol.  
Feldkirch  
is carried  
by the Re-  
publicans.

July 13.

July 14.

extreme right of the Prince of Reuss, who from the mountains of Tyrol was now in a situation, from the advance of the French army into the heart of Germany, to threaten its communications. For this purpose Lecourbe was detached, with the right wing of the army, towards Feldkirch, the formidable position which covered the north-west of that rugged district, and against which all the efforts of Massena and Oudinot had failed in the preceding campaign. The troops who garrisoned its intrenchments had been in great part drawn away to keep up the communication with the Prince of Condé and the main body of the Imperialists on the eastern frontier of Tyrol; and those which remained were so scattered over many different points, as to be incapable of rendering effectual resistance at any. After some trifling successes at Fusen and Immenstadt, Coire and Luciensteg were abandoned to the enemy, whose superiority of force rendered opposition impossible; and although the Austrians, in the first instance, gained some advantage before Feldkirch, they found themselves in the end unable to man sufficiently its extensive works, and on the following day that celebrated stronghold, which had lost much of its importance from the new theatre on which the war was carried on, was abandoned to the enemy. While Lecourbe was thus clearing the right of the Republican position, Sainte-Suzanne, who had been despatched to the Lower Rhine to organise the French forces in that direction, was performing the same service on the banks of the Maine. He invested Philippsburg, and advanced to Aschaffenburg, where the Imperialists were repulsed; and the Lower Maine was speedily cleared of their troops.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
357, 367.  
Dum. iv. 71,  
82. Nap. i.  
180.

Matters were in this situation, when the truce which had been concluded at Alessandria between France and Austria a month before, was extended to Germany, under the appellation of the armistice of Parsdorf. By this subsidiary treaty, hostilities were terminated at all

34.  
Armistice  
of Parsdorf  
in Germany.  
July 15.

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1800.

points in the Empire, and were not to be resumed without twelve days' notice. The French occupied all the country from Balzers in the Grisons, on the right bank of the Rhine, to the sources of the Inn; the whole valley of that river, from the latter point, by the reverse of the mountains to the sources of the Lech, and the intermediate country occupied by their troops along the Iser to its junction with the Danube; and from thence by Weissenburg and the Rednitz to the Maine. The fortresses included within this line, still in the hands of the Imperialists, particularly Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philippsburg, were to remain in their possession, on the condition, on the one hand, that their garrisons were not to be augmented, and on the other, that they were to be provisioned every ten days, under the superintendence of commissioners named by the belligerent powers. In the circumstances in which the Austrians then were—threatened with invasion in the Hereditary States in their most vulnerable quarter, the valley of the Danube—this armistice was a most fortunate event, and gave them a breathing-time, of which they stood much in need, to repair their shattered forces, and prepare for the further struggles which awaited the monarchy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. iv.  
84, 90.

Important as these events were, they were eclipsed by those which, during the same period, occurred to the south of the Alps.

35.  
Designs of  
Napoleon  
for the re-  
conquest of  
Italy.

An ordinary general, terrified at the dangers with which the southern departments were threatened, would have hastened with the army of reserve to the Var, in order to protect the menaced frontier of Piedmont. But Napoleon, who was well aware of the difficulties attending a front attack upon the Imperialists in that mountainous region, and appreciated with all the force of his genius the importance of the central position which he occupied in Switzerland, determined upon a more important and decisive operation. This was to cross the Alps by one of

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the central passes after the Austrians were far advanced in Piedmont, interpose between them and their resources, cut them off from their communication with the Hereditary States, and compel them to fight under the most disadvantageous circumstances, with their front towards Lombardy, and their rear shut in by the Mediterranean sea and the inhospitable ridges of the Appenines. Defeat in such circumstances could not be other than ruin, while a disaster to the French would be of comparatively little importance, as their retreat, at least for the infantry and cavalry, was secure over the passes of the St Gothard or the Simplon into Switzerland, which was still in their hands, and where experience had proved they could resist the utmost efforts of the Imperialists.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Jom. xiii.*  
39, 40. *Nap.*  
i. 252.

But before this great blow could be struck, the French had a desperate and hopeless struggle to maintain on the ridges of the Appenines. During the winter months, while the Austrians were reposing from their fatigues, and repairing their losses in men, horses, and equipments, in the fertile plains of Lombardy, the French army, perched on the rugged summits of the mountains, had to contend at once with the hardships incident to those sterile regions, and the contagious maladies which they brought with them from their disastrous campaign in the plains. No words can describe the sufferings they underwent during that afflicting period. A few regiments lost two thousand men in the hospitals of Genoa in four months; the wants of the troops, without shoes, blankets, or winter clothing, produced universal insubordination; and the authority of the officers being generally lost under the influence of the common calamities, vast numbers openly abandoned their colours and returned into France. The French army was rapidly melting away under such accumulated disasters, and everything announced an easy conquest of Genoa to the Imperialists, when the torrent was arrested by the energetic measures adopted by the First Consul, immediately after he assumed the reins of public affairs.<sup>2</sup>

36.  
Extreme  
suffering of  
the troops  
on the sum-  
mits of the  
Maritime  
Alps.

<sup>2</sup> *Jom. xiii.*  
45, 46.

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37.

Massena is appointed to the command. His proclamation to these troops.

His first care was to appoint Massena, whose abilities in mountain warfare had been so fully tried, and who was so well acquainted, from the campaigns of 1795 and 1796, with that country, to the direction of the army; and upon assuming the command, that able general issued an energetic proclamation in Napoleon's name to the troops:—"The first quality of a soldier," said he, "is to bear with constancy the privations of war; valour is but a secondary consideration. Many corps have abandoned their colours; they have remained deaf to the voice of their officers. Are, then, the brave men of Castiglione, Rivoli, and Neu-markt no more? Rather than desert their colours, they would have perished at their feet. Your rations, you complain, have not been regularly distributed. What would you have done, if, like the 18th and 32d regiments, you had found yourselves in the midst of the desert, without either bread or water, having nothing but horse and camel flesh to subsist on? 'Victory will give us bread,' said they. And you desert your standards! Soldiers of Italy! a new general is to take the command of you; he was ever with the advanced-guard in the days of your glory; place your confidence in him—he will again chain victory to your standards." These energetic words, and still more the magic of Napoleon's name, had a prodigious effect on the French soldiers, ever liable to pass with rapidity from one extreme to another. The desertion speedily diminished, and some severe examples which Massena made immediately after his arrival, stopped it altogether.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 200, 201. Jom. xiii. 45, 48. Bot. iii. 455.

38.

Energetic measures taken to restore order. Positions of the opposite armies.

At the same time, the vigour of the First Consul provided more substantial additions to the comforts of the men. Their rations were augmented, and distributed with regularity; a portion of their arrears was discharged; and by incredible exertions, not only were ample supplies conveyed to their frigid bivouacs, but fresh clothing provided for their shivering limbs. By these means the spirit of the soldiers was in a short time so restored, that an army, which a few weeks before seemed menaced with approach-



ing dissolution, became capable of the most persevering exertions. A new organisation was completed by Massena, and four regiments, which he brought with him, in the highest state of equipment, from the north of Switzerland, became the model on which the army was formed. The army, which amounted to twenty-eight thousand men, in Liguria, and eight thousand on the summits of the Alps, from the Col d'Argentière to Mont Cenis, was divided into three corps. The right, under the command of Soult, sixteen thousand strong, occupied Gavi, the Campo-Fredde, the Bochetta, and the summit of the valleys leading from Piedmont to Genoa; the centre, consisting of twelve thousand, guarded the ridges extending westward, and from thence, through Cadcbone, Vado, Savona, and the Col de Tende, towards France; while the left wing, under Thurreau, perched on the summit of the Alps which form the western boundary of the plain of Piedmont, watched the important passes of Mont Cenis, the Little St Bernard, and the Col de Genevre. The Austrians, cantoned in the plain below, and at the entrance of the numerous valleys which were occupied by the enemy, were so much scattered, that out of ninety-six thousand men who composed their active troops, not more than sixty thousand could be assembled for operations on the Bormida and in the Appenines. This force, however, was amply sufficient for the object in view, which was the expulsion of the French from Italy; and at length the order from Vienna arrived, and active operations commenced on the 6th April.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bot. iii.  
455, 456.  
Nap. i. 201.  
Jom. xiii.  
45, 46, 51,  
53, 54.

The city of Genoa, against which all the efforts of the Imperialists were now directed, is situated at the centre of the gulf which bears its name, and from a very early period has occupied a distinguished place in the history of modern Europe. Placed on the southern slope of the Appenines, where they dip into the Mediterranean sea, it exhibits a succession of lofty buildings, terraces, gardens, and palaces, rising one above another in imposing masses

39.  
Description  
of Genoa.

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from the water's edge to a very great height. The streets of palaces, rising tier above tier from the sea, girdle with the long lines of their bright white houses the vast sweep of the harbour, the mouth of which is marked by a huge natural mole of rock, surmounted by a magnificent lighthouse tower. The gay and glittering aspect of the buildings, ascending in succession from the bay to the summit of the hills which screen it from the north; the splendour of the palaces which adorn its higher quarters; the picturesque air of the towers and fortifications by which it is surmounted; the contrast between the dazzling whiteness of the edifices, and the dark green of the firs and olives by which they are shrouded; the blue sea which washes the southern ramparts of the city, and reflects its innumerable domes and spires—form a spectacle at once so varied and gorgeous, as to have early captivated the imagination of the Italians, and secured for it the appellation of “*Genova la Superba*.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Personal observation, and Arnold's History, 215.

40.  
Its walls and fortifications.

A double circle of fortifications, rising above one another on the successive ridges which, on the land side, surmount the walls, surrounds this splendid city. These exterior fortifications are the famous lines closely resembling those which, in ancient days, surrounded the Epipolæ of Syracuse, which, converging inland, and running up the hills from the eastern and western extremities of the city, meet at the apex on their summit. The outer or exterior walls consist of a triangle of nine thousand toises in circumference. On the south, bounded by the sea, this line extends from the point of the Lanterne, at the mouth of the rivulet called the Polcevera, to the mouth of the Bisagno: the eastern side runs along the banks of the Bisagno to the fort of Eperon, which forms the apex of the triangle, and the western descends from that elevated point to the Lanterne along the margin of the Polcevera. The batteries on the western side command the whole valley of the Polcevera, with the long and straggling faubourg of St Pierre d'Arena, which runs through its

centre ; those on the east, on the other hand, are themselves commanded by the heights of Monte Ratti and Monte Faccio, a circumstance which rendered it necessary to occupy them by detached outworks, which are called the forts of Quizzi, of Richelieu, and of San Tecla, on the Madonna del Monte. Higher up the Appenines than the Fort Eperon, is the plateau of the Two Brothers, which is commanded in rear by the Diamond Fort, perched on a summit twelve hundred toises from Fort Eperon. The peculiar situation of Genoa, lying on the rapid declivity where the Appenines descend into the sea, rendered it necessary to include these mountains in its rear in the exterior line of its fortifications, and to occupy so many points beyond their wide circuit by detached outworks, which give the ridges by which it is encircled the appearance of an immense castle. The interior line which surrounds the city properly so called, is susceptible of some defence ; but the possession of the outer works would render any protracted resistance impossible, as the batteries on the Lanterne and the fort of Eperon would expose the city to the horrors of a bombardment.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 203, 204. Jom. xiii. 88, 92. Dum. iii. 227, 231. Personal observation.

Early in March, Admiral Keith, who commanded the British fleet in the Mediterranean, established a close blockade of the harbour of Genoa and its dependencies, which promised to augment extremely the difficulties of the besieged ; and in the beginning of April, General Melas having completed his preparations, moved forward in three columns to the attack of the French defensive positions. Ott, with the left wing, fifteen thousand strong, was intrusted with the attack of the French right, and the forts on Monte Faccio ; Melas, with the centre, consisting of twenty-four thousand, was to ascend the valley of the Bormida, and separate the centre of the enemy from their left wing ; while Elnitz with the right, amounting to eighteen thousand soldiers, was to assail their left, and to facilitate the important and decisive movements of Melas in the centre. These attacks all proved successful. The

41.  
Measures taken for its blockade by land and sea. Successful attack of the Imperialists on the French position.

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. iii.  
47, 49. Nap.  
i. 206. Jom.  
xiii. 53, 55.  
Thib. 76, 72.

42.  
Suchet is  
separated  
from the  
main body,  
and driven  
back to-  
wards  
France.  
April 6.

Imperialists experienced everywhere the most vigorous resistance, and the courage and enterprise on both sides seemed exalted to the highest pitch by the great object for which they contended, and the lofty eminences, midway between the plain and the clouds, on which the struggle took place. But the resolution of the Austrians, aided by their great superiority of numbers, and the advantage which the initiative always gives in mountain warfare, at length overcame all the aid which the French derived from the possession of the heights and the fortifications by which they were strengthened.<sup>1</sup>

Soult, on the French left-centre, driven from Montenotte, the first scene of Napoleon's triumphs, was thrown back upon Genoa; while Savona, Cadebone, and Vado, were occupied by the Imperialists, and the extreme left of the French, under Suchet, was altogether detached from the centre, and driven off towards France. Hohenzollern, who was intrusted with the attack of the Bochetta, drove the French from the neighbourhood of Gavi far up that important pass, and with some difficulty succeeded in attaining the crest of the mountains; while, on the Austrian left, Klenau obtained the most important advantages. Commencing his march from the valley of the Trebbia, he advanced in three columns up the narrow ravines which lead to the eastern fortifications of Genoa, carried the summit of the mountains, drove the Republicans from the Monte Faccio and the Monte Ratti, and invested the forts of Quizzi, Richelieu, and San Tecla, within cannon-shot of the walls of the city. Its inhabitants were variously agitated with hopes and fears, as the firing of the musketry and cannon came nearer and nearer. At length the smoke was distinctly visible, even from the interior ramparts; and while the broken regiments of Soult were entering the city from the westward, by the gates of the Lanterne, the whole heavens to the north and east were illuminated by the fires of the bivouacs, from the crowded summits of the Monte Faccio.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Dum. iii.  
47, 51. Nap.  
i. 206, 207.  
Jom. xii. 53,  
57. Bot. iii.  
460, 462.  
Thib. 70, 85.  
Siège de  
Gènes.

The situation of Massena was now highly critical ; the more especially as a large and influential part of the inhabitants were strongly attached to the cause of the Imperialists, and ardently desired deliverance from the democratic tyranny to which for years they had been subjected. The effervescence in the city was extreme, especially among the working classes, who had been grievously straitened from the cessation of commerce since the French government had been established, and the English blockade had closed their harbour. Their ardour, strongly excited by the sight of the Austrian watchfires, and the sound of the tocsin, which incessantly rang to rouse the peasants on the neighbouring mountains, was with difficulty restrained even by the presence of a garrison, now increased, by the refluxence from all quarters, to twenty thousand men. But Massena was not a man to be easily daunted ; and on this accumulation of force in the central position of Genoa, he founded his hopes of expelling the enemy from the posts most threatening to the city. By daybreak on the 7th, he threw open the gates of the town, and attacked the Austrian division on the Monte Faccio with such vigour, that in a short time that important post was regained ; the Imperialists were driven from the Monte Cornua, Torriglio ; and all the passes of the Appenines in that direction, and fifteen hundred men made prisoners, who were before nightfall marched through the astonished crowds into the interior of the city.<sup>1</sup>

On the same day a series of obstinate engagements took place on the Austrian right between Elnitz and Suchet, which, though attended with varied success, upon the whole had the effect of establishing the Imperialists in great strength on the heights of St Giacomo and Vado, and completing the separation of the French left wing from the centre of their army and the city of Genoa. No sooner was the French general informed of this disaster, than he perceived that it was not by any transient success on the Monte Faccio, but by a vigorous effort

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43.

Desperate  
and success-  
ful sortie of  
Massena.

April 7.

<sup>1</sup> Bot. iii.  
463. Jom.  
xiii. 36, 37.  
Nap. i. 207.  
Dum. iii. 51,  
52. Thib.  
80, 110.

44.

His disposi-  
tions for re-  
opening his  
communication  
with  
Suchet.

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towards Savona, and for the re-establishment of his communications with Suchet, that the torrent of disaster was to be arrested. With this view he formed his army into three divisions: the first, under Miollis, being intrusted with the defence of the city and environs of Genoa; the second, under Gazan, was to advance from Voltri towards Sasselo; while the third, under Massena in person, was to move along the sea-coast. Suchet at the same time received orders to suspend his retreat, and co-operate in the general attack, which, it was hoped, would lead to the capture of the Austrian division at Montenotte and Savona, and re-establish the important communications with Suchet and France. The execution of the combined attack was fixed for the 9th of April.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
60, Bot. iii.  
463, 464.  
Nap. i. 208,  
209, Thib.  
110, 135.

45.  
Austrian  
measures to  
prevent it,  
which prove  
successful.

Meanwhile Melas, having so far strengthened Elmhitz on the heights of Vado, as to enable him to make head against Suchet, resolved to move with the bulk of his forces against Massena at Genoa, wisely judging that the principal efforts of his opponent would be directed to the opening a communication with France and the left wing of his army. With this view he moved forward Hohenzollern on the evening of the 8th, who, after a sharp resistance, carried the Bochetta by moonlight, which had been abandoned after the reverse on the Monte Faccio, and drove the French down the southern side to Campo Marone. This success so entirely disconcerted Soult, who directed Gazan's division, that though he had gained considerable advantages, he deemed it prudent to suspend the march of his troops. On the following night, however, having been strongly reinforced by the general-in-chief, he assailed with superior forces the division of St-Julien at la Vercira, and after a desperate conflict routed it with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners and seven standards. But this success was more than compensated by the disaster which on the same day befell the left of the French at Cogoletto, who were overwhelmed by Melas, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Massena in person, and driven back,

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sword in hand, to the neighbourhood of Voltri. At the same time, Elnitz and Suchet combated with divided success on the Monte Giacomo. At first the Republicans were victorious, and an Austrian brigade commanded by General Ulm, separated from the main body, was surrounded and compelled to lay down its arms. But this advantage having led Suchet to attempt on the following day the attack of the Monte Giacomo itself, a lofty ridge of prodigious strength, he was repulsed with great slaughter, and, after leaving the slopes of the mountain and its snowy crest covered with the dead and the dying, driven back in confusion to Melogno and Sette Pani on the sea-coast.<sup>1</sup>

April 12.  
1 Bot. iii.  
463, 465.  
Jom.xiii.61,  
71. Dum.  
iii. 53, 65.  
Nap. i. 210,  
211. Thib.  
167, 169.

46.  
Continued  
successes of  
the Imperialists.

Thus, though the Republicans combated everywhere with rare intrepidity, and inflicted fully as great a loss on their adversaries as they received themselves, yet, on the whole, the object of their exertions was frustrated. Gigantic efforts had been made, blood had flowed in torrents, and the rival armies, amidst the rocks and clouds of the Appenines, had struggled with unheard-of obstinacy, but still the Austrians retained their advantage; their columns remained interposed in strength between the French centre and left, and the multitude of killed and wounded was weakening, in an alarming degree, an army now cut off from all external assistance. Both parties now made the utmost efforts to concentrate their forces, and bring this murderous warfare to a termination. On the 15th, Melas renewed the attack with the utmost vigour at Ponte Ivrea, and at the same time reinforced Hohenzollern on his left, and directed him to press down from the Bochetta, and threaten the communication of the French with Genoa. The soldiers of both armies, though exhausted with fatigue, and almost destitute of provisions, fought with the utmost obstinacy on the following day; but at length Soult, finding that his rear was threatened by a detachment of Hohenzollern's, fell back to Voltri,<sup>2</sup> overthrowing in his course the Austrian brigade who endeavoured to dispute the

April 15.

April 16.  
2 Bot. iii.  
464, 465.  
Nap. i. 211.  
Jom.xiii.71,  
75. Dum.  
iii. 69, 73.  
Thib. 180,  
200.

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47.  
Massena  
finally  
driven into  
Genoa.

passage. On the same day, Massena in person was repulsed by the Imperialists under Latterman; and finding his retreat also menaced by Hohenzollern, he too retreated to Voltri in the night, where the two French divisions were united on the following morning.

But the Imperialists, who now approached from all quarters, gave the wearied Republicans no rest in this position. From the heights of Monte Fayole, Melas beheld the confusion which prevailed in the army of his opponents; while the corps of Ott, whose right wing now began to take a part in the hostilities, already threatened Sestri, and the only line of retreat to Genoa which still remained to them. A general attack was immediately commenced. Melas descended the Monte Fayole; while Ott, whose troops were comparatively fresh, assailed the French from the eastern side, and by a detachment menaced the important post of Sestri in their rear. Ott forced his way to Voltri, while Soult was still resolutely combating Melas on the heights of Madonna del Acqua, at the foot of Monte Fayole, and a scene of matchless horror and confusion immediately ensued. Soult, informed that his communications were threatened, instantly began his retreat; the victorious troops of Ott were assailed at once by the flying columns of that general, who fought with the courage of despair, and the troops they had displaced from Voltri, who rallied and returned to the rescue of their comrades. After a desperate conflict, continued till nightfall, in which the French and Imperialists sustained equal losses, the passage was at length cleared, and the retreating columns, by torchlight, and in the utmost confusion, reached the Polcevera, and found shelter within the walls of Genoa.<sup>1</sup>

April 21.

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 200,  
217. Dum.  
iii. 74, 76.  
Jom. xiii. 76,  
78. Bot. iii.  
467.

48.  
Results of  
these com-  
bats, and  
defeat of  
Suchet by  
Elnitz.

Thus, after a continued combat of fifteen days, maintained with matchless constancy on both sides, and in which the advantages of a fortified central position on the side of the Republicans long compensated their inferiority of force to the Imperialists, Massena with his heroic troops



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was shut up in Genoa, and all hope of co-operating with Suchet, or receiving reinforcements from France, finally abandoned. In these desperate conflicts, the loss of the French was seven thousand men, fully a third of the force which remained to their general after he was shut up in Genoa; but that of the Austrians was nearly as great, and they were bereaved, in addition, of above four thousand prisoners,—a success dearly purchased by the French in a city where the dearth of provisions already began to be severely felt. Meanwhile Suchet, having been informed by Oudinot, who had made a perilous passage by sea in the midst of the English cruisers, of the desire of Massena that he should co-operate in the general attack, instantly made preparations for a fresh assault on the blood-stained ridge of the Monte Giacomo; but in the interval, Melas, now relieved on his left by the retreat of Massena into Genoa, had reinforced Elnitz by three brigades, and the position of the Imperialists, naturally strong, was thereby rendered impregnable. The consequence was, that the moment the Republicans made their appearance at the foot of the mountain, they were attacked and overthrown so completely, that it was only owing to an excess of caution on the part of the Imperialists that they were not wholly cut off and made prisoners. By this disastrous defeat Suchet lost all hope of regaining his communication with Genoa, and was compelled to fall back, for his own security, towards the Var and the frontier of France.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. iii.  
76, 79. Jom.  
xiii. 76, 79,  
80.

On the other hand, Melas, having completed the investment of Genoa, and left Ott with twenty-five thousand men to blockade that fortress, moved himself, with the bulk of his forces, to reinforce Elnitz on the Monte Giacomo, and pursue his successes against Suchet. To aid in the accomplishment of this object, he moved up part of the twenty-five thousand men, who, during this desperate struggle in the Appenines, had lain inactive in Piedmont under Kaim. Threatened by so many forces, Suchet

49.  
Suchet is  
driven over  
the Var into  
France.  
April 27.

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May 2.

May 6.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
84, 86. Bot.  
iii. 467, 469.  
Dum. iii.  
198, 200.

50.  
General  
attack on  
the French  
positions  
around  
Genoa.  
April 30.

retired with about ten thousand men to Albenga, in the rear of Loano, and took a position at Bordinetto, where Kellermann, in 1795, had so successfully arrested the advance of General Divini. There, however, he was attacked a few days after by Melas with superior forces, and driven from the field with great loss. He endeavoured in vain to make a stand on the Monte de Torria and the Col de Tende; the columns of the Austrians turned his flanks and pushed him across the frontier and over the Var, with the loss of fifteen hundred prisoners, and an equal number killed and wounded. Thus the French, after a desperate struggle, were at length driven back into their own territories; and nothing remained to them of their vast conquests in Italy but the ground which was commanded by the cannon of Genoa.<sup>1</sup>

While Melas was thus chasing the Republican eagles from the Maritime Alps, Ott was preparing a general attack upon Genoa, by which he hoped to drive the French from the exterior line of defence, and thereby render their position untenable in that important fortress. With this view, while the English fleet kept up a severe cannonade upon the town from the entrance of the harbour, a general assault was planned against the defences of Massena on the Bisagno, the Polcevera, and the fortified summits of the Madonna del Monte and the Monte Ratti. These attacks were all in the first instance successful. Bussy, supported by the fire of the English gunboats, made himself master of St Pierre d'Arcna and the valley of the Polcevera; while Palfi, by a vigorous attack, carried the Monte Ratti, surrounded the fort of Richelieu, surprised the fort of Quizzi, and gained possession of all the southern slopes of the Monte Faccio and the Madonna del Monte. At the same time Hohenzollern stormed the important plateau of the Two Brothers, and summoned the commander of Fort Diamond, now completely insulated, to surrender.<sup>2</sup> The Imperialists even went so far as to make preparations for establishing mortar batteries on the commanding

<sup>2</sup> Nap. 212.  
Bot. iii. 472,  
473. Dum.  
iii. 224.  
Jom. xiii. 95,  
96. Thib.  
200, 209.

heights of Albaro, and bombarding the city over its whole extent, so as to render the French position untenable within its walls.

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Had the Austrians possessed a sufficient force to make good the advantages thus gained, they would have speedily brought the siege of Genoa to a conclusion, and by a concentration of all their forces on the Bormida, might have defeated the invasion by Napoleon over the Alps, and changed the fate of the campaign. But General Ott had only twenty-five thousand men at his disposal, while an equal number, under Kaim, lay inactive in the plains of Piedmont; and this imprudent distribution of force proved in the highest degree prejudicial to the Imperial interests through the whole campaign. Availing himself with skill of the immense advantage which the possession of a central position in an intrenched camp afforded, Massena withdrew four battalions from the western side, where he judged the danger less pressing, and despatched them, under Soult, to regain the heights of the Two Brothers, while he himself hastened, with four battalions more, to reinforce Miollis on the Monte Albaro. The Imperialists, who had gained time to strengthen their positions, received the attack with great resolution; the fury of the combatants was such that soon fire-arms became useless, and they fought hand to hand with the bayonet. For long the result was doubtful, and some success was even gained by the Imperialists; but at length the Republicans were victorious, and the Monte Ratti, with its forts and four hundred prisoners, fell into their hands. At the same time, Soult glided round by the ravines into the rear of the Two Brothers; and the Austrians, under Hohenzollern, assailed in front by the garrison of Fort Diamond, and in the rear by these fresh troops, were broken, and escaped in small parties only by throwing themselves with desperate resolution on the battalions by which they were surrounded. By the result of this day the Imperialists lost three thousand men, of whom eighteen

51.  
Which, at  
first suc-  
cessful, is  
finally re-  
pulsed by  
Massena.

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. iii.  
236, 241.  
Jom. xiii.  
97, 98. Nap.  
i. 212. Bot.  
iii. 472, 473.  
Thib. 210,  
230.

hundred were made prisoners, and they were forced to abandon all the ground which they had gained from their opponents, excepting the Monte Faccio ; while the spirits of the French were proportionally elevated by the unlooked-for and glorious success which they had achieved. Taking advantage of the consternation of the besiegers, Massena on the following day attempted a sally, and attacked the fortified heights of Coronata ; but after a trifling advantage he was repulsed with great slaughter, and compelled again to shut himself up within the walls of Genoa.<sup>1</sup> \*

52.  
Successful  
sally of the  
French.

May 11.

Nothing of moment occurred for the next ten days ; but during that time Massena, finding that famine was likely to prove even a more formidable enemy than the Austrian bayonets, and that it was necessary at all hazards to endeavour to procure a supply of provisions, resolved upon a sally. The Austrians had been celebrating, by a *feu-de-joie* along their whole lines, the success of Melas on the Var, when Massena determined, by a vigorous effort, both to prove that the spirits of his own garrison were not sinking, and to facilitate the meditated descent of the First Consul into Piedmont. Miollis was charged with the attack of the Monte Faccio on the front of the Sturla, while Soult, ascending the bed of the torrent Bisagno, was to take it in flank. The attack of Miollis, commenced before Soult was at hand to second it, failed completely. He gained possession, in the first instance, of the front positions of the enemy on the slopes of the mountain, and was advancing over the ground, drenched with the blood

\* A singular circumstance occurred at this assault of the Monte Faccio. The soldiers of two French regiments, the 25th light infantry and the 24th of the line, had been on the worst possible terms since the opening of the campaign, because, during the winter, when insubordination was at its height, the former, which maintained its discipline, had been employed to disarm the latter. They had, in consequence, been carefully kept asunder from each other ; but during the confusion of this bloody conflict, their ranks became intermingled. The same dangers, the same thirst for glory, animated both corps ; and these generous sentiments so far obliterated their former jealousies, that the soldiers embraced in the midst of the fire, and fought side by side like brothers during the remainder of the day.—See DUMAS, iii. 245, 246.

of so many brave men of both nations, when his troops were charged by the Imperialists in close column with such vigour, that they were instantly thrown into confusion, and driven back, in the utmost disorder, to the glacis of the Roman gate of Genoa, where, by the opportune arrival of the general-in-chief with a reserve, some degree of order was at length restored. The expedition of Soult was more fortunate. The Imperialists, assailed in front by the Republicans whom Massena had rallied on the Sturla, and in flank by the troops of Soult, were driven from the Monte Faccio, and were only able to force their way through their pursuers by leaving thirteen hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
101, 102.  
Dum. iii.  
243, 247.  
Bot. iii. 473.  
Nap. i. 220.  
Thib. 220,  
249.

This brilliant success led to a still more audacious enterprise, which proved the ruin of the able and enterprising French general. This was the attack of the Monte Creto, the most important position occupied by the Austrians on the mountains in the rear of the city; an attempt which, if successful, would have rendered it necessary for them to raise the siege. The Republicans, six thousand strong, issued by the Roman gate, and, ascending the olive-clad steep of the Bisagno, attacked the Austrians in this important post; while Gazan, at the head of eighteen hundred men, assailed them on the other side. The intrenched camp on the Monte Creto was fortified with care, and its defence intrusted to Hohenzollern, supported by a powerful reserve. The French advanced with intrepidity to the attack; but, as they approached the intrenchments, a violent thunder-storm enveloped the mountain, the air became dark, the rain descended in torrents, and the hostile forces could only discern each other by the flashes of lightning which at intervals illuminated the gloom. In the midst of the tempest the lines met; the shock was terrible, but the Republicans insensibly gained ground. Already the first line of intrenchments was carried, and the Austrian barracks were on fire, when Hohenzollern, charging at the head of the reserve in close column, over-

53.  
Which leads  
to another,  
in which  
they are de-  
feated, and  
Soult made  
prisoner.  
May 12.

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.

102, 105.

Dum. iii.

247, 252.

Nap. i. 220.

Bot. iii. 473.

Thib. 249,

260.

threw the assailants. Soult, wounded in the thigh, was made prisoner, and his troops, dispersing in the utmost confusion, fled to Genoa with a heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. At the same time, intelligence was received of the surrender of Savona; and Massena, now severely weakened, had no alternative but to remain shut up within the walls, exposed to all the horrors of approaching famine.<sup>1</sup>

This disaster terminated the military operations of the siege of Genoa. Thenceforward it was a mere blockade; the Austrians, posted on the heights which surround the city, cut off all communication with the land side; while Admiral Keith, with the British fleet, rendered all intercourse impossible with the neighbouring harbours. The horrors of famine were daily more strongly felt, and in that inglorious warfare the army was called upon to make more heroic sacrifices than ever they had made in the tented field. The miserable soldiers, worn down by fatigue and attenuated by want, after having consumed all the horses in the city, were driven to the necessity of feeding on dogs, cats, and vermin, which were eagerly hunted out in the cellars and common-sewers. Soon even these wretched resources failed, and they were reduced to the pittance of four or five ounces of black bread, made of cocoa, rye, and other substances ransacked from the shops of the city. Even in these desperate circumstances, however, the firmness of Massena kept up the spirits and overawed the murmurs of the soldiers. He eat the same coarse and scanty fare as the soldiers, braved with them the fire of the enemy, and sustained, in addition, the cares and anxieties of the command-in-chief. Nothing but the ascendant of a great mind could have upheld his authority in such disastrous circumstances. "He will make us eat his boots before he will surrender," was a common saying among the men; but, nevertheless, they submitted implicitly to his commands. Affairs were in this state when Captain Fianeschi, who had left Napo-

54.

The siege  
is convert-  
ed into a  
blockade.  
Extreme  
sufferings  
of the in-  
habitants.

leon at the foot of the St Bernard, arrived in the roads of Genoa with despatches from the First Consul. In an open boat, with three rowers, he had succeeded, during the night, in steering through the midst of the British fleet; when day dawned, he was discovered, about a mile from the shore, under the guns of their cruisers. They instantly fired, and some of the seamen were wounded. The brave officer stripped off his clothes, took his sabre in his teeth, and swam towards the harbour. After incredible efforts he reached the shore, and landed, almost exhausted, on the mole, whence he was immediately conducted to the general-in-chief.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. iii.  
255. Jom.  
xiii. 105.  
Bot. iii. 471.  
Thib. 250,  
270. Thiers,  
i. 393, 396.

The cheering intelligence of the passage of the Alps by Napoleon, and the first successes of Moreau in Germany, revived the dying hopes of the French garrison. The spectres who wandered along the ramparts were animated with a passing ebullition of joy; and Massena, taking advantage of this momentary enthusiasm, commenced a general attack on the Monte Ratti and the Monte Faccio. But this effort was beyond the strength of his men. The soldiers marched out with all their wonted enthusiasm, and with a fierce countenance began the ascent of the heights; but the unusual exertion wore out their exhausted strength, and when they arrived at the foot of the redoubts, they were torn to pieces by a tremendous and well-sustained fire of grape and musketry, without the possibility of making any effort to avert their fate. Broken and dispirited, the enfeebled mass was driven back into the city, after having acquired, from sad experience, the mournful conviction that the Imperialists, whatever their reverses might have been in other situations, had abated nothing of their firm countenance in the neighbourhood of Genoa. Two days afterwards, the rolling of distant thunder in the Appenines was mistaken by General Gazan for the welcome sound of their approaching deliverers.<sup>2</sup> Massena himself hastened, with a palpitating heart, to the heights of Tinalle; but he was there witness to the imperturbable aspect of

55.  
A fresh  
sortie is  
defeated.  
May 28.

<sup>2</sup> Dum. iii.  
256, 257.  
Bot. iii. 474.  
Jom. xiii.  
224. Thib.  
251, 260.

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56.  
Agonies  
endured by  
the inhabi-  
tants.

the Austrians in their impregnable intrenchments, and the agitated crowd returned, sad and downcast, to their quarters.

While the French garrison was alternately agitated by these hopes and fears, the wretched inhabitants were a prey to unparalleled sufferings. From the commencement of the siege the price of provisions had been extravagantly high, and in its latter days grain of any sort could not be had at any cost. The horrors of this prolonged famine, in a city containing above a hundred thousand souls, cannot be adequately described. All day the cries of the unhappy victims were heard in the streets; while the neighbouring rocks, within the walls, were covered with a famished crowd, seeking, in the vilest animals and the smallest traces of vegetation, the means of assuaging their intolerable pangs. At night the lamentations of the people were still more dreadful; too agitated to sleep, unable to endure the agony by which they were surrounded, they prayed aloud for death to relieve them from their sufferings. In this extremity, the usual effect of long-endured calamity became conspicuous, in closing the fountains of mercy in the human heart, and rendering men insensible to everything but their own disasters. Infants deserted in the streets by their parents, women who had sunk down from exhaustion on the public thoroughfares, were abandoned to their fate, and sought, with dying hands, in the sewers and other receptacles of filth, for the means of prolonging for a few hours a miserable existence. Parents and children lay down to die together, and perished locked in each other's arms. In the desperation produced by such prolonged torments, the more ardent and impetuous sought the means of destruction. They rushed out of the gates, and threw themselves on the Austrian bayonets, or precipitated themselves into the harbour, where they perished without either commiseration or assistance. In the general agony, not only leather and skins of every kind were consumed, but the horror at



human flesh itself was so much abated, that numbers were supported on the dead bodies of their fellow-citizens. Pestilence, as usual, came in the rear of famine; contagious fevers swept off multitudes, whom the strength of the survivors was unable to inter. Death in every form awaited the crowds whom common suffering had mingled together in the hospitals; and the multitude of unburied corpses which encumbered the streets threatened the city with depopulation, almost as certainly as the grim hand of famine under which they were melting away. In the course of this dreadful siege nearly twenty thousand of the inhabitants perished of famine, or the contagious disorders to which it gave rise: an awful instance of the ravages of war, and loudly calling for some change in its laws.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Arnold's Lectures on History, 218. Bot. iii. 476, 477. Dum. iii. 257. Jonn. xiii. 224.

Such accumulated horrors at length shook the firm spirit of Massena. The excitement in the city had risen to an alarming height, and there was every probability that the famished French garrison would be overpowered by the multitudes whom despair had armed with unwonted courage. Matters were in this desperate state, when the French general received a letter from Melas, couched in the most flattering terms, in which he invited him, since resistance had now become hopeless, to conclude an arrangement for the evacuation of the city. Massena at first suspected that this was merely a *ruse* to cover the approaching raising of the siege; and refused to accede to any terms; but a severe bombardment both by land and sea, on the night of the 31st, having convinced him that there was no intention on the part of the Allies of abandoning their enterprise, and provisions, even after the most rigid economy, existing only for two days more, the negotiation was resumed, and at length, on the 4th June, when they were totally exhausted, a capitulation was agreed to, in virtue of which the gates were surrendered to the Allies on the following day at noon. It was stipulated that the garrison should evacuate Genoa, with their

57. Massena at length surrenders. May 31.

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arms, artillery, baggage, and ammunition ; they were conducted by the Allies, to the number of nine thousand, by land and sea, to Voltri and Antibes. Three thousand had been killed and four thousand wounded during the contests, incessantly carried on for three weeks, of this memorable siege. The conditions of the treaty were faithfully observed towards the vanquished, and all the stipulations in favour of the democratic party at Genoa implemented by the Austrians with true German faith : a trait as honourable to them, as the opposite conduct of the English admiral at Naples, a year before, was derogatory to the well-earned character of British integrity. When the evacuation took place, the extent of suffering which the besieged had undergone appeared painfully conspicuous. "Upon entering the town," says the faithful annalist of this memorable siege, "all the figures we met bore the appearance of profound grief or sombre despair ; the streets resounded with the most heartrending cries ; on all sides death was reaping its victims, and the rival furies of famine and pestilence were multiplying their devastation ; in a word, the army and the inhabitants seemed approaching their dissolution."<sup>1</sup> The Allies acted generously to the heroic garrison, with their illustrious chief ; while, upon the signal of a gun fired from the ramparts, innumerable barks, laden with provisions, entered the harbour, amidst the transports of the inhabitants. "Your defence," said Lord Keith to Massena, "has been so heroic, that we can refuse you nothing ; yet you alone are worth an army ; how can we allow you to depart ?"<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thib. 282.<sup>2</sup> Jom. xiii. 228, 231.

Dum. iii.

260, 263.

Bot. iii. 478.

Thiers'

Cons. et

l'Emp. i.

401, 403.

58.

The Austrians set out to meet Napoleon. Advance of the Allies to Nice.

It was not without reason that the Imperialists urged forward the evacuation, and granted the most favourable terms to the besieged, in order to accelerate their departure. At the very time when the negotiations were going on, a messenger arrived from Melas, with intelligence of the entry of Napoleon into Milan, and an immediate order to raise the siege. The embarrassment of the Austrian general, between his reluctance to relinquish so important

a conquest, and his apprehensions at disobeying the orders of his superior officer, was extreme ; and he deemed himself happy at being able to escape from so serious a dilemma by granting the most favourable terms of capitulation to his enemy. No sooner was the place surrendered, than he detached a division to Tortona, and a brigade to Placentia ; and set out on the following day with his remaining forces in the same direction, leaving Hohenzollern to occupy Genoa with sixteen battalions.

Meanwhile Suchet had continued his retrograde movement towards the Var, and on the 11th May had effected the passage of that river. He was closely followed by the Austrians under Mclas, who on the same day entered into Nice, and took up their quarters in the territory of the Republic. The enthusiasm of the troops rose to the highest pitch ; at length they found themselves on the soil of France, and that ambitious power, which had so long sent forth its armies to devastate and oppress the adjoining states, began now to experience the evils it had inflicted on others.<sup>1</sup>

The Var is a mountain river, in general fordable, but which, like all mountain streams in those latitudes, is readily swollen by rains in a few hours into an impetuous torrent. It has always been considered as a weak part of the French frontier, because, to give solidity to its left extremity, it would be necessary to carry the line of defence far into the French Alps, to the distance of ten or twelve leagues from the sea. The portion of this line, however, which was occupied by Suchet, was much more inconsiderable, and did not extend above half a mile in breadth between the sea and the first rugged eminences. It had been fortified with care during the years 1794 and 1795, and the long bridge which traverses the broad gravelly bed of the river was covered by a formidable *tête-de-pont*, mounted with a plentiful array of heavy artillery. In this position Suchet hoped to arrest the enemy until the army of reserve, under Napoleon, had descended into Italy and appeared in their rear. In effect, the alarming

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59.  
Description  
of Suchet's  
position on  
the Var, and  
attack on it  
by the Aus-  
trians.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 217.  
Jom. xiii.  
87, 227, 232.

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May 22.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
200, 201.  
Dum. iii.  
204, 211.  
Nap. i. 218.

60.  
Fresh attack  
and final re-  
pulse of  
them.

reports which he received of the appearance of a powerful French force in the valley of Aosta, induced Melas, soon after his arrival at Nice, to detach a large part of his troops in that direction : and at length, when there could no longer be any doubt of the fact, he set out in person for Piedmont, leaving Elnitz, with eighteen thousand men, to make himself master of the bridge of the Var. Suchet had but thirteen thousand; but they were covered by formidable works, and were daily receiving additions of strength from the conscripts and national guard in the interior. The Imperialists, having at length got up their heavy artillery from Nice, unmasked their batteries on the 22d, and advanced with great intrepidity to the attack. But when Suchet evacuated the territory of Nice, he left a garrison in Fort Montauban, perched on a rock in the rear, from whence everything which passed in the Austrian lines was visible, and from which he received, by telegraph, hourly intelligence of what was preparing on the enemy's side. Thus warned, the Republicans were on their guard; the Austrian columns, when they arrived within pistol-shot of the works, were received with a tremendous fire of grape and musketry; and after remaining long and bravely at the foot of the intrenchments, a prey to a murderous fire which swept off numbers by every discharge, they were compelled to retire, after sustaining a considerable loss.<sup>1</sup>

Elnitz, however, was not discouraged. The accounts which he received from his rear rendered it more than ever necessary to carry this important post, in order to secure a barrier against the French, in the event of its being necessary to retire, and make head against the invasion of the First Consul. Already intelligence had arrived of the descent of Thurreau upon Suza, and the capture of Ivrea by Lannes with the vanguard of Napoleon. Collecting, therefore, all his forces, he made a last effort. Twenty pieces of heavy cannon, placed in position within musket-shot, battered the Republican defences,

while the British cruisers thundered against the right of the position. Under the cover of this imposing fire, the Hungarian grenadiers advanced to the assault, and the sappers succeeded in breaking through the first palisades. But the brave men who headed the columns almost all perished at the foot of the intrenchment, and, after sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon their enterprise. After this check, all thoughts of carrying the *tête-de-pont* on the Var were laid aside, and the Austrians broke up during the night, and retreated, with seventeen thousand men, in the direction of Piedmont.<sup>1</sup>

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May 27.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. iii.  
215, 216.  
Jom. xiii.  
201.

It is now time to return to the operations of Napoleon and the army of reserve, which rendered necessary these retrograde movements of the Imperialists, cut short their brilliant career of victories, and ultimately precipitated them into unprecedented reverses. This army, which had been in preparation ever since its formation had been decreed by the Consuls, on 7th January 1800, had been intrusted, since the commencement of April, to Berthier, whose indefatigable activity was well calculated to create, out of the heterogeneous elements of which it was composed, a formidable and efficient force. Thirty thousand conscripts and twenty thousand veteran troops, rendered disposable by the conclusion of the war in la Vendée, were directed to different points between Dijon and the Alps, to form the basis of the armament. Napoleon, whose gigantic mind was equal alike to the most elevated conceptions and the superintendence of the minutest details, was indefatigable in his endeavours to complete the preparations, and from his cabinet directed the march, provisioning, and equipment of every regiment in the army. He was at first undecided whether to direct the great reserve upon Germany or Italy; but the angry correspondence which had passed between him and Moreau, joined to the reverses experienced by Massena in the environs of Genoa, at length determined

61.  
Formation  
of the army  
of reserve by  
Napoleon.

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him to cross the Alps and move upon Piedmont. Reports were obtained from skilful engineers on the state of all the principal passes, from Mont Cenis to the St Gothard. After full consideration, he determined to cross the Great St Bernard. The advantages of this passage were obvious. It was at once the shortest road across the mountains, being directly in front of Lausanne, Vevay, and Besançon, where the greater part of the army was cantoned; and it led him in a few days into the rear of the army of Melas, so as to leave that general no alternative but to abandon his magazines and reserves, or fight his way to them, with his face towards Milan and his back to the Maritime Alps. In such a situation, the loss of a considerable battle could hardly fail to be fatal to the Imperial army, and might reasonably be expected to lead to the conquest of all Italy; whereas a reverse to the Republicans, who could fall back upon the St Gothard and the Simplon, was not likely to be attended with any similar disaster. But it was only the centre of the army, forty thousand strong, which was to cross by the pass of the Great St Bernard. The left wing, of sixteen thousand men, detached from the army of Germany, was to cross the St Gothard; five thousand under General Chabran were to cross the Little St Bernard from Montmelian in Savoy, and join the main body at Ivrea; while Thurreau, with four thousand, was to descend the Mont Cenis, and move on Turin. Thus sixty-five thousand men were to converge from various points towards the plains of Piedmont, directly in the rear of the Imperial army, which lay scattered over the mountains from the gates of Genoa to the banks of the Var.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 252,  
253. Jom.  
xiii. 172,  
173. Dum.  
iii. 219.

62.

Skilful mea-  
sures taken  
to conceal  
its strength.

Towards the success of this great design, however, it was indispensable that the real strength and destination of the army of reserve should be carefully concealed, as the forces of the Austrians lay in the valley of Aosta, on the southern side of the St Bernard; and, by occupying in strength the summit of the mountain, they might render the passage difficult, if not impossible. The device fallen

upon by the First Consul for this purpose, was to proclaim openly the place where the army was collected, and the service to which it was destined, but to assemble such inconsiderable forces there as might render it an object rather of ridicule than alarm to the enemy. With this view it was pompously announced, in various ways, that the army of reserve, destined to raise the siege of Genoa, was assembling at Dijon; and when the Austrian spies repaired thither, they found only a few battalions of conscripts and some companies of troops of the line, not amounting in all to eight thousand men, which entirely dissipated the fears which had been formed by its announcement. The army of reserve at Dijon, in consequence, became the object of general ridicule throughout Europe; and Melas, relieved of all fears for his rear, continued to press forward with perseverance his attacks on the Var, and considered the account of this army as a mere feint, to serve as a diversion to the siege of Genoa.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Jom.* xiii.  
175. *Nap.* i.  
253, 254.  
*Dum.* iii.

The Great St Bernard, which had been used for above two thousand years as the principal passage between Italy and France, lies between Martigny in the Valais, and Aosta in the beautiful valley of the same name on the southern side of the Alps. Though the direct communication between these countries, however, and perfectly passable for horsemen and foot-soldiers, it presented great difficulties for the transit of artillery and caissons. As far as St Pierre, indeed, on the side of the Valais, the passage is practicable for cannon, and from Aosta to the Italian plains the road is excellent; but in the interval between these places the track consists often merely of a horse or bridle path, following the sinuosities of the ravines through which it is conducted, or winding round the innumerable precipices which overhang the ascent. The summit of the ridge itself, which is above 8000 feet above the level of the sea,\* consists of a small plain or valley, shut in by

63.  
Description  
of the pass  
of the Great  
St Bernard.

\* 7542 French feet, or 8167 English feet; twelve French inches being equal to thirteen English.—EBEL, i. 178.

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snowy mountains of still greater elevation, about a mile in length, with features of such extraordinary gloom as to be indelibly imprinted on the recollection of every traveller who has witnessed it. At the northern extremity, where the path, emerging from the steep and rugged ascent of the Valley of Desolation, as it is emphatically called, first enters upon the level surface, is situated the convent of St Bernard, the highest inhabited ground in Europe, founded a thousand years ago by the humanity of the illustrious saint whose name it bears, and tenanted ever since that time by pious and intrepid monks, the worthy followers of such a leader, who there, amidst ice and granite, have fixed their abode, to rescue from destruction the travellers overwhelmed by snow, amidst the storms to which those elevated regions are at almost every season of the year exposed.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ebel, i.  
178. Personal observation.

64.  
The Italian side.

At the southern end are still to be seen a few remains of the Temple of Jupiter Penninus, which formerly stood at the summit of the Italian side of the pass, and at its foot the cut in the solid rock through which the Roman legions defiled for centuries to the tributary provinces of the empire on the north of the Alps. Innumerable votive offerings are found among the ruins of the solitary edifice, in which the travellers of ancient days expressed in simple but touching language their gratitude to heaven for having surmounted the dangers of the passage. In the centre of the valley, midway between the remains of heathen devotion and the monument of Christian charity, lies a lake, whose waters, cold and dark even at the height of summer, reflect the bare slopes and snowy crags which shut it in on every side. The descent towards Aosta is much more precipitous than on the north; and in the season when avalanches are common, travellers are often exposed to great danger from the masses of snow, which, detached from the overhanging heights, sweep with resistless violence across the path, which there descends for miles down the bare and exposed side of the mountain.



The climate in these elevated regions is too severe to permit of vegetation; the care of the monks has reared a few cresses and hardy vegetables in the sheltered corners of the slopes, on the northern side of the lake; but in general the mountains consist only of sterile piles of rock and snow; and not a human being is ever to be seen, except a few travellers, shivering and exhausted, who hasten up the toilsome ascent to partake in the never-failing hospitality of the convent at the summit.

This scene, so interesting from historical recollections as well as natural sublimity, was destined to receive additional celebrity from the memorable passage of the French army. None of the difficulties with which it was attended were unknown to their resolute chief; but, aware of the immense results which would attend an irruption by this route into Italy, he resolved to incur their hazard. To all the observations of the engineers on the obstacles which opposed the passage, he replied, "We must surmount several leagues of rocks covered with snow. Be it so. We will dismount our guns, and place them on sledges adapted to the rugged nature of the ascent. Nothing is to be found in these sterile mountains but a few chestnuts and herds of cattle:—we will transport rice and biscuit by the lake of Geneva to Villeneuve; every soldier will carry as much as will suffice him for six days, and the sumpter-mules will transport subsistence for six days more. When we arrive in the valley of Aosta, we shall hasten to the fertile banks of the Tessino, where abundance and glory will reward our daring enterprise." In pursuance of this bold design, the most active preparations were made by Marmont to facilitate the passage. Two million of rations of biscuit were baked at Lyons, and transported by the lake of Geneva to Villeneuve, to await the arrival of the army; trees were felled in the forests of the Jura to form sledges for the cannon, and mules and peasants summoned from all quarters to aid in the transport of the stores and ammunition. Napoleon set out from Paris on the 6th

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
174, 176.  
Nap. i. 255,  
256.

66.  
Measures  
taken for  
effecting the  
passage.

<sup>2</sup> Nap. i. 257.  
Bour. vii.  
109.

May 9.

May, and arrived at Geneva on the 8th. He instantly sent for Marescot, the chief of engineers. After listening with patience to his enumeration of the difficulties of the attempt, he said, "Is it possible to pass?"—"Yes!" he replied, "but with difficulty."—"Let us then set out," answered the First Consul: words eminently descriptive of the clear conception and immovable resolution which formed the leading features of that great man's character.<sup>1</sup>

At Geneva, Napoleon had an interview with M. Necker, who had remained in retirement at his villa of Coppet, near that town, since the period of his banishment by the Constituent Assembly. He professed himself little struck with his conversation, and alleged that he did not disguise his desire to be restored to the direction of the Republican finances; but it is probable the First Consul regarded the Swiss statesman with prejudiced eyes, from his strong sense of the incalculable evils which his concessions to democratic ambition had brought upon the French people.<sup>2</sup> On the 13th, he passed in review at Lausanne the vanguard of the real army of reserve, consisting of six regiments of veteran troops, newly equipped, and in the finest possible order. Shortly after, he received a visit from Carnot, the minister of war, who brought accounts of the victory of Moeskirch, and the advance of Moreau in Germany; while the stores and artillery arrived from all quarters. The preparations were rapidly completed. A hundred large firs were hollowed out so as to receive each a piece of artillery; the carriages were taken to pieces and put on the backs of mules; the ammunition dispersed among the peasants, who arrived from all quarters with their beasts of burden to share in the ample rewards which the French engineers held forth to stimulate their activity. Two companies of artillery-workmen were stationed, the one at St Pierre, on the north, the other at St Remi, on the south of the mountains, to take to pieces the artillery, and remount them on their carriages; the ammunition of the army was conveyed in little boxes, so constructed as

to go on the backs of mules. With such admirable precision were these arrangements made, that the dismounting and replacing of the guns hardly retarded for an hour the march of the columns; and the soldiers, animated by the novelty and splendour of the enterprise, vied with each other in their efforts to second the activity of their officers. Berthier, when they reached the foot of the mountains, addressed them in the following proclamation: "The soldiers of the Rhine have signalised themselves by glorious triumphs; those of the army of Italy struggle with invincible perseverance against a superior enemy. Emulating their virtues, do you ascend and reconquer beyond the Alps the plains which were the first theatre of French glory. Conscripts! you behold the ensigns of victory: march, and emulate the veterans who have won so many triumphs; learn from them how to bear and overcome the fatigues inseparable from war. Buonaparte is with you; he has come to witness your first triumph. Prove to him that you are the same men whom he formerly led in these regions to immortal renown." These words inflamed to the highest pitch the ardour of the soldiers, and there was but one feeling throughout the army, that of seconding to the uttermost the glorious enterprise in which they were engaged.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv. 10,  
11. Nap. i.  
257. Jom.  
xiii. 176,  
177. Dum.  
iii. 169, 170.

On the 16th May, the First Consul slept at the convent of St Maurice, at the foot of the northern side of the St Bernard, and on the following morning the army commenced the passage of the mountain. During the four following days the march continued, and from eight to ten thousand men passed daily. The first night they slept at St Pierre, the second at St Remi or Etroubles, the third at Aosta. Napoleon himself remained at St Maurice till the 20th, when the whole army had crossed. The passage, though toilsome, presented no extraordinary difficulties till the leading column arrived at St Pierre. But from that village to the summit, the ascent was painful and laborious in the highest degree. To each gun a hundred

67.  
Passage of  
the moun-  
tain.

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men were harnessed, and relieved by their comrades every half mile; the soldiers vied with each other in the fatiguing undertaking of dragging it up the toilsome and rugged track, and it soon became a point of honour for each column to prevent their cannon from falling behind the array. To support their efforts, the music of each regiment played at its head, and where the paths were peculiarly steep, the charge sounded to give additional vigour to their exertions. Toiling painfully up the ascent, hardly venturing to halt to draw breath lest the march of the column should be retarded, ready to sink under the weight of their arms and baggage, the soldiers animated each other by warlike songs, and the solitudes of the St Bernard resounded with the strains of military music. From amidst the snows and the clouds, the glittering bands of armed men appeared; and the distant chamois on the mountains above, startled by the unwonted spectacle, bounded away to the regions of desolation, and paused on the summit of their inaccessible cliffs to gaze on the columns which wound around their feet.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 259.  
Dum. ii. 170.  
Bot. iv. 13.

C8.  
The summit  
is at length  
reached.

After six hours of toilsome ascent, the head of the army reached the hospice at the summit; and the troops, forgetting their fatigues, traversed with joyful steps the snowy vale, or, reposing beside the cool waters of the lake, rent the air with acclamations at the approaching termination of their labours. By the provident care of the monks, supported by large supplies furnished by Napoleon, every soldier received a large ration of bread and cheese, and a draught of wine at the gate—a seasonable supply, which exhausted the ample stores of their establishment, but was fully repaid by the First Consul before the termination of the campaign. After an hour's rest, the columns wound along the margin of the lake, and began the steep and perilous descent to St Remi. The difficulties here were still greater than on the northern side. The snow, hard beneath, was beginning to melt on the surface, and great numbers, both of men and horses, lost

their footing, and were precipitated down the rapid declivity.\* At length, however, they reached a more hospitable region; the sterile rocks and snow gave place to herbage, enamelled with the flowers of spring; a few firs next gave token of the descent into the woody region; gradually a thick forest overshadowed their march, and before they reached Etroubles, the soldiers, who had so recently shivered in the blasts of winter, were melting under the rays of an Italian sun.† Napoleon himself crossed on the 20th. He was mounted on a sure-footed mule, which he obtained from the Priory of St Maurice, and attended by a young and active guide, who confided to him, without knowing his quality, all his wishes, and was astonished to find them, some time after, all realised by the generous recollection of the First Consul. He rested an hour at the convent, and descended to St Remi over the hard and slippery surface of the snow, chiefly on foot, often sliding down, and with considerable difficulty.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 261.  
Dum. iii.  
171, 172.  
Bot. iv. 13,  
14.

The passage of the St Bernard has been the subject of great exaggeration from those who are unacquainted with the ground. To speak of the French troops traversing

\* It is a curious coincidence, that a difficulty precisely similar befell Hannibal when his army began the descent on the Italian side of the Alps. "The snows," says Polybius, "of the former year, having remained unmelted upon the mountains, were now covered over by those which had fallen in the present year. The latter, being soft and of no great depth, gave an easy admission to the foot; but when these were trodden through, and the soldiers began to touch the snows that lay beneath, which were now so firm that they would yield to no impression, their feet both fell at once from under them, as if they had been walking on the edge of some high and slippery precipice. And when struggling with their hands and knees to recover from their fall, they slid down with great violence."—POLYBIUS, iii. 55.

† "Oh joy! the signs of life appear,  
The first and single fir  
That on the limits of the living world  
Strikes in the ice its roots;  
Another, and another now,  
And now the larch, that flings its arms  
Down-curving like the falling wave,  
And now the aspen's glittering leaves  
Gray glitter on the moveless twig,  
The poplar's varying verdure now,  
And now the birch so beautiful,  
Light as a lady's plume."

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69.

Comparison  
of the pas-  
sages of the  
Alps, by  
Hannibal,  
Napoleon,  
Suwarroff,  
and Macdon-  
ald.

paths known only to the smuggler or the chamois-hunter is ridiculous, when the road has been a beaten passage for two thousand years, and is traversed daily in summer by great numbers of travellers. One would suppose, from these descriptions, it was over the Col du Géant between Chamouni and Aosta, or over the summit of the Col du Bonhomme, that the French army had passed. It will bear no comparison with the passage of Hannibal over the Mont Cenis,\* opposed as it was by the mountain tribes, through paths comparatively unformed, and in the course of which the Carthaginian general lost nearly half his army. Having traversed on foot both the ground over which Napoleon's army passed at the Great St Bernard, that traversed by Suwarroff on the St Gothard, the Schächenthal, and the Engiberg, and that surmounted by Macdonald in the passage of the Splügen, the Mont Aprigal, and the Mont Tonal, the author is enabled to speak with perfect confidence as to the comparative merit of these different undertakings. From being commenced in the depth of winter, and over ridges comparatively unfrequented, the march of Macdonald was by far the most hazardous, so far as mere natural difficulties were concerned; that of Suwarroff was upon the whole the most worthy of admiration, from the vigorous resistance he experienced at every step, the total inexperience of his troops in mountain warfare, and the unparalleled hardships, both physical and moral, in which its later stages were involved. That of Napoleon over the St Bernard, during a fine season, without any opposition from the enemy, with every aid from the peasantry of the district, and the experience of his own officers, and by a road impracticable only for carriages and cannon, must, with every impartial observer acquainted with the ground, rank as the easiest of these memorable enterprises.

Lannes, who commanded the advanced-guard, descended

\* The author has no doubt Hannibal passed the Alps by the Mont Cenis. His reasons are given elsewhere.

rapidly the beautiful valley of Aosta, occupied the town of the same name, and overthrew at Clâtillon a body of fifteen hundred Croatians who endeavoured to dispute his passage. The soldiers, finding themselves in a level and fertile valley, abounding with trees, vines, and pasture, deemed their difficulties past, and joyfully followed the hourly increasing waters of the Dora Baltea, under spreading chestnuts, and amidst smiling vineyards, until their advance was suddenly checked by the fort and cannon of Bard. This inconsiderable fortification had wellnigh proved a more serious obstacle to the army than the whole perils of the St Bernard. Situated on a pyramidal rock midway between the opposite cliffs of the valley, which there approach very near to each other, and at the distance of not more than fifty yards from either side, it at once commands the narrow road which is conducted close under its ramparts, and is beyond the reach of any but regular approaches. The cannon of the ramparts, two-and-twenty in number, are so disposed upon its well-constructed bastions, as to command not only the great road which traverses the village at its feet, but every path on either side of the adjacent mountains by which it appears practicable for a single person to pass.<sup>1</sup> No sooner was the advanced-guard arrested by this formidable obstacle, than Lannes advanced to the front, and ordered an assault on the town, defended only by a single wall. It was quickly carried by the impetuosity of the French grenadiers; but the Austrians retired in good order into the fort on the rock above, and from its secure casemates the garrison kept up an incessant fire upon every column that attempted the passage. Marescot, the chief of the engineers, reported, after a reconnaissance, that the fort could not be carried by a *coup-de-main*, while the rocky cliffs of the mountains on either side opposed the greatest difficulties to a regular siege.<sup>2</sup> The advance of the army was instantly checked; cannon, caissons, infantry, and cavalry, accumulated in the narrow

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70.

The army is  
stopped in  
the valley of  
Aosta by the  
Fort of  
Bard.<sup>1</sup> Personal  
observation.<sup>2</sup> Nap. i. 261,  
262. Jom.  
xiii. 182,  
183. Dum.  
iii. 176, 177.  
Bot. iv. 14.

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defile in the upper part of the valley, and the alarm rapidly running from front to rear, the advance of the columns behind was already suspended, from the apprehension that the enterprise was impracticable, and that they must recross the mountains.

71.  
Firm resistance of the  
Austrian  
commandant.  
May 23.

Napoleon, deeming all his difficulties surmounted, was advancing with joyful steps down the southern declivity of the St Bernard, when he received this alarming intelligence. Instantly advancing to the vanguard, he ascended the Monte Albaredo, which commanded the fort on the left bank of the Dora Baltea, and with his telescope long and minutely surveyed its walls. He soon perceived that it was possible for the infantry to pass by a path along the face of the cliffs of that rugged mountain, above the range of the guns of the fort ; but by no exertions was it possible to render it practicable for artillery. In vain the Austrian commandant was summoned, and threatened with instant assault and death in case of refusal to surrender ; he replied as became a man of courage and honour, well aware of the importance of his position, and the means of defending it which were in his power. A few pieces of artillery were, by great efforts, hoisted up to an eminence on the Monte Albaredo which commanded the fort ; but their fire produced little impression on the bomb-proof batteries and vaulted casemates which sheltered the garrison ; a single piece only, placed on the steeple of the town, answered with effect to the fire of one of the bastions. Time pressed, however, and it was indispensable that the army should without delay continue its advance. Contrary to the advice of Marescot, Napoleon ordered an escalade ; and Berthier formed three columns, each of three hundred grenadiers, who advanced with the utmost resolution at midnight to the assault. They climbed in silence up the rock, and reached the works without being discovered. The outer palisades were carried, and the Austrian videttes retired precipitately to the rampart above ; but at its foot all the efforts of the Republicans



were frustrated. The garrison was instantly on the alert. A shower of balls spread death through their ranks, while vast numbers of shells and hand-grenades, thrown down amongst them, augmented the confusion and alarm inseparable from a nocturnal attack. After sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon the attempt; the passage seemed hermetically closed; the army could not advance a step further in its progress.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 263.  
Jom. xiii.  
185. Bour.  
iv. 102.  
Dum. iii.  
176.

In this extremity, the genius and intrepidity of the French engineers surmounted the difficulty. The infantry and cavalry of Lannes' division traversed one by one the path on the Monte Albaredo, and re-formed lower down the valley; while the artillerymen succeeded in drawing their cannon, in the dark, through the town, close under the guns of the fort, by spreading straw and dung upon the streets, and wrapping the wheels up, so as to prevent the slightest sound being heard. In this manner forty pieces and a hundred caissons were drawn through during the night, while the Austrians, in unconscious security, slumbered above, beside their loaded cannon, directed straight into the street where the passage was going forward. A few grenades and combustibles were merely thrown at random over the ramparts during the gloom, which killed a considerable number of the French engineers, and blew up several of their ammunition-waggons, but without arresting for a moment the passage. Before daylight a sufficient number were passed to enable the advanced-guard to continue its march; and an obstacle, which might have proved the ruin of the whole enterprise, was effectually overcome. During the succeeding night, the same hazardous operation was repeated with equal success; and while the Austrian commander was writing to Melas that he had seen thirty-five thousand men and four thousand horse cross the path of the Albaredo, but that not one piece of artillery or caisson should pass beneath the guns of his fortress, the whole cannon and ammunition of the army were safely proceeding on the road to

<sup>72.</sup>  
Device by  
which the  
passage was  
at length  
effected.

May 25.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

1800.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 263,  
265. Jom.  
xiii. 185,  
188. Dum.  
xiii. 176,  
180. Bour.  
iv. 102, 103.

Ivrea. The fort of Bard itself held out till the 5th June; and we have the authority of Napoleon for the assertion, that if the passage of the artillery had been delayed till its fall, all hope of success in the campaign was at an end. The presence of an Austrian division seven thousand strong would have fully sufficed to destroy the French troops as they emerged without cannon from the perilous defile of the Albaredo. On such trivial incidents do the fate and the revolutions of nations in the last result often depend.<sup>1</sup>

73.  
After a  
short skir-  
mish at  
Ivrea, the  
French ad-  
vance to  
Turin.

Meanwhile Lannes, proceeding onward with the advanced-guard, emerged from the mountains, and appeared before the walls of Ivrea. This place, once of considerable strength, and which in 1704 had withstood for ten days all the efforts of the Duke of Vendôme with a formidable train of artillery, had of late years fallen into decay, and its ruined walls, but partially armed, hardly offered an obstacle to an enterprising enemy. Lannes ordered an assault at once on the three gates of the city. He advanced himself with the column on the right, and with his own hand directed the first strokes of the hatchet at the palisades. The defences were soon broken down, the chains of the drawbridges cut, the gates blown open, and the Republicans rushed, with loud shouts, on all sides into the town. A battalion which defended the walls was forced to fly, leaving three hundred prisoners in the hands of the enemy; and the Austrian troops drawn up behind the town retired precipitately towards Turin. They took post behind the Chinsella, spreading themselves out, according to custom, over a long line, to cover every approach to the capital of Piedmont. They were there attacked on the following day by the French general, and a warm contest ensued. The Imperialists, confident in the numbers and prowess of their cavalry, vigorously charged the Republicans; but, though they urged their horses to the very bayonets of the infantry, they were in the end repulsed, and the bridge over the river was carried by the

May 26.

assailants. After this check the Austrians retired towards Turin ; and Lannes, pursuing his successes, pushed on to the banks of the Po, where he made himself master of a flotilla of boats, of the greatest value to the invading army, as they did not possess the smallest bridge-equipage. The whole army, thirty-six thousand strong, was assembled at Ivrea, with all its artillery, on the 28th, while the advanced-guard pushed its patrols to the gates of Turin.<sup>1</sup>

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May 28.  
<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 266,  
267. Dum.  
iii. 185, 187.  
Jom. xiii.  
193, 195.

While the centre of the army of reserve was thus surmounting the difficulties of the St Bernard, the right and left wings performed with equal success the movements assigned to them. Thurreau, with five thousand men, crossed the Mont Cenis, and descended to Suza and Novalesse ; while Moucey, detached with sixteen thousand choice troops from the army of the Rhine, crossed the St Gothard, and began to appear in the neighbourhood of the Lago Maggiore. At the same time General Bethencourt, with a brigade of Swiss troops, ascended the Simplon, and, forcing the terrific defile of Gondo, appeared at Duomo d'Ossola, and opened up a communication with the left of the army. Thus, above sixty thousand men, converging from many different quarters, were assembled in the plains of Piedmont, and threatened the rear of the Imperial army engaged in the defiles of the Appenines from Genoa to the mouth of the Var. No sooner did Melas receive information of the appearance of this formidable enemy in the Italian plains, than he despatched couriers in all directions to concentrate his troops. He himself, as already mentioned, broke up from the Var with the greater part of his forces, and orders were despatched to Ott to raise the siege of Genoa, and hasten with all the strength he could collect to the Bormida. The orders arrived at Genoa just at the time when the capitulation was going forward, so that the advance of the army of reserve was too late to raise the siege of that fortress ; but still an important and decisive operation awaited the

74.  
Passage of  
the St Gothard and  
Mont Cenis  
by the wings  
of the army.  
Melas in  
haste concentrates  
his troops.

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XXXI.

1800.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. Vie  
de Nap. i.  
134, and  
xiii. 190,  
192. Dum.  
iii. 187, 192.

First Consul. To oppose him, in the first instance, the Austrians had only the corps of Wukassowich, Laudon, and Haddick, who could hardly muster eighteen thousand men in all, and not above six thousand at any one point, so widely were their immense forces scattered over the countries they had conquered; while the concentration of their troops from the Var and the neighbourhood of Genoa would require a considerable time.<sup>1</sup>

In these circumstances the French commander had the choice of three different plans, each of which promised to be attended with important results. The first was to incline to the right, form a junction with Thurreau, and, in concert with Suchet, attack the Austrian army under Melas; the second, to cross the Po by means of the barks so opportunely thrown into his power, and advance to the relief of Massena, who yet held out; the third, to move to the left, pass the Tessino, form a junction with Moncey, and capture Milan with the stores and reserve parks of the Imperialists. Of these different plans the first appeared unadvisable, as the forces of Melas were superior to those of the First Consul without the addition of Moncey, and it was extremely hazardous to run the risk of a defeat, while the fort of Bard still held out and interrupted the retreat of the army. The second was equally perilous, as it plunged the invading army, without any line of communication, into the centre of the Imperial forces, and it was doubtful whether Genoa could hold out till the Republican eagles approached the Bochetta. The third had the disadvantage of abandoning Massena to his fate; but to counterbalance that, it offered the most brilliant results. The possession of Milan could not fail to produce a great moral impression, both on the Imperialists and the Italians, and to renew, in general estimation, the halo of glory which encircled the brows of the First Consul. The junction with Moncey would raise the army to full fifty thousand effective men, and secure for it a safe retreat in case of disaster by the St Gothard and

75.  
Different  
plans which  
lay open to  
Napoleon.  
He resolves  
to occupy  
Milan.

the Simplon; the magazines and parks of reserve collected by the Austrians lay exposed to immediate capture in the unprotected towns of Lombardy; while, by intercepting their communications with Germany, and compelling them to fight with their rear towards France and the Maritime Alps, the inestimable advantage was gained of rendering any considerable disaster the forerunner of irreparable ruin.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 268,  
270. Jom.  
xiii. 190,  
196.

Influenced by these considerations, Napoleon directed his troops rapidly towards the Tessino, and arrived on the banks of that river on the 31st May. The arrival of so great a force, in a quarter where they were totally unexpected, threw the Austrians into the utmost embarrassment. All their disposable infantry was occupied at Bellinzona in opposing the advance of Moncey, or had retired behind the Lago Maggiore, before Bethencourt. The only troops which they could collect to oppose the passage were the cavalry of Festenberg, with a few regiments under Laudon—a force under five thousand men, and totally inadequate to maintain the line of the Tessino from Calende, where it flows out of the Lago Maggiore, to Pavia, where it joins the Po, against an enemy thirty thousand strong. Unable to guard the line of the river, the cavalry of Festenberg was drawn up in front of Turbigo, when Gerard, with the advanced-guard, crossed the river under cover of the French artillery, advantageously posted on the heights behind, and instantly made himself master of the bridge of Naviglio, by which the infantry of the division began to defile to his assistance. He was immediately and warmly attacked by the Imperial cavalry; but though they at first had some success, yet the French having retired into a woody position deeply intersected by canals, they succeeded in maintaining their ground, until the Republicans had crossed over in such numbers as to enable them to carry Turbigo with the bayonet, and effectually establish themselves on the left bank of the river. At the same time Murat effected a passage at

76.  
Advance  
into Lom-  
bardy, and  
capture of  
Milan.  
May 31.

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June 2.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 271.

272. Dum.

iii. 265, 268.

Jom. xiii.

208, 210.

Buffalora, on the great road from Turin to Milan, with hardly any opposition; the Austrians retired on all sides, and Napoleon, with the advanced-guard, made his triumphant entry into Milan on the 2d June, where he was received with transports of joy by the democratic party, and by the inconstant populace with the same applause which they had lavished the year before on Suwarroff.<sup>1</sup>

77.

He spreads  
his forces  
over Lombardy :  
proclamation  
to his  
troops.

Nothing could exceed the astonishment of the Milanese at this sudden apparition of the Republican hero. Some believed he had died near the Red Sea, and that it was one of his brothers who commanded the army; none were aware that he had so recently crossed the Alps, and returned to the scenes of his former glory. He instantly dismissed the Austrian authorities, re-established, with more show than sincerity, the republican magistrates; but foreseeing that the chances of war might expose his partisans to severe reprisals, wisely forbade any harsh measures against the dethroned party. Taking advantage of the public enthusiasm which his unexpected arrival occasioned, he procured, by contributions and levies, large supplies for his troops, and augmented their numbers by the regiments of Moncey, which slowly made their appearance from the St Gothard. On the 6th and 7th June these troops were reviewed, and the French outposts extended in all directions. They were pushed to Placentia and the Po, the principal towns in Lombardy being abandoned, without resistance, by the Austrians. Pavia fell into their hands, with 200 pieces of cannon, 8000 muskets, and stores in proportion. At the same time the following animated proclamation was addressed to the troops, and electrified all Europe, recently accustomed only to the reverses of the Republicans:—"Soldiers! when we began our march, one of our departments was in the possession of the enemy: consternation reigned through all the south of France. The greatest part of the Ligurian republic, the most faithful ally of our country, was overrun. The Cisalpine republic, annihilated in the last campaign,

groaned under the feudal yoke. You advanced, and already the French territory is delivered: joy and hope have succeeded in our country to consternation and fear. You will restore liberty and independence to the people of Genoa: you already are in the capital of the Cisalpine republic. The enemy, terror-struck, seeks only to regain his frontiers: you have taken from him his hospitals, his magazines, his reserve parks. The first act of the campaign is finished; millions of men address you in strains of praise. But shall we allow our audacious enemies to violate with impunity the territory of the republic? Will you permit the army to escape which has carried terror among your families? You will not. March, then, to meet him; tear from his brows the laurels he has won; teach the world that a malediction attends those who violate the territory of the great people. The result of our efforts will be unclouded glory and a durable peace."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 272,  
275. Jom.  
xiii. 209,  
210, 214,  
216. Dum.  
iii. 269, 271,  
273. Bul.  
110, 117.

While these important operations were going forward in Lombardy, Melas conceived the project of threatening his adversary's communications by a movement on Vercelli. But, when on the point of executing this design, he received intelligence of the simultaneous disasters which in so many different quarters were accumulating on the Austrian monarchy; the repeated defeats of Kray in Germany, and his concentration in the intrenched camp at Ulm; the arrival of Monecy at Bellinzona, and the retreat of Wukassowich towards the Adda. In these circumstances more cautious measures seemed necessary, and he resolved to concentrate his army under the cannon of Alessandria. But while the French soldiers were abandoning themselves to the flattering illusions which this extraordinary and rapid success suggested, they received the disastrous intelligence of the surrender of Genoa; and Napoleon had the mortification of finding, from the point to which the troops who capitulated were to be conveyed, that they could be of no service to him in the decisive operations that were fast approaching. It was evident,

78.  
Napoleon  
advances to  
meet Melas,  
who concen-  
trates his  
forces at  
Alessandria.

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therefore, that he would have the whole Austrian army on his hands at once, and therefore no time was to be lost in striking a decisive blow. The fort of Bard capitulated on the 5th June, which both disengaged the troops of Chabran employed in its reduction, and opened the St Bernard as a secure line of retreat in case of disaster. The rapid marches and counter-marches of the Republicans through the plain of Lombardy, had made the enemy fall back to Mantua and the line of the Mincio, and the French troops already occupied Lodi and blockaded Pizzighettone, and other fortresses on the Po. But from this dispersion of force, and eccentric direction given to a large portion of the army, arose a most serious inconvenience; it reduced to one-half the mass that could be collected to make head against Melas in Piedmont. In effect, out of the sixty-five thousand men which he commanded in Lombardy, Napoleon could only collect thirty thousand in one body to meet the main army of the enemy. But, confident in his own abilities and the spirit of his troops, he resolved with this inconsiderable force to cut Melas off from his line of retreat; and for this purpose moved upon Stradella, on the right bank of the Po, which brought him on the great road from Alessandria to Mantua.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 275,  
277. Dum.  
iii. 276, 279.  
Jom. xiii.  
212, 220.  
Bul. 124,  
127.

79.  
The French  
vanguard  
comes up  
with the  
Austrians  
at Montebello.

The French army began its march towards the Po on the 6th June, and Lannes, commanding the advanced-guard, crossed that river at St Cipriano. At the same time Murat, who had broken up from Lodi, attacked the *têtes-de-pont* at Placentia, and drove the Austrians out of that town on the road towards Tortona; while Duhesme, not less fortunate, assailed Cremona, and expelled the garrison, with the loss of eight hundred men. The line of the Po being thus broken through at three points, the Imperialists everywhere fell back; and, abandoning all hope of maintaining their communication with Mantua and their reserves in the east of Italy, concentrated their forces near Stradella, towards Casteggio and Montebello.



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Ott there joined them with the forces rendered disposable by the surrender of Genoa, and stationed his troops on a chain of gentle eminences, in two lines, so disposed as to be able to support one another in case of need. Fifteen thousand chosen troops were there drawn up in the most advantageous position: their right resting on the heights which formed the roots of the Appenines, and commanding the great road to Tortona which wound round their feet; their left extending into the plain, where their splendid cavalry could act with effect. At the sight of such an array, Lannes was a moment startled; but, instantly perceiving the disastrous effect which the smallest retrograde movement might have on a corps with its rear resting on the Po, he resolved forthwith to attack the enemy. His forces did not exceed nine thousand men, while those of the enemy were fifteen thousand strong; but the division of Victor, of nearly equal strength, was only two leagues in the rear, and might be expected to take a part in the combat before its termination.<sup>1</sup>

June 9.  
1 Bot. iv. 23.  
Nap. i. 279.  
Dum. iii.  
288, 290.  
Jom. xiii.  
257, 258.

The French infantry with great gallantry advanced in echelon, under a shower of grape-shot and musketry, to storm the hills on the right of the Austrian position, where strong batteries were placed, which commanded the whole field of battle. They succeeded in carrying the heights of Revetta; but they were there assailed, while disordered by success, by six fresh regiments, and driven with great slaughter down into the plain. In the centre, on the great road, Watrin with difficulty maintained himself against the vehement attacks of the Imperialists; and notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Lannes, defeat appeared inevitable, when the battle was restored by the arrival of a division of Victor's corps, which enabled the Republicans to rally their troops and prepare a fresh attack. New columns were immediately formed to assail the heights on the left, while Watrin commenced a furious onset in the centre; the Austrians were everywhere driven back, and the triumph of the French appeared

80.  
Desperate  
and bloody  
action there,  
in which the  
Austrians  
are worsted.

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certain, when Ott brought up his reserves from the second line, and victory again inclined to the other side. The Republicans, attacked in their turn by fresh troops, gave way, and the loud shouts of the Imperialists announced a total overthrow, when the arrival of the remainder of Victor's corps not only restored the balance, but turned it against the Austrians. Their troops, however, were too experienced, and their confidence in themselves too great, to yield without a desperate struggle. Both sides were animated by the most heart-stirring recollections. The French fought to regain the laurels they had won in the first Italian campaign, the Imperialists to preserve those they had reaped in so many later triumphs; and both parties felt that the fate of the war, in a great degree, depended on their exertions; for the Austrians struggled to gain time for the concentration of their forces to meet this new enemy, the Republicans to avoid being driven back with ruinous loss into the Po. The last reserves on both sides were soon engaged, and the contending parties fought long hand to hand with the most heroic resolution. At length the arrival of Napoleon, with the division Gardanne, decided the victory. Ott, who now saw his right turned, while the centre and left were on the point of giving way, reluctantly gave the signal of retreat; and the Imperialists, in good order, and with measured steps, retired towards St Julian, after throwing a garrison of a thousand men into the fortress of Tortona.<sup>1\*</sup>

This was one of the most desperate actions which had yet occurred in the war. "The bones," said Lannes, "cracked in my division like glass in a hailstorm." The

\* It is remarkable that Napoleon's foresight had, before he crossed the Alps, pointed to St Julian as the theatre of his first conflict with the enemy. "Un jour, avant de partir, couché sur ses cartes, y posant des signes de différentes couleurs, pour figurer la position des corps Français et Autrichiens, il disait devant son secrétaire M. Bourrienne:—'Ce pauvre M. de Mèlas passera par Turin, se repliera vers Alexandrie: Je passerai le Pô, je le joindrai sur la route de Plaisance, dans les plaines de la Scrivia, je le battrai là, là.' En disant ces mots, il posait un de ses signes à St Julian."—BOURRIENNE, iv. 86; and THIERS' *Consulat et l'Empire*, i. 357.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 278,  
280. Bot.  
iv. 23, 24.  
Jom. xiii.  
256, 260.  
Dum. iii.  
293, 297.  
Bul. 137.  
145. Bour.  
iv. 110, 112.

Austrians lost in it three thousand killed and wounded, and fifteen hundred prisoners. The French had to lament nearly an equal number slain or disabled ; but the moral effect of the victory was immense, and more than counterbalanced all their losses. It restored at once the spirit of their troops, which the continued disasters of the preceding campaign had severely weakened ; and when Napoleon traversed the field of battle late in the evening, he found the soldiers lying on the ground, and exhausted with fatigue, but animated with all their ancient enthusiasm. He halted his army at Stradella, a strong position, formed by the advance of a lower ridge of the Appenines towards the Po, where the intersected and broken nature of the ground promised to render unserviceable the numerous cavalry of the enemy. In this position he remained the three following days, concentrating and organising his troops for the combat which was approaching, and covering by *têtes-de-pont* the two bridges over the Po in his rear—his sole line of retreat in case of disaster, or means of rejoining the large portion of his army which remained behind.<sup>1</sup>

While Napoleon, with the army of reserve, was thus threatening Melas in front, and occupied, at Stradella, the principal line by which the Austrian general could re-establish his communications with the plain of Lombardy, disasters of the most formidable kind were accumulating in the rear of the Imperialists. No sooner did Elnitz commence his retreat, in the night of the 27th May, than Suchet, reinforced by some thousands of the national guard in the vicinity, which raised his corps to fourteen thousand men, instantly resumed the offensive. His plan was, by constantly throwing forward his left wing up the rocky bed of the Roya, to gain the Col de Tende before the Austrians, and thus force them to retreat along the crest of the Appenines to gain some of the more distant passes. At noon, on the following day, General Menard attacked the intrenchments which covered the retreat of the Austrians,

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81.

Position of  
the French  
in the Pass  
of Stradella,  
between the  
Appenines  
and the Po.<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 280.  
Dum. iii.  
297, 299.  
Jom. xiii.  
260, 261.

82.

Disastrous  
retreat of  
Elnitz from  
the Var.

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forced them, and made three hundred prisoners. Following up his successes, he advanced rapidly on the three succeeding days, and on the 31st attacked Bellegarde, and drove him from a strong position on the Col de Braus. On the next day, all the French columns were put in motion by sunrise. Garnier moved upon the Col de Tende by the Col de Rauss ; Menard, by the heights of Pietra Cava, directed his steps to the fort of Saorgio, now dismantled, and the camp of Mille-Fourches ; while Brunet attacked the Col de Braus in front, supported by a lateral column on each flank. These movements, though complicated from the nature of the ground, were attended with complete success. The important positions of the Col de Rauss, and the camp of Mille-Fourches, were successively carried, the troops who defended them flying towards the Col de Tende and Fontan, leaving a thousand prisoners in the hands of the Republicans ; Menard descended from the heights in its rear to the romantic fort of Saorgio, which fell without any resistance ; at the same time, Garnier and Lesuire established themselves on the Col de Tende, the troops intrusted with the defence of which sought refuge within the walls of Coni.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
234, 238.  
Dum. iii.  
219, 224.  
Bot. iv.  
21, 22.

83.  
His immense  
losses.

The great road by the Col de Tende being thus forced, and the Austrian line broken through the middle, the usual series of disasters fell upon their scattered detachments. Elnitz, instead of uniting his forces to fall on Menard, and regain the decisive pass of Saorgio and the great road, moved to the left to Aqua-Dolce to cover the communication with Genoa. The consequence of this was, that the Austrian generals, Ulm and Bellegarde, with two Austrian brigades, were surrounded at Breglio, and being cut off by the fall of Saorgio from the great road, had no alternative but to sacrifice their artillery, consisting of twelve light pieces, and throw themselves upon the heights of Foscoire, a branch of the Mont Jove. They were there attacked on the following day by Ro-

chambeau, and driven back to Pigna, while Suchet pursued Elnitz towards Aqua-Dolce, and Menard descended from the sources of the Tanaro towards Pieve. He had hardly arrived at that place when Ulm and Bellegarde, who, after unheard-of fatigues, had surmounted the rugged mountains which overhang Triola, arrived at the same place, exhausted with fatigue and totally unable to make any resistance. They occupied the houses without opposition, but they soon found that the overhanging woods were filled with enemies, and, to complete their consternation, intelligence shortly after arrived that Delaunay, with an entire brigade, had cut off their only line of retreat. A panic instantly seized the troops; whole battalions threw down their arms and dispersed, and, after wandering for days in the woods, were compelled by the pangs of hunger to surrender to the enemy. Of their whole force, only three hundred men, with the two generals, made their retreat by the Monte Ariolo to Latterman's camp. Elnitz at length, with eight thousand men, reached Ceva, having lost nearly nine thousand men in this disastrous retreat; while Suchet united at Voltri with the garrison of Genoa, landed at that place by the Austrians, and advanced with these combined forces to the heights of Montenotte.<sup>1</sup>

June 4.

June 7.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
234, 243.  
Dum. iii.  
219, 227.  
Bot. iv. 22,  
24. Bul.  
187, 195.

These disasters accumulating, one after another, on all sides, rendered the position of Melas highly critical. In his front was Napoleon, with the army of reserve, amounting in all to sixty thousand men; while, in his rear, Suchet occupied all the mountain-passes, and was driving before him the scattered Imperialists like chaff before the wind. On his left, the awful barrier of the Alps, leading only into a hostile country, precluded all hopes of retreat; while on his right, the ridges of the Appenines, backed by the sea, rendered it impossible to regain by a circuitous route the Hereditary States. Nothing could be more perilous than his situation; but the Austrian veteran was not discouraged, and, concentrating all his disposable forces,

84.  
Gallant resolution of Melas to cut his way through Napoleon's army.

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he resolved to give battle, and open a communication, sword in hand, with the eastern provinces of the empire. Nor was it without reason that he ventured on this step, albeit hazardous at all times, and doubly so when retreat was impossible, and communication with the base of operations cut off. He could collect above thirty thousand veteran troops in one field, animated with the best spirit, and proud of two campaigns of unbroken glory ; his artillery was greatly superior to that of the enemy, while the plains of the Bormida, where the decisive battle apparently was to be fought, seemed admirably adapted for his numerous and magnificent cavalry. Having taken his resolution, he despatched messengers in all directions to concentrate his forces ; Elnitz, with the broken remains of his corps, was recalled from Ceva ; Hohenzollern from Genoa, the defence of which was intrusted to the attenuated prisoners liberated from captivity by its fall ; while a courier was despatched in haste to Admiral Keith, to accelerate the arrival of a corps of twelve thousand British, who at this decisive crisis lay inactive at Minorca.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. iii.  
298, 299.  
Jom. xiii.  
244, 248.  
Bul. 200,  
209.

85.  
Arrival of  
Desaix from  
Egypt at  
Napoleon's  
headquar-  
ters.

The post of Stradella, where Napoleon awaited the arrival of the enemy, and barred the great road to the eastward, was singularly well adapted to compensate the inferiority in cavalry and artillery of the First Consul. The right rested on impracticable morasses, extending to the Po ; the centre was strengthened by several large villages ; the left, commanding the great road, extended over heights, the commencement of the Appenines, crowned with a numerous artillery. In addition to these advantages for a defensive struggle, this position had others still more important in a strategetical point of view. Near it the principal feeders of the Po, the Tessino and the Adda, fall into that noble stream. Having the command of the bridges over these rivers, and blocking up the main road from Alessandria to Placentia, with his left resting on the Appenines, and in possession of its passes,

the French general had the entire command of the country against an enemy advancing from the west. Napoleon remained there, awaiting the attack, for three days ; but the Austrian general had scarcely completed his preparations, and he judged it not advisable to abandon the open plain, so favourable for his cavalry, for the broken ground selected by the enemy. On the 11th, Desaix, who had returned from Egypt, and performed quarantine at Toulon, arrived at headquarters with his aides-de-camp, Savary and Rapp. They sat up all night conversing on the changes of France, and the state of Egypt since they had parted on the banks of the Nile ; and the First Consul, who really loved his lieutenant, and appreciated his military talents, immediately gave him the command of the division of Boudet. Finding that the Austrians were resolved not to attack him where he was, and remained grouped under the cannon of Alessandria, and fearful that they might recoil upon Suchet, or incline to the right towards Genoa, or the left to the Tessino, and threaten in turn his own communications, he resolved to give them battle in their own ground, and advanced to Voghera and the plain of MARENGO. Ott, at his approach, retired across the Bormida, the two bridges over which were fortified, and armed with cannon.<sup>1</sup>

June 12.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 281,  
203. Bot.  
iv. 24. Dum.  
iii. 299.  
Jorn. xiii.  
260, 263.  
Thiers, i.  
417, 419.

Melas learned on the 10th, at Alessandria, the disastrous issue of the combat at Montebello, and the immense extent of the losses sustained by Elnitz. Far from being stunned by so many reverses, he only rose in firmness as the danger increased ; and, after despatching a courier to Lord Keith, with accounts of his critical situation, and his resolution, in case of disaster, to fall back upon Genoa, he addressed a noble proclamation to his troops, in which, without concealing their danger, he exhorted them to emulate their past glory, or fall with honour on the field which lay before them. Napoleon, on his side, fearful that the enemy meditated a retreat, and might retire unbroken to the fastnesses of the Appenines, pushed for-

86.  
Preparatory  
movements  
of both parties.

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June 13.

ward with vigour. Lapoype, with his division, who had been left in observation on the north of the Po, received orders instantly to cross that river, and hasten to the scene of action ; while Victor was directed to advance straight towards Marengo, and make himself master of the bridges over the Bormida. He successfully performed the task ; Marengo, after a slight resistance, was carried, and the victorious French troops were arrested only by the fire of cannon from the *têtes-de-pont* on the Bormida. The facility with which Marengo was abandoned, confirmed Napoleon in his opinion that the Austrian general meditated a retreat ; and impressed with this idea, he resolved to return during the night to Ponte Curone, and move in the direction of the Po—a resolution which would have proved fatal to his army, as it would have been attacked and routed on the following day, while executing its movement, by the Austrian general. The rapid swelling of the torrent of the Scrivia rendered this impossible, and induced the First Consul to fix his headquarters at Torre de Garofalo, between Tortona and Alessandria ; and during the night intelligence of such a kind was received, as rendered it necessary to suspend the lateral movements, and concentrate all his forces to resist the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 287,  
288. Jom.  
xiii. 263,  
266. Dum.  
iii. 305, 307.  
Bul. 210,  
220.

67.  
Forces as-  
sembled on  
both sides.

In effect, Melas, having collected thirty-one thousand men on the Bormida, of which seven thousand were cavalry, with two hundred pieces of cannon, was advancing with rapid strides towards Marengo ; having finally determined, in a general council on the preceding day, to risk everything on the issue of a battle. Napoleon's troops of all arms present on the field, did not exceed twenty-nine thousand, of which only three thousand six hundred were horse ; no less than thirty thousand being in observation or garrison in the Milanese states, or on the banks of the Po. The Austrian force had undergone a similar diminution from the same supposed necessity of protecting the rear ; four thousand were left in Coni, and so many in



Liguria, that instead of the thirty thousand who were disposable at the end of May in that quarter, only sixteen thousand joined the Imperial headquarters. Their spirits, however, which had been somewhat weakened by the recent reverses, were elevated to the highest degree when the determination to fight was taken; every one returned in joyful spirits to his quarters; the camp resounded with warlike cries and the note of military preparation, and that mutual confidence between officers and men was observable, which is the surest forerunner of glorious achievements.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv. 25.  
Jom. xiii.  
270. Bul.  
230, 233.

By daybreak, on the 14th June, the whole army of Melas was in motion; they rapidly defiled over the three bridges of the Bormida; and when the first rays of the sun appeared above the horizon, they glittered on twenty-one thousand foot-soldiers, seven thousand cavalry, and two hundred pieces of cannon, pressing forward in proud array over the vast and level field of Marengo, perhaps the only plain in Italy where charges of horse can be made in full career.<sup>2</sup> The First Consul was surprised; he never anticipated an attack from the enemy; his troops were disposed in oblique order by echelon, the left in front, and the right at half a day's march in the rear, in marching order; not more than twenty-two thousand men, under Lannes and Victor, could be brought till noon into the field to withstand the shock of the whole Austrian army. The vehemence of the cannonade soon convinced him that a general battle was at hand, and he instantly despatched orders to Desaix to remeasure his steps, and hasten to the scene of action. But before he could do this, events of the utmost importance had taken place. At eight o'clock, the Austrian infantry, under Haddick and Kaim, preceded by a numerous and splendid array of artillery, which covered the deploying of their columns, commenced the attack. They speedily overthrew Gardanne, who with six battalions was stationed in front of Marengo, and drove him back in disorder towards that village. They were there received

88.  
Battle of  
Marengo.  
June 14.

<sup>2</sup> Personal  
observation.

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by the bulk of Victor's corps, which was by this time drawn up, with its centre in the village, and its wings along the hollow of Fontanone, which separated the two armies ; that of Lannes was still in the rear. For two hours, Victor withstood all the efforts of Haddick and Kaim with heroic resolution : at length the corps of Lannes came up, and the forces on both sides became more equal. The battle now raged with the utmost fury ; the opposing columns stood, with invincible firmness, within pistol-shot of each other, and all the chasms, produced by the dreadful discharges of artillery, were rapidly filled up by a regular movement to the centre of the brave men who formed the ranks.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 289.  
Dum. ii. 310,  
314. Jom.  
xiii. 272,  
275.

89.  
Great suc-  
cess of the  
Austrians.

While this desperate conflict was going on, intelligence was received that the advanced-guard of Suchet had reached Acqui in the rear. Melas, uneasy for his communications, detached two thousand five hundred horse to arrest his progress—an unnecessary precaution, as he was too far off to effect anything on the field of battle ; and which, perhaps, decided the fate of the day. At length the perseverance of the Austrians prevailed over the heroic devotion of the French : the stream of the Fontanone was forced, Marengo was carried, and the Republicans were driven back to the second line they had formed in the rear. Here they made a desperate stand, and Haddick's division, disordered by success, was repulsed across the stream by Watrin with the right of Lannes' division ; but the Republicans could not follow up their advantage, as Victor's corps, exhausted with fatigue, and severely weakened in numerical strength, was in no condition to support any offensive movement. The Austrians, perceiving his weakness, redoubled their efforts ; a fresh attack was made on the centre and left, by which Victor's corps, weakened by four hours' incessant fighting, was at length broken. The Imperialists pressed forward with redoubled vigour, when their adversaries gave way ; their regiments were rapidly pursued, and frequently surrounded, and no re-

source remained but to traverse for two leagues the open plain as far as St Julian, where the reserve under Desaix might be expected to arrive for their support. The Imperialists rapidly followed, preceded by fifteen pieces of artillery, which spread death through the retreating columns. Melas, with the centre, established himself at Marengo, and Lannes, now entirely uncovered on his left, was obliged to commence a retrograde movement, which at first was performed by echelon in squares with admirable discipline. Gradually, however, the retreat became more disorderly; in vain Kellermann and Champeaux, by repeated charges, arrested the Imperial cavalry, which swept round the retreating columns. They could not check the Hungarian infantry, which advanced steadily in pursuit, halting at every fifty yards, and pouring in destructive volleys, while the intervals between the regiments were filled up by a powerful artillery, which incessantly sent a storm of grapeshot through the retreating masses. No firmness could long endure such a trial. Gradually the squares broke; the immense plain of Marengo was covered with fugitives; the alarm spread even to the rear of the army, and the fatal cry, "*Tout est perdu—sauve qui peut!*" was already heard in the ranks.<sup>1</sup>

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Matters were in this disastrous state, when Napoleon, at eleven o'clock, arrived on the field of battle with his guard. The sight of his staff, surrounded by two hundred mounted grenadiers, revived the spirits of the fugitives; the well-known plumes recalled to the veterans the hopes of success. The fugitives rallied at St Julian, in the rear of those squares of Lannes which still kept their ranks, and Napoleon detached eight hundred grenadiers of his guard to the right of the army, to make head against Ott, who there threatened to turn its flank. At the same time, he himself advanced with a demi-brigade to the support of Lannes, in the centre, and detached two demi-brigades of Monnier's division, the vanguard of Desaix's corps, to Castel-Cerriolo, on the extreme right, to hold in

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 280,  
290. Bot.  
iv. 27, 28.  
Dum. iii.  
310, 317.  
Jom. xiii.  
272, 279.  
Sav. i. 174,  
175. Bul.  
232, 245.

90.  
Arrival of  
Napoleon on  
the field of  
battle, and  
his first  
steps.

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check the light infantry of the enemy, who were there making serious progress. The grenadiers first advanced in square into the midst of the plain, clearing their way equally through the fugitives and the enemy; from their sides, as from a flaming castle, issued incessant volleys of musketry, and all the efforts of the Imperialists were long unable to force back this intrepid band. At length, however, they were shaken by the steady fire of the Imperial artillery, and being charged in front by the Hungarian infantry, and in flank by the Austrian hussars, were broken and driven back in disorder. Their destruction appeared certain, when the leading battalions of Monnier's division, under Cara St-Cyr, arrived, disengaged this band of heroes from the numerous enemies by whom they were surrounded, and advancing rapidly forward, made themselves masters of the village of Castel-Ceriolo. Here, however, they were charged with fury by Vogelsang, with part of Ott's division, who regained Castel-Ceriolo, and separated Monnier from the grenadiers of the guard; it was soon, however, retaken by the French, and Cara St-Cyr, barricading himself in the houses, succeeded in maintaining that important post during the remainder of the day.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 290,  
291. Dum.  
iii. 318, 321.  
Bot. iv. 29,  
30. Jom.  
xiii. 279,  
282. Sav. i.  
176. Bul.  
249, 260.

91.  
Imminent  
danger of  
the French.

While the reserves of Napoleon were thus directed to the French right, with a view to arrest the advance of the Austrians in that quarter, the left was a scene of the most frightful disorder. Then was felt the irreparable loss to the Austrians which the detachment of so large a portion of their cavalry to the rear had occasioned. Had the squadrons detached to observe Suchet poured in upon the broken fugitives in that quarter, the defeat of the left and centre would have been complete; and Desaix, assailed both in front and flank, would have come up only in time to share in the general ruin. But nothing of the kind was attempted. Melas, deeming the victory gained, after having had two horses shot under him, and being exhausted with the excessive heat and fatigue, retired at two o'clock to Alessandria, leaving to his chief of the staff, Zach,

the duty of following up his success; and the broken centre and left of the Republicans retired to St Julian, leisurely followed by the Austrian army. Zach put himself at the head of the advanced-guard, and at the distance of half a mile behind him came up Kaim with three brigades, and at an equal distance in his rear the reserve, composed of Hungarian grenadiers. Napoleon on his part had resolved to abandon the great road to Tortona, and effect his retreat by the shorter line of Sale or Castel Nuovo.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nap.i. 291,  
292. Jom.  
xiii. 282,  
283. Bot.  
iv. 29, 30.  
Dum. iii.  
320. Sav.i.  
177. Bul.  
260, 264.

Matters were in this desperate state, when, at four o'clock, the main body of Desaix at length made its appearance at St Julian. "What think you of the day?" said Napoleon to his lieutenant, when he arrived with his division. "The battle," said Desaix, "is completely lost. But it is only four o'clock; there is time to gain another one." Napoleon and he alone were of this opinion; all the others counselled a retreat. In pursuance of this resolution, the remains of Victor and Lannes' corps were re-formed, under cover of the cavalry, which was massed in front of St Julian, a masked battery prepared under the direction of Marmont, and Desaix advanced at the head of his corps, consisting of little more than four thousand men, to attempt arresting the progress of the enemy. Napoleon, advancing to the front, rode along the line, exclaiming, "Soldiers! we have retired far enough. You know it is always my custom to sleep on the field of battle." The troops replied by enthusiastic shouts, and immediately advanced to the charge. Zach, little anticipating such an onset, was advancing at the head of his column, five thousand strong, when he was received by a discharge of twelve pieces, suddenly unmasked by Marmont, while at the same time Desaix debouched from the village at the head of his division. The Imperialists, astonished at the appearance of so considerable a body, where they expected to find only fugitives in disorder, and apprehensive of falling into a snare, paused and fell back; but

92.  
Arrival of  
Desaix.  
After a gal-  
lant charge,  
he too is  
defeated.

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
286, 287,  
289. Nap. i.  
292, 293.  
Dum. iii.  
324, 325.  
Sav. i. 178.  
Bul. 260,  
271. Bour.  
iv. 122.

93.  
A decisive  
charge of  
Kellermann  
converts the  
defeat into  
a victory.

Zach soon succeeded in restoring order in the front, and checked the advance of the enemy. At this moment Desaix was struck by a ball in the breast, and soon after expired. This catastrophe, however, was far from weakening the ardour of his soldiers. The second in command, Boudet, succeeded in inspiring them with the desire of vengeance, and the fire rolled rapidly and sharply along the whole line. But the Imperialists had now recovered from their surprise; the Hungarian grenadiers advanced to the charge; the French in their turn hesitated and broke, and victory was more doubtful than ever.<sup>1</sup>

At this critical moment, a happy inspiration seized Kellermann, which decided the fate of the day. The advance of Zach's column had, without their being aware of it, brought their flank right before his mass of cavalry, eight hundred strong, which was concealed from their view by a vineyard, where the festoons, conducted from tree to tree, rose above the horses' heads, and effectually intercepted the sight. Kellermann instantly charged with his whole force upon the flank of the Austrians, as they advanced in open column, and the result must be given in his own words. "The combat was engaged," says Kellermann. "Desaix soon drove back the enemy's tirailleurs on their main body; but the sight of that formidable column of six thousand Hungarian grenadiers made our troops halt. I was advancing in line on their flank, concealed by the festoons; a frightful discharge took place; our line wavered, broke, and fled; the Austrians rapidly advanced to follow up their success, in all the disorder and security of victory. I see it; I am in the midst of them; they lay down their arms. The whole did not occupy so much time as it has taken me to write these six lines." The Duchess of Abrantes states also that she repeatedly heard the battle of Marengo discussed by Lannes, Victor, and the other generals engaged, at her own table, and that they all ascribed the victory to Kellermann's charge.<sup>2</sup> Zach's

<sup>2</sup> Sav. i. 178,  
179. Bul.  
271, 275.  
Nap. i. 292,  
293. Dum.  
iii. 324, 325;  
v. 361. Jom.  
xiii. 286,  
289. Bot.  
iv. 30, 31.  
Mém. du  
Dépôt de  
la Guerre,  
iv. 272.  
D'Abrantes,  
iii. 44, 45.

grenadiers, cut through the middle by this unexpected attack, and exposed to a murderous fire in front from Desaix's division, which had rallied upon receiving this unexpected aid, broke and fled. Zach himself, with two thousand men, were made prisoners; the remainder, routed and dispersed, fled in the utmost disorder to the rear, overthrowing in their course the other divisions which were advancing to their support.

This great achievement was decisive of the fate of the battle. The remains of Victor and Lannes' corps no sooner beheld this success, than they regained their former spirit, and turned fiercely upon their pursuers. The infantry of Kaim, overwhelmed by the tide of fugitives, gave way; the Austrian cavalry, which already inundated the field, were seized with a sudden panic; and, instead of striving to restore the day, galloped off to the rear, trampling down in their progress the unfortunate fugitives who were flying before them. A general cry arose, "To the bridges—to the bridges!" and the whole army, disbanding, rushed in confusion towards the Bormida. In the general consternation, Marengo was carried, after a gallant defence, by the Republicans; the cannoneers, finding the bridge choked up by the fugitives, plunged with their horses and guns into the stream, where twenty pieces stuck fast, and fell into the hands of the enemy. At length Melas, who hastened to the spot, rallied the rearguard in front of the bridges, and by its heroic resistance, gained time for the army to pass the river; the troops, regaining their ranks, re-formed upon the ground they had occupied at the commencement of the day; and after twelve hours' incessant fighting, the sun set upon this field of carnage.<sup>1</sup> \*

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1809.

94.  
Final defeat  
of the Aus-  
trians.

<sup>1</sup> Bul. 275,  
280. Sav. i.  
179. Nap. i.  
293, 294.  
Jom. xiii.  
290, 294.  
Dum. iii.  
325, 326.  
Bot. iv. 3J.  
Saalfeld, iv.  
230, 231.  
Gaz. Mil.  
d'Autriche,  
Ann. 1823.

\* There is a considerable similarity between the crisis of Marengo and that of Waterloo, with this difference, that the rout of the French was complete before the arrival of Desaix, while not an English square was broken before the final charge of the Old Guard. But the defeat of the last attacks in both battles was accomplished in the same way. The rout of Zach's column, by the fire of Desaix's division in front, added by the charge of Kellermann in flank, was precisely similar to the defeat of the Old Guard at Mount St John by the English

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1800.

95.

Loss sus-  
tained on  
both sides.

Such was the memorable battle of Marengo, one of the most obstinately contested which had yet occurred during the war, in which both parties performed prodigies of valour, and which was attended with greater results, perhaps, than any conflict that had yet occurred in modern Europe. The Imperialists had to lament seven thousand men killed and wounded, besides three thousand prisoners, eight standards, and twenty pieces of cannon, taken by their enemies. The French sustained an equal loss in killed and wounded, besides one thousand prisoners taken in the early part of the day. But although the disproportion was not so great in the trophies of victory, the difference was prodigious in the effect it produced on the respective armies, and the ultimate issue of the campaign. The Austrians had fought for life or death, with their faces towards Vienna, to cut their way sword in hand through the French army. Defeat in these circumstances was irreparable ruin. By retiring either to Genoa or the Maritime Alps, they ran the risk of being cooped up in a corner of a hostile territory, without any chance of regaining their own country, and the certainty of depriving the Empire of the only army capable of defending its Italian possessions. The French, on the other hand, had now firmly established themselves in the plains of Piedmont, and could, by merely retaining their present position, effectually cut off the Imperialists, and hinder their rendering any assistance to the Hereditary States. In these circumstances, the victory gave the Republicans, as that under the walls of Turin had given the Imperialists a century before, the entire command of Italy.<sup>1</sup> Such a result was in itself of vast importance; but, coming as it did in the outset of Napoleon's career as First Consul, its

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i. 294.  
Jom. xiii.  
295, 296.  
Dum. iii.  
328, 329.  
Bot. iv. 32,  
34. Aus-  
trian Official  
Account,  
Gaz. Mil.  
d'Autriche,  
1823. Mé-  
morial du  
Dépôt de la  
Guerre, iv.  
333. Bul.  
280, 281.

Guards, aided by the happy flank attack of Colonel Colborne, now Lord Seaton, with the 52d and 71st regiments, and the gallant subsequent charge of Sir Hussey Vivian with the 10th, 21st, and 18th hussars. In both cases the overthrow of the last columns of attack drew after it the total defeat of the army.— See "*Crisis of Waterloo*," by MAJOR GAWLER and SIR H. VIVIAN. *United Service Journal*, July 1833.



consequences were incalculable. It fixed him on the throne, revived the military spirit of the French people, and precipitated the nation into that career of conquest which led them to Cadiz and the Kremlin.\*

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United with the great qualities of Napoleon's character was a selfish thirst for glory, and consequent jealousy of any one who had either effectually thwarted his designs, or rendered him such services as might diminish the lustre of his own exploits. His undying jealousy of Wellington was an indication of the first weakness; his oblivion of Kellermann's invaluable service, an instance of the second. When this young officer was brought into the presence of the First Consul after the battle, he coldly said, "You made a good charge this evening;" and immediately turning to Bessières, added, "The guard has covered itself with glory."—"I am glad you are pleased," replied Kellermann, "for it has placed the crown on your head." He repeated the same expression in a letter, which was opened at the post-office and brought to Napoleon. The obligation was too great to be forgiven. Kellermann was not promoted like the other generals, and never afterwards enjoyed the favour of the chief on whose brow he had placed the diadem.† The First Consul, at the same time, was perfectly aware of the

96.  
Base conduct of Napoleon to Kellermann.

\* In the preceding account of the battle of Marengo, the author has corrected the various French and German accounts of the engagement hitherto published, by some Manuscript Notes by General Kellermann, who had so great a share in achieving the success, written on the margin of the collection of the various accounts of the battle, contained in the "Mémorial du Dépôt de la Guerre," iv. 269, 343. For these valuable manuscript notes, the author is indebted to the kindness of his esteemed friend, Captain Basil Hall.

† The poets had prefigured this feeling; so true are the words of Corneille:—

" Il m'a trop bien servi ;  
Et qui me fait régner en effet est mon maître.  
Pour paraître à mes yeux son mérite est trop grand,  
On n'aime point à voir ceux à qui l'on doit tant.  
Tout ce qu'il a fait parle au moment qu'il approche ;  
Et sa seule présence est un secret reproche ;  
Elle me dit toujours qu'il m'a fait trois fois roi,  
Que je tiens plus de lui qu'il ne tiendra de moi."

*Nicomède*, Act II. Scène 1.

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<sup>1</sup> Bour. iv.  
124, 125.  
Bot. iv. 34.

immense service rendered by the charge of his lieutenant; for he said in the evening to Bourrienne, "That little Kellermann made a happy charge. He struck in at the critical moment; we owe him much. On what trivial events do affairs depend!" Tacitus has unfolded the secret reason of such ingratitude:—"Tanto proclivius est injuriæ, quàm beneficio vicem exsolvere: quia gratia oneri, ultio in quæstu habetur."<sup>1</sup>\*

97.  
Meias pro-  
poses a sus-  
pension of  
arms:  
armistice of  
Alessandria.

While nothing but congratulation and triumph were heard in the French lines, the Austrian camp exhibited the utmost consternation. The night was spent in reforming the regiments, repairing the losses of the artillery, and replenishing the exhausted stores of ammunition. A council of war was summoned; the majority, thunder-struck by the magnitude of the disaster and the hopeless nature of their situation, inclined for a treaty to evacuate the Piedmontese territory. "If we cut our way through," said they, "supposing us to be successful, we must sacrifice ten thousand men left in Genoa, and as many in the fortresses of Piedmont, and shall not be the less compelled to take refuge under the cannon of Mantua. It is better to save these twenty thousand men than to preserve towns for the King of Sardinia." In conformity with these views, a flag of truce was despatched on the following morning to the French headquarters to propose terms of capitulation. He arrived at their outposts just at the time when an attack on the *têtes-de-pont* on the Bormida was preparing; and, after some difficulty, the terms of the treaty were agreed upon between the two generals. By this convention it was provided that "there should be an armistice between the two armies till an answer was obtained from the court of Vienna. That, in the mean time, the Imperial army should occupy the country between the Mincio and the Po; that is, Peschiera, Mantua, Borgoforte, and from it

June 15.

\* "So much more prone are men to avenge an injury than requite a benefit; for gratitude is a burden, revenge a gratification."—TACITUS, *Hist.* iv. 3.

to the left bank of the Po, and on its right bank, Ferrara, Ancona, and Tuscany: that the French should possess the district between the Chiesa, the Oglio, and the Po, and the space between the Chiesa and the Mincio should not be occupied by either army: that the fortresses of Tortona, Milan, Turin, Pizzighettone, Arona, Placentia, Ceva, Savona, Urbia, Coni, Alessandria, and Genoa, should be surrendered to the French, with all their artillery and stores, the Austrians taking with them only their own cannon." The evacuation of all these places, and the final retreat of the Austrian army, were to be completed by the 24th June.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Nap. i. 294,  
295, 296.  
Jom. xiii.  
296, 300.  
Bul. 281,  
287.

Thus the complete reconquest of Piedmont and the Milanese, the cession of twelve fortresses, armed with fifteen hundred pieces of cannon, and the advance of the Republican eagles to the Mincio, were the immediate effect of the stubborn resistance of Desaix and the happy charge of Kellermann. A few battalions and eight hundred horse changed the face of the world. But Napoleon must not be deprived of his share in these glorious results. These incidents were but the last steps in a chain of causes which his genius had prepared, and his skill brought to bear upon the final issue of the campaign. He had thrown himself upon his adversary's communications without compromising his own, and thence its astonishing consequences. Defeated at Marengo, he could still have fallen back upon an equal force detached in his rear, and, in the worst event, have retired over the St Gothard and the Simplon, with no other sacrifice but that of his artillery. To have achieved such results, at so inconsiderable a risk, is the greatest triumph of genius in the science of war. The convention of Alessandria was religiously observed by the Austrian commanders. The English expedition under Abercromby, with twelve thousand men, arrived in the bay of Genoa just in time to see that important city surrendered to the Republican commanders; but, notwithstanding that important succour,

98.  
Its immense  
results, and  
faithful ob-  
servance by  
the Aus-  
trians.

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
301, 302,  
305.

German integrity swerved nothing from its good faith. Had this important reinforcement, instead of lying inactive at Minorca, arrived a fortnight sooner with the troops which so soon afterwards conquered in Egypt, what important effects might it have had upon the fortune of the war! But the English at that period were ignorant of the importance of time in military operations, and but novices in the art of war. The time was yet to come when they were to appear in it as masters.<sup>1</sup>

99.  
Napoleon  
returns to  
Milan, and  
thence to  
Paris.

Napoleon, after this great victory, appointed Jourdan regent in the Continental dominions of the King of Sardinia, until their destiny was determined by a general peace, and returned to Milan to enjoy his triumph. He was received with extraordinary demonstrations of joy by the inconstant populace, and Italian adulation lavished on him those splendid epithets which, during three centuries of servitude, they have learned to bestow upon their rulers. He discoursed there much on peace, religion, literature, and the sciences. The Ligurian republic was immediately reorganised, and regained its nominal independence. He shortly after returned by Mont Cenis and Lyons to Paris. When passing through the former city, he laid, with extraordinary pomp, amidst an immense concourse of spectators, the first stone of the new Place Bellecour, erected on the site of that which had been destroyed by the barbarity of the Convention. Napoleon was in high spirits during the remainder of the journey; but his triumphs, great as they were, appeared to him but as nothing in comparison of those which he yet desired to achieve. "Well," said he, "a few more great events like those of this campaign, and I may really descend to posterity; but still it is little enough. I have conquered, it is true, in less than two years, Cairo, Paris, Milan; but were I to die to-morrow, half a page of general history would, after ten centuries, be all that would be devoted to my exploits." He reached Paris during the night; and nothing could exceed the universal transports on the

following day when his arrival was known. The people had been kept in a cruel state of suspense during his absence; the first news they received of the battle of Marengo was from a mercantile traveller who left the field at one o'clock, and reported that all was lost. Rich and poor now vied with each other in their demonstrations of joy; all business was suspended; nothing but songs of triumph were heard in the streets; and at night a general illumination proclaimed the universal transports.<sup>1</sup>

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1800.  
July 2.

<sup>1</sup>Nap.i. 301,  
303. Bour.  
iv. 164, 171,  
181. Bot.v.  
36.

Such was the memorable campaign of Marengo. Inferences of the most important kind, both in a moral and political view, may be drawn from the events which occurred during its progress.

I. Great changes in human affairs never take place from trivial causes. The most important effects, indeed, are often apparently owing to inconsiderable springs; but the train has been laid in all such cases by a long course of previous events, and the last only puts the torch to its extremity. A fit of passion in Mrs Masham arrested the course of Marlborough's victories, and preserved the tottering kingdom of France; a charge of a few squadrons of horse, under Kellermann, at Marengo, fixed Napoleon on the consular throne; and another, with little greater force, against the flank of the Imperial Guard at Waterloo, chained him to the rock of St Helena. Superficial observers lament the subjection of human affairs to the caprice of fortune or the casualties of chance; but a more enlarged observation teaches us to recognise in these apparently trivial events the operation of general laws, and the last link in a chain of causes which have all conspired to produce the general result. Mrs Masham's passion was the immediate cause of Marlborough's overthrow; but that event had been prepared by the accumulating jealousy of the nation during the whole tide of his victories, and her indignation was but the drop which made the cup overflow. Kellermann's charge, indeed, fixed Napoleon on the throne, but it was the sufferings of the Revo-

100.  
Reflections  
on this  
campaign.  
Great  
changes are  
never owing  
to trivial  
causes.

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XXXI.

1800.

161.  
Disasters  
of France  
under the  
Directory.

lution, the glories of the Italian campaigns, the triumph of the Pyramids, which induced the nation to hail his usurpation with joy; the charge of the 10th and 18th hussars broke the last column of the imperial array, but the foundation of the triumph of Wellington had been laid by the long series of his Peninsular victories and the bloody catastrophe of the Moscow campaign.

II. The sudden resurrection of France, when Napoleon assumed the helm, is one of the most extraordinary passages of European history, and singularly descriptive of the irresistible reaction in favour of a firm government, which inevitably arises from a long course of revolutionary convulsions. Let not future ages be deluded by the idea that a period of democratic anarchy is one of national strength; it is, on the contrary, in the end, the certain forerunner of public calamity. The glories of the Revolutionary wars were achieved under the despotic rule of the Convention, wielding ten times the power which had ever been enjoyed by Louis XIV.; the effects of democratic anarchy appeared upon its dissolution in the disasters of the Directory. After the fall of the Committee of Public Salvation, the triumphs of France centred in Napoleon alone; wherever he did not command in person, the greatest reverses were experienced. In 1795 the Republicans were defeated by Clairfait on the Rhine; in 1796 by the Archduke Charles in Germany. In 1799 their reverses were unexampled both in Italy and Germany; from the 9th Thermidor to the 18th Brumaire, a period of about five years, the fortunes of the Republic were singly sustained by the sword of Napoleon and the lustre of his Italian campaigns. When he seized the helm in November 1799, he found the armies defeated and ruined; the frontier invaded, both on the sides of Italy and Germany, the arsenals empty, the soldiers in despair deserting their colours, the royalists revolting against the government, general anarchy in the interior, the treasury empty, the energies of the Republic apparently exhausted.

Instantly, as if by enchantment, everything was changed; order reappeared out of chaos, talent emerged out of obscurity, vigour arose out of weakness. The arsenals were filled, the veterans crowded to their eagles, the conscripts joyfully repaired to the frontier, la Vendée was pacified, the exchequer began to overflow. In little more than six months after Napoleon's accession, the Austrians were forced to seek refuge under the cannon of Ulm, Italy was regained, unanimity and enthusiasm prevailed among the people, and the revived energy of the nation was finally launched into the career of conquest. Changes so extraordinary cannot be explained by the influence of any one man. Great as the abilities of Napoleon undoubtedly were, they could not be equal to the Herculean task of reanimating a whole nation. It was the transition from anarchy to order, from the tyranny of demagogues to the ascendant of talent, from the weakness of popular to the vigour of military government, which was the real cause of the change. The virtuous, the able, the brave, felt that they no longer required to remain in obscurity; that democratic jealousy would not now be permitted to extinguish rising ability; financial imbecility to crush patriotic exertion; private cupidity to exhaust public resources; civil weakness to paralyse military valour. The universal conviction that the reign of the multitude was at an end, produced the astonishing burst of talent which led to the glories of Marengo and Hohenlinden.

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XXXI.

1800.

102.

The sudden  
resurrection  
under Na-  
poleon.

III. The disastrous issue of the German campaign to the Imperialists, is not to be entirely ascribed either to the genius of Moreau, or the magnitude of the force which the First Consul placed at his command. It was chiefly owing to the ruinous dispersion of the Austrian army, and their obstinate adherence to the system of a cordon, when, by the concentration of their enemy's troops, it had become indispensably necessary to accumulate adequate forces on the menaced points. Kray, at the opening of the cam-

103.

Causes of  
the disas-  
ters of the  
campaign  
to the Im-  
perialists.

CHAP.  
XXXI.

1800.

paign, had nearly one hundred and ten thousand men at his command ; but this immense force, irresistible when kept together, was so dispersed over a line above two hundred miles in length, from the Alps to the Maine, that he could not collect forty-five thousand men to resist the shock of the French centre of nearly double that strength, at Engen or Biberach. The loss of these battles, by piercing the Allied line, compelled the whole body to fall back ; and thus seventy thousand men abandoned Suabia and Franconia without firing a shot, while half their number, added to the Austrian centre, would have prevented the Republicans from ever crossing the Black Forest. The brief campaign of 1815 afforded another example of the same truth : the Allied forces quartered over all Flanders, though greatly superior, upon the whole, to the army of Napoleon, were inferior to their assailants both at Ligny and Waterloo ; and the intrepid daring of Wellington, joined to the devoted heroism of his troops, alone prevented in that struggle the continued disasters of Biberach and Moeskirch. The successful stand, on the other hand, made by the Austrian army when concentrated under the cannon of Ulm, and the effectual covering which, in that confined spot, they gave to the whole Hereditary States, affords the clearest proof of the superior efficacy of such an assembled force to any cordon, however skilfully disposed, in arresting an invading enemy. No army will ever advance into an enemy's country, leaving sixty or eighty thousand men together in their rear ; for in such a case they are exposed to the danger of losing their communications, and being compelled, as at Marengo, to peril all upon the issue of a single battle to regain them ; but nothing is easier than to make double that force, dispersed over a long line, abandon a whole frontier, by striking decisive blows with a superior force at a part of its extent. In fifteen days the Imperial cordon was driven back, by attacks on its centre, from the Rhine to the Danube ; for six weeks its concentrated



force in position at Ulm, not only arrested the victor, but covered the Imperial frontier, and gained time for the revival of the spirit of the monarchy.

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1800.

IV. The successful stand which Kray, with a defeated army, made against the vast forces of Moreau for six weeks under the cannon of Ulm, demonstrates the wisdom and foresight of the Archduke Charles in fortifying, at the close of the preceding campaign, that important central position; and the justice of his remark, that it is in the valley of the Danube that the blows are to be struck which are decisive of the fate of Austria.<sup>1</sup> The long check which this single fortress gave to the powerful and victorious army of Moreau suggests a doubt, whether central are not more serviceable than frontier fortifications; or, at least, whether a nation, in contemplation of invasion by a powerful and ambitious enemy, should not always be provided with some strongholds in the interior, to the shelter of which a defeated army may retire, and where it may both recruit its losses and recover its spirit. Certain it is, that it is to the want of some such *point d'appui* that the sudden prostration of Austria, after the defeats of Ulm and Ecmühl,—of Prussia, after that of Jena,—and of France, after the disasters of 1814 and 1815, are mainly to be ascribed. But for the fortifications of Vienna, Austria, before the arrival of John Sobieski, would have been overwhelmed by the arms of Soliman; without those of Genoa, the conquest of Italy would have been complete, and the victorious Austrians grouped in irresistible strength in the plains of Piedmont, before the Republican eagles appeared on the St Bernard; and but for those of Torres Vedras, the arms of Britain, instead of striking down the power of France on the field of Waterloo, would have sunk, with lustre for ever tarnished, upon the shores of Portugal.

104.  
Great effect  
of central  
fortifications  
in a state.

<sup>1</sup> Arch. Cha.  
ii. 264.  
Strategie,  
1796.

V. A mere fortified position, like that of the Drissa, to which Barclay de Tolly retired in 1812, is not sufficient for this purpose; it is an intrenched camp, connected

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105.

What is the  
real fortifi-  
cation re-  
quired in  
such a case?

with a strong fortress, which forms the really formidable obstacle. The defeat of the Prussians, in the first attack on Warsaw in 1794, and the astonishing stand made by Skrynecki, with forty thousand regular troops, against the whole forces of the Russian empire in 1831, prove the inestimable effect of central fortresses, such as Warsaw and Modlin, in forming a nucleus to the national strength, and enabling an inconsiderable to withstand the forces of a powerful monarchy. The difference between central and frontier fortresses in this respect is great and important. The former constitute so many secure asylums, round which the national strength may be agglomerated in the last struggle for national independence; and the retreating army finds itself strengthened in the heart of the empire by the garrisons of the interior fortresses and the new levies who are disciplined within their walls, while their fortifications form an imposing stronghold, to the siege of which the largest armies are hardly adequate. The latter prove an impassable barrier only to armies of inconsiderable magnitude; and if, by an overwhelming force, the protecting army is compelled to retire, it too often finds itself severely weakened by the great detachments doomed thereafter to useless inactivity in the frontier fortresses. When Napoleon was struck to the earth in 1814, he still held the fortresses on the Elbe and the Rhine: above a hundred thousand veteran troops were there immured, when he maintained an unequal conflict with fifty thousand in the plains of Champagne; and that which he boasted triple line of fortresses could not do for France, would have been certainly effected by an intrenched camp, like that at Ulm, on Montmartre and Belleville. The conclusion to be drawn from this is, not that frontier fortresses are totally useless, and central ones alone to be relied on, but that the combination of the two is requisite to lasting security: the former to cover the provinces, and impede an inconsiderable enemy; the latter to repel those desperate strokes

which are directed by a gigantic foe at the vitals of the state.

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106.

Merits of  
Napoleon  
in the cam-  
paign.

VI. The march of Napoleon across the St Bernard, and his consequent seizure of the Austrian line of communication, is one of the greatest conceptions of military genius, and was deservedly crowned by the triumph of Marengo; but, in the execution of this design, he incurred unnecessary hazard, and all but lost his crown by the dispersion of his troops before the final struggle.<sup>1</sup> The forces at his command, after he debouched on the plains of Piedmont, were, including Moncey's division, sixty thousand men; while the Imperialists by no exertions could have brought forty thousand into the field to meet them, so widely were their troops dispersed over the vast theatre of their conquests:<sup>2</sup> whereas, when the die came to be cast on the field of Marengo, the Austrians had thirty-one thousand, and the French only twenty-nine thousand in line. This but ill accords with the principle which he himself has laid down, that the essence of good generalship consists, with equal or inferior forces, in being always superior at the point of attack. The march to Milan was the cause of this weakness, and the advantages which it promised were nothing to the danger and risk with which it was attended. It delivered over Genoa, with its indomitable governor and heroic garrison, to the enemy, at the very moment when certain deliverance might have been given. Nor did it, as a set-off to this great disaster, produce any concentration at the decisive point of the French forces. On the contrary, it occasioned the greatest danger by their dispersion. When Lannes and Victor, with twenty thousand men, struggled with an overwhelming enemy on the banks of the Bormida, twenty-nine thousand were in position or observation on the Mincio and the Po. So great a dispersion of force to secure the rear was altogether unnecessary; for, in case of disaster, the French army, after the fort of Bard had capitulated on the 5th June, could have retreated as well

<sup>1</sup> Nap. i.  
280.

<sup>2</sup> Rapport  
Officiel  
d'Autriche,  
Gaz. Mil.  
1823.

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by the St Bernard and Mont Cenis as by the Simplon and St Gothard. A forward movement, in conjunction with Thurreau, after the army, numbering forty thousand combatants, was concentrated at Ivrea on the 24th May, would have delivered Massena, who did not capitulate till the 4th June, and added his troops, ten thousand strong, to the invading army, while Moncey, with sixteen thousand, would have adequately protected the rear; and the retreat of Melas, then far advanced in the defiles of the Maritime Alps, would have been equally cut off. The astonishing consequences which followed the battle of Marengo, afford no proof that the campaign in this particular was not based on wrong principles; the same results might have been gained without the same risk; and it is not the part of a prudent general to commit to chance what may be gained by combination. Had the torrent of the Scrivia not swollen, and stopped the march of the French army on the evening of the 13th June; had Desaix advanced an hour later on the 14th; had Kellermann not opportunely charged an unsuspecting foe from the concealment of luxuriant vines; had Melas not detached his cavalry to the rear to observe Suchet,—in any of these cases, the fate of the action would probably have been reversed, and Marengo been Pavia. No scruple need be felt at making these observations, even in reference to so great a commander. The military art, like every other branch of knowledge, is progressive; the achievements of one age illuminate that which succeeds it, and mediocrity can, in the end, judge of what genius only could at first conceive. A schoolboy can now solve a problem, to which the minds of Thales and Archimedes alone were adequate in the commencement of geometry.

107.  
And of the  
Austrian  
commander.

VII. If the conduct of the Austrian commander is examined, it will be found to be no less open to exception, previous to the battle of Marengo, than that of the First Consul. The desire to retain everything, to guard at once all the points which had been gained, was the

cause of a dispersion, on his part so much the more reprehensible than that of Napoleon, as, being in a conquered country, with all the fortresses in his possession, it was the less necessary. Two thousand men would have sufficed for the garrison of Tortona, as many for that of Coni. The surplus troops thus acquired, with the cavalry detached to observe Suchet, would have formed a force considerably superior to the reserve of Desaix, and would have insured the victory. Of what avail were the four thousand men in either of these fortresses the next morning, when all the strong places of Piedmont were surrendered to the enemy? Thrown into the scale when the beam quivered after the repulse of Desaix, they would have hurled Napoleon from the consular throne.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
303, 304.

VIII. The conduct of the Austrian commander, during and after the battle, has been the subject of much severe animadversion from the German writers. Bulow, in particular, has charged him with having unnecessarily surrendered the fortresses of Piedmont on the following day, when he had still at command a force capable of breaking through the enemy, and regaining his communications with Mantua.<sup>2</sup> Certain it is that Melas, whose conduct in the outset of the action is worthy of the highest praise, did not follow up his first successes so vigorously as seems to have been possible; that his detachment of cavalry to the rear was unnecessary and eminently hurtful; and it is more than probable that, if Napoleon had been in his place, Marengo would have been the theatre of as great a reverse to the Republicans as Salamanca or Vitoria. But, in agreeing to the armistice on the following day, his conduct appears less liable to exception. He had then only twenty thousand men on whom he could rely in the field, and these, with the garrisons in the Piedmontese fortresses, formed the chief defence of the Austrian possessions in Italy. His first duty was to preserve this nucleus of veteran troops for the monarchy, and trans-

108.  
Propriety of the convention of Alessandria considered.

<sup>2</sup> Bul. Feldzug Marengo, 292.

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1800.

<sup>1</sup> Rap. Off.  
d'Autriche,  
1823. Mém.  
du Dep. de  
la Guerre,  
iv. 337, 339.

109.  
Inexpedi-  
ence of  
receiving  
battle in the  
oblique  
order.

port them from a situation where they were cut off from their communications, and could be of little service to their country, to one in which they were restored to both. Perched on the Appenines, or shut up in the walls of Genoa, they would have been exposed to the whole weight of the army of reserve, which might thus have been raised, by the concentration of forces from the rear, to forty-five thousand men, besides the victorious troops of Suchet, with the garrison of Genoa, nearly twenty-five thousand more. It is doubtful whether the whole force of Melas, aided as it would have been by the expedition of Abercromby and the English fleet, could have successfully withstood such a concentration of seventy thousand combatants, flushed with victory, and headed by Napoleon; and if they failed, disasters tenfold greater awaited the monarchy. Thirty thousand men might have been made prisoners at once, and the walls of Genoa witnessed as great a catastrophe as the heights of Ulm afterwards did.<sup>1</sup>

IX. The oblique *attack*, or the attack by column coming up after column by echelon, has frequently achieved the most decisive success in war; and the victories of Leuthen by Frederic, and Salamanca by Wellington, were chiefly owing to the skilful use of that method of action. But to *receive* battle in that position is a very different matter. To do so is to expose the successive columns to be overwhelmed by a superior enemy, who, by the defeat of the first, acquires a superiority which it becomes afterwards a matter of extreme difficulty to counterbalance. The action of Montebello was an instance of the successful application and great effect of an attack in this order; the narrow escape from a catastrophe at Marengo, an example of the peril to which troops themselves attacked in such a situation are exposed. The difference between the two is important and obvious. When the attacking army advances in echelon, if it can overthrow the first column of the enemy, it throws it back upon the one in

rear, which soon finds itself overpowered by a torrent of fugitives, or shaken by the sight of its comrades in disorder; while, if it is stubbornly resisted, it is soon supported by fresh troops advancing on its flank, in perfect order, to the attack. But when the troops in echelon stand still, all these advantages are reversed; the disorder created in front speedily spreads to the rear, and the successive columns, instead of coming up to the aid of an advancing, too often find themselves overwhelmed by the confusion of a retreating army.<sup>1</sup> Napoleon was perfectly aware of these principles; he never intentionally received an attack in echelon; at Marengo he was assailed unawares in that position by the enemy, and his ultimate extrication from destruction was owing to the opportune arrival of troops, whom his first orders had removed far from the scene of action, or upon events upon which no human foresight could have calculated at the commencement of the struggle.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
271, 272.

X. When it is recollected that Abercromby's corps, twelve thousand strong, lay inactive at Port Mahon in Minorca during this interesting and important crisis, big, as the event proved, with the fate not only of the campaign but of the war, it is impossible not to feel the most poignant regret at its absence from the scene of action; or to avoid the reflection, that England at that period partook too much of the tardiness of her Saxon ancestors; and that, like Athelstane the Unready, she was never prepared to strike till the period for successful action had passed. What would have been the result if this gallant force had been added to the Imperialists during their desperate strife round Genoa, or thrown into the scale, when victory was so doubtful, to meet the troops of Kellermann and Desaix at Marengo! When it is recollected what these very men accomplished in the following year, when opposed to an equal force of Napoleon's veterans on the sands of Alexandria, it is impossible to doubt that their addition to the Allied forces in Italy at this juncture would

110.  
Deplorable  
effects of the  
English  
being absent  
from the  
scene of  
action.

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in all probability have been attended with decisive effects. But, notwithstanding all this, it is impossible to say that the British government were to blame for the apparently inexcusable inactivity of so important a reserve. The equality of force at Marengo, it must always be recollected, was not only unforeseen, but could not have been calculated upon by any degree of foresight. At the outset of the campaign, the Imperialists were not only victorious, but greatly superior to their antagonists in Italy ; and even after Napoleon and the formidable army of reserve were thrown into the balance, their advantage was so marked, that, but for a ruinous and unnecessary dispersion of force, they must have crushed him on that well-contested field. In these circumstances, no crisis in which their co-operation was likely to be attended with important consequences was to be anticipated in the north of Italy ; there was no apparent call upon the government to alter the direction of a force destined for important operations either on the shores of Provence or on the banks of the Nile ; and the British historian must therefore absolve them from any serious blame in this matter, however much he may lament the absence of a band of veterans stationed so near the scene of action, which was adequate to have turned the scales of fortune, and possibly altered the destinies of the world.



## CHAPTER XXXII.

CAMPAIGN OF HOHENLINDEN. FROM THE ARMISTICE OF  
ALESSANDRIA TO THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE. JUNE 1800  
—FEB. 1801.

FRANCE soon experienced the beneficial results of the conquest in Italy and the successes in Germany. More passionately desirous than any other people in Europe of military glory, its citizens received with the utmost enthusiasm the accounts of their victories; and the angry passions of the Revolution, worn out by suffering, willingly turned to joyful comparison of their present triumphs with the disasters which had preceded the return of the First Consul. The battle of Marengo fixed Napoleon on the consular throne. The Jacobins of Paris, the royalists of the west, were alike overwhelmed by that auspicious event; and two English expeditions, which appeared, as usual too late, on the coasts of Brittany and la Vendée, under Sir Edward Pellew and Sir James Pulteney, were unable to rouse the inhabitants to resistance against the triumphant authority of the capital.<sup>1</sup>

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1.

Universal  
joy in France  
at the vic-  
tory of  
Marengo.

August.  
1 Ann. Reg.  
212, 213.  
Jom. xiv.  
4, 5.

Two days before intelligence was received of the battle of Marengo, a treaty for the further prosecution of the war had been signed at Vienna, between the Imperial cabinet and Great Britain. By this convention it was provided, that within three months England was to pay to Austria a loan of £2,000,000 sterling, to bear no interest during the continuance of the war, and that neither of the

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2.

Treaty  
previously  
signed be-  
tween Aus-  
tria and  
England.  
Good faith  
of the Im-  
perial gov-  
ernment  
in adhering  
to it.  
June 20.

high contracting parties should make any separate peace with the enemy during the period of one year from its date. The disastrous intelligence of the defeat at Marengo, and the armistice of Alessandria, followed up as it soon was by similar and still more pressing calamities in Germany, could not shake the firmness or good faith of the Austrian cabinet. The inflexible Thugut, who then presided over its councils, opposed to all the representations with which he was assailed as to the perils of the monarchy, the treaty recently concluded with Great Britain, and the disgrace which would attach to the Imperial government, if, on the first appearance of danger, engagements of such long continuance and so solemnly entered into were to be abandoned. Nor did the situation of affairs justify any such desponding measures. If the battle of Marengo had lost Piedmont to the Allied powers, the strength of the Imperial army was still unbroken; it had exchanged a disadvantageous offensive position in the Ligurian mountains for an advantageous defensive one on the frontiers of Lombardy; the cannon of Mantua, so formidable to France in 1796, still remained to arrest the progress of the victor, and the English forces of Abercromby, joined to the Neapolitan troops and the Imperial divisions in Ancona and Tuscany, would prove too formidable a body on the right flank of the Republicans to permit any considerable advance towards the Hereditary States.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Martens,  
vii. 61. Jom.  
xiv. 7.

3.

State of  
affairs in  
Germany.

Nor were affairs by any means desperate in Germany. The advance of Moreau into Bavaria, while Ulm and Ingolstadt were unreduced, was a perilous measure; the line of the Inn furnished a defensive frontier not surpassed by any in Europe, flanked on one side by the mountains of the Tyrol, and on the other by the provinces of Bohemia, both in the possession of the Imperial forces; the strength of the monarchy would be more strongly felt, and reinforcements more readily obtained, when the enemy approached its frontiers, and the ancient patriotism

of the inhabitants was called forth by the near approach of danger; and the disastrous issue of the campaign of 1796 to the Republican forces proved how easy was the transition from an unsupported advance to a ruinous retreat. Finally, the treaty of Campo Formio had only been signed after a whole campaign of disasters, and when the standards of France were almost within sight of Vienna; and it would be disgraceful to subscribe the same conditions when the Imperial banners were still on the Mincio, or lose the fruits of a long series of triumphs in the terror produced by a single misfortune.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
241. State  
Papers.  
Journ. xiv.  
7, 8.

Influenced by these considerations, the Austrian cabinet resolved to gain time, and, if they could not obtain tolerable terms of peace, run all the hazards of a renewal of the war. Count St Julien arrived at Paris on the 21st July, as plenipotentiary on the part of Austria, bearing a letter from the Emperor, in which he stated,—“You will give credit to everything which Count St Julien shall say on my part, and I will ratify whatever he shall do.” In virtue of these powers, preliminaries of peace were signed at Paris in a few days by the French and Austrian ministers. The “treaty of Campo Formio was taken as the basis of the definitive pacification, unless where changes had become necessary; it was provided that the frontier of the Rhine should belong to France, and the indemnities stipulated for Austria by the secret articles of the treaty of Campo Formio were to be given in Italy instead of Germany.” As this treaty was signed by Count St Julien in virtue of the letter from the Emperor only, and without an exchange of full powers, it was provided that “these preliminary articles shall be ratified, and that they shall not be binding upon the respective governments till after the ratification.” The cabinet of Vienna availed themselves of this clause to evade the ratification of these preliminary articles, in subscribing which their plenipotentiary had not entered into the views of the government. He was accordingly recalled, and the refusal to ratify was notified on

4.  
Count St  
Julien ar-  
rives at  
Paris, and  
signs pre-  
liminaries,  
which are  
disavowed  
by the Im-  
perial  
cabinet.

July 28.

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<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
278, 280.  
State Pa-  
pers. Dum.  
v. 8, 9. Nap.  
ii. 2, 3.

5.  
Negotia-  
tions with  
England for  
a naval  
armistice.

the 15th August, the appointed time, by Count Lehrbach, accompanied, however, by an intimation of the wish of the Imperial cabinet to make peace, of the treaty which bound them not to do so without the concurrence of Great Britain, and of the readiness of the latter power to enter into negotiations, on authority of a letter from Lord Minto, the British ambassador at Vienna, to Baron Thugut.<sup>1</sup>

Napoleon either was, or affected to be, highly indignant at the refusal by Austria to ratify the preliminaries, and he immediately gave notice of the termination of the armistice on the 10th September, sent orders for the second army of reserve, which was organising at Dijon, to enter Switzerland on the 5th of that month, and ordered Augereau, with eighteen thousand men from Holland, to take a position on the Lahn, in order to co-operate with the extreme left of Moreau's army. But he soon returned to more moderate sentiments, and despatched full powers to M. Ott, who resided at London as agent for the exchange of prisoners, to conclude a *naval armistice* with Great Britain. The object of this proposal, hitherto unknown in European diplomacy, was to obtain the means, during the negotiations, of throwing supplies into Egypt and Malta, the first of which stood greatly in need of assistance, while the latter was at the last extremity, from the vigilant blockade maintained for nearly two years by the British cruisers. No sooner was this proposal received by the English government, than they proceeded to signify their anxious desire to be included in the general pacification; and proposed, for this purpose, that passports should be forwarded for Lord Grenville's brother to proceed in the character of plenipotentiary of Great Britain to the congress at Luneville; but they declined to agree to a naval armistice, as a thing totally unknown, till the preliminaries of peace had been signed.<sup>2</sup> Napoleon, however, resolutely bent on saving Malta and Egypt, continued to insist on the immediate

<sup>2</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxv. 540,  
550. Dum.  
v. 9, 10, 11.  
Ann. Reg.  
214.  
Sept. 5.

admission of a naval armistice as a *sine quâ non*, and signified that, unless it was agreed to before the 11th September, he would recommence hostilities both in Italy and Germany.

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The urgency of the case, and the imminent danger which Austria would run, if the war were renewed on the Continent at so early a period, induced the cabinet of London to forego the advantages which a declinature of the proposals of the First Consul promised to afford to the maritime interests of Great Britain. On the 7th September, therefore, they presented to M. Ott a counter-project for the general suspension of hostilities between the belligerent powers. By this it was proposed that an armistice should take place by sea and land, during which the ocean was to be open to the navigation of trading vessels of both nations; Malta and the harbours of Egypt were to be put on the same footing as were Ulm Philippsburg, and Ingolstadt, by the armistice of Parsdorf; that is to say, they were to be provisioned for fourteen days, from time to time, during the continuance of the negotiation. The blockade of Brest and the maritime ports was to be raised; but the British squadrons were to remain on their stations off their mouths, and ships of war were not to be permitted to sail. Nothing could be more equitable towards France, or generous towards Austria, than these propositions. They compensated the recent disasters of the Imperialists by land with concessions by the British at sea, where England had constantly been victorious, and had nothing to fear; they placed the blockaded fortresses which the French retained on the ocean, on the same footing with those which the Imperialists still held in the centre of Germany, and abandoned to the vanquished on one element those advantages of a free navigation, which they could not obtain by force of arms, in consideration of the benefits accruing from a prolongation of the armistice to their allies on another.<sup>1</sup>

6.  
Proposals  
of Great  
Britain.

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxv. p. 551,  
555. Dum.  
v. 11, 12.  
Ann. Reg.  
215.

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1860.

7.

Which fail,  
from the un-  
reasonable  
demands of  
France.

Sept. 20.

Napoleon, however, insisted upon a condition which ultimately proved fatal to the negotiation. This was, that the French ships of the line only should be confined to their ports; but that frigates should have free liberty of egress; and that six vessels of that description should be allowed to go from Toulon to Alexandria without being visited by the English cruisers. He has told us in his "Memoirs" what he intended to have done with those frigates. They were to have been armed *en flûte*, and to have carried out three thousand six hundred troops, besides great military stores, to Alexandria.\* What rendered this condition peculiarly unreasonable was, that at the moment (20th September) when M. Ott declared to the British government that the condition as to these frigates was a *sine quâ non* for the continuation of the negotiation, he addressed to Moreau a telegraphic despatch, "not to agree to a prolongation of the armistice except on condition that Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philippsburg, were placed in the hands of the French as a guarantee." Thus, at the very time when the First Consul made a condition for the *preservation* of the maritime blockaded fortresses a *sine quâ non* with the British government, he made the immediate *cession* of the corresponding blockaded ones on the Continent an indispensable condition of a continuation of the armistice with the Austrian cabinet. In these simultaneous propositions is to be seen little of that spirit of moderation which he so loudly professed, but much of that inflexible desire for aggrandisement, which so long was attended with success, but which ultimately occasioned his ruin.<sup>1</sup>

The Imperialists, with the dagger at their throats, were

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxv. 566,  
583. Nap. ii.  
8, 9. Dum.  
v. 12, 14.  
Ann. Reg.  
215.

\* M. Thiers fully admits that this was the object the First Consul had in view in this stipulation:—"Son intention était assez claire, et il avait raison de ne pas déguiser un intérêt que tout le monde devinait à la première vue. Il voulait armer ces six frégates *en flûte*, les charger d'hommes et de munitions de guerre, et les convoier en Egypte. Il espérait qu'elles pourraient porter quatre mille soldats, beaucoup de fusils, de sabres, de bombes, &c. Il avait ainsi tout sacrifié à son objet essentiel—le ravitaillement de Malte, et le recrutement de l'armée d'Egypte."—THIERS, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, ii. 137, 138.

in no condition to resist the demands of the victor. A new convention was therefore concluded at Hohenlinden, on the 28th September, by which the cession of the three German fortresses was agreed to, and the armistice was prolonged for forty-five days. A similar convention, signed at Castiglione a few days afterwards, extended the armistice for the same period to the Italian peninsula. The British government, however, was under no such necessity; and as Napoleon peremptorily refused to abandon his condition as to despatching six frigates to Egypt, the negotiation was broken off, the cabinet of the Tuileries having declared that they would treat only with each of the two courts separately. This was equivalent to its total abandonment, as both the allied powers had intimated to France that they were bound by the recent convention to treat only in concert with each other. No sooner was it evident that Great Britain would not consent to the demands of the First Consul, than he resolved to prosecute the war with vigour against Austria. On the 8th October, accordingly, the portfolio of the war office was put into the hands of Carnot, with instructions to redouble his exertions to put all the armies immediately on a footing to resume hostilities. On the same day on which this took place, a plot to assassinate Napoleon at the opera was discovered by the police; Cerachi and Demerville, the leaders of the conspiracy, and both determined Jacobins, were arrested and executed. It originated in the remains of the democratic faction, and served to increase the already formed exasperation of the First Consul against that party.<sup>1</sup>

During the interval of hostilities, both parties made the most indefatigable efforts to put their armies on a respectable footing, and prepare for a vigorous prosecution of the war. A corps of fifteen thousand men was formed at Dijon, under the name of the second army of reserve, the command of which was intrusted to General Macdonald, already well known by his campaigns in Naples, and by

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8.

Armistice  
with the  
Austrians,  
and Jacobin  
conspiracy  
to assassi-  
nate Napo-  
leon.  
Sept. 28.  
Oct. 9.

Oct. 8.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
13, 14. Nap.  
ii. 9. Jom.  
xiv. 15, 24.

9.

Prepara-  
tions of  
France for  
a renewal of  
hostilities.

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the battle of the Trebbia. The official reports gave out that it was to consist of thirty thousand, and even Macdonald himself was led to believe it amounted to that number. The object in spreading this delusion was to augment the troops, which the Austrians, recollecting what the first army of reserve had effected, would deem necessary to watch his operations. It was destined to penetrate through the Grisons into the Tyrol, and threaten the flank of the Imperialists either in Italy or Germany, as circumstances might render advisable. Another army, 20,000 strong, was assembled under Augereau on the Maine; it was intended to advance along the course of that river to Würzburg, and menace Bohemia, so as to prevent the troops in that province from undertaking anything against the flank or rear of the grand army under Moreau in Bavaria. That army was raised to above 110,000 men, all in the highest state of discipline and equipment; the soldiers were all newly clothed, the artillery and cavalry remounted, and all the *matériel* in the finest possible state. The Republic had never, since the commencement of the war, had on foot an army so perfect in its composition, so admirably organised, and so completely furnished with all the appointments requisite for carrying on a campaign. The army of Italy was reinforced to 80,000 men; its cavalry and artillery were in an especial manner augmented; and, besides these great forces, a reserve of 10,000 chosen troops was formed at Amiens, to watch the movements of the British expeditions; and which, as soon as they proceeded to the coast of Spain, was moved to the south to support the army of Italy in the Grisons. In all, the Republic had 240,000 men in the field, ready for active operations; and besides this, there was nearly an equal force in Egypt, Malta, in the depots of the interior, or stationed along the coasts.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 20,  
21. Dum. v.  
16, 17. Jom.  
xiv. 63, 65.

Austria, on her part, had made good use, during the four months of the armistice, of the resources of the monarchy and the subsidies of England. Never on any



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10.

And of Aus-  
tria. Noble  
efforts of her  
people.

former occasion had the patriotic spirit of her inhabitants shone forth with more lustre, nor all ranks co-operated with more enthusiastic zeal, in the measures for the common defence. No sooner was it announced, by the refusal of Napoleon to treat with either court separately, that peace was no longer to be hoped for, than the generous flame, like an electric shock, burst forth at once in every part of the monarchy. The Archduke Palatine repaired to Hungary, decreed the formation of a levy *en masse*, and threw himself on those generous feelings which, in the days of Maria Theresa, had saved the empire. The Emperor announced his resolution to put himself at the head of the army, and actually repaired to the Inn for that purpose. His presence excited to the highest degree the spirit of the people and the soldiers. The Archduke Charles, in his government of Bohemia, pressed the organisation of twelve thousand men, destined to co-operate with the army on the Inn in resisting the menaced invasion; and the Empress sent to that accomplished prince a helmet set with magnificent jewels. These warlike measures excited the utmost enthusiasm among all classes; the peasantry everywhere flew to arms; the nobles vied with each other in the equipment of regiments of horse, or the contribution of large sums of money; every town and village resounded with the note of military preparation. But unfortunately the jealousy or erroneous views of the Aulic Council were but ill calculated to turn to the best account this general burst of patriotic spirit. The Archduke Charles, indeed, in accordance with the unanimous wishes of the army, was declared generalissimo; but instead of being sent to head the forces on the Inn, he was retained in his subordinate situation of the government of Bohemia. Kray, whose talents at Ulm had so long arrested the progress of disaster, was dismissed to his estates in Hungary; while the command of his army was given to the Archduke John,<sup>1</sup> a young man of considerable promise and

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
21, 27, 80,  
81. Jom.  
xiv. 13, 14.

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thorough military education; but whose inexperience, even though aided by the councils of Lauer, the grand-master of artillery, was but ill calculated to contend with the scientific abilities of Moreau.

11.  
Austrian  
forces.

Before the renewal of hostilities, Austria had greatly augmented her forces in all quarters. Five thousand additional troops in British pay had been obtained from Bavaria; the cession of Philippsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, had rendered disposable eighteen thousand more; and the recruits from the interior amounted to fifteen thousand men. These additions had so far counterbalanced the heavy losses sustained during the campaign by sickness, fatigue, and the sword, that the Imperialists could reckon upon one hundred and ten thousand effective men on the Inn, to defend the frontiers of the Hereditary States. But this great force, after the usual system of the Austrians, was weakened by the vast extent of country over which it was spread. The right, twenty-seven thousand strong, occupied Ratisbon and the Palatinate; the left, consisting of eighteen thousand men, under Hiller, was stationed in the German Tyrol; so that not more than sixty thousand combatants could be relied on to maintain the important line of the Inn. In Italy, Field-marshal Bellegarde had one hundred thousand under his command, but they too were weakened by the immense line they had to defend; fifteen thousand were in the Italian Tyrol, under Davidowitch; ten thousand in Ancona and Tuscany; twenty thousand consisted of Neapolitan troops, who could be little relied on: so that, for the decisive shock on the Mincio, not more than sixty thousand effective men could be assembled.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 19,  
20. Jom.  
xiv. 72, 73.  
Dum. v. 20,  
21.

12.  
Russia and  
Prussia  
keep aloof.

Nor was the Imperial cabinet less active in its endeavours to awaken the northern powers to a sense of the dangers which menaced them, from the great abilities and evident ambition of the First Consul. Special envoys were despatched to St Petersburg and Berlin to endeavour to rouse the Russian and Prussian cabinets into

activity, but in vain. Frederick-William persisted in the system of neutrality which he had so long pursued, and which he was destined so bitterly to expiate; and the Emperor Paul, intent upon his newly acquired ideas of the freedom of the seas, refused to embroil himself with France, and, in the pursuit of the imaginary vision of maritime independence, fixed upon Europe the real evils of territorial slavery. He retained a hundred and twenty thousand men inactive under KUTUSOFF and Count Pahlen, both reserved for great destinies, on the frontiers of Lithuania, who, if thrown into the scale at this critical moment, might have righted the balance when it was beginning to decline, and saved Russia from the rout of Austerlitz and the conflagration of Moscow.<sup>1</sup>

It is painful to be obliged to add, that the military efforts of England, though intended to follow out the true spirit of the alliance, were not better calculated to aid the common cause. On the 4th June an attack was made on the forts in Quiberon bay, by the squadron under the command of Sir Edward Pellew; but after gaining a trifling success, and dismantling the fortifications, they embarked without making any permanent impression. Early in July a secret expedition under the command of Sir James Pulteney, consisting of eight thousand men, sailed for the coast of France. It first appeared off Belleisle; but as the strong works on that island rendered any attack a difficult enterprise, it shortly made sail for the coast of Spain, and landed in the neighbourhood of Ferrol. After two skirmishes, in which the Spaniards were defeated, the British took possession of the heights which overlook the harbour; and everything promised the immediate reduction of that important fortress, with the fleet within its walls, when the English commander, intimidated by the rumour of reinforcements having reached the town, withdrew his forces without any apparent reason, but in pursuance of secret instructions, and made sail for Gibraltar,<sup>2</sup> where Aber-

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1 Dum. v.  
21, 22. Jum.  
xiv. 23, 24.13.  
English ex-  
pedition of  
Sir James  
Pulteney  
sails at Fer-  
rol.  
June 4.

July 8.

Sept. 18.  
2 Ann. Reg.  
212, 213.  
Jom. xiv. 46,  
47. Dum. v.  
42.

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14.  
And from  
dread of the  
plague, he  
declines to  
attack  
Cadiz.

Oct. 5.

cromby, with the expedition which had so long lain inactive at Port Mahon, awaited his arrival.

The union of two squadrons, having on board above twenty thousand British troops, in the straits of Gibraltar, excited the utmost alarm through the whole Peninsula. This armament, one of the greatest which had sailed from the British shores during the whole war, menaced alike Carthagenæ, Seville, and Cadiz. Reinforcements from all quarters were hastily directed to the lines of St Roch in front of Gibraltar; vessels were sunk at the entrance of the harbour of Cadiz, and all the means adopted which could be thought of to repel the threatened attack. The British commanders, instead of making sail the moment they arrived, for the isle of St Leon, lay above a fortnight inactive in the straits of Gibraltar, and at length appeared off Cadiz on the 5th October. Seldom was a more formidable armament assembled; the naval forces consisted of twenty sail of the line, twenty-seven frigates, and eighty-four transports, having on board above twenty thousand foot-soldiers. As far as the eye could reach, the ocean was covered by the innumerable sails of the British armada, which seemed destined to revenge upon Spain the terrors of the celebrated armament which had been baffled by the firmness of Elizabeth. Noways intimidated by the formidable spectacle, the Spanish governor wrote a touching letter to the British commanders, in which he adjured them not to add to the calamities which already overwhelmed the inhabitants, from an epidemic which carried off several hundreds of persons daily. They replied, that the town would not be attacked if the ships of war were delivered up; and as this was not acceded to, preparations were made for landing the troops. But before they could debark, the accounts received of the yellow-fever within its walls were so serious, that the British commanders, justly apprehensive that, if the city were taken,<sup>1</sup> the ulterior objects of the expedition might be frustrated by the effect of the contagion among the

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
216. Jom.  
xiv. 47, 48.  
Dum. iv.  
342, 347.

troops, withdrew from the infected isle to the straits of Gibraltar.

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But while the honour of the British arms was tarnished by the failure of such mighty forces on the western coast of Europe, an event of the utmost importance to the future progress of the maritime war occurred in the Mediterranean. Malta, which for above two years had been closely blockaded by the British forces by land and sea, began, in the course of this summer, to experience the pangs of hunger. Two frigates sailed from the harbour in the end of August with part of the garrison, one of which was speedily taken by the British cruisers. At length, all their means of subsistence having been exhausted, a capitulation was entered into in the middle of September, in virtue of which the French were to be conveyed as prisoners of war, not to serve till regularly exchanged, to Marscilles; and this noble fortress, embracing the finest harbour in the world within its impregnable walls, long the bulwark of Christendom against the Turks, and now the undisputed key to the Mediterranean, was permanently annexed to the British dominions.<sup>1</sup>

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15.  
Surrender  
of Malta to  
the British  
blockading  
squadron.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
215. Jom.  
xiv. 13, 14.  
Bot. iv. 49,  
50.

The hopes of the Imperial cabinet, in the event of a renewal of the war, were not a little founded on the hostile attitude of the south of Italy, to which, it was hoped, the arrival of the English expedition under Abercromby would give a certain degree of consistency. Pope Pius VI. had sunk under the hardships of his captivity in France, and died in March of this year. The choice of the Roman Conclave, assembled, under the Imperial influence, at Venice, fell on the Cardinal Chiaramonte, who assumed the tiara under the title of Pius VII. At the time when he ascended the papal throne, the inhabitants of Rome were suffering severely under the exactions of the Neapolitans, and he wisely resolved to do his utmost to alleviate their misfortunes. Without, therefore, engaging openly in the war, he lent a willing ear to the propositions which the First Consul, who was extremely desirous

16.  
Affairs of  
Italy. Elec-  
tion of Pius  
VII. at  
Venice, and  
hostilities  
of the Nea-  
politans.

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of the support of the supreme pontiff, instantly made to him. But the other parts of Italy were in the most hostile state. A body of ten thousand Neapolitans had taken a position on the Tronto between the Upper Abruzzes and the March of Ancona; a Neapolitan division, under Count Roger de Damas, was in the Roman states; Piedmont, in consternation at the recent annexation of the Novarese territory to the Cisalpine republic, and the intolerable oppressions of the French armies, was in so agitated a state, that a spark might blow it into open combustion; while the peasants of Tuscany, in open insurrection to support the Imperial cause, presented a tumultuary array of seven or eight thousand men. These bands, it is true, were little formidable to regular troops in the field; but as long as they continued in arms, they required to be watched by detachments, which diminished the strength of the army; and it was one of the motives which induced Napoleon to accede to the prolongation of the armistice with Austria, that it would give him time, during its continuance, to clear his flank of these troublesome irregulars.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv. 40,  
50. Dum. v.  
62, 63. Nap.  
ii. 11. Jom.  
xiv. 141,  
142.

17.  
The French  
crush the  
Tuscan  
insurgents  
with great  
cruelty.

As the armistice, by a strange oversight, did not extend to the Italian powers, and the English expedition was detained in useless demonstrations on the coast of Spain, it was no difficult matter for the French troops to effect this object. General Sommariva, to whom the Grand-duke of Tuscany had intrusted the military forces of his estates, was rapidly proceeding with the organisation of the peasants in the Appenines, when Dupont, early in October, intimated to him, that unless the insurrection was forthwith disbanded, he would move against Tuscany with a formidable force. As this summons met with no attention, the French troops advanced in great strength, in three columns. After a vain attempt to defend the Appenines, Florence was occupied on the 15th. The Austrians, under Sommariva, retreated towards Ancona, and the greater part of the insurgents retired to Arezzo,

Oct. 15.

where they resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity. An attempt to force open the gates having failed, the French general Monnier made preparations for a general assault, which took place on the following morning at five o'clock. Nothing could resist the impetuosity of the French columns; the grenadiers mounted the scaling-ladders amidst a shower of balls; quickly they made themselves masters of the ramparts, and chasing the unhappy peasants from house to house, and street to street, soon filled the town with conflagration and carnage. The slaughter was dreadful; a few escaped by subterraneous passages, and made good their flight into the country; others retired into the citadel, which was soon obliged to surrender at discretion, and was razed to the ground; but by far the greater number perished in the town, under the sword of an irritated and relentless victor.<sup>1</sup>

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Oct. 18.

<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv. 50,  
55. Dum. v.  
67, 68. Jom.  
xiv. 144.  
145. Nap.  
ii. 18, 19.

This bloody stroke proved fatal to the Tuscan insurrection. The fugitives who escaped the carnage, spread far and wide the most dismal accounts of the fate of their unhappy comrades; and the peasants, thunderstruck by the rapidity and severity of the blow, lost no time in deprecating the wrath of an enemy who appeared irresistible. Sommariva, fettered by the armistice with Austria, retired entirely from the Tuscan states; and the inhabitants, left to their own means of defence, had no resource but in immediate submission. A strong division was immediately despatched to Leghorn, which entered the place without opposition, and, after the barbarous method of carrying on war now adopted by the First Consul, instantly confiscated the whole English property in the harbour and town. Forty-six vessels, with their cargoes, besides 750,000 quintals of wheat and barley, and 90,000 quintals of dried vegetables, were thus obtained for the use of the army—an acquisition of great importance to its future operations;<sup>2</sup> but one which, like all other ill-gotten gains, in the end recoiled upon the

18.  
Leghorn is  
seized, and  
the English  
merchan-  
dise confis-  
cated.

<sup>2</sup>Dum. v. 69.  
Nap. ii. 18.  
Jom. xiv.  
145, 146.

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heads of those who acquired them, and contributed to rouse that deep and universal hatred at the French domination, which at length precipitated Napoleon from the throne.

19.

Last remnant of Swiss independence destroyed. Incorporation of the Netherlands with France, and capture of Surinam and Demerara by the English.

At the same period the Swiss, whose divisions and democratic transports had exposed their country to the severities of Republican conquest, were doomed to drain to the dregs the cup of misery and humiliation. The shadow even of their independence vanished before the armed intervention of the First Consul. The numerous insurrections of the peasants against the enormous requisitions of the Republican agents; the obstinate resistance of the partisans of the ancient institutions; the general anarchy and dissolution of government which prevailed, loudly called for a remedy. Napoleon applied it, by causing his minister Reinhard to declare to the democratic despots who ruled the country, that he would recognise no authority but that of the executive commission to whom he transmitted his orders; a declaration which at once brought the whole country under the immediate sway of the central government at the Tuileries. The English in the course of this year made themselves masters of Surinam, Berbice, St Eustache, and Demerara—Dutch settlements on the mainland and in the islands of the West Indies. At the same time Napoleon published an edict, permanently incorporating the provinces acquired by the Republic on the left bank of the Rhine, and extending the French laws and institutions to these valuable acquisitions. Thus, while England was extending its mighty arms over both hemispheres, France was laying its iron grasp on the richest and most important provinces of Europe. The strife could not be other than for life or death between two such powers.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
24, 25, 71.

Such was the state of Europe, when the armistice of Hohenlinden was denounced by the First Consul, and hostilities were recommenced at all points in the end of



November. Had the Aulic Council determined to remain on the defensive, no line was more capable of admitting an obstinate resistance to the invader than that of the Inn. That river, which does not yield to the Rhine either in the impetuosity or the volume of waters which it rolls towards the Danube, meanders in the Tyrol, as far as Kufstein, between inaccessible ridges of mountains, whose sides, darkened with pine-forests, are surmounted by bare peaks, occasionally streaked with snow, even in the height of summer. From thence to Mühldorf it flows in a deep bed, cut by the vehemence of the torrent through solid rock, whose sides present a series of perpendicular precipices on either bank, excepting only in a few well-known points, which were strongly guarded, and armed with cannon. This powerful line, supported on the left by the fortress of Kufstein, and on the right by that of Braunau, both of which were in a formidable state of defence, was flanked on either side by two immense bastions, equally menacing to an invading enemy; the one formed by the Tyrol, with its warlike and devoted population and inaccessible mountains, the other by Bohemia and the chain of the Böhmerwald, which skirts the Danube from Lintz to Straubing, where the Archduke Charles was organising a numerous body of forces.<sup>1</sup>

Had the Austrians, headed by the Archduke Charles, remained on the defensive in this strong position, it is probable that all the disasters of the campaign would have been avoided. It was next to impossible to force such a central line, defended by eighty thousand men, under the direction of that great commander; while to attempt to turn it, either by the Tyrol or Bohemia, would have been equally perilous. To detach thirty thousand men into the defiles leading into Bohemia would have been imminently hazardous, when so large a force threatened the centre of the invader; while a similar movement into the Tyrol, besides being attended with the same danger, would have incurred the hazard of being defeated

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20.

Description  
of the line  
of the Inn.  
Nov. 28.<sup>1</sup> Personal  
observation.  
Jom. xiv. 73,  
74. Dum. v.  
82. Nap. ii.  
27.

21.

Advantages  
of this posi-  
tion, and  
offensive  
movement  
of the Im-  
perialists,  
with its  
object.

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by the Prince of Reuss, who occupied the impregnable passes and fortresses which guarded the entrance into that difficult country. But from these difficulties the French were relieved by the resolution of the Imperialists to cross the Inn, and carry the war vigorously into the heart of Bavaria; a project which might have led to victory if conducted by the experience and ability of the Archduke Charles, but which terminated in nothing but disaster in the hands of his brave but inexperienced successor. Although, however, the offensive movement of the Imperialists led to such calamitous results, it was skilfully combined, and promised in the outset the most brilliant success. The Republican right, under Lecourbe, stretched through the Voralberg mountains to Feldkirch in the Tyrol; the centre, under Moreau in person, was in position at Ebersberg, on the high-road leading from Munich to Haag; the left, commanded by Grenier, was stationed at Hohenlinden on the road to Mühldorf. The project of the Austrian general was to detach Klenau from Ratisbon towards Landshut, where he was to be joined by Keimayer with twenty thousand men; meanwhile the centre was to advance by echelons towards Hohenlinden, and throw the weight of their forces on the Republican left, where the least resistance might be expected.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Join. xiv.  
78, 79.  
Dum.v. 96,  
97.

22.  
Operations  
on the  
Lower  
Rhine.  
Nov. 24.

Hostilities were commenced by Augereau, who was at the head of the Gallo-Batavian army. He denounced the armistice four days before his colleagues, and advanced, at the head of twenty thousand men, from Frankfort by the course of the Maine towards Würzburg. Though the Imperial forces in that quarter were nearly equal to his own, they opposed but a feeble resistance, from being composed chiefly of the troops recently levied in Bohemia and the states of Mayence, little calculated to resist the French veterans. After a slight combat, the Imperialists were repulsed at all points; the Baron Albini, after an ephemeral success at Aschaffenburg, was driven with loss

out of that town and forced back to Schweinfurt, while Dumonçeau pushed on to Würzburg, and summoned the garrison, which shut itself up in the citadel. The first effect of these disasters was to dissolve the insurrectionary troops of Mayence, under Albini, who never appeared again during the campaign. The Austrian general Simbschen, his forces being reduced by this defection to thirteen thousand men, took a position at Bourg-Eberach, to cover Bamberg; he was there attacked on the following day by Augereau, and, after an obstinate conflict, driven back to Pommersfeld. Satisfied with this success, the French general established his troops behind the Regnitz to await the fall of the citadel of Würzburg, which Dumonçeau was beginning to besiege in regular form. These advantages were much more important upon the issue of the campaign than might have been supposed, from the quality and numbers of the troops engaged; for by clearing the extreme left of Moreau, they permitted him to draw his left wing, under Sainte-Suzanne, nearer to his centre, and reinforce the grand army on the Inn, in the precise quarter where it was menaced by the Imperialists.<sup>1</sup>

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Dec. 3.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
86, 95. Nap.  
ii. 23, 24.  
Jom. xiv.  
81, 85.

Meanwhile, operations of the most decisive importance had taken place on the Inn. On the 27th November the Imperialists broke up to execute their intended concentration on the right towards Landshut: but the heavy rains which fell at that time retarded considerably the march of their columns; and it was not till the 29th that their advanced-guard reached that place. At the same time Moreau concentrated his forces in the centre, and advanced by Haag towards Ampfing and Mühldorf. Fearful of continuing his flank movement in presence of a powerful enemy, who threatened to fall perpendicularly on his line of march, the Archduke John arrested his columns, and ran the hazard of a general battle on the direct road to Munich. They accordingly, on the 30th, retraced their steps, and moved through cross-roads

23.  
The Austrians advance into Bavaria, and Moreau at the same time pushes forward.  
Nov. 27.

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towards Ampfing and Dorfen. This lateral movement, performed amidst torrents of rain, and in dreadful roads, completed the exhaustion of the Austrian troops; but it led, in the first instance, to the most promising results. By a singular accident, Moreau had heard nothing of the advance of the Imperialists towards Landshut, far less of their cross movement to Ampfing; but some confused accounts had merely reached the Republican headquarters of considerable assemblages of the enemy towards Mühl-dorf; and the French general, desirous to explore his way, pushed forward strong reconnoitring parties in that direction. His right occupied Rosenheim, his left and centre were gradually approaching the Austrian columns by Haag and Wasserburg. The effect of this movement was to bring the Imperial army, sixty thousand strong, and massed together, perpendicularly against the left of the French, who, ignorant of their danger, were advancing in straggling and detached columns to discover where they were.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 30.  
Jom. xiv. 55,  
90. Dum. v.  
100, 104,  
105.

24.  
Great suc-  
cess of the  
Austrians in  
the outset :  
the French  
retire to  
Hohenlin-  
den.  
Dec. 1.

The effect of this state of things, and of the able manœuvre of the Archduke, speedily showed itself. The French army, turned and surprised, was exposed to be cut up in detail, while separated in a line of march, by an enemy drawn up in battle array on one of its flanks. Grenier, who was the first in advance, was leisurely approaching Ampfing, when he was suddenly assailed by vast masses of the enemy, in admirable order and battle array. He was speedily thrown into confusion, and put to the rout. In vain Ney exerted all his talent and resolution to sustain the weight of the Imperial columns: his troops, consisting of his own division and that of Hardy, after a brave resistance, were broken and driven back upon the division of Grandjean, which advanced to its support and shared the same fate. At the same time Legrand, after a sharp conflict in the valley of the Isen, was constrained to retire to the neighbourhood of Dorfen. The Imperialists were everywhere successful. They had

attacked, in compact and regular masses, the enemy's divisions while in march and separated, and spread alarm and discouragement from the general's tent to the sentinels' outposts. So far the most brilliant success had attended the Austrian advance, and if it had been vigorously followed up by a general capable of appreciating the immense advantages which it offered, and forcing back the enemy's retreating columns without intermission upon those which came up to their support, it might have led to the total defeat of the French army, and changed the whole fortune of the campaign. But the Archduke John, satisfied with this first advantage, allowed the enemy to recover from their consternation. On the following day no forward movement was made; and Moreau, skillfully availing himself of that respite, retired through the forest of HOHENLINDEN to the ground which he had originally occupied, and carefully studied as the probable theatre of a decisive conflict.<sup>1</sup>

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Dec. 2.  
1 Nap. ii. 30,  
31. Dum. v.  
104, 107,  
108. Jom.  
xiv. 90, 92.

The space which lies between the Inn and the Isar, which is from twelve to fifteen leagues in breadth, is intersected in its centre by this forest, now celebrated not less in poetry than history.\* Parallel to the course of the two rivers, its woods form a natural barrier or stockade, six or seven leagues long, and from a league to a league and a half broad. Two great roads only, that from Munich to Wasserburg, and that from Munich to Mühldorf, traverse that thick and gloomy forest, where the pine-trees approach each other so closely, as in most places to render the passage of cavalry or artillery, excepting on the great roads, impossible. The village of Hohenlinden is at the entrance on the Munich side of the one defile, that of Mattenpott at the mouth of that leading to Mühldorf. The village of Ebersberg forms the entrance of the other defile leading to Wasserburg.<sup>2</sup> Between these two roads the broken and uneven surface of the forest is traversed only

25.  
Description  
of the field  
of battle.

<sup>2</sup> Dum. v.  
109, 110.  
Personal  
observation.

\* The reader will recollect Campbell's noble ode to Hohenlinden.

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26.  
Able plan  
of Moreau.

by country paths, almost impracticable during the storms of winter even to foot passengers.

Moreau with his staff had carefully reconnoitred this ground ; and as soon as it became evident that the Archduke was to advance through its dangerous defiles, he prepared, with the art of a consummate general, to turn it to the best account. Rapidly concentrating his forces in the plain at the entrance of the defiles on the Munich side, he at the same time gave orders to Richepanse, with his division, to advance by the country roads across the forest, so as to fall, early on the morning of the 3d, perpendicularly on the line of the great chaussée from Hohenlinden to Mühldorf. He naturally anticipated that this movement would bring him on the flank of the Austrian centre, when entangled in the defile, with its long train of artillery and chariots ; and that if the Republican force at the entrance of the pass could only maintain its ground till this side-attack took place, the ruin of the whole column, or at least the capture of all its cannon, would be the result. To effect this object, he concentrated all the forces he could command at the mouth of the defile ; but so unforeseen was the attack, that not above two-thirds of his army could take a part in the action ; neither the right wing under Lecourbe, nor the half of the left, under Sainte-Suzanne, could be expected to arrive so as to render any assistance.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 31,  
32. Jom.  
xiv. 94, 96.  
Dum. v. 111,  
112. Mém.  
du dépôt de  
la Guerre,  
v. 212.

27.  
Battle of  
Hohenlin-  
den.  
Dec. 3.

The Imperialists had committed the great error of allowing the surprised Republicans all the 2d to concentrate their scattered forces ; but they did not on the following day repeat their mistake. Early on the morning of the 3d, a day ever memorable in the military annals of France, all their troops were in motion, and they plunged, in three great columns, into the forest to approach the enemy. The centre, forty thousand strong, advanced by the great road from Mühldorf to Munich, the only road which was practicable, in the dreadful state of the weather, for artillery ; above a hundred pieces of cannon and five

hundred chariots encumbered its movements. The infantry marched first; then came the long train of artillery and caissons; the cavalry closed the procession. The right wing, under the command of General Latour, consisting of twenty-five thousand men, followed an inferior road leading up the valley of the Isen; Latour was to debouche by Isen upon Preisendorf; Keinmayer moved on the flank of that column, through the forest, from Langdorf upon Harthofen; while the left wing, under Riesch, was directed to proceed by a cross-path by Albaching to St Christoph, to gain the chaussée of Wasserburg. The Imperial columns, animated by their success on the preceding days, joyfully commenced their march over the yet unstained snow two hours before it was daylight, deeming the enemy in full retreat, and little anticipating any resistance before their forces were united and disposed in battle array, in the open plain, on the Munich side of the forest.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 33.  
Mém. v. 251.  
Dum. v. 114,  
116. Jom.  
xiv. 95, 97.

From the outset, however, the most sinister presages attended their steps. During the night the wind had changed; the heavy rain of the preceding days turned into snow, which fell, as at Eylau, in such thick flakes as to render it impossible to see twenty yards before the head of the column; while the dreary expanse of the forest presented, under the trees, a uniform white surface, on which it was impossible to distinguish the beaten track.\* The cross-paths between the roads which the troops followed, bad at any time, were almost impassable in such a storm; and each body, isolated in the snowy wilderness, was left to its own resources, without either receiving intelligence or deriving assistance from the other. The central column, which advanced along the only good road, outstripped the others; and its head had traversed the forest, and approached Hohenlinden about nine o'clock.

28.  
Dreadful  
struggle at  
the outlet of  
the forest.

\* "On Linden, when the sun was low,  
All bloodless lay the untrodden snow;  
And dark as winter was the flow  
Of Iser rolling rapidly."

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1800.

It was there met by the division of Grouchy, and a furious conflict immediately commenced; the Austrians endeavoured to debouche from the defile and extend themselves along the front of the wood, the French to coerce their movements, and drive them back into the forest. Both parties made the most incredible efforts; the snow, which fell without interruption, prevented the opposing lines from seeing each other; but they aimed at the flash which appeared through the gloom, and rushed forward with blind fury to the deadly charge of the bayonet. Insensibly, however, the Austrians gained ground; their ranks were gradually extending in front of the wood, when Generals Grouchy and Grandjean put themselves at the head of fresh battalions, and by a decisive charge drove them back into the forest. The Imperial lines were broken by the trees, but still they resisted bravely in the entangled thickets; posted behind the trunks, they kept up a murderous fire on the enemy; and the contending armies, broken into single file, fought, man to man, with invincible resolution.<sup>1</sup> \*

20.  
Decisive  
flank move-  
ment of  
Richepanse.

While this desperate conflict was going on in front of Hohenlinden, the leading ranks of the Austrian right began to appear at the entrance of the forest on the other road. Ney instantly repaired with his division to the scene of danger, and, by a vigorous charge on the flank of the enemy's column, which was in the act of deploying, not only drove it back into the wood, but captured eight pieces of cannon and a thousand prisoners. The effect of these vigorous efforts on the part of Moreau, in preventing the deploying of the heads of the Imperial columns from the forest, was to produce vacillation and confusion in the long train in their centre, which, unable to advance from the combat in its front, and pressed on by the crowd in its rear, soon began to fall into confusion. They

\* " 'Tis morn;—but scarce yon level sun  
Can pierce the war-clouds, rolling dun,  
Where fiery Frank and furious Hun  
Shout in their sulphurous canopy!"



were in this state, jammed up amidst long files of cannon and waggons, when the division of Richepanse, which had broken up early in the morning from Ebersberg, on the Munich side of the one defile, and struggled on with invincible resolution through dreadful roads across the forest, arrived in the neighbourhood of Mattenpott, on the Mühlendorf side of the other, directly in the rear of the centre of the Austrian army, and at the close of its protracted array. The orders of Richepanse were to move from Ebersberg on St Christoph, but without ulterior or more detailed directions.\* But just as it was approaching this decisive point, and slowly advancing in open column through the forest, this division was itself pierced through the centre, near St Christoph, by the Austrian left wing under Ricsch, which, moving up by the valley of Albaching, to gain the chaussée of Wasserburg, by which it was destined to pierce through the forest, fell perpendicularly on its line of march. Thus Richepanse, with half his division, found himself irretrievably separated from the remainder; the manœuvre which he was destined to have performed on the centre of the Imperialists was turned against himself, and with a single brigade he was placed between that immense body and their left wing. An ordinary general, in such alarming circumstances, would have sought safety in flight, and thus, by allowing the Imperial centre to continue its advance, endangered the victory; but Richepanse, whose able mind was penetrated with the importance of his mission, bravely resolved to push on with the single brigade which remained under his command, and fall on the rear of the grand column of the enemy. He sent orders, therefore, to his separated brigade to maintain itself to the last extremity at St Christoph,<sup>1</sup> and advanced himself with half his men, with the utmost intrepidity,

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 34,  
35. *Jom.*  
xiv. 97, 99.  
Dum. v. 118,  
120. *Mém.*  
v. 270, 274.  
*Ney*, ii. 48,  
57.

\* See the orders in *Mémorial du Dépôt de la Guerre*, v. 241; and THIERS' *Consulat et l'Empire*, ii. 254.

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1800.

30.

The Aus-  
trian line of  
communica-  
tion is inter-  
cepted.

towards Mattenpott and the line of march of the grand Austrian column.

When the French troops approached the great road, they came upon the cuirassiers of Lichtenstein who formed part of that vast body, who had dismounted, and were reposing leisurely under the trees until the great park of artillery and the reserves of Kollowrath had passed the defile. It may easily be imagined with what astonishment they beheld this new enemy on their flank, who was the more unexpected, as they knew that their left wing, under Riesch, had passed through the forest, and they deemed themselves perfectly secure on that side. They made, in consequence, little resistance, and were speedily driven off the chaussée. Not content with this success, Richepanse left to his cavalry the charge of keeping off the Imperial cuirassiers, and advanced himself with the two remaining regiments of infantry to attack the rear of the Imperial centre in the forest of Hohenlinden. The appearance of this force, amounting to nearly three thousand men, behind them, excited the utmost alarm in the Austrian column. The troops of that nation are proverbially more sensitive than any in Europe to the danger of being turned when in a line of march. A brigade of the Bavarian reserve was speedily directed to the menaced point, but it was overwhelmed in its advance by the crowds of fugitives, and thrown into such disorder by the overturned cannon and caissons which blocked up the road, that it never reached the enemy. Three Hungarian battalions were next brought up; but, after resisting bravely, amidst the general consternation around them, they too at length were broken and fled. This little action decided the victory; the whole Austrian artillery lay exposed to the attacks of the victor in a situation where, from being jammed together in a thick forest, it was incapable of making any resistance.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 35,  
36. *Jom.*  
xiv. 99, 100.  
*Dum.* v. 121,  
122.

Moreau, at the entrance of the defile in front of Hohenlinden, was still maintaining an anxious conflict, when

the sound of cannon in the direction of Mattenpott, and the appearance of hesitation and confusion in the enemy's columns, announced that a decisive attack in the chaussée behind them, by Richepanse, had taken place. This was a mere lucky accident; for he had neither directed nor foreseen it: nor, indeed, could it have been anticipated amidst the complicated movements of the interlaced hostile columns. He immediately, however, saw its importance, and resolved to turn it to the best advantage. On the spot, he directed Grouchy and Ney to make a combined charge in front on the enemy. The French battalions, which had so long maintained an obstinate defence, now commenced a furious onset, and the Austrian centre, shaken by the alarm in its rear, was violently assailed in front. The combined effort was irresistible. Ney, at the head of the Republican grenadiers, pressed forward in pursuit of the fugitives along the chaussée, until the loud shouts of his troops announced that they had come into co-operation with the victorious Richepanse, who was advancing along the same road to meet him, as fast as its innumerable incumbrances would permit. No words can paint the confusion which now ensued in the Austrian columns. The artillery-drivers cut their traces, and galloped in all directions into the forest; the infantry disbanded and fled; the cavalry rushed in tumultuous squadrons to the rear, trampling under foot whatever opposed their passage; the waggons were abandoned to their fate, and, amidst the universal wreck, 97 pieces of cannon, 300 caissons, and 7000 prisoners, fell into the enemy's hands.<sup>1</sup>

While this decisive success was being gained in the centre, the columns of Latour and Keimayer, who had succeeded in debouching from the forest, and united in the plain on its other side, violently assailed the Republican left, where Grenier, with inferior forces, consisting only of Legrand and Bastoul's divisions, and Hautpoul's reserve cavalry, defended the other approach to Munich. Not-

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1800.

31.

Able measures of Moreau to profit by it.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv. 99, 101. Mém. v. 272, 284. Dum. v. 121, 124. Nap. ii. 36, 37.

32.

Great victory gained by the French.

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withstanding all his efforts, and the assistance of a part of the division of Ney, he was sensibly losing ground, when the intelligence of the defeat of the centre compelled the enemy to abandon his advantages, and retire precipitately into the forest. Grenier instantly resumed the offensive, and, by a general charge of all his forces, succeeded in overwhelming the Austrians while struggling through the defile, and taking six pieces of cannon and fifteen hundred prisoners. At the same time, General Decaen, with his fresh division, disengaged the half of Richepanse's division, cut off during his advance, which was hard pressed between General Riesch's corps and the retiring columns of the centre, who still preserved their ranks. Before night, the Republicans, at all points, had passed the forest. Four of their divisions were assembled at Mattenpott, and the headquarters were advanced to Haag; while the Imperialists, weakened by the loss of above a hundred pieces of cannon and fourteen thousand soldiers, took advantage of the night to withdraw their shattered forces across the Inn.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 36.  
37. Dum. v.  
127, 128.  
Jom. xiv.  
101, 105.  
Mém. v. 280,  
285.

33.  
Its prodigious consequences, and merit of Moreau in gaining it.

Such was the great and memorable battle of Hohenlinden, the most decisive, with the exception of that of Rivoli, which had yet been gained by either party during the war, and superior even to that renowned conflict in the trophies by which it was graced, and the immense consequences by which it was followed. The loss of the French on that and the preceding days was nine thousand men; but that of the Imperialists was nearly twice as great, when the deserters and missing were taken into account: they lost two-thirds of their artillery, and the moral consequences of the defeat were fatal to the campaign. The victory of Marengo itself was less momentous in its military consequences. It merely gave the Republicans possession of the Sardinian fortresses and the Cisalpine republic; but the disaster of Hohenlinden threw the army of Germany without resource on the Hereditary States, and at once prostrated the strength of the monarchy.

Common justice must award to Moreau the merit of skilful combination and admirable use of the advantages of ground in this great victory ; but it is at the same time manifest that he owed much to chance, and that fortune converted a well-conceived plan of defence into a decisive offensive movement. The whole arrangements of the French general were defensive ; he merely wished to gain time, in order to enable his right and left wings, under Lecourbe and Sainte-Suzanne, to arrive and take a part in the action. By the movements on the previous days, he was so far out-generaled, that, though his army on the whole was greatly superior to that of his opponents, he was obliged to fight at Ampfing with an inferiority of one to two, and at Hohenlinden on equal terms. The movement of General Richepanse, however well conceived to retard or prevent the passage of the forest by the Austrian army, could not have been reckoned upon as likely to produce decisive success ; for if he had advanced half an hour later, or if Riesch's column, which it should have done, according to the Austrian disposition, had arrived half an hour sooner, he would have fallen into the midst of superior forces, and both his division and that of Decaen, which followed his footsteps, would probably have perished. The imprudence of the Austrians in engaging in these perilous defiles in presence of the enemy's army, and not arranging matters so that all their columns might reach the enemy at the same time, undoubtedly was the principal cause of the disaster which followed ; but although Moreau's arrangements were such as would probably at all events have secured for him the victory, it was the fortunate accidents which occurred during the action which rendered it so decisive.<sup>1\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Jom.* xiv.  
106, 107.  
*Dum.* v. 129.  
*Nap.* ii. 52,  
54, 131.

\* Napoleon's observations on this battle, and the whole campaign of Moreau, have been here adopted only in so far as they appear to be consonant to reason and justice. They are distinguished by his usual ability, but strongly tinged by that envenomed feeling towards his great rival which formed so marked a feature of his character. He says that the decisive march of Richepanse was undertaken without orders ; whereas, as already shown, he had received orders, (to be found in the *Mémoires du Dépôt de la Guerre*, v. 241.) though

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34.

The Austrians retire behind the Inn.

Thunderstruck by this great disaster, the whole Imperial army retired behind the Inn, and made a show of maintaining itself on that formidable line of defence. But it was but a show. From the first the disposition of its columns, disposed in part in echelon along the road to Salzburg, indicated an intention of retreating in that direction. After maturely weighing all the circumstances of the case, Moreau resolved to force the passage of the Upper Inn, on the road to Salzburg; but in order to deceive the enemy, he caused all the boats on the Isar to be assembled at Munich, collected the bulk of his forces in that direction, and gave out that he was about to cross the lower part of the river. By adopting this line of advance, the French general had the prospect of cutting off the Imperialists from their left wing, hitherto untouched, in the Tyrol, menacing upper Austria and Vienna, and endangering the retreat of Bellegarde from the plains of Italy. These advantages were so important, that they overbalanced the obvious difficulties of the advance in that direction, arising from the necessity of crossing three mountain streams, the Inn, the Alza, and the Salza, and the obstacles that might be thrown in his way from the strength of the mountain-ridges in the neighbourhood of Salzburg.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
111, 112.  
Dum. v. 133,  
134, 135.

35.  
Skilful  
manœuvre  
by which the  
passage of  
that river  
is effected  
by Moreau.

While the boats of the Isar were publicly conducted, with the utmost possible eclat, to the Lower Inn, Lecourbe caused a bridge-equipage to be secretly transported in the night to Rosenheim, on the road to Salzburg; and, having collected thirty-five thousand men in the neighbourhood, established a battery of twenty-eight pieces during the night of the 8th December at Neubevern, where the Inn flows in a narrow channel, and which is the only point in

general ones only, and by no means anticipating the great effects the march had on the issue of the action. Jealousy towards every one who had either essentially injured or rivalled his reputation, and a total disregard of truth when recounting their operations, are two of the defects in so great a man, upon which it is at once the most necessary and the most painful duty of the historian to dwell.

that quarter where the right bank is commanded by the left. At six o'clock on the following morning, while it was still pitch-dark, the French cannon, whose arrival was wholly unknown to the Austrian videttes, opened a furious fire, so well directed that the Imperialists were obliged to retire; and the Republicans instantly constructed a bridge, and threw across so strong a body of troops as gave them a solid footing on the left bank. At the same time a battery was placed in front of the bridge at Rosenheim, in order to prevent the burning of the remaining arches of that wooden structure, of which one only had been destroyed; but the corps of the Prince of Condé, which was stationed on the opposite bank, faithfully discharged its duty, and the whole was soon consumed. In consequence of this circumstance, Grouchy's and Decaen's divisions were obliged to make a circuit by the passage at Neubevern, in order to support Lecourbe, but so dilatory were the movements of the Imperialists, that no sufficient force could be collected to oppose their progress; a second bridge of boats was constructed near Rosenheim, by which Richepanse's division was passed over, and the Austrians, abandoning the whole line of the Upper Inn, retired behind the Alza. Thus was one of the most formidable military lines in Europe broken through in the space of a few hours, without the loss of a single man. This extraordinary success was chiefly owing to the Imperialists having been led, by the demonstration of Moreau against the Lower Inn, to concentrate the right wing of their army, which had suffered least in the disastrous battle of Hohenlinden, in that quarter, which removed it three or four marches from the scene where the real attack was made. No sooner did they receive intelligence of the passage of Lecourbe over the Upper Inn, than they hastily moved all their disposable troops towards the menaced point; but, finding that the enemy were established on the right bank in too great force to be dislodged, they fell back on all sides,<sup>1</sup> and, abandoning the

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
112, 116.  
Dum. v. 124,  
141, 143.  
Nap. ii. 38,  
39.

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36.  
Rapid advance of the French towards Salzburg.

Dec. 12.

whole line of the Inn, concentrated their army behind the Alza, between Altenmarkt and the Chiem See, to cover the roads to Salzburg and Vienna.

Moreau, conceiving with reason that the spirit of the Austrian army must be severely weakened by such a succession of disasters, resolved to push his advantages to the utmost. The Austrians now experienced the ruinous consequences attending the system of extending themselves over a vast line in equal force throughout, which, since the commencement of the war, they had so obstinately followed. They found themselves unable to arrest the march of the victor at any point, and, by the rapid advance of Lecourbe, were irrecoverably separated from their left wing in the Tyrol. Moreau having resolved not to allow them to establish themselves in a solid manner behind the Salza, pushed rapidly forward across the Achen and the Traun to Salzburg.\* He experienced no considerable opposition till he reached the neighbourhood of that town; but when Lecourbe with the advanced-guard approached the Saal, he found the bulk of the Austrian army, thirty thousand strong, including ten thousand cavalry, posted in a strong position covering the approach to Salzburg. Its front was covered by the Saal, the rapid course of which offered no inconsiderable obstacle to an attacking force; its left rested on inaccessible rocks, and its right was protected by the confluence of the Saal and the Salza. But this position, how strong soever, had its dangers; it was liable to be turned by a passage of the Salza, effected below the town between Laufen and Salzburg, in which case the army ran the risk of being cut off from Vienna, or thrown back in disorder upon the two bridges of boats which preserved its communication with the right bank of the river.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv. 115, 116.  
Dum. v. 195, 197. Nap. ii. 39, 40.

\* The Alza, in the upper part of its course, before throwing itself into the Chiem See, is called the Achen: the Traun here mentioned is a tributary of the Alza, and must be distinguished from the river of the same name which falls into the Danube near Lintz.



Lecourbe commenced the attack with his accustomed vigour: Gudin carried the village of Salzbourghoffen, and made six hundred prisoners; but Montrichard was so rudely handled by the Imperial cavalry, that he was driven back in disorder, with the loss of five hundred men. This success, however, was of little avail, for Moreau ordered Decaen to cross the Salza at Laufen, an operation which was most successfully performed. While the attention of the Imperialists was drawn to the broken arches of the bridge by a violent cannonade, this able general directed four hundred chosen troops to a point a little lower down, who, undeterred by the violence and cold of the winter torrent, threw themselves into the stream, swam across, and made themselves masters of some boats on the opposite side, by the aid of which the passage was speedily effected. Moreau was no sooner informed of this success, than he pushed Richepanse, with two fresh divisions, across at this place, and advanced against Salzbouurg by the right bank. Encouraged by this support, Lecourbe, on the day following, renewed his attack on the Austrian rear-guard, commanded by the Archduke John in person, posted in front of Salzbouurg. His troops advanced in two columns, one by the road of Reichenhall, the other formed in front of Vaal; a thick fog covered the ground, and the French tirailleurs advanced inconsiderately to the attack, deeming the Austrians in full retreat, and desirous of having the honour of first reaching Salzbouurg. They were received by the fire of thirty pieces of cannon, whose discharges soon dissipated the mist, and discovered two formidable lines of cavalry drawn up in battle array. Lecourbe brought up his horse; but they were overwhelmed by the first line of the Imperial cavalry, which broke into a splendid charge when the Republicans approached their position. Lecourbe, finding himself unequal to the task of opposing such formidable forces, drew back his wings behind the Saal, and posted his infantry in the rear of the village of Vaal.<sup>1</sup> He there maintained himself with diffi-

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37.  
Defeat of  
the French  
at Salz-  
bourg. Dec.  
13.

Dec. 14.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 40,  
41. Jom.  
xiv. 116,  
120. Dum.  
v. 198, 206.

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38.  
But the Imperialists  
are nevertheless  
obliged to  
retire, and  
Moreau  
pushes on  
towards  
Vienna.

culty till the approach of night, glad to purchase his safety by the loss of two thousand men left on the field of battle.

Had it not been for the passage of the river at Laufen, this brilliant achievement might have been attended with important consequences; but that disastrous circumstance rendered the position at Salzbourn no longer tenable. Moreau, at the head of twenty thousand men, was rapidly advancing up the right bank, and the Archduke John, unable to oppose such superior forces, was compelled to retire during the night, leaving that important town to its fate. Decaen, with the advanced-guard of Moreau, took possession of Salzbourn, without opposition, on the following morning, and the Republican standards for the first time waved on the picturesque towers of that romantic city. The occupation of Salzbourn, and the abandonment of the line of the Salza, decided the fate of the monarchy. The shattered remains of the grand army, which had failed to maintain the formidable lines of two such rivers, broken in numbers, subdued in spirit, were unable thereafter to make any head against a numerous enemy, flushed with victory, and conducted with consummate military skill. Emboldened by the unexpected facility with which he had passed these considerable rivers, Moreau resolved to give the enemy no time to recover from his consternation, but to push on at once towards Vienna, and decide the war in the centre of the Hereditary States, before the other French armies had begun seriously to skirmish on the frontier. He disquieted himself little about the forces in the Tyrol, deeming the troops in that province sufficiently occupied with the invasion of Lombardy by Brune, and the march of Macdonald through the Grisons, which will immediately be noticed. Satisfied with the precautions, therefore, of leaving on the right small bodies as he advanced, to mask the principal passes into that mountainous region,<sup>1</sup> and on the left of detaching Sainte-Suzanne with his wing to watch the motions of Klenau,

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
121, 123.  
Dum. v. 200,  
207, 208.  
Nap. ii. 40.

who was threatening the Gallo-Batavian army at Würtzburg, he himself pushed on with his whole centre and right wing in pursuit of the enemy.

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Richepanse, who conducted his advanced-guard, marched with so much expedition, that he came up with the Austrian rear at Hendorf. Notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, who the day before had marched twelve leagues, he attacked the enemy at daybreak, routed them, and made a thousand prisoners. The two following days were a continued running fight; the Austrians retired, combatting all the way, to Schwannenstadt. This indefatigable leader was closely followed by Decaen and Grouchy, who came up to his support the moment that any serious resistance arrested his columns; while Lecourbe, at the head of the right wing of the invading army, advanced by the mountain road, in order to turn the streams where they were easily fordable, and constantly menace the left flank of the enemy. In front of Schwannenstadt the Imperialists made an effort to arrest this terrible advanced-guard. Three thousand cavalry, supported by rocky thickets, lined with tirailleurs on either flank, stood firm, and awaited the onset of the Republicans; but these were now in a state of exultation which nothing could resist. The infantry advanced to within three hundred paces of that formidable mass of cavalry, without noticing the tirailleurs, who rattled incessantly on either flank, and then, breaking into a charge, approached the horse with levelled bayonets with so much resolution, that the Austrian dragoons broke and fled, and nearly a thousand men were killed or made prisoners. On the following day, a scene of dreadful confusion ensued, when the Imperial rearguard crossed the Traun. A column of twelve hundred men, under Prince Lichtenstein, stationed in front of the town of Lambach, where the passage was going forward, made such a heroic resistance as gave time to the greater part of the cannon and baggage to defile over the bridge; but at length they fell victims to their devotion,

39.  
Great successes gained by his advanced-guard.  
Dec. 16, 17, and 18.

Dec. 19.

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1800.

and were almost all slain or made prisoners. Immediately the whole remaining Imperialists, who had not passed, fled towards the defile: they were rapidly followed by the Republicans. A scene of indescribable horror ensued: in the *mêlée* of fugitives, carriages, and trampling squadrons, the arches were fired, and multitudes threw themselves into the stream; but such was the resolution of the French grenadiers, that, regardless alike of the flames and the discharges of grape from the opposite bank, they rushed across; by their exertions the bridge was preserved from destruction, and was speedily passed by the triumphant French battalions.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 40,  
41. Dum. v.  
208, 214.  
Jom. xiv.  
125, 128.

40.  
The Arch-  
duke Charles  
joins the  
army, but  
cannot  
arrest the  
disasters.  
Dec. 19.

Affairs were in this disastrous state when the Archduke Charles, whom the unanimous cries of the nation had called to the post of danger, as the only means left of saving the monarchy, arrived and took the command of the army. The presence of that distinguished leader, who brought with him a few battalions, for a little revived the spirits of the soldiers; but that gleam was of short duration. He had flattered himself that he would be able to arrest the progress of the enemy in Upper Austria, while Klenau made a diversion on the side of Bohemia, and Hiller on that of the Tyrol, so as to menace his communications in Bavaria and Suabia. But the appearance of the army, as it crossed the Traun, rendered it evident to his experienced eye that it was too late to calculate on the success of these movements. Instead of the proud battalions whom he had led to victory at Stockach and Zurich, the Archduke beheld only a confused mass of infantry, cavalry, and artillery covering the roads: the bands of discipline were broken; the soldiers neither grouped round their colours nor listened to the voice of their officers; dejection and despair were painted on every countenance. Even the sight of their beloved chief, the saviour of Germany, could hardly induce the exhausted veterans to lift their eyes from the ground.<sup>2</sup> He saw that it was too late to remedy the disorder, but still he bravely

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xiv.  
129. Dum.  
v. 217, 218.

resolved to do his utmost to arrest it, and rather give battle under the walls of Vienna, than purchase, by an ignominious peace, the retreat of the conqueror.

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The spirits of the troops, revived for a moment by the arrival of their favourite leader, were irretrievably damped by the continuance of the retreat, after the passage of the Traun, to Steyer on the Enns. The Archduke gave the most pressing orders to hasten the advance of the Hungarian insurrection, and urge forward the armaments in the capital; but in the midst of these energetic measures, the rout of the rearguard under Prince Schwartzberg, who was overwhelmed at Kremsmünster on the road to Steyer, with the loss of twelve hundred men, gave him melancholy proof that the troops were so completely dejected, that no reliance could be placed on their exertions. Penetrated with grief at this disaster, he despatched a messenger to Moreau, soliciting an armistice, which, after some hesitation, was signed on the 25th by the French general, and repose given to the troops, worn out by a month's incessant marching and misfortunes.<sup>1</sup>

41.  
An armistice is agreed to.  
Dec. 20.

Dec. 21.  
1 Dum. v.  
221, 222.  
Nap. ii. 41.  
42. Jom.  
xiv. 130,  
131.

To complete the picture of the memorable campaign of 1800 in Germany, it only remains to notice the concluding operations of the Gallo-Batavian army on the Maine. After the action at Bourg-Eberach and the investment of the citadel of Würzburg, Augereau endeavoured to put himself in communication with the grand army under Moreau. His situation became critical, when the advance of that army after the battle of Hohenlinden left him entirely to his own resources; and it was rendered doubly so by the approach of Klenau with ten thousand regular Austrian troops on his right flank, while Simbschen with twelve thousand troops menaced his left. The danger soon became pressing; a division of his troops was attacked on the 18th in front of Nuremberg by Klenau, and after a gallant resistance, forced to retreat; while his left with difficulty maintained itself against Simbschen. Discouraged by these simultaneous attacks, the French general

42.  
Operations of the army on the Maine.

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on the two following days retired behind the Regnitz. On the 21st he was again attacked and defeated at Neukirchen by the united Imperial generals; but they were unable to follow up their advantages, from having received orders on the night of their victory to retire to Bohemia, in order to succour the heart of the monarchy, now violently assailed by the enemy. They were in the course of executing these orders, when the armistice of Steyer put a period to their operations. Thus the Republican army, in a short campaign of little more than three weeks, in the middle of winter, and in the most severe weather, marched ninety leagues; crossed three considerable rivers in presence of the enemy; made twenty thousand prisoners; killed, wounded, or dispersed as many; captured 150 pieces of cannon, 400 caissons, and 4000 carriages; and never halted till its advanced-guard, arrested by an armistice, was within twenty leagues of Vienna. Such results require no eulogium; the annals of war have few such triumphs to recount, and they deservedly placed Moreau in the very highest rank of the captains of the eighteenth century.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
137, 139.  
Nap. ii. 25,  
26. Dum. v.  
229, 241.

43.  
Operations  
in the Gri-  
sons, and  
designs of  
Napoleon  
there.

While these great events were in progress in Germany, operations, inferior, indeed, in magnitude, but equal in the heroism with which they were conducted, and superior in the romantic interest with which they were attended, took place in the snowy amphitheatre of the Alps. It has been already noticed, that the second army of reserve, consisting of fifteen thousand men, was moved forward in October to the valley of the Rhine in the Grisons; and that it was destined to menace the rear of the Imperial army on the Mincio, while Brune attacked it in front. This auxiliary corps would probably have rendered more essential service, if it had been directed to the grand army of Moreau, which was destined to operate in the valley of the Danube, the true avenue to the Austrian states; but such a disposition would have ill accorded with the views of the First

Consul, who was little anxious to put a preponderating force, so near their frontier, into the hands of a dreaded rival, and destined for himself the principal part in the campaign, with the troops which he was to lead by the Noric Alps to Vienna. Independently of this secret feeling, which undoubtedly had its weight, Napoleon was misled by the great results of the Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1797, and the paralysing effect of the march of the army of reserve across the St Bernard in the present year. He conceived that Italy was the theatre where the decisive events were to take place, and had yet to learn the superior importance of the valley of the Danube, in which he himself on future occasions was destined to strike such redoubtable blows. It is fortunate for the historian that this destination of Macdonald's corps took place, as it brought to light the intrepidity and heroism of that gallant officer, of whose descent Scotland has so much reason to be proud; while it led to the interesting episode of the passage of the Splügen, perhaps the most wonderful achievement of modern war, and which has been portrayed by one of its ablest leaders, with the fidelity of Xenophon, and the power of Livy.<sup>1\*</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
64. Arch. i.  
264. Nap.  
ii. 61.

The army of Macdonald, which was announced to consist of forty thousand men, and was furnished with staff and other appointments adequate to that number, in reality amounted only to fifteen thousand troops. Macdonald no sooner discovered this great deficiency, than he made the most urgent representations to the First Consul, and requested that the chosen reserve of ten thousand men, which Murat was leading from the camp at Amiens to the plains of Italy, should be put under his orders. But Napoleon, who intended this corps in the Alps to operate on the campaign, more by the apprehensions it excited among the Imperialists than by its actual achievements

44.  
Macdonald's  
army there.

\* Count Mathieu Dumas, author of the great military history of France, from 1799 to the peace of Tilsit, to which this work has been so largely indebted.

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
148, 149.  
Nap. iii. 61.

in the field, refused to change the destination of Murat's division, and it continued its route for the banks of the Mincio. He still believed that the frontier of the Inn would sufficiently cover the Hereditary States on that side, and that it was by accumulating ninety thousand men in the Southern Tyrol and Italy, that the decisive blow against the Austrian power was to be struck. The command of this great army, destined to dictate peace under the walls of Vienna, he ultimately designed for himself.<sup>1</sup>

45.  
Description  
of the road  
over the  
Splügen.

Of all the passages from Switzerland to Italy, there was none which presented more serious natural obstacles, and was more carefully guarded by the enemy, than that which leads over the Splügen into the Italian Tyrol. It is first necessary to pass from the valley of the Rhine, near its source, over the Splügen into that of the Adda, which descends in a rapid course from the Julian Alps to the lake of Como; from thence, if an advance to the eastward is required, the Col Apriga, a steep ridge entangled with wood and lofty chestnuts, must be surmounted, which brings the traveller into the valley of the Oglio; between which and the stream of the Adige there is interposed the rugged ridge of the Mont Tonal, the snowy summit of which was occupied, and had been carefully fortified, by the Austrian troops. Macdonald no sooner was made acquainted with these obstacles, than he despatched his chief of the staff, General Mathieu Dumas, to lay before the First Consul an account of the almost insuperable difficulties which opposed his progress. No man could be better qualified than the officer whose graphic pencil has so well described the passage, to discharge this delicate mission; for he was equally competent to appreciate the military projects of the general-in-chief, and to portray the physical obstructions which opposed their execution.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Dum. v.  
153, 154.  
Personal  
observation.

Napoleon listened attentively to his statement; interrogated him minutely on the force and positions of Hiller's



corps, and the divisions of Laudon, Davidowich, and Wukassowich, which were stationed near the head of the valleys which in that part of the Alps separate Italy from Germany; and then replied, "We shall wrest from them without a combat that immense fortress of the Tyrol; we must manœuvre on their flanks: menace their last line of retreat, and they will immediately evacuate all the upper valleys. I shall make no change in my dispositions. Return quickly; tell Macdonald that an army can always pass, in every season, *where two men can place their feet*. It is indispensable that, in fifteen days after the commencement of hostilities, the army of the Grisons should have seen the sources of the Adda, the Oglio, and the Adige; that it should have opened its fire on the Mont Tonal which separates them; and that, having descended to Trent, it should form the left wing of the army of Italy, and threaten, in concert with the troops on the Mincio, the rear of Bellegarde's army. I shall take care to forward to it the necessary reinforcements. It is not by the numerical force of an army, but by its destination and the importance of its operations, that I estimate the merit due to its commander."<sup>1</sup>

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46.

Napoleon's  
design for  
the passage  
of that  
mountain.<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
153, 154.

Having received these verbal instructions, Macdonald prepared, with the devotion of a good soldier, to obey his commands. His troops advanced, the moment the armistice was denounced, into the upper Rheinthal, and concentrated between Coire and Tisis, at the entrance of the celebrated defile of the Via Mala, which is the commencement of the ascent of the Splügen; while, at the same time, to distract the enemy and conceal his real designs, demonstrations were made towards Feldkirch, as if it was intended to break into the Tyrol in that quarter. A few days were spent at Tisis in organising the army, and making the necessary preparations for the formidable undertaking which awaited them, of crossing in the depth of winter the snowy summits of the mountains. All the artillery was dismounted, and placed on sledges constructed

47.

Prepara-  
tions of  
Macdonald  
for crossing  
the Splügen.

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in the country, to which oxen were harnessed; the artillery ammunition was divided, and placed on the backs of mules; and in addition to his ordinary arms, ball-cartridge and knapsack, every soldier received five days' provisions, and five packets of cartridges to bear on his shoulders over the rugged ascent. Had he lived to see the French infantry preparing, in the middle of December, under the weight of these enormous burdens, to cross the snow-clad ridges of the Rhetian Alps, by paths hardly accessible at that season to the mountaineers of the country, the eloquent historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire would have expunged from his immortal work the reflection on the comparative hardihood of ancient and modern times.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
154, 161.  
See Gibbon,  
chap. i.  
Jom. xiv.  
146, 147.

48.  
Description  
of the pas-  
sage of the  
Via Mala.

Tusis is situated at the confluence of the Albula and the Rhine, at the foot of a range of pine-clad cliffs of great elevation, which run across the valley, and in former times had formed a barrier, creating a lake in the valley of Schams, a few miles further up its course. Through this enormous mass, three or four miles broad, the Rhine has, in the course of ages, forced its way in a narrow bed, seldom more than thirty or forty, sometimes not more than eight or ten yards broad, shut in on either side by stupendous cliffs which rise to the height of two or three thousand feet above its rocky channel. The road, conducted along the side of these perpendicular precipices, repeatedly crosses the stream by stone bridges, of a single arch, thrown from one cliff to the other, at an immense height above the raging torrent. Innumerable cascades descend from these lofty precipices, and are conducted in subterraneous channels under the road, or are lost in the sable forests of pine which clothe their feet. Impetuous as the Rhine is in this extraordinary channel, the roar of its waters is scarcely heard at the immense elevation above it at which the bridges are placed. The darkness of the road, overshadowed by primeval pines of gigantic stature, often conducted through galleries cut out of the solid rock, or on arches thrown over

the awful abyss; the solitude and solemnity of the impenetrable forests around, the stupendous precipices above and beneath, which make the passenger feel as if he were suspended in middle air, conspire to render this pass the most extraordinary and sublime in the whole amphitheatre of the central Alps.<sup>1\*</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Personal observation.  
Dum.v.151.  
Ebel, Art.  
Via Mala.

Emerging from this gloomy defile, the road traverses for two leagues the open and smiling valley of Schams; it next ascends by a winding course the pine-clad cliffs of la Roffla, and at length reaches, in a narrow and desolate pastoral valley, the village of Splügen, situated at the foot of the ascent of the mountain of the same name. Here the road, leaving the waters of the Rhine, which descend cold and clear from the glaciers of the Hinter Rhein, turns sharp to the left hand, and ascends a lateral valley as far as its upper extremity, when it emerges upon the bare face of the mountain above the region of wood, and by a painful ascent, often of forty-five degrees elevation, reaches the summit in an hour and a half. This description applies to the old road as it stood in 1800. The new road, over the same ground, is wound gradually up the ascent, with that admirable skill which has rendered the works of the French and Italian engineers in the Alps the object of deserved admiration to the whole civilised world. The wearied traveller then beholds with joy the waters flowing towards the Italian streams, in a narrow plain about four hundred yards broad, situated between two glaciers at the base of overhanging mountains of snow. From thence to Isola, on the Italian side of the declivity, is a descent of two leagues, conducted in many

49.

And of the  
Splügen  
mountain.

\* The defile of the Via Mala is not so celebrated as its matchless features deserve; but the admirable road which is now conducted through its romantic cliffs, and over the Splügen, must ultimately bring it into more general notice. It exceeds in sublimity and horror any scene in the Alps. There is no single pass in the Simplon, Mont Cenis, the Great St Bernard, the Little St Bernard, the St Gothard, the Bernhardin, the Brenner, or the Col de Tende, which can stand in comparison with it. It approaches more nearly to the savage character of the Breach of Roland, or the Circle of Gabarnie in the Pyrenees, but exceeds in stupendous features either of these extraordinary scenes.

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
164, 165.  
Personal  
observation.

places down zig-zag slopes, and attended with great danger. On the right, for several miles, is a continued precipice, or rocky descent, in many places three or four hundred feet deep, which bears the name of the slopes of the Cardinal; while, on the left, the road is cut out of the solid rock, on the bare face of the mountain, exposing the traveller to be overwhelmed by the avalanches, which, loosened on the heights above by the warmth of the southern sun, often sweep with irresistible violence to the bottom of the declivity.<sup>1</sup>

50.  
Precautions  
necessary in  
crossing  
during  
winter.

In summer, when the road is well cleared, it is possible to go in three hours from the village of Splugen to the hospice on the summit; but when the newly fallen snow has effaced all traces of the path in those elevated regions, above the zone of the arbutus and rhododendron; when the avalanches or the violence of the winds have carried off the black poles which mark the course of the road, it is not possible to ascend with safety to the higher parts of the mountain. The traveller must advance with cautious steps, sounding, as he proceeds, as in an unknown sea beset with shoals; the most experienced guides hesitate as to the direction which they should take; for in that snowy wilderness the horizon is bounded by icy peaks, affording few landmarks to direct their steps, even if they should be perceived for a few minutes from amidst the mantle of clouds which usually envelop their summits. It may easily be conceived, from this description, what labours are requisite during the winter season to open this passage. It is necessary for an extent of five leagues, from the village of Splugen to that of Isola, either to clear away the snow, so as to come to the earth, or to form a passable road over its top; and the most indefatigable efforts cannot always secure success in such an enterprise. The frequent variations of the atmosphere, the clouds which suddenly rise up from the valleys beneath, the terrible storms of wind which arise in these elevated regions,<sup>2</sup> the avalanches which descend with irresistible force from

<sup>2</sup> Dum. v.  
164, 165.

the overhanging glaciers, in an instant destroy the labour of weeks, and obliterate under a mountain of snow the greatest efforts of human industry.

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Such were the difficulties which awaited Macdonald in the first mountain ridge which lay before him in the passage of the Alps. He arrived, with the advanced guard, on the evening of the 26th, at the village of Splügen, the point where the mountain passage, properly speaking, begins, with a company of sappers, and the first sledges conveying the artillery. The country guides placed poles along the ascent; the labourers followed, and cleared away the snow; the strongest dragoons next marched to beat down the road by their horses' feet. They had already, after incredible fatigue, nearly reached the summit, when the wind suddenly rose, an avalanche fell from the mountain, and, sweeping across the road, cut right through the column, and precipitated thirty dragoons near its head into the gulf beneath, where they were dashed to pieces between the ice and the rocks, and never more heard of. General Laboissière, who led the van, was ahead of the cataract of snow, and reached the hospice; but the remainder of the column, thunderstruck by the catastrophe, returned to Splügen; and the wind, which continued for the three succeeding days to blow with great violence, detached so many avalanches, that the road was entirely blocked up in the upper regions, and the guides declared that no possible efforts could render it passable in less than fifteen days.<sup>1</sup>

51.  
Extreme  
difficulties  
experienced  
by the  
French  
troops in  
the passage.  
Nov. 26.

Nov. 27.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
154, 155.  
Dum. v. 168,  
169.

Macdonald, however, was not to be daunted by any such obstacles. Independent of his anxiety to fulfil his destined part in the campaign, necessity forced him on; for the unwonted accumulation of men and horses in those elevated Alpine regions, promised very soon to consume the whole subsistence of the country, and expose the troops to the greatest dangers from actual want. He instantly made the best arrangements which circumstances would admit for re-opening the passage. First marched

52.  
Macdonald  
still perse-  
veres: pas-  
sage of the  
vanguard.  
Dec. 1.

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four of the strongest oxen that could be found in the Grisons, led by the most experienced guides ; they were followed by forty robust peasants, who cleared or beat down the snow ; two companies of sappers succeeded, and improved the track ; behind them marched the remnant of the squadron of dragoons, which had suffered so much on the first ascent, and who bravely demanded the post of danger in renewing the attempt. After them came a convoy of artillery and a hundred beasts of burden, and a strong rearguard closed the party. By incredible efforts the heads of the column, before night, reached the hospice ; and although many men and horses were swallowed up by the avalanches in the ascent, the order and discipline so necessary to the success of the enterprise were maintained throughout. They here joined General Laboissière, who continued the same efforts on the Italian side ; and led this adventurous advanced-guard in safety to the sunny fields of Campo Dolcino at the southern base of the mountain. Two other columns, arranged in the same order, followed on the 2d and 3d December, in clear frosty weather, with much less difficulty, because the road was beaten down by the footsteps of those who had preceded them ; but several men died from the excessive cold on the higher parts of the mountain.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
170, 171.  
Jom. xiv.  
156. Bot.  
iv. 58, 59.

53.  
Increased  
difficulties,  
and heroism  
of Mac-  
donald.

Encouraged by this success, the remainder of the army advanced to Splugen on the 4th December ; and Macdonald, leaving only a slight rearguard on the northern side of the mountain, commenced his march on the morning of the 5th, at the head of seven thousand men. Though no tempest had been felt in the deep valley of the Rhine, the snow had fallen during the night in such quantities, that from the very outset the traces of the track were lost, and the road required to be made anew, as at the commencement of the ascent. The guides refused to proceed ; but Macdonald insisted upon making the attempt, and after six hours of unheard-of fatigues, the head of his column succeeded in reaching the summit.

In the narrow plain between the glaciers, however, they found the road blocked up by an immense mass of snow, formed by an avalanche newly fallen, upon which the guides refused to enter; and in consequence the soldiers turned, unanimously exclaiming that the passage was closed. Macdonald instantly hastened to the front, revived the sinking spirits of his men, encouraged the faltering guides, and, advancing himself at the head of the column, plunged into the perilous mass, sounding every step as he advanced with a long staff, which often sank deep into the abyss. "Soldiers," said he, "the army of reserve has surmounted the St Bernard; you must overcome the Splügen: your glory requires that you should rise victorious over difficulties to appearance insuperable. Your destinies call you into Italy; advance and conquer, first the mountains and the snow, then the plains and the armies."\* Roused by such an example, the troops and the peasants redoubled their efforts. The vast walls of ice and snow were cut through; and although the hurricane increased with frightful rapidity, and repeatedly filled up the excavations thus made, they at length succeeded in rendering the passage practicable. The tempest continued to blow with dreadful violence during the passage to the hospice and the descent of the Cardinal; the columns were repeatedly cut through by avalanches, which fell across the road, and more than one regiment was entirely dispersed in the icy wilderness. At length, by the heroic exertions of the officers, whom the example of their general had inspired with extraordinary ardour, the headquarters reached Isola, and rested there during the two succeeding days, to rally the regiments,<sup>1</sup> which the hardships of the passage had broken into a confused mass

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<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv. 59.  
Jom. iv.  
156, 157.  
Dum. v.  
171, 174.

\* A parallel incident occurred in ancient times, and, what is very extraordinary, during the decay of Roman virtue. "The Emperor Majorian," says Gibbon, "led his troops over the Alps in a severe winter. The Emperor led the way on foot, and in complete armour, sounding with his long staff the depth of the ice or snow, and encouraging the Scythians, who complained of the extreme cold, by the cheerful assurance that they should be satisfied with the heat of Africa."—*Decline and Fall*, chap. xxxvi. vol. iv. 343.

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of insulated men : but above one hundred soldiers, and as many horses and mules, were swallowed up in the abysses of the mountains.\*

54.  
He arrives  
at Chia-  
venna, on  
the lake of  
Como.  
Dec. 7.

Late on the evening of the 6th December, the greater part of the troops and a large part of the artillery had passed the mountain, and headquarters were advanced to the smiling fields of Chiavenna, near the upper extremity of the lake of Como. No sooner did Hiller hear of this advance, than he moved forward his columns towards the head of the valley of the Inn to assail him ; but the intelligence of the disastrous battle of Hohenlinden arrived that very day, and, by rendering it evident that all the forces of the monarchy would be required to defend the capital, precluded the possibility of following up any distant enterprises. The Austrians, therefore, wisely determined to act only on the defensive, took post on the summits of the Albula, the Julierberg, and the Broglio—the three ridges which separate the Italian from the German side of the mountains in that quarter,—and strongly reinforced the division on the Tonal,<sup>1</sup> the only

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
158, 159.  
Dum. v. 174,  
175.

Unworthy  
jealousy of  
this passage  
displayed by  
Napoleon.

\* The passage of the Splugen by Macdonald is the most memorable and extraordinary undertaking of the kind recorded in modern war, so far as the obstacles of nature are concerned. It yields only to the march of Suwarroff over the St Gothard, the Schächenthal, and the Engiberg, where, in addition to similar natural difficulties, the efforts of an able and indefatigable enemy were to be overcome. The passage of the St Bernard by Napoleon in fine weather, and without opposition, will bear no comparison with either the one or the other. That he himself was conscious of this, is obvious from the striking terms of disparagement in which he speaks of Macdonald's exertions in this passage—an instance of that jealousy of every rival, in any of his great achievements, which is almost unaccountable in so great a man. "The passage of the Splugen," says he, "presented, without doubt, some difficulties ; but winter is by no means the season of the year in which such operations are conducted with most difficulty ; the snow is then firm, *the weather settled, and there is nothing to fear from the avalanches*, which constitute the true and only danger to be apprehended in the Alps. In December, you often meet with the finest weather, on these elevated mountains, of dry frost, during which the air is perfectly calm."—NAPOLEON, ii. 61, 62. Recollecting that this was written after the First Consul had received the full details from Macdonald of the extraordinary difficulties of the passage, it is inexcusable, and clearly betrays a consciousness of the inferiority of his own passage over the St Bernard. In his official despatch, written by order of the First Consul, to Macdonald, Berthier says :—"I have received the relation which the chief of your staff has transmitted to me, relative to the passage of the Splugen by the army which you



pass between the valley of the Oglio, to which Macdonald was hastening, and that of the Adige, which was the ultimate object of his efforts.

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While still on the banks of the Adda, the French general had the misfortune to receive intelligence of the capture of a battalion of dismounted hussars, which negligently lay in the elevated valley at its upper extremity, by a well-concerted surprise from the Imperial forces in the Engadine. At the same time, he received orders from the First Consul to place himself under the command of General Brune, of whose army he was to form the left wing—a mortifying circumstance to a general who had just achieved so important a service in a separate command as the passage of the Splügen, but which abated nothing of his zeal in the public cause. He suggested to Brune that two divisions should be detached from the army of Italy to reinforce his corps; and thus, with a body of twenty-four thousand men, he would advance across the mountains to Trent, and effect a decisive operation in the rear of the Imperial army. But the

55.  
He is placed  
under the  
orders of  
Brune, and  
passes the  
Col Apriga.

command. I have communicated the details to the consuls, and they have enjoined me to make known to you their high satisfaction at the intrepidity and heroic constancy which the officers, and soldiers, and generals, have evinced in this passage, which will form a memorable epoch in our military annals. The consuls, confident in your talents, behold with interest the new position of the army of the Grisons. I impatiently expect the details of the celebrated passage of the Splügen, and the losses which it occasioned, to enable them to appreciate the admiration and gratitude which is due to the chiefs and soldiers of your army.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dec. 14.  
See Dum. vi.  
255. Pièces  
Just.

It was equally unworthy of Napoleon to say in his Memoirs,—“The march of Macdonald produced no good effect, and contributed in no respect to the success of the campaign; for the corps of Baraguay d’Hilliers, detached into the Upper Engadine, was too weak to effect anything of importance. Macdonald arrived at Trent on the 7th January, when the enemy was already chased from it by the left of the army of Italy, by the corps under the orders of Moncey and Rochambeau.”<sup>2</sup> Had Napoleon forgotten that Macdonald’s advance, by paralysing Laudon and Wukassowich, enabled Brune to achieve the passage of the Mincio; and that, if it had not been for the credulity of Moncey, he would have compelled the surrender of the former at la Pietra with 7,000 men? The great truth, “*Magna est veritas et prævalebit*,” does not seem ever to have crossed Napoleon’s mind; he never contemplated the minute examination to which his account of transactions would be exposed by posterity, and thought he could deceive future ages, as he did his own, by means of sycophantish writers, and an enslaved press.

<sup>2</sup> Nap. ii. 62,  
63.

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general-in-chief refused to comply with this request, which was evidently hazardous, as exposing to overwhelming attacks in detail two separate armies, too far severed from each other to be able to render any effectual assistance in case of need. Napoleon's orders had directed Macdonald to penetrate as soon as possible into the valley of the Adige, in order to threaten the flank and rear of the Imperialists on the Mincio. For this purpose it was necessary to cross the Col Apriga, which lay between the valley of the Adda and that of the Oglio, and afterwards surmount the icy summit of Mont Tonal, between the latter stream and the Adige. The passage of the Col Apriga, though this mountain is considerably less elevated than the Splugen, was in some respects even more difficult, by reason of the extreme steepness of the ascents, the entangled wood which encumbered its lower region, and the dreadful nature of the road, which in many places is little better than the bed of a torrent; but it was much shorter, and did not lead into the regions of snow or ice. In seven hours all these difficulties were overcome; the army found itself on the banks of the Oglio, and extended its outposts as far as Bormio at the upper extremity of the valley.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xix.  
158, 159.  
Dum. v. 176,  
180, 182,  
185. Bot.  
iv. 61.

56.  
Attack on  
the Mont  
Tonal, in  
which the  
French are  
repulsed.

There still remained, however, the herculean task of surmounting the Tonal—a mountain ridge of great elevation, which could be reached at that rude season only by a path through the snow, in which the troops were confined to single files. The summit, as usual in these elevated regions, consisted of a small plain three hundred yards abroad, situated between two enormous and inaccessible glaciers. Across this narrow space the Austrians had drawn a triple line of intrenchments, faced for the most part by enormous blocks of ice, cut in the form of regular masonry, and even more difficult to scale than walls of granite. Notwithstanding these obstacles, the French grenadiers, after a painful ascent by the narrow and slippery path, reached the front of the intrenchments. Though

Dec. 22.

received by a shower of balls, they succeeded in forcing the external palisades ; but all their efforts were ineffectual against the walls of ice which formed the inner strength of the works. They were in consequence obliged to retreat, and brought back the disheartening report that this position was impregnable. Sensible, however, of the vital importance of forcing this passage, Macdonald resolved to make another attempt. Eight days afterwards, another column was formed, under the command of Vandamme, and approached the terrible intrenchments. The Austrians had in the interval added much to the strength of the works ; but they were assaulted with so much vigour, that the two external forts were carried. Still, however, when they approached the principal intrenchment, the fire from its summit, and from a blockhouse on an elevated position in its rear, was so violent that all the efforts of the Republicans were again ineffectual, and they were forced to retire, after staining with the blood of their bravest the cold and icy summit of the mountain. Macdonald was in some degree consoled for this disaster by the success of his left wing, which spread itself into the Engadine, driving the Imperialists before it, and made itself master of the well-known stations of Martinsbruck and Glurns, on the Tyrolean side of the mountains.<sup>1</sup>

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Dec. 31.

<sup>1</sup> *Jom. xiv.*  
161, 162,  
163. *Dum.*  
v. 186, 188,  
191. *Bot. iv.*  
61. Personal  
observation.

The importance of these operations, and the obstinacy with which the attack and defence of the inhospitable Alpine ridges were conducted at this inclement season, will be best understood by casting a glance over the positions and movements of the contending armies in the Italian plains at this period. When hostilities were recommenced to the south of the Alps, by the denunciation of the armistice, the Imperial army, sixty-five thousand strong, of which fifteen thousand were cavalry, occupied the formidable line of the Mincio, covered by a hundred pieces of cannon, flanked on the one extremity by the Po, on the other by the lake of Garda, and supported by the

57.  
Positions  
and forces of  
the French  
and Aus-  
trians in  
Italy.

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1800.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
243, 244.  
Jom. xiv.  
166, 167.  
Bot. iv. 63.

strong fortress of Mantua, and the inferior fortifications of Peschiera and Borghetto, which gave them the immense advantage of being able to debouche at pleasure on either side of the river. The Imperialists had received orders to remain on the defensive in this excellent position until their flanks were secured, and the prospect of an advantageous attack was afforded by the advance of the Neapolitan troops over the hills of Tuscany, and the descent of Laudon and Wukassowich from the mountains of the Tyrol.<sup>1</sup>

58.  
French  
forces in  
Italy.

The French forces in Italy were immense. In the Peninsula there were altogether ninety-five thousand men, besides twenty-seven thousand in hospital. Of this great body, sixty-one thousand infantry, nine thousand cavalry, and one hundred and seventy-eight pieces of cannon, were ready for active operations on the Mincio, while the remainder occupied Tuscany, Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria. During the five months that these troops had occupied the fertile plains of the Po, they had profited to an extraordinary degree by the resources of the country. The soldiers had been completely new clothed, the artillery horses renewed, the cavalry was admirably mounted, the magazines were full, the troops in the highest state of discipline, spirits, and equipment. But the vast supplies which had produced this improvement, wrung by the terrors of military execution from an unhappy and impoverished people, had excited the utmost discontent in the peninsula.\* The inhabitants compared the high-sounding proclamations of the invaders with the sad consequences which had followed their footsteps; and, rendered more sullen by the disappointment of their hopes than even by the serious injuries they had undergone, were

\* No less than 110,000 soldiers of the French army were at this period fed, clothed, lodged, and paid at the expense of foreign states,—viz., 30,000 in Lombardy, 10,000 in Piedmont, 15,000 in Tuscany, 25,000 in Holland, 15,000 in Switzerland, 15,000 in the Trevisan March.—*THIERS' Consulat et l'Empire*, ii. 374. This was the permanent allocation, independent of the vast bodies of troops introduced for a time during the operations of the campaign.

ready upon any reverse to have risen unanimously against their oppressors. This state of things was well known to the French commanders ; and, to secure their flanks and rear, they were obliged to detach twenty-five thousand men from the grand army on the Mincio, though they were well aware that it was there that the fate of Italy was to be decided.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv. 62.  
63. Jom.  
xiv. 164.  
166. Nap.  
ii. 64, 65.

Hostilities were first commenced by Brune, who found the spirit of his troops so much elevated by the intelligence of the battle of Hohenlinden, and the passage of the Splügen by Macdonald, that their ardour could no longer be restrained. The firing commenced on the 16th, but nothing except inconsiderable skirmishes ensued before the 20th. The Mincio, in its course of twenty miles from the lake of Garda to Mantua, though fordable in many places in summer, was absolutely impassable in winter ; and the five bridges which were thrown over its current at Peschiera, Salionze, Valeggio, Volta, and Goito, were either within the walls of fortifications, or strongly intrenched and barricaded. The left bank, in the hands of the Austrians, was generally more elevated than the right, in the possession of the Republicans ; but at Monzambano and Molino, near Pozzuolo, the right had the advantage, which evidently pointed out these stations as the most advantageous for forcing a passage. For these reasons they had been fortified with care by the Imperial engineers, who had pushed their intrenchments, which were occupied by twenty thousand combatants under Hohenzollern, to a considerable distance from the right bank of the river ; and against these advanced works it first behoved Brune to direct his efforts.<sup>2</sup>

59.  
First operations of  
Brune.  
Dec. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Nap. ii. 66,  
67. Bot. iv.  
62, 63. Jom.  
xiv. 174,  
175. Dum.  
v. 243, 244.

On the 20th, the whole French army approached the Mincio in four columns. The right, under Dupont, moved towards the shores of the Mantuan lake ; the centre, under Suchet, advanced direct upon Volta ; the third column, destined to mask Peschiera, was ordered to take post near Ponti ; the left and the reserve were directed

60.  
Passage of  
the Mincio.  
Dec. 20.

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Dec. 25.

against Monzambano. The French general had intended to have made feigned attacks only on the centre and right, and to have attempted to force the passage in good earnest near the lake of Garda, and at the foot of the mountains; but the course of events fell out otherwise. As the Republicans approached the Mincio, the Imperialists, who had orders not to engage in any serious affair on the right bank, seeing that they had the whole French army on their hands, successively abandoned all the positions they had fortified with so much care, and withdrew to the other side, leaving only detachments to occupy Valeggio and the *tête-de-pont* of Borghetto, on the Republican side. The French patroles, in consequence, everywhere approached the river; and Dupont, ignorant that the attack on his side was intended only to be a feint, and that the left was the real point of attack, made the most active preparations for effecting a passage. He succeeded so well, that, early on the morning of the 25th, he had thrown a battalion over, near Molino, which speedily established a bridge, and soon enabled a whole division to obtain a firm footing on the left bank. Hardly was the passage completed, when orders arrived from the commander-in-chief to cover, by a fire of cannon, merely the bridge which had been established, and allow no troops to pass over to the other side. But this despatch arrived too late: the division of Watrin was already over; the enemy's troops opposed to it were hourly and rapidly increasing, and any attempt to fall back to the bridge would have exposed it to certain and irremediable ruin. In these trying circumstances, Dupont conceived that the execution of his orders had become impossible, and resolved to retain the advantage he had gained, by aiding Watrin with his remaining troops. In this resolution he was confirmed by Suchet, who was no sooner informed that the passage was irrevocably engaged on the right, than he resolved to support it with all his forces, and, hastening to the bridge at Molino, crossed over with his whole corps.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 67,  
71. Bot. iv.  
63. Jom.  
xiv. 175,  
181.

On their side, the Imperialists, who had judiciously placed the bulk of their army in mass, a little in the rear of the centre of the line, no sooner heard of the passage at Molino than they directed an overwhelming force to assail the advanced-guard of the enemy. But for the timely assistance afforded by Suchet, Dupont's troops would have been totally destroyed; as it was, a furious combat ensued, which continued with various success till night, in which the Republicans only maintained their ground by the sacrifice of the bravest of their men. For long the French infantry repulsed with invincible firmness the repeated and vehement charges of the Austrian cavalry; but at length they were driven, by a desperate effort of the Hungarian grenadiers, out of the village of Pozzuolo, and forced in disorder to the water's edge. All seemed lost; when the Imperialists, checked by a terrible discharge of grape from the batteries on the French side, hesitated in their advance; and Dupont took advantage of their irresolution to animate his men, and lead them back to the charge, which was executed with such vigour, that Pozzuolo was regained, and the Imperialists repulsed with the loss of seven hundred prisoners and five pieces of cannon. The Austrians, however, brought up fresh troops; Pozzuolo was again carried at the point of the bayonet; Suchet advanced with his division and retook it; it was a third time carried by the Imperialists, and continued to be alternately conquered and reconquered till nightfall, when it finally remained in the hands of the Austrians.\* Even the darkness of a winter night could not suspend this terrible combat. Between eleven and twelve the fitful gleams of the moon, through a tempestuous and cloudy sky, enabled the Republicans to perceive two deep masses of grenadiers who silently approached their intrenchments.<sup>1</sup> They were received with a general discharge of fire-arms

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61.

Desperate  
conflict of  
the troops  
who had  
crossed  
over.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 67,  
75. Bot. iv.  
63, 64.  
Dum. v. 251,  
266. Jom.  
xiv. 175,  
185.

\* Bellegarde says it remained in the hands of the Austrians: Oudinot affirms it was ultimately carried by the French. The well-known veracity of the German character makes it probable that the former was the true account.

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of all sorts ; the batteries thundered from the opposite bank ; for a few minutes a volcano seemed to have burst forth on the shores of the Mincio : but all the efforts of the Imperialists were unavailing ; and, after a gallant struggle, they were obliged to retire, leaving the French in possession of their blood-stained intrenchments.

62.  
Brune at length relieves them, and the passage is completed.

Dec. 26.

Brune, during this desperate conflict, remained in a state of the greatest irresolution, hesitating between his original design of effecting a passage at Monzambano, and the new project to which he was urged, of holding the ground, won at so dear a price, on the lower part of the stream. He thus ran the risk of losing his whole right wing, which was in truth only saved by the resolute valour of the troops of which it was composed.\* At length he resolved to pursue his original design, and force a passage at Monzambano. For this purpose Marmont, at daybreak on the 26th December, established a battery of forty pieces of cannon on the heights above that place, which commanded the left bank, and despatched orders to Dupont and Suchet to keep themselves within their intrenchments until they heard the firing warmly engaged on the left. Under cover of a thick fog, the passage was speedily effected, and the French advanced-guard soon after came to blows with the enemy. It was evident, however, that the latter fought only to cover their retreat. Oudinot, at the head of the Republican grenadiers, bravely resisted till sufficient reinforcements passed over to enable him to assume the offensive, which he did with such vigour, that the Imperialists were driven back to Valeggio, from whence they continued their retreat in the night, leaving Borghetto to its fate, which, next day, after repulsing an assault with great loss, surrendered with its garrison of eight hundred men. In effect, Bellegarde, conceiving the passage of the river effected by the bridge established at Molino, had resolved upon a general retreat ;<sup>1</sup> his troops fell back in all quarters

1 *Jom. xiv.*  
188, 192.  
*Dum. v.* 268,  
275. *Nap. ii.*  
76, 78. *Bot.*  
*iv.* 64, 65.

\* For this he incurred the just and merited censure of the First Consul.—  
See NAPOLEON, ii. 75, 76.



towards the Adige, leaving garrisons in Mantua, Verona, Legnago, and Peschiera, which reduced his effective force to forty thousand combatants.

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In the passage of the Mincio, the Austrians lost above seven thousand men, of whom one-half were prisoners, and forty pieces of cannon. Its moral consequences, as is generally the case with a first decisive success, determined the fate of the campaign. The French resumed the career of victory with their wonted alacrity; the Imperialists fell into the despondency which is the sure prelude to defeat; and the disastrous intelligence they received from the Bavarian frontier contributed to spread the disheartening impression that the Republicans were invincible, and that no chance of safety remained to the monarchy but in a speedy submission to the conqueror.<sup>1</sup>

63.  
Great losses  
of the Imper-  
ialists.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
275, 276.  
Jom. xiv.  
192, 193.  
Nap. ii. 80.

Brunc, however, advanced cautiously after his victory. Leaving detachments to mask Mantua, Verona, and Peschiera, he approached the Adige in the end of December. To effect the passage of that river, the French general made use of the same stratagem which had been attempted for the passage of the Mincio—viz. to make demonstrations both against the lower and upper part of the stream; and, while the enemy were distracted in their attention by a multiplicity of attacks, the artillery and bridge equipage were secretly conducted to Bassolengo. Sixty pieces of cannon were established there in battery, on the heights of the right bank, on the morning of the 1st January, which opened their fire at daybreak, under cover of which a bridge was speedily constructed without opposition from the enemy. The troops passed over, and established themselves on the left bank without firing a shot; the Imperialists were much less solicitous about interrupting their operations than to effect a junction with the corps of Wukassowich and Laudon, which were hastening by the defiles of the Brenta towards the plain of Bassano.<sup>2</sup> Bellegarde withdrew his forces on all sides, and concentrated

64.  
Bellegarde  
retires to  
Caldiero.

Jan. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xiv.  
196, 197.  
Dum. v. 276,  
290. Nap.  
ii. 78, 79.  
Bot. iv. 66.

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them in the strong position of Caldiero, already signalised by a victory in 1796 over Napoleon; while the Republicans closely followed his footsteps, and, extending their left up the rocky gorge of the Adige, made themselves masters, after severe combats, of the narrow defile of Corona and the memorable plateau of Rivoli.

65.

Advance of  
the Republi-  
cans up the  
valley of the  
Adige.

The Republicans, under Moncey, pursued their advantages: the Imperialists, under Laudon, long and obstinately defended the town of Alta, in the valley of the Adige, but were driven from it with the loss of five hundred prisoners. They again held firm in the intrenchments of St Marco, but were at length forced to retreat, and took refuge in the defile of Calliano, already celebrated by so many combats. At the same time, the Italian division of Count Theodor Lecchi ascended the valley of the Oglio, and entered into communication with Macdonald's corps immediately after its repulse from the icy ramparts of Mont Tonal; while detachments in the rear formed the blockades of Mantua, Peschiera, Verona, and Legnago. Laudon retired with six thousand men to Roveredo, from whence he was soon after driven, and fell back, disputing every inch of ground, to the foot of the fort of Pietra, overhanging the deep and rapid stream of the Adige between that town and Trent.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Jom. xiv.*  
198, 199.  
*Dum. v.*  
288, 290.

66.  
Alarming  
situation of  
Laudon on  
the Upper  
Adige.

Bellegarde, finding his force so materially weakened by the garrisons which he was obliged to throw into the fortified towns on the Mincio, and the losses sustained in the passage of that river, had given orders to Wukassowich and Laudon, whose united forces exceeded twenty thousand men, to fall back from the Italian Tyrol, through the defiles of the Brenta, and join him in the plains of Bassano, in the rear of Caldiero; and it was to give them time to accomplish this junction that he took post on the almost impregnable heights of that celebrated position. Laudon was commencing this movement when he was rudely assailed by the division of Moncey, and harassed in his retreat up the valley of the Adige in the manner

which has been mentioned. But a greater danger awaited him. On the very day on which he retired to the castellated defile of la Pietra, he received the alarming intelligence that Trent, directly in his rear, and by which he required to pass to gain the upper extremity of the Brenta, was occupied by Macdonald, at the head of nine thousand men.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv. 66,  
67. Jom.  
xiv. 198,  
199. Dum.  
v. 284, 285.

To understand how this happened, it is necessary to return to the army of the Grisons, after its repulse from the glaciers of Mont Tonal. After that check, Macdonald had collected in the Val Camonica, including the Italian division of Lecchi, above nine thousand men; and with them he eagerly sought for some defile or mountain-path by which to penetrate across the rocky chain which separates that valley from that of the Sarca, from whence he could reach Trent and the banks of the Adige. But these rugged cliffs, which push out, with hardly any fall, almost to Brescia, in the plain of Lombardy, defeated all his efforts; and it became necessary to turn their southern extremity by Pisogno, at the head of the lake of Isea, from thence to cross the Col di San Zeno, into the valley of Sabia, and again surmount another ridge into the Val Trompia, in order to ascend by the beautiful sides of the Chiesa into the valley of Sarca. This long circuit, which would have been completely avoided by forcing the passage of Mont Tonal, irritated to the highest degree the French troops, who had expected at once, after surmounting the Splugen, to take a part in the glories of the campaign. Their impatience increased when, on their arrival at Pisogno, Macdonald received and published the account of the passage of the Mincio, and the retreat of the Imperial army towards the Adige.<sup>2</sup>

67.  
Macdonald  
makes his  
way into  
the Italian  
Tyrol.

<sup>2</sup> Bot. iv. 67.  
Dum. v. 285,  
287. Jom.  
xiv. 198,  
199.

He was there joined by General Rochambeau with three thousand men from Brune's army, who had at length become sensible of the importance of the operations in the Alps on the flanks and rear of the retreating army,

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68.

And at  
length  
reaches the  
Upper  
Adige.

and received the most pressing invitations to accelerate his march, so as to cut off some of its detached columns. The difficulties of the ridge of San Zeno, however, had almost arrested the soldiers whom the snows of the Splügen had been unable to overcome; a few horses only could be got over by cutting through blocks of ice as hard as rock on the summit, and the greater part of the cavalry and artillery required to descend by the smiling shores of the Lago Isca to Brescia, and ascend again the vine-clad banks of the Chiesa. Such, however, was the vigour of the Republican troops, that they overcame all these obstacles; on the 6th January they arrived at Storo in the Italian Tyrol; while the left wing, under Baraguay d'Hilliers, surmounted the higher ridges at the sources of the Adige, and, following the retreating Austrian columns, descended by Glurns and Schlanders upon Meran on the banks of the Upper Adige. Thus, after surmounting incredible difficulties, the object of the First Consul was at length gained: the whole mountain-ridges were crossed, and the Imperialists turned by the upper extremity of all the valleys where their forces in the Italian Tyrol were situated.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
285, 287.  
Jom. xiv.  
198, 199.  
Bot. iv. 67.

69.

Laudon is  
surrounded  
at Trent.

The approach of these different columns, amounting in all to twenty-five thousand men, and conducted with equal skill and vigour, from the north, south, and west, convinced the Austrian generals that they had not a moment to lose in concentrating their troops at Trent, and regaining, by the defile of the Brenta, the army of Bellegarde at Bassano. If Wukassowich ascended towards Bolzano to aid in repelling Baraguay d'Hilliers, who was descending the Adige, he ran the risk of leaving Laudon to be overwhelmed by Moncey; if he moved towards Roveredo to the support of the latter general, he abandoned the avenues of Trent and the line of communication in his rear to Macdonald. In these critical circumstances he rapidly withdrew his right to Trent, ordered the troops who covered la Sarca to defend that city against Mac-

donald as long as possible, and enjoined Laudon to maintain himself to the last extremity in the important defile of la Pietra. But the French general, who was now fully aware of the situation of Laudon, made incredible exertions: in one day he marched forty miles; crossed the Col Vezzano; forced the passage of the Adige, and entered Trent. Wukassowich hastily retired by the great road to the defiles of the Brenta; but Laudon with seven thousand men, who was still posted at la Pietra, farther down the Adige towards Verona, was left to his fate, with a superior enemy, part of Brune's forces, in Lombardy, in his front, and the army of the Grisons, under Macdonald, in his rear, occupying the only road by which he could retreat.<sup>1</sup>

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Jan. 7.  
1 Dum. v.  
285, 292.  
Jom. xiv.  
201, 202.  
Bot. iv. 67.

The only remaining chance of safety to Laudon was by a rugged path, which leads over the mountains from Pietra to Levico on the Brenta. It was impossible that his corps could retire by this defile, passable only by single file, if they were attacked either by Moncey or Macdonald; and Laudon was well aware that the former, with fifteen thousand men, was preparing to assail him on the following morning, and that the latter, notwithstanding the fatigue of his troops, had already pushed a patrol beyond Trent, on the road to Roveredo, and would advance to the support of his comrade the moment that the combat was seriously engaged. In this extremity he made use of a *ruse de guerre*, if that name can properly be applied to a fabrication inconsistent with the proverbial German good faith. He sent an officer of his staff to Moncey, announcing the conclusion of an armistice between Brune and Bellegarde, similar to that already concluded in Germany, and proposing a suspension of arms. The honourable Moncey, suspecting no deceit, fell into the snare; he agreed to the proposal, upon condition that the pass of la Pietra and the town of Trent should be placed in his hands; which being agreed to, and its execution prepared for the following day, Laudon in the mean time, during the night, with-

70.  
He escapes  
by a lateral  
path to  
Basano.

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<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv. 67.  
Dum. v. 292,  
295. Jom.  
xiv. 202,  
203.

drew his troops, man by man, through the narrow straits of Caldonazzo by paths among the rocks, where two file could not pass abreast, to Levico on the banks of the Brenta, in the Val Sugana. The French advanced-guard, proceeding next day to take possession of Trent, was astonished to find it already in the hands of Macdonald, and to discover the extent of the danger from which their unsuspecting honesty had delivered the Imperial general.<sup>1</sup>

71.  
Bellegarde  
retreats to  
Treviso.  
Armistice  
there.  
Jan. 10.

Jan. 16.

Bellegarde, finding that Wukassowich and Laudon had effected their junction in the valley of the Brenta, deemed it no longer necessary to retain his position on the heights of Caldiero, but retired leisurely, and facing about at every halt, to Bassano, where he effected his junction with the divisions which had descended from the Tyrol. This great reinforcement gave him a marked superiority over his adversary; and though he fell back to the neighbourhood of Treviso, he was making preparations to give battle in front of that town, when operations on both sides were concluded by the armistice of Treviso, which at length put a period to this murderous contest. By this convention, the Austrians agreed to give up Peschiera, Verona, Legnago, Ancona, and Ferrara, which gave Brune an excellent base for future operations; but they retained possession of Mantua, the key of Lombardy, and the great object of the First Consul's desires. This was the more irritating to Napoleon, as Murat's corps, twelve thousand strong, had already reached the Italian plains, and Brune himself had written to government, only three days before, that he would agree to no armistice, unless Mantua, as well as the other fortresses, was put into his hands. The truth is, that in the interval circumstances had changed. The Imperialists were concentrated in the immense plains of Treviso, where their cavalry could act with peculiar effect; the divisions from the Tyrol had joined their ranks; while Brune, whose army was severely weakened by the numerous blockading

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divisions left in his rear, could not oppose to them an equal force. But Napoleon, whose impatient spirit, fed by repeated victories, could brook no obstacle, was indignant at this concession to the Imperialists; he manifested his highest displeasure at Brune, whom he never again employed in an important command, and announced to his ministers at Lunéville that he would instantly resume hostilities, both in Germany and Italy, unless Mantua were abandoned.\* The disastrous state of affairs in the former country had taken away from the Austrians all power of resistance; they yielded to his desires, and a few days afterwards the peace of LUNÉVILLE put an end to the disastrous war of the second coalition.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii. 80,  
82. Bor. iv.  
68, 69. Jom.  
xiv. 209.  
210. Dum.  
v. 300, 303.  
Thiers, ii.  
281.

Before proceeding to the conditions of this celebrated treaty, it is necessary to resume the narrative of the events in the southern part of the Italian peninsula, previous to the general pacification.

At the moment when this double armistice consolidated the French power in Italy and Germany, a dangerous insurrection broke out in Piedmont. The people of that country were exasperated to the highest degree by the endless and vexatious requisitions of the French troops. The most ardent democrats were thunderstruck by the annexation of the territory of Vercelli to the Cisalpine republic; and the clergy and nobles were justly apprehensive of the extinction of their rights and properties, from the continued ascendant of France. Fed by so many sources, the flame of discontent, though long smothered, at length broke out. The peasants of the valley of Aosta took up arms, expelled the French detachment, and shut up their depot of conscripts in the fortress of Ivrea, while symp-

72.  
An insurrec-  
tion breaks  
out in Pied-  
mont.  
Jan. 15.

\* "You are positively forbidden," said he to Joseph Buonaparte, whom he sent to conduct the negotiations on his part, "to listen to any proposals, the basis of which is not 'the Rhine and the Adige.' Hold to these conditions as fixed and unchangeable. Hostilities shall never cease in Italy till Mantua is ceded. Should they recommence, the Thalweg of the Adige shall be carried to the summit of the Julian Alps, and Austria shall be entirely excluded from Italy." NAPOLEON to JOSEPH BUONAPARTE, 2d January 1801; THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, ii. 286.

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<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
210, 211.  
Bos. iv. 69.  
Dum. v.  
321, 322.

73.  
The Neapolitans invade the Roman states, and are totally defeated.

Jan. 10.

toms of insurrection appeared at Turin. But the vigour of Soult overcame the danger; he speedily surrounded and disarmed the insurgent quarter of the capital: and the appearance of Murat, who at that moment descended from the mountains in their rear, extinguished the revolt in the Alpine valleys. The revolutionary party of Piedmont found themselves inextricably enveloped in a despotic net, from which it was impossible to escape.<sup>1</sup>

The cannon of Marengo had shaken the throne of the Two Sicilies. The court of Naples was conscious that the sanguinary executions which had disgraced its return to the shores of Campania, had exposed it to the utmost danger from the vengeance of the popular party; and that it had little to hope from the mercy of the First Consul, if the Imperial standards were finally chased from Italy. Finding its very existence thus endangered, the cabinet of Ferdinand IV. had made exertions disproportioned to the strength of the kingdom. An army, sixteen thousand strong, splendid in appearance, and formidable, if numerical strength only were considered, under the command of Count Roger de Damas, had advanced through the Roman states, and taken post on the confines of Tuscany, ready to foment the discontent of its inhabitants, which the enormous requisitions of the French authorities had exasperated to the greatest degree, and act in conjunction with the Imperialists under Sommariva, whose headquarters were at Ancona. The weakness of Miollis, the French commander in Tuscany, whose forces had been reduced, by the garrisons in Lucca, Leghorn, and Florence, to four thousand men, encouraged them to attempt an offensive movement. They advanced to Sienna, the inhabitants of which rose in insurrection against the French; while Arezzo, supported by detachments from Ancona, again displayed the standard of revolt. But on this, as on every other occasion during the war, the utter loss of military character by the Neapolitans was painfully conspicuous. Miollis collected six thousand veterans from



the neighbouring garrisons, and advanced against the invaders. The vanguard of Ferdinand turned about at the bare sight of the enemy. In vain the infantry were formed into squares and encouraged to stand; they broke at the first charge of the Piedmontese columns, supported by a single squadron and three companies of French grenadiers; the superb hussars fled in confusion, trampling under foot their own flying regiments; and the whole army soon became a useless crowd of fugitives, which hastened, like a flock of sheep, towards the Roman frontier, without having sustained any serious loss. On this occasion the French hardly fired a shot, and the Neapolitans were discomfited by the mere sight of the Piedmontese levies; a striking proof how much more rapidly military virtue had declined in the south than in the north of the peninsula.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXII.1801.  
Jan. 14.<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv. 70.  
Dum. v. 314,  
329. Jom.  
xiv. 214,  
215. Nap.  
ii. 84, 85.

Even, however, if the Neapolitan troops had combated with the valour of the ancient Samnites, the result would have been the same. Sommariva no sooner heard of this disaster at Sienna than he retraced his steps towards Ancona; the insurgents at Arezzo made haste to offer their submission to the conqueror; Murat's corps, ten thousand strong, was approaching Parma; and the armistice of Treviso, a few days after, put a final period to the co-operation of the Imperialists. Ancona was delivered up agreeably to the convention; Ferrara passed into the hands of the Republicans; southern Italy lay open to the invader; and the unwarlike Neapolitans were left alone to combat a power before which the veteran bands of Austria and Russia had succumbed. Napoleon openly expressed his determination to overturn the throne of the Two Sicilies, and Murat, at the head of an army of twenty-eight thousand men, composed of his own corps, that of Miollis, and two divisions of veterans from the Mincio, soon after crossed the Appenines, to carry into execution the mandates of Republican vengeance.<sup>2</sup>

74.  
The contest  
was plainly  
hopeless.

Jan. 16.

Jan. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Nap. ii. 84,  
85. Dum. v.  
320, 331.  
Jom. xiv.  
215, 217.  
Bot. iv. 70,  
71.

But the court of Naples had not trusted merely to its

CHAP.  
XXXII.

1801.

75.

The Queen  
of Naples  
flies to St  
Petersburg  
to implore  
the aid of  
Paul.

military preparations. The address of the queen extricated the throne from the imminent danger to which it was exposed, and gave it a few years longer of precarious existence. No sooner had the battle of Marengo and the armistice of Alessandria opened the eyes of this able and enterprising, though vehement and impassioned woman, to the imminence of the danger which threatened the Neapolitan throne, if it were left alone to resist the redoubtable forces of France, than she adopted the only resolution which could ward off the impending calamities. Setting off in person from Palermo, shortly before the winter campaign commenced, she undertook a journey to St Petersburg to implore the powerful intercession of the Czar, should events prove adverse, to appease the wrath of the conqueror. It soon appeared how prophetic had been her anticipations. The Emperor Paul, whose chivalrous character and early hostility to the principles of the Revolution had been by no means extinguished by his admiration for Napoleon, was highly flattered by this adventurous step. The sight of a queen setting out in the depth of winter, and undertaking the arduous journey from Palermo to St Petersburg to implore his aid, was as flattering to his vanity as the renown of upholding a tottering throne was agreeable to his romantic ideas of government. He warmly espoused the cause of the unfortunate princess, and not only promised to intercede with all his influence in her favour with the First Consul, but forthwith despatched M. Lowascheff, an officer high in his household, and who enjoyed his intimate confidence, to give additional weight to his mediation with the cabinet of the Tuileries.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bot. iv. 71.  
Dum. v. 317,  
319. Jom.  
xiv. 211,  
212.

76.  
Napoleon  
willingly  
yields to his  
intercession.

Napoleon had many reasons for yielding to the efforts of the northern emperor. A conqueror, who had recently usurped the oldest throne in Europe, was naturally desirous to appear on confidential terms with its greatest potentate; and the sovereign who had just placed himself at the head of the northern maritime coalition against

England, could hardly be expected to intercede in vain at the court of its inveterate enemy. For these reasons, M. Lowascheff was received with extraordinary distinction at Paris. On the road to Italy he was treated with the honours usually reserved for crowned heads; and the Italians, who recollected the desperate strife between the Russians and Republicans, beheld with astonishment the new-born harmony which had risen up between their envoys. He arrived at Florence at the same time that General Murat made his entry. The city was brilliantly illuminated in the evening; everywhere in public they appeared together, overshadowed by a tricolor and a Russian standard; and the Russian envoy declared to the bewildered Florentines, "that the two great nations should for ever be united for the repose of mankind."<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXII.  
1801.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
217, 218.  
Dum.v. 333,  
334. Bot. iv.  
71.

Backed by such powerful influence, and the terrors of thirty thousand French soldiers on the Tiber, the negotiation was not long of being brought to a termination. Napoleon had directed that the affairs of Naples should be altogether excluded from the articles of the armistice at Treviso, in order that he might alone regulate the destinies of a kingdom, the old ally of England, and the impassioned enemy of the Revolution. The terms prescribed to Murat, and embodied in the armistice of Foligno, were less distinguished by severity towards the Neapolitans than hostility to the English; and this treaty is remarkable as containing the first official enunciation of the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, to which, through the whole remainder of his career, Napoleon so inflexibly adhered, and which had so large a share, through the misery which it occasioned, in bringing about his ultimate overthrow. By the armistice of Foligno it was provided that the Neapolitan troops should forthwith evacuate the Roman States, but that, even after their retreat, the Republicans should continue to occupy Narni and the line of the Nera, to its junction with the Tiber; that "all the

77.  
Peace between  
France and  
Naples concluded at  
Foligno,  
Feb. 9. Its  
conditions.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
341, 342.  
Jom. xiv.  
219, 220.  
Bot. iv. 72,  
73.

ports of Naples and Sicily should instantly be *closed against English vessels of merchandise as well as war*, and remain shut till the conclusion of a general peace ; that all prosecutions on account of political offences should cease, and that the scientific men, unworthily detained at Naples on their return from Egypt, should be instantly set at liberty."<sup>1</sup>

78.  
The French  
take possession  
of the  
whole Neapolitan  
territories.  
March 28.

By the treaty of Foligno, which was signed soon afterwards, the ambitious projects of the First Consul were more completely developed, and the first indications were manifested of that resolution to envelop the Continent in an iron net, which was afterwards so completely carried into effect. By this treaty it was provided, that "all the harbours of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily should be closed to all English or Turkish vessels until the conclusion of a general peace ; that Porto Longone in the island of Elba, Piombino in Tuscany, and a small territory on the sea-coast of that duchy, should be ceded to France ; that all political prosecutions should cease, and the sum of 50,000 francs be paid by the Neapolitan government to the victims of the disorders on the former return of the court from Sicily ; that the statues and paintings taken from Rome by the Neapolitan troops should be restored ; and that, in case of a menaced attack from the troops of Turkey or England, a French corps, equal to what should be sent by the Emperor of Russia, should be placed at its disposal." Under these last words was veiled the most important article in the treaty, which was speedily carried into effect, and revealed the resolution of the French government to take military possession of the whole peninsula. On the 1st April, only three days after the signature of this treaty, and before either any requisition had been made by the Neapolitan government or any danger menaced their dominions, a corps of twelve thousand men, under the command of General Soult,<sup>2</sup> set out from the French lines, and before the end of the same month took possession of the fortresses of

<sup>2</sup> Martens,  
vii. 345.

Taranto, Otranto, Brindisi, and all the harbours in the extremity of Calabria.

CHAP.  
XXXII.

1801.

79.

Secret articles of this treaty.

By a secret article in the treaty, the Neapolitan government were to pay 500,000 francs (£20,000) a-month for the pay and equipment of this corps, besides furnishing gratis all the provisions it might require. The object of this occupation was to facilitate the establishment of a communication with the army in Egypt, and it excited the utmost solicitude in the breast of Napoleon. His instructions to Soult are extremely curious, as proving how early he had embraced the new political principles on which his government was thereafter founded. Among other things, he directed that the general "should engage in no revolution, but, on the contrary, severely repress any appearance of it which might break out; that he should communicate to all his officers that the French government had no desire to revolutionise Naples; that with all his staff he should go to mass on every festival with military music, and always endeavour to conciliate the priests and Neapolitan authorities; that he should maintain his army at the expense of Tuscany and Naples, as the Republic was so overwhelmed by the return of its armies to the territory of France, that he could not send them a single farthing." Finally, he gave minute directions for the reduction of Porto Ferraio and the island of Elba, little anticipating that he was seeking to acquire for the Republic his own future place of exile.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. vi.  
268, 270,  
280. Pièces  
Just. Nap.  
ii. 89.

This little island, which has since acquired such interest from the residence of Napoleon in 1814, was at first deemed an easy conquest by the French general. But he soon found that he had a very different enemy to deal with from the pusillanimous troops of Naples. The English garrison of Porto Ferraio consisted merely of three hundred British soldiers, eight hundred Tuscan troops, and four hundred Corsicans in the pay of Great Britain; but into this motley assemblage, the governor, Colonel Airley, had infused his own undaunted resolution. At

80.  
Siege of  
Elba.  
July.

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XXXII.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
358, 359.  
Jom. xiv.  
371.

81.  
Its gallant  
defence by  
the English  
garrison.

<sup>2</sup> Article 7,  
treaty of  
Amiens.

first the French commenced the siege with fifteen hundred men only ; but finding that number totally inadequate, they gradually augmented their force to six thousand men, while three frigates maintained a strict blockade, which soon reduced the garrison to great straits from want of provisions. But in the end of July, Sir John Borlase Warren hove in sight with an English squadron ; the French cruisers instantly took refuge in the harbour of Leghorn ; and the Republicans in their turn began to experience the hardships of a blockade. Three French frigates were captured in endeavouring to convey supplies across the straits of Piombino to the besiegers ; but as in spite of these disasters the siege still advanced, a general effort was made on the 13th September to destroy the works.<sup>1</sup>

Two thousand men, consisting of the Swiss regiment of Watteville and detachments from the marines of the fleet, were landed, and attacked the Republicans in rear, while Airley, by a vigorous sortie, assailed them in front. The attack was at first successful, and some of the batteries which commanded the entrance of the harbour were taken and spiked ; but the Republicans having returned in greater force, the besieged were obliged to retire, and the troops who had landed were again embarked. Notwithstanding this, however, the most vigorous defence was made ; the terrors of a bombardment were tried in vain to shake the resolution of the garrison ; and after a siege of five months, the governor had the glory of surrendering the fortress intrusted to his charge only in consequence of an express condition in the treaty of Amiens.<sup>2</sup> This successful resistance by a handful of men to the troops who had vanquished the greatest military monarchies of Europe, excited a great sensation both in England and on the Continent, and served as a presage of that desperate struggle which awaited them, when, after trampling under foot the southern hosts, they encountered the stubborn valour of northern freedom. "It was," says the impartial French

historian, "an extraordinary spectacle in the midst of the triumphal songs, and in the bosom of a Continental peace, so long desired, so painfully acquired, to see an island, of easy access, and almost touching the Continent, the scene of a long-continued and doubtful strife; and Europe beheld with amazement, in that island, a single fortress arrest the arms which the forces of the coalition had been unable to subdue."<sup>1</sup>

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XXXII.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
358, 359.  
Ann. Reg.  
p. 179. Jum.  
xiv. 371,  
374.

By the treaty of Lunéville, which the Emperor Francis was obliged to subscribe, "not only as Emperor of Austria, but in the name of the German empire," Belgium and all the left bank of the Rhine were again formally ceded to France; Lombardy was erected into an independent state, and the Adige declared the boundary betwixt it and the dominions of Austria; Venice, with all its territorial possessions as far as the Adige, was guaranteed to Austria; the Duke of Modena received the Brisgau in exchange for his duchy, which was annexed to the Cisalpine republic; the Grand-duke of Tuscany, the Emperor's brother, gave up his dominions to the infant Duke of Parma, a branch of the Spanish family, on the promise of an indemnity in Germany; France abandoned Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein, on condition that these forts should remain in the situation in which they were when given up; the princes dispossessed by the cession of the left bank of the Rhine were promised indemnities in the bosom of the Empire; the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics was guaranteed, and their inhabitants declared "to have the power of choosing whatever form of government they preferred." These conditions did not differ materially from those contained in the treaty of Campo Formio, or from those offered by Napoleon previous to the renewal of the war; a remarkable circumstance, when it is recollected how vast an addition the victories of Marengo, Hohenlinden, and the Mincio, had since made to the preponderance of the French arms.<sup>2</sup>

82.  
Treaty of  
Lunéville.  
Feb. 9.

<sup>2</sup> See the  
Treaty in  
Dumas, vi.  
282, et seq.  
Pièces  
Just.; and  
in Martens,  
vii. 286.

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1801.

83.  
The Em-  
peror signs  
for the em-  
pire as well  
as Austria.

The article which compelled the Emperor to subscribe this treaty as head of the German empire as well as Emperor of Austria, gave rise in the sequel, as will be shown, to the most painful internal divisions in Germany. By a fundamental law of the empire, the Emperor could not bind the electors and states of which he was the head, without either their concurrence or express powers to that effect previously conferred. The want of such powers had rendered inextricable the separate interests referred to the Congress at Rastadt; but Napoleon, whose impatient disposition could not brook such formalities, cut the matter short at Lunéville, by throwing his sword into the scale, and insisting that the Emperor should sign for the empire as well as himself; leaving him to vindicate such a step as he best could to the princes and states of the Imperial Confederacy. The Emperor hesitated long before he subscribed such a condition, which left the seeds of interminable discord in the Germanic body; but the conqueror was inexorable, and no means of evasion could be found.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. vi.  
29, 30.  
Hard. viii.  
52.

84.  
His apology  
to the Elec-  
tors of Ger-  
many.

He vindicated himself to the electors in a dignified letter, dated 8th February 1801, the day before that on which the treaty was signed, in which, after premising that his Imperial authority was restrained by the Germanic constitution on that point in a precise manner, and therefore that he had been compelled to sign, as head of the empire, without any title so to do, he added, "But, on the other hand, the consideration of the melancholy situation in which, at that period, a large part of Germany was placed, the prospect of the still more calamitous fate with which the superiority of the French menaced the empire if the peace was any longer deferred; in fine, the general wish, which was loudly expressed, in favour of an instant accommodation, were so many powerful motives which forbade me to refuse the concurrence of my minister to this demand of the French plenipotentiary."<sup>2</sup> The electors and princes of the empire felt the force of this touching appeal; they commiserated the situation of the first

<sup>2</sup> See the  
original;  
Dum. vi.  
298. *Pièces*  
*Just.*



monarch in Christendom, compelled to throw himself on his subjects for forgiveness of a step which he could not avoid; and one of the first steps of the Diet of the empire, assembled after the treaty of Lunéville was signed, was to give it their solemn ratification, grounded on the extraordinary situation in which the Emperor was then placed. But the question of indemnities to the dispossessed princes was long and warmly agitated. It continued for above two years to distract the Germanic body; the intervention both of France and Russia was required to prevent the sword being drawn in these internal disputes; and by the magnitude of the changes which were ultimately made, and the habit of looking to foreign protection which was acquired, the foundation was laid of that league to support separate interests which afterwards, under the name of the CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE, so well served the purposes of French ambition, and broke up the venerable fabric of the German empire.<sup>1</sup>

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1801.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. vi.  
29, 30.  
Hard. viii.  
52.

This peace excited, as might well have been expected, the most enthusiastic joy in Paris. It was announced in these terms to the inhabitants by Napoleon:—"A glorious peace has terminated the Continental war. Your frontiers are extended to the limits assigned to them by nature; nations long separated from you rejoin their brethren, and increase by a sixth your numbers, your territory, and your resources. This success you owe chiefly to the courage of your soldiers, to their patience in fatigue, their passion for liberty and glory: but you owe it not less to the happy restoration of concord, and that union of feelings and interests, which has more than once saved France from ruin. As long as you were divided, your enemies never lost the hope of subjugating you; they trusted that you would be vanquished by yourselves, and that the power which had triumphed over all their efforts would crumble away in the convulsions of discord and anarchy. Their hope has been disappointed; may it never revive! Remain for ever united by the recollection of

85.  
Extra-  
vagant joy at  
this peace  
in Paris.  
March 20.

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your domestic misfortunes, by the sentiment of your present grandeur and force. Beware of lowering by base passions a name which so many exploits have consecrated to glory and immortality. Let a generous emulation second our arts and our industry ; let useful labours embellish that France which external nations will never name but with admiration and respect ; let the stranger who hastens to visit it, find among you the gentle and hospitable virtues which distinguished your ancestors. Let all professions raise themselves to the dignity of the French name ; let commerce, while it reforms its relations with other people, acquire the consistency which fixes its enterprises, not on hazardous speculations, but constant relations. Thus our mercantile industry will resume the rank which is due to it ; thus will be strengthened the bonds which unite us to the most enlightened people on the Continent ; thus will that nation, even, which has armed itself against France, be taught to abjure its excessive pretensions, and at length learn the great truth, that, for people as for individuals, there can be no security for real prosperity but in the happiness of all." It is curious to observe how early, amidst his Continental triumphs, the ambition of the First Consul was directed to commercial and maritime greatness, in the effort to attain which he was led to indulge in such implacable hostility to this country.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. vi.  
296. Pièces  
Just. Moni-  
teur, March  
20.

86.  
Reflections  
on this cam-  
paign.

The winter campaign of 1800 demonstrates, in the most striking manner, the justice of the observation by the Archduke Charles, that the valley of the Danube is the quarter where vital blows against the Austrian monarchy are to be struck, and the importance of frontier or central fortifications to arrest the march of a victorious invader. The disaster of Marengo was soon repaired, and did not prevent the Austrians again taking the field at the head of an army which almost balanced the Republican forces ; but the battle of Hohenlinden at once laid open the vitals of the monarchy.

The reason is to be found in the numerous fortresses which covered the Imperial frontiers in Lombardy, and the total want of any such barrier between Austria and Bavaria. After the passage of the Mincio, the army of Brune was so severely weakened by the detachments left in the rear to blockade the fortresses on that river, that he was unequal to any further offensive movements, and if the war had continued, he would probably have been compelled to retreat: but, after the battle of Hohenlinden, the undiminished battalions of Moreau poured in resistless strength into the undefended Hereditary States. The Archduke Charles had long before foreseen this; by the fortifications of Ulm he enabled Kray for six weeks to arrest the victor in the middle of his career; and so sensible was Napoleon of their importance, that his first measure, when they fell into his hands, was to level them with the ground.

The peace of Lunéville was the first considerable pause in the Continental strife; and already it had become manifest that the objects of the war had been changed, and that hostilities were now to be carried on for the subjugation of a different power from that which was at first contemplated. The extinction of the revolutionary spirit, the stoppage of the insidious system of propagandism, by which the French democracy was shaking all the thrones, and endangering all the institutions and liberties of Europe, had been the real object of the war. The restoration of the Bourbons was never considered of importance, further than as affording a guarantee, and what at first appeared the best guarantee, against that tremendous danger. By the result of a struggle of nine years' duration, this object had been gained, not indeed in the way which at first would have been deemed most likely to effect it, but in a manner which experience soon proved was far more efficacious. The restoration of an amiable and honourable, but weak and unwarlike race of monarchs, would have been but a feeble

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87.  
The real  
object of  
the war was  
already  
gained by  
the Allies.

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barrier against the turbulent spirit of French democracy ; but the elevation of an energetic and resolute conqueror to the throne, who guided the army by his authority and dazzled the people by his victories, proved perfectly sufficient to coerce its excesses. Napoleon said truly, "that he was the best friend which the cause of order in Europe ever had, and that he did more for its sovereigns, by the spirit which he repressed in France, than evil by the victories which he gained in Germany." The conquests which he achieved affected only the external power or present liberty of nations ; they did not change the internal frame of government, or prevent the future resurrection of freedom : and when his military despotism was subverted, the face of European society reappeared from under the mask of slavery without any material alteration. But the innovations of the National Assembly totally subverted the fabric of a constitutional monarchy, and by destroying all the intermediate classes between the throne and the peasantry, left to the people of France no alternative for the remainder of their history but American equality or Asiatic despotism. The cause of order and freedom, therefore, gained immensely by the accession of Napoleon to the throne. Great as were the dangers to the independence of the surrounding states from the military power which he wielded, they were trifling in comparison of the perils to the very existence of liberty which arose from the democratic innovations of his predecessors.

88.  
Evidence of  
Napoleon's  
implacable  
hostility to  
England.

But though the cause of liberty was thus relieved from its most pressing dangers, the moment that the First Consul seized the helm, the peril to the independence of the surrounding states, and of Britain in particular, became extreme. His conduct soon showed what his memoirs have since confessed, that he had formed, from the very commencement, a resolution to make France the first of European powers, and turn all the energies of their combined forces against the existence of Great Britain. Already

his measures were all directed to this end. He made it the first condition of peace to all the vanquished nations, that they should exclude British ships from their harbours; and he had contrived, by flattering the vanity of the Emperor of Russia, and skilfully fomenting the jealousy of the neutral states, to combine a formidable maritime league against Britain in the north of Europe. Thus, as time rolled on, the war totally altered its object; and the danger of subjugation changed sides. Commenced to stop the revolutionary propagandism of France, it terminated by being directed against the maritime preponderance of Great Britain; and Britain, which set out with heading the confederacy, ended by finding herself compelled to combat for her existence against the power of combined Europe.

In the progress of the conflict, also, a change not less important in the mode of carrying on the war had arisen; and the Revolutionary armies, in consequence of the penury of their domestic resources, had adopted a system of extorting supplies from the vanquished states, hitherto unknown in modern warfare. It had been the boast of the philosophic historian, that civilisation had softened even the rude features of war in modern Europe; that industry securely reaped its harvest amidst hostile squadrons, and the invaded territory felt the enemy's presence rather by the quickened sale for its produce than by the ruthless hand of the spoiler.<sup>1</sup> But though this was often true when Gibbon wrote, the French Revolution had introduced a very different system, and made war retrograde to the rapine and spoliation of barbarous times. The revolutionary armies issued from the Republic as the Goths had in former days from the regions of the north, powerful in numbers, destitute of resources, starving from want, but ferocious in spirit, energetic in will, reckless of crime. Determined to seek for plenty, at the sword's point, from the countries through which they passed, the principle on which they uniformly acted was to make war maintain

89.  
Increasing  
and system-  
atic pillage  
by the Re-  
publican  
armies.

<sup>1</sup> Gibbon.

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XXXII.

1801.

war, and levy in its theatre, whether a hostile or neutral territory, the means of carrying on the contest. They formed no magazines; brought with them no money; paid for nothing; but by the terrors of military execution wrung from the wretched inhabitants the most ample supplies. "The army of Moreau," says General Mathieu Dumas, himself not the least distinguished of the Republican commanders, "ransacked the country between the Rhine and the Inn, devoured its subsistence, and reduced the inhabitants to despair, while it maintained the strictest discipline. The devastation of war for centuries before, even that of the Thirty Years, was nothing in comparison. Since the period when regular armies had been formed, the losses occasioned by the marches and combats of armies were passing evils; the conquest of a country did not draw after it its ruin. If a few districts, or some towns carried by assault, were abandoned to the fury of the soldiers, the inexorable pen of history loaded with reproaches the captains who permitted, or the sovereigns who did not punish, such outrages. But Moreau's army levied, in a few months, above twenty millions of francs (£800,000) in requisitions; enormous contributions were unceasingly exacted; the people were overwhelmed; the governments of the oppressed states entirely exhausted. It was reserved for our age to witness, in the midst of the rapid progress of civilisation, and after so many eloquent declamations in favour of humanity, the scourge of war immeasurably extended; the art of government become in the hands of the conqueror an instrument of extortion, and systematic robbery be styled, by the leaders of regeneration, the right of conquest."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. v.  
72, 73.

90.  
Symptoms  
of patriotic  
and general  
resistance  
springing  
up.

Even in this gloomy state of the political horizon, however, the streaks of light were becoming visible which were destined to expand into all the lustre of day. The invasion of the French troops, their continued residence in other states, had already gone far to dispel those illusions in their favour, to which, even more than the terror

of their arms, their astonishing successes had been owing. Their standards were no longer hailed with enthusiasm by the people who had experienced their presence; the declaration of war to the palace and peace to the cottage had ceased to deceive mankind. The consequences of their conquests had been felt. Requisitions and taxes—merciless requisitions, grievous taxes—had been found to follow rapidly in the footsteps of these alluring pretensions; penury, want, and starvation, were seen to stalk in the rear of the tricolor flag. Already the symptoms of POPULAR RESISTANCE were to be seen; the peasantry even of the unwarlike Italian peninsula had repeatedly and spontaneously flown to arms; the patriotic efforts of Austria had recalled the glorious days of Maria Theresa; the heroic sacrifices of the Forest Cantons had emulated the virtues, if not the triumphs, exhibited at Sempach and Morgarten. Unmarked as it was amidst the blaze of military glory, the sacred flame was beginning to spread which was destined to set free mankind; banished from the court and the castle, the stern resolution to resist was gathering strength among the cottages of the poor. It is in such reflections that the philosophic mind best derives consolation for the many evils arising from the ambition of the rulers, and the wickedness of the agitators of mankind; and by observing how uniformly, when oppression becomes intolerable, an under-current begins to flow, destined ultimately to correct it, that the surest foundation is laid for confidence in the final arrangements of Supreme Wisdom, amidst the misfortunes or the vices of the world.

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

FROM THE PEACE OF LUNEVILLE TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE  
NORTHERN MARITIME CONFEDERACY. NOVEMBER 1799—  
MAY 1801.

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1.  
Origin of the  
difference of  
the laws of  
war at sea  
and land.

THERE arises, from the very nature of the elements on which they are respectively exercised, an essential difference between the laws of war at sea and at land. Territorial conquests are attended by immediate and important advantages to the victorious power. It gains possession of a fruitful country, of opulent cities, of spacious harbours, and costly fortresses ; it steps at once into the authority of the ruling government over the subject people ; and all the resources of the conquered state, in money, provisions, men, and implements of war, are at its command. But the victor at sea finds himself in a very different situation. The most decisive naval victories draw after them no acquisition of inhabitants, wealth, or resources ; the ocean is unproductive alike of taxes or tribute ; and among the solitary recesses of the deep you will search in vain for the populous cities or fertile fields which reward the valour of terrestrial ambition. The more a power extends itself at land, the more formidable does it become, because it unites to its own the forces of the vanquished state ; the more it extends itself at sea, the more it is weakened, if it trusts to the deep alone for its resources, because the surface which it must protect is augmented, without any proportional addition being made to the means by which its empire is to be maintained.



In the infancy of mankind the usages of war are the same on both elements. Alike at sea as on shore, the persons and property of the vanquished are at the disposal of the conquerors; and from the sack of cities and the sale of captives the vast sums are obtained which constitute the object and the reward of their inhuman hostility. The liberty for which the Greeks and Romans contended was not mere national independence or civil privileges, but liberation from domestic or predial servitude, from the degradation of helots, or the lash of patricians. Such is to this day the custom in all the uncivilised portions of the globe, in Asia, Africa, and among the savages of America; and such, till comparatively recent times, was the practice even among the Christian monarchies and chivalrous nobility of modern Europe. But with the growth of opulence, and the extension of more humane ideas, these rigid usages have been universally softened among the European nations. As agriculture and commerce improved, and population augmented, it was found to be as impossible as it was inhuman to carry off all the property of the vanquished people, the growth, perhaps, of centuries of industry, or attempt to reduce millions of men at once to a state of slavery. The revenue and public possessions of the state furnished an ample fund to reward the conquering power; while the regular pay and fixed maintenance at the public expense of the soldiers, took away the pretext for private pillage as a measure of necessity. All nations, subject in their turn to the vicissitudes of fortune, found it for their interest to adopt this lenient system, which so materially diminished the horrors of war; and hence the practice became general—excepting in the storming of towns, and other extreme cases, where the vehemence of passion bade defiance to the restraints of discipline—to respect private property in the course of hostilities, and look for remuneration only to the public revenue or property of the state. It is the disgrace of the leaders of the French Revolution, that amidst all

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2.

Early usages  
of war on  
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Gradual  
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their declamations in favour of humanity, they were the first who have departed from these beneficent usages, and, under the specious names of contributions, and of making war support war, have restored at the opening of the nineteenth, the rapacious oppression of the ninth century.

3.  
Original  
usages still  
kept up at  
sea.

Humanity would have just reason to rejoice, if it were practicable to establish a similar system of restrained hostility at sea; if the principle of confining the right of capture to public property could be introduced on the one element as well as the other, and the private merchant were in safety to navigate the deep amidst hostile fleets, in the same manner as the carrier at land securely traverses opposing armies. But it has never been found practicable to introduce such a limitation, nor has it ever been attempted, even by the most civilised nations, as a restraint upon their own hostility, however loudly they may sometimes have demanded it as a bridle upon that of their enemies. And when the utter sterility of the ocean, except as forming a highway for the intercourse of mankind, is considered, it does not appear probable that, until the human heart is essentially changed, such an alteration, how desirable soever by the weaker states, ever can be adopted. It may become general when ambition and national rivalry cease to sway the human heart, but not till then. Certain it is that, of all nations upon earth, revolutionary France had the least title to contend for such a change; she having not only introduced new usages of unprecedented rigour in modern times into her warfare at land, but issued and acted upon edicts for her maritime hostility on principles worthy of Turkish barbarity.\*

\* The decree of the Directory, 18th January 1798, declares, that all *vessels* found on the high seas with any English goods whatever on board, to *whomsoever belonging*, shall be good prize; that neutral sailors found on board English vessels shall be *put to death*, and that the harbours of France shall be shut against all vessels which had touched at an English harbour; and it requires certificates of origin, under the hands of French consuls, exactly as the Berlin and Milan decrees afterwards did.—ROBINSON'S *Admiralty Reports*, i. 341.

But it is not merely with the subjects of nations in a state of hostility that belligerents are brought in contact during modern warfare ; they find themselves continually in collision also with NEUTRAL VESSELS trading with their enemies, and endeavouring, from the prospect of high profits, to furnish them with those articles which they are prevented from receiving directly from the trade of their own subjects. Here new and important interests arise, and some limitation of the rigour of maritime usage evidently becomes indispensable. If the superior power at sea can at pleasure declare any enemy's territory in a state of blockade, and make prize of all neutral vessels navigating to any of its harbours, it will not only speedily find itself involved in hostilities with all maritime states, but engaged in a species of warfare from which itself at some future period may derive essential injury. On the other hand, it is equally impossible to maintain that the vessels of other states are to be entirely exempted from restraint in such cases ; or that a belligerent power, whose warlike operations are dependent perhaps upon intercepting the supplies in progress towards its antagonist, is patiently to see all its enterprises defeated, merely because they are conveyed under the cover of a neutral flag instead of in its enemy's bottoms. Such a pretension would render maritime success of no avail, and wars interminable, by enabling the weaker power, under fictitious cover, securely to repair all its losses. These considerations are so obvious, and are brought so frequently into collusion in maritime warfare, that they early caused the introduction of a system of international law, which for centuries has been recognised by all the states of Europe, and is summed up in the following propositions by the greatest masters of that important branch of jurisprudence that ever appeared in this or any other country.

1. That it is not lawful for neutral nations to carry on, in time of war, for the advantage or on the behalf of one of the belligerent powers, those branches of their

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4.  
Common  
maritime  
law of  
Europe as  
to neutral  
vessels.

5.  
Principles  
of that law.

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commerce from which they are excluded in time of peace.

2. That every belligerent power may capture the property of its enemies wherever it shall meet with it on the high seas, and may for that purpose detain and bring into port neutral vessels laden wholly or in part with any such property.

3. That under the description of contraband of war, which neutrals are prohibited from carrying to the belligerent powers, the law of nations, if not restrained by special treaty, includes all naval as well as military stores, and generally all articles serving principally to afford to one belligerent power the instrument and means of annoyance to be used against the other.

4. That it is lawful for naval powers, when engaged in war, to blockade the ports of their enemies by cruising squadrons *bona fide* allotted to that service, and duly competent to its execution. That such blockade is valid and legitimate, although there be no design to attack or reduce by force the port or arsenal to which it is applied; and that the fact of the blockade, with due notice given thereof to neutral powers, shall affect not only vessels actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which shall be elsewhere met with, and shall be found to have been destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the blockade.

5. That the right of visiting and searching neutral vessels is a necessary consequence of these principles; and that, by the law of nations, (when unrestrained by particular treaty,) this right is not in any manner affected by the presence of a neutral ship of war, having under its convoy merchant ships, either of its own nation or of any other country.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lord Grenville's speech, 13th Nov., on the convention with Russia. Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 211, 212.

In these propositions are contained the general principles of the maritime code of the whole European nations, as it has been exercised by all states towards each other, and laid down by all authorities on the subject from the

dawn of civilisation. The special application of these principles to the question immediately at issue between the contending powers in 1801 is contained in the following propositions, laid down as incontestable law by that great master of maritime and international law, Sir William Scott (Lord Stowell):—

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1. "That the right of visiting and searching merchant ships upon the high seas, whatever be the ships, whatever be the cargoes, whatever be the destinations, is an incontestable right of the lawfully commissioned cruisers of a belligerent nation.\*

6.  
Sir William  
Scott's expo-  
sition of the  
maritime  
law.

2. "That the authority of the sovereign of the neutral country, being interposed in any matter of mere force, cannot legally vary the rights of a legally commissioned belligerent cruiser, or deprive him of his right to search at common law.†

3. "That the penalty for the violent contravention of this right, is the confiscation of the property so withheld from visitation and search.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Sir Wil-  
liam Scott in  
the case of  
the Maria.  
Robinson's  
Admiralty  
Reports, i.  
359, 363.

4. "That nothing further is necessary to constitute blockade, than that there should be a force stationed to prevent communication, and a due notice or prohibition given to the party.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. i. 86.

5. "That articles tending probably to aid the hostilities of one of the belligerents, as arms, ammunition, stores, and, in some cases, provisions, are contraband of war,<sup>3</sup> and

<sup>3</sup> The Jonge  
Margaretta,  
ibid. i. 190,  
191.

\* "This right of search," says Sir William Scott, "is clear in practice, which is uniform and universal upon the subject. The many European treaties which refer to this right refer to it as pre-existing, and merely regulate the exercise of it. All writers upon the law of nations unanimously acknowledge it, without the exception even of Hubner himself, the great champion of neutral privileges. In short, no man, in the least conversant with subjects of this kind, has ever, that I know of, breathed a doubt upon it."—ROBINSON'S *Admiralty Reports*, i. 60; *The Maria*.

† Two sovereigns may agree, as in some instances they have agreed by special covenant, that the presence of one of their armed ships along with their merchant ships is to be held as a sufficient guarantee that nothing is to be found in that convoy of merchant ships inconsistent with amity or neutrality; but no sovereign can, by the common law of nations, legally compel the acceptance of such a security by mere force, or compel the belligerent to forego the only security known in the law of nations upon this subject, independent of special covenant—the right of personal visitation.

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7.  
This law  
universally  
acknow-  
ledged in  
Europe  
prior to  
1780.

as such liable to seizure by the vessels of the other party, with the vessel in which they are conveyed." \*

These rights had never formed any peculiar or exclusive privilege, which the British claimed alone of all other nations. On the contrary, under the equitable modifications introduced by the common maritime law, they had, from the dawn of European civilisation, been universally acknowledged and maintained, equally by the courts and the lawyers of Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, and Britain.<sup>1</sup> Authors there were, indeed, who contended in their studies for a different principle, and strenuously asserted that the flag should cover the merchandise; but these novel speculations had never received any sanction from the maritime law of Europe, or the practice, independent of express treaty, of belli-

<sup>1</sup> Sir William Scott; Robinson, i. 360. Lord Eldon; Parl. Hist. xxxv. 886.

\* The judgments of Sir William Scott are here referred to with perfect confidence, as explaining not merely the English understanding of the maritime law, but that which for centuries has been recognised and admitted by all the European states. "In forming my judgments," says that great authority, "I trust it has not for one moment escaped my anxious recollection that the duty of my station calls me to consider myself not as stationed here to deliver occasional and shifting opinions to serve present purposes of particular national interest, but to administer with indifference that justice which the law of nations holds out, *without distinction*, to independent states—some happening to be neutral and some belligerent. The seat of judicial authority is indeed locally here in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations; but the law itself has no locality. It is the duty of the person who sits here to determine the question exactly as he would determine it if sitting at Stockholm; to assert no pretension on the part of Great Britain, which he would not allow to Sweden in the same circumstances, and to impose no duties on Sweden as a neutral country, which he would not admit to belong to Great Britain in the same character."<sup>2</sup> And of the impartiality with which this great duty at this period was exercised by this distinguished judge, we have the best evidence in the testimony of another eminent statesman, the warm advocate of neutral rights, and certainly no conceiver of undeserved praise to his political opponents. "Nothing," says Lord Chancellor Brougham, "can be more instructive than the decisions of our prize courts on this point, (the right of search,) and nothing can give us more gratifying views of the purity with which those tribunals administer the law of nations, and their impartiality in trying the delicate questions which come before them, between their own sovereign or their own countrymen, and the rulers or the people of other states. It is with pleasure, therefore, that we have to consider how anxiously and rigorously at this period (1798—1800) the principles for which we are contending have been enforced in the High Court of Admiralty under the presidency of Sir William Scott."—*Edin. Review*, vol. xix. 298, 299.

<sup>2</sup> Robinson's Reports, i. 350.

gerent states ; and, accordingly, various treaties had been entered into among different powers, restraining or limiting the right of search between their respective subjects,<sup>1</sup> precisely because they knew that, but for that special stipulation, the common maritime law would admit it. So strongly was this felt by the English lawyers who, in the House of Commons, espoused the cause of the neutral powers previous to the maritime confederacy in 1800, that they admitted the right of Great Britain to search neutral ships for the goods of an enemy, and that the northern confederacy contended for a principle which militated against the established law of nations, as laid down with universal assent by that great master of the maritime law, Lord Mansfield. They maintained merely that it would be prudent to abate somewhat of former pretensions in the present disastrous crisis of public affairs.<sup>2\*</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Per Sir  
W. Grant ;  
Parl. Hist.  
xxxv. 922.

<sup>2</sup> See Sir  
William  
Grant ; Parl.  
Hist. xxxv.  
922. Dr  
Lawrence,  
919, 920.

\* The hardihood with which it is constantly asserted by the foreign diplomatists and historians, that the principles of maritime law for which England contends are a usurpation on her part, founded on mere power, and unsanctioned either by the usage of other states or the principles of maritime jurisprudence, renders it important to lay before the reader a few of the authorities of foreign legal writers on the subject.

Eineccius says, "Idem statuendum arbitramus, si res hostiles in navibus amicorum reperiantur. *Illas capi posse nemo dubitat, quia hosti in res hostiles omnia liciunt*—eatenus ut eas, ubicunque repertas, sibi possit vindicari."—*De Navibus ob. vict. c. ii. sec. 9.*

"I believe it cannot be doubted," says President Jefferson, "that, by the general law of nations, the goods of a friend found in the vessels of an enemy are free; and the goods of an enemy found in the vessels of a friend are good prize."—JEFFERSON'S *Letter to GENET, 24th July 1797.*

"The ordinances of the old French marine, under the monarchy, direct that not only shall the enemy's property, found on board a neutral vessel, be confiscated, *but the neutral ship itself* be declared lawful prize." The practice of England has always been to release all neutral property found on board an enemy's ship; but France always considered it as lawful prize.—*Ordonnance de Marine. Art. 7. Valin. 284.*

"Les choses qui sont d'un usage particulier pour la guerre, et dont on empêche le transport chez un ennemi, s'appellent marchandises de contrebande. Cels sont les armes, les munitions de guerre, les bois, et tout ce qui sert à la construction et à l'armement des vaisseaux de guerre."—VATTELL, c. 7, sec. 112.

In their letter to Mr Pinckney, January 16, 1797, the American Government expressly declare that, "by the law of nations, timber and other naval stores are contraband of war."—*See Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 213, note.*

"On ne peut empêcher le transport des effets de contrebande, si l'on ne visite pas les vaisseaux neutres que l'on rencontre en mer : *on est donc en droit de les visiter.*"—VATTELL, c. 3, sec. 114.

"Tout vaisseau qui refusera d'amener ses voiles après la sommation qui lui

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8.

But these  
rights were  
sometimes  
abated by  
special  
treaty.  
Dec. 11,  
1674.

From motives of policy, indeed, Britain had repeatedly waived or abated this right of search in favour of particular states by special agreement. This was done towards Holland in 1674, to detach that power from France, and in the belief that the United Provinces would never be neutral when Britain was at war; and to France, by the commercial treaty of 1787, under the influence of the same idea that she would never be neutral when Great Britain was in a state of hostility. But in the absence of such express stipulation, these rights had been invariably exercised, both by Britain towards other nations, and other nations towards Britain—particularly by Lord Chatham during the whole course of the Seven Years' War, and by the ministers of Anne during the long War of the Succession—without any complaint whatever from neutral states. And of the disposition of Britain to submit in her turn to the maritime law which she requires from others, no better instance can be desired than occurred during the Duke of Wellington's administration in 1829, when the British government declined to interfere in the capture of a British merchantman trying to elude the blockade of Terceira, though a few British frigates would have sent the whole Portuguese navy to the bottom.<sup>1</sup>

The obvious disadvantage, however, to which such a maritime code must occasionally expose neutral states, by

en aura été faite par nos vaisseaux ou ceux de nos sujets, armés en guerre, pourra y être contraint par artillerie ou autrement, et en cas de résistance et de combat, il sera de bon prise."—*Ordonnance de la Marine de France*.—Tit. Procès, Art. 12. The Spanish ordinance of 1718 has an article to the same effect.

"Other nations," says Heeren, "advanced similar claims in maritime affairs to the English; but as they had not the same naval power to support them, this was of little consequence."—*European States System*, ii. 41.

The claims of neutrals for the security of their commerce are stated by Bynkerschoek as limited to this, that they may continue to trade in war as they did in peace. But this claim, he adds, is limited by the rights of a belligerent. "Queritur quid facere aut non facere possunt inter duos hostes: omnia forte inquires quæ potuerunt si pax esset inter eos, quos inter nunc est bellum."—BYNKERSCHOEK, *Quest. Juris Pub.* i. 9.

These principles were fully recognised in various treaties between England and other maritime states. In article 12 of the treaty 1661, between Sweden and England, it was provided, "But lest such freedom of navigation and passage of the one confederate should be of detriment to the other while engaged in

<sup>1</sup> Per Sir W. Grant; Parl. Hist. xxxv. 922.



sometimes depriving them of a trade at the very time when it is likely to be most lucrative—and the natural jealousy at the exercise of so invidious a right as that of search, especially when put in force by the stronger against the weaker power—had long led to complaints against belligerent states. In 1740, the King of Prussia disputed the right of Britain to search neutral vessels, though without following up his protest with actual resistance; and in 1762 the Dutch contended, that it could not be admitted by their vessels when sailing under convoy. But nothing serious was done to support these novel pretensions till the year 1780, when the northern powers, seeing Britain hard pressed by the fleets of France and Spain at the close of the American war, deemed the opportunity favourable to establish by force of arms a new code of maritime laws; and accordingly entered into the famous confederacy known by the name of the ARMED NEUTRALITY, which was the first open declaration of war by neutral powers against Great Britain and the old system of maritime rights. By this treaty, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark proclaimed the principles, that free ships make free goods, that the flag covers the merchandise, and that a blockaded port is to be understood only when such a force is stationed at its entrance as renders it dangerous to enter.<sup>1</sup>\*

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9.  
Origin of  
resistance to  
these rights.  
The Armed  
Neutrality.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1780, 206,  
348.

war, by sea or land, with other nations, and lest the goods or merchandise of the enemy should be concealed under the name of a friend and ally, for the avoiding all suspicion and fraud of such sort, it is agreed that all ships, carriages, wares, and men, belonging to either of the confederates, shall be furnished in their voyage with certificates, specifying the names of the ships, carriages, goods, and masters of the vessels, together with such other descriptions as are expressed in the following form, &c.; and *if the goods of an enemy are found in such ship of the confederate, that part only which belongs to the enemy shall be made prize*, and what belongs to the confederate shall be immediately restored." There is a similar clause in article 20 of the treaty between England and Denmark in 1760.—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxvi. 226.

\* The words of the proclamation are,—1. That all neutral ships may freely navigate from port to port, and on the coasts of nations at war. 2. That the effects belonging to the subjects of the said warring powers shall be free in all neutral vessels, except contraband merchandise. 3. That the articles are to be deemed contraband which are mentioned in the 10th and 11th articles of Russia's treaty of commerce with Great Britain. 4. That to determine what is

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10.  
Its principles are subsequently abandoned by the northern powers in their own case.

So undisguised an attack upon the ancient code of European law, which England had so decided an interest to maintain, because its abandonment placed the defeated in as advantageous circumstances as the victorious power, in fact amounted to a declaration of war against Great Britain. But her cabinet were compelled to dissemble their resentment at that time, in consequence of the disastrous state of public affairs at the close of the American contest. They contented themselves, therefore, with protesting against these novel doctrines at the northern capitals, and had influence enough at the court of the Hague, soon after, to procure their abandonment by the United Provinces. The Baltic powers, however, during the continuance of the American war, adhered to the principles thus laid down, although no allusion was made to them in the peace which followed. But they soon found that it introduced rules so much at variance with the practice of European warfare, that they were immediately obliged, when they in their turn became belligerents, to revert to the old system.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg. 1780, 206, 207.

11.  
Various examples of this abandonment.

In particular, when Sweden went to war with Russia in 1787, she totally abandoned the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and acted invariably upon the ancient maritime code. Russia, in the same year, reverted to the old principles in her war with the Turks; and in 1793 entered into a maritime treaty with Great Britain, in which she expressly gave up the principles of the year 1780, and engaged to use her efforts to prevent neutral powers from protecting the commerce of France on the high seas, or in the harbours of that country. Both Denmark and Sweden were bound by the treaties of 1661 and 1670, with Eng-

meant by a blockaded port, this only is to be understood of one, which is so well kept in by the ships of the power which attacks it, and which keep their places, that it is dangerous to enter into it.—See *Declaration of Russia*, 23d April 1780; *Ann. Reg.* xxxv. 348, *State Papers*. It is worthy of observation, as Sir William Scott observes, that even in this manifesto, no denial of the right of search is to be found, at least to the effect of determining whether or not the neutral has contraband articles on board.—See *ROBINSON'S Reports*, i. 360; *The Maria*.

land, to admit the right of search, and give up the pretension to carry enemy's property; and, by a convention entered into between these two powers in 1794, which was communicated by them to the British government, they bound themselves "to claim no advantage which is not clearly and unexceptionably founded on their respective treaties with the powers at war, and not to claim, in cases not specified in their treaties, any advantage which is not founded on the universal law of nations, hitherto acknowledged and respected by all the powers and all the sovereigns of Europe, and from which they can as little suppose that any of them will depart, as they are incapable of departing from it themselves." Further, both Russia\*

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\* In 1793, the Empress of Russia herself proposed and concluded a treaty with Great Britain, in which she expressly engaged to unite with his Britannic Majesty "all her efforts to prevent other powers not implicated in this war from giving any protection whatever, directly or indirectly, in consequence of their neutrality, to the commerce and property of the French on the sea, or in the ports of France;" and, in execution of this treaty, she sent a fleet into the Baltic and North Seas, with express orders "to seize and capture all the ships bearing the pretended French flag, or any other flags which they may dare to hoist; and to stop also and to compel all neutral vessels bound to or freighted for France, according as they shall deem it most expedient, either to sail back or to enter some neutral harbour."—*Note, 30th July 1793, by the Russian ambassador to the High Chancellor of Sweden, Ann. Reg. 1793, p. 175, State Papers.* A similar note was presented to the court of Denmark at the same time, and both Denmark and Sweden, in their treaty with each other, on July 6, 1794, Prussia in her treaty with America in 1797, Russia in her war with the Turks in 1787, and Sweden in her war with Russia in 1789, promulgated and acted upon these principles, diametrically opposed to the doctrines of the Armed Neutrality.<sup>1</sup> With such ardour was this system acted upon by the Emperor Paul, that he threatened the Danes with immediate hostilities in 1799, on account "of their supplying assistance and protection to the trade of France, under the neutral colours of the Danish flag;" and he was only prevented from carrying these threats into immediate execution by the amicable interference of Great Britain; a seasonable interposition, which Denmark repeatedly acknowledged with becoming gratitude.—*Ann. Reg. 1800, p. 91.* In 1794 the Empress notified to the Swedish court, that "the Empress of Russia has thought proper to fit out a fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, with frigates proportional, to cruise in the North Seas, for the purpose (in conjunction with the English maritime forces) of preventing the sending of any provisions or ammunition to France; the Empress therefore requests the King of Sweden not to permit his ships of war to take any Swedish merchantmen laden with any such commodities under their convoy. Her Imperial Majesty further orders all merchant ships which her squadron may meet in those seas to be searched, to see if their cargoes consist of any such goods." A similar declaration was made by the Court of Russia to that of Denmark, both dated August 6, 1794.—*Ann. Reg. 1794, p. 241; State Papers.*

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 203.

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<sup>1</sup> Convention,  
March  
27, 1794.  
Ann. Reg.  
1794, 238.

12.  
But the  
neutrals  
suffered  
severely in  
the close of  
the war.

and Denmark\* had issued edicts, at the commencement of the war, in which they prohibited their subjects from taking on board contraband articles; while America, in the same year, had entered into a maritime treaty with England, in which the right of search was expressly admitted.† Both by the common maritime law, and by the force of recent and subsisting treaties, therefore, the right of search, claimed by Great Britain, was founded on an unquestionable basis.<sup>1</sup>

But this specific state of matters was totally altered by the result of the maritime war, and especially by the decisive battle of the Nile. These great events, by entirely sweeping the French flag from the ocean, left them dependent on other powers for the supplies necessary for their navy; and the Republican government saw the necessity of relaxing the rigour of their former proceedings against neutrals, in order, through their intervention, to acquire the means of restoring their marine. The intemperate conduct of the Directory, and the arbitrary doctrines which they enforced in regard to neutrals, had all but involved the Republic in open hostilities with America, Denmark, and Sweden; and on the accession of the First Consul, he found an embargo laid on all the ships of these powers in the French harbours. The *arrêts* of the Directory of the 18th January and 29th October 1798, were to the last degree injurious to neutral commerce, for they declared every vessel good prize which had on board any

\* We, Christian VII., King of Denmark, order, that "should any vessel bound to a neutral harbour take in such goods or merchandise as, if they were consigned to any harbour of the belligerent powers, would be contraband, and as such stipulated in the treaties between those powers and us, and mentioned in our orders and proclamations of 22d and 25th February 1793, besides the oath of the master and freighter of the ships, there shall be made a special declaration conformable to the invoice and bills of lading," to show the destination of the said ship.—*Ibid.* p. 240-241.

† "In the event of vessels being captured, or detained on suspicion of having enemy's property on board, such property alone is to be taken out, and the vessels are to be permitted to proceed to sea with the remainder of their cargo."—Art. 17, *Treaty between Great Britain and America*, 19th May 1795.—Art. 18, specifies what articles are to be deemed contraband.—*Ann. Reg.* 1795, p. 296-297; *State Papers*.

quantity, however small, of British merchandise; and in virtue of that law, numbers of American vessels had been seized and condemned in the French harbours. Adding insult to injury, the Directory, in the midst of these piratical proceedings, gravely proposed to the Americans that they should lend them 48,000,000 francs; insinuating at the same time, that the loan should be accompanied by the sum of 1,250,000 francs, (£50,000,) to be divided, as a private *douceur*, between Barras and Talleyrand.<sup>1</sup>

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1801.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. i.  
260.

These extravagances so irritated the Americans, that, by an act of the Legislature, they declared the United States "liberated from the stipulations in the treaty of 1778 with France, and authorised the President to arm vessels of war to defend their commerce against the French cruisers;" grounding these extreme measures upon the statement that the French had confiscated the cargoes of great numbers of American vessels having enemy's property on board, while it was expressly stipulated, by the treaty of 1778, that the flag should cover the cargo; had equipped privateers in the ports of the Union contrary to the rights of neutrality, and treated American seamen, found on board enemy's ships, as pirates. This led, in its turn, to an embargo, in the French harbours, on all American vessels; and nothing but the Atlantic which rolled between them, and the British cruisers which prevented them reaching each other, prevented these two democratic states from engaging in fierce hostility with each other.<sup>2</sup>

13.  
Excessive  
violence of  
the Direc-  
tory against  
the United  
States.  
July 7,  
1796.<sup>2</sup>Nap. i. 109;  
ii. 110, 111;  
iii. 112.  
Bign. i. 260,  
275, 276.

But this state of mutual exasperation was soon terminated after the accession of the First Consul to the helm. He at once perceived the extreme impolicy of irritating, by additional acts of spoliation, a power recently at war with Great Britain, and still labouring under a strong feeling of hostility towards that state; the firm ally in better times of France, and one of the most important in the maritime league which he already contemplated

14.  
Napoleon  
terminates  
these differ-  
ences.

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1801.

Feb. 9, 1800.

J. Ann. Reg.  
1800, 288,  
289. Bign.  
i. 277.15.  
Maritime  
treaty with  
America.  
Sept. 30,  
1800.

against the English naval power. He received, therefore, with distinguished honour the American envoys who were despatched from New York, in the end of 1799, to make a last effort to adjust the difference between the two countries; and published a warm eulogium on the great Washington, when intelligence arrived in France, early in the following spring, of the death of that spotless patriot. At the same time, the embargo on American vessels was taken off in the French harbours, and every possible facility was given to the commencement of negotiations between the two powers. Prospective arrangements were readily agreed on, both parties having an equal interest in establishing the new maritime code of the Armed Neutrality; but it was not found so easy a matter to adjust the injuries that were past, or reconcile the consular government to those indemnities which the Americans so loudly demanded for the acts of piracy long exercised upon their commerce. At length it was agreed to leave these difficult points to ulterior arrangement in a separate convention, and to conclude a treaty for the regulation of neutral rights in future times.<sup>1</sup>

By this treaty, signed at Morfontaine on the 30th September 1800, the new code was fully established between France and America. It was stipulated, 1st, That the flag should cover the merchandise. 2d, That contraband of war should be understood only of warlike stores, cannon, muskets, and other arms. 3d, That the right of search, to ascertain the flag and examine whether there were any contraband articles on board, should be carried into effect, out of cannon-shot of the visiting vessel, by a boat containing two or three men only; that every neutral ship should have on board a certificate, setting forth to what country it belonged, and that that certificate should be held as good evidence of its contents; that if contraband articles were found on board, they only should be confiscated, and not the ship or remainder of the cargo: that no vessels under convoy should be subject to search,

but the declaration of the commander of the convoy be received instead : that those harbours only should be understood to be blockaded, where a sufficient force was stationed at their mouth to render it evidently dangerous to attempt to enter ; and that enemy's property on board neutral vessels should be covered by their flag, in the same manner as neutral goods found on board enemy's vessels.<sup>1</sup> So far the French influence prevailed in this convention ; but they failed in their attempt to get the Americans openly to renounce the treaty concluded in 1794 with Great Britain, which could not have been done without at once embroiling them with the British cabinet. A similar convention had previously been entered into on the same principles between the United States and the Prussian government.<sup>2</sup>

Circumstances at this period were singularly favourable to the revival of the principles of the Armed Neutrality. A recurrence of the same political relations had restored both the grievances and the ambition which, at the close of the American war, had led to that formidable confederacy. Neutral vessels, endeavouring to slide into the lucrative trade which the destruction of the French marine opened up with that country, found themselves perpetually exposed to inquisition from the British cruisers ; and numerous condemnations had taken place in the English courts, which, though perfectly agreeable to the law of nations, and to existing treaties between Great Britain and the governments of the neutral states, were naturally felt as exceedingly hard by the sufferers under them, and all contributed to renew the ancient and extinguishable jealousy of their respective cabinets at the British naval power. In December 1799, an altercation took place in the straits of Gibraltar between some British frigates and a Danish ship, the *Hausenan*, in which the Dane refused to submit to a search of the convoy under his command ; but the conduct of the captain in this instance was formally disavowed by his government, and the amicable relations of the two countries

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XXXIII.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Treaty, Articles 18, 19. Ann. Reg. 1800, 288, 289. Nap. ii. 122, 123. Bign. i. 277, 278. Dum. vi. 96. Martens, vii. 304.

<sup>2</sup> On July 11, 1799. See State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1800, 294, 295. Articles, 13, 14, 15.

16.  
Revival of the principles of the Armed Neutrality.

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XXXIII.

1801.

continued unchanged. The next collision of the same kind which took place, however, occasioned more serious consequences. On 25th July 1800, the commander of the Danish frigate, Freya, refused to allow his convoy to be searched, but, agreeably to the recent stipulations in the treaties between France and America, offered to show his certificates to the British officer : intimating, at the same time, that if a boat was sent to make a search it would be fired upon. The British captain upon this laid his vessel alongside the Dane, and resistance being still persisted in, gave her a broadside, and, after a short action, brought her into the Downs.<sup>1</sup>

1 Ann. Reg.  
1800, 94, 95.  
Nap. ii. 117,  
118. Bign. i.  
292. Hard.  
vii. 444, 445.

17.  
Lord Whitworth is sent to Copenhagen, and enters into an accommodation. Aug. 23, 1800.

The British cabinet at this time had received intelligence of the hostile negotiations which were going on in the northern courts relative to neutral rights ; and deeming it probable that this event would be made the signal for openly declaring their intentions, they wisely resolved to anticipate an attack. For this purpose, Lord Whitworth was sent on a special message to Copenhagen ; and, to give the greater weight to his representations, a squadron of nine sail of the line, four bombs, and five frigates, was despatched to the Sound, under the command of Admiral Dickson. They found four Danish line-of-battle ships stationed across that strait, from Cromberg castle to the Swedish shore ; but the British fleet passed without any hostilities being committed on either side, and cast anchor off the harbour of Copenhagen. The Danes were busily employed in strengthening their fortifications ; batteries were erected on advantageous situations near the coast, and three floating bulwarks moored across the mouth of the harbour ; but their preparations were not yet complete, and the strength of the British squadron precluded the hope of successful resistance. An accommodation was therefore entered into, the principal conditions of which were, “ that the frigate and convoy carried into the Downs should be repaired at the expense of the British government ; and that the question as to the right of search should be adjourned for further consideration to London.”<sup>2</sup> Until

Aug. 29.  
2 Ann. Reg.  
1800, 93, 97.  
Nap. ii. 117,  
119. Bign. i.  
292.



this point was settled, the Danish ships were to sail with convoy only in the Mediterranean, for the purpose of protection from the Barbary cruisers, and in the mean time their other vessels were to be liable to be searched as heretofore."

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1801.

Situated as Great Britain was, this treaty was a real triumph to her arms, and reflected no small credit on the vigour and ability of the government by which so delicate a matter had been brought to so favourable a conclusion. It might have been adjusted without any further effusion of blood, had it not been for a train of circumstances which, about the same time, alienated the vehement and capricious Emperor of Russia from the British alliance. The northern autocrat had been exceedingly irritated at the bad success of the combined operations both in Switzerland and Holland; the first of which he ascribed to the ill conduct of the German, the latter of the British auxiliaries. This feeling was increased by the impolitic refusal of the British government to include Russian prisoners with English in the exchange with French—a proposal which, considering that they had fought side by side in the Dutch campaign, in which English interests were mainly involved, it was certainly imprudent to have declined; although the dubious conduct of Paul, in having withdrawn his troops from the German alliance, and broken with Austria, gave him no title to demand it as a right. Napoleon, as already observed, instantly and adroitly availed himself of this circumstance to appease the Czar. He professed the utmost indignation that the gallant Russians should remain in captivity from the refusal of the British government to agree to their liberation for French prisoners; set them at liberty without exchange; and not only sent them back to their own country, but restored to them the arms and standards which they had lost, and clothed them anew from head to foot in the uniform of their respective regiments. These courteous proceedings made the greatest impression on the impetuous Czar, the more so as they were contrasted

18.  
Growing  
irritation of  
the Emperor  
Paul at the  
Allies. Poli-  
tic conduct  
of Napoleon.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. i.  
287, 289.  
Jom. xiv.  
234.  
Nap.  
ii. 128.

with the imprudent refusal of his ally, the English government, to include them in their exchange. They led to an interchange of good offices between the two courts, which was soon ripened into an alliance of the strictest kind, in consequence of the vehement character of the Emperor, and the unbounded admiration which he had conceived for the First Consul.<sup>1</sup>

19.  
Differences  
about Malta.

Another circumstance at the same time occurred, which contributed not a little to widen the breach between the cabinets of St Petersburg and London. Disengaged from his war with France, and ardently desirous of warlike renown, the Emperor had revived the idea of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, and made proposals, in May and June 1800, to the cabinets of Stockholm and Copenhagen to that effect, which had produced the sudden change in the Danish instructions to their armed vessels to resist the search of the British cruisers. The island of Malta, it was foreseen, would soon surrender to the British squadron, and it was easy to anticipate that the English cabinet would not readily part with that important fortress; while the Emperor conceived that, as Grand-Master of the order of St John of Jerusalem, to which it had formerly belonged, he was bound to stipulate its restoration to that celebrated order.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Bign. i.  
287, 290.  
Hard. vi.  
446.

20.  
Violent pro-  
ceedings of  
Paul. Aug.  
28, 1800:  
surrender of  
Malta to  
England.  
Nov. 5,  
1800.

Matters were in this uncertain state at the court of St Petersburg, when the arrival of the British squadron in the Sound brought them to a crisis. The Czar, with that impetuosity which formed the leading feature of his character, instantly ordered an embargo on all the British ships in the Russian harbours; and in consequence nearly three hundred vessels, most of them with valuable cargoes on board, were forcibly detained till the frost had set in, and the Baltic had become impassable. Nor was this all. Their crews, with Asiatic barbarity, and in defiance of all the usages of civilised states, were marched off into prisons in the interior, many of them above a thousand miles from the coast; while the whole British property

on shore was put under sequestration. Several British vessels at Narva weighed anchor and escaped the embargo. This so enraged the autocrat that he ordered the remaining ships in the harbour to be burnt; and in the official gazette, published a declaration that the embargo should not be taken off till Malta was given up to Russia. The demand was rested on the allegation, that the restitution of that island to the order of Jerusalem was agreed upon in the convention between Great Britain and Russia, in December 1798, whereas that treaty contained no such stipulation. These proceedings on the part of the Emperor Paul were in a peculiar manner arbitrary and oppressive, not merely as contrary to the general practice of civilised states, which never authorises such severity against the crews of merchant ships or goods on shore, but as directly in the face of an express article in the existing treaty of 1793, between Great Britain and Russia, in which it was stipulated that "in the event of a rupture between the two powers, there should be no embargo laid on vessels in the harbours of either, but the merchants on both sides have a year to convey away or dispose of their effects."<sup>1</sup>

Nothing more than the support of Russia was necessary to make the northern powers, who derived such benefits from the lucrative neutral trade which had recently fallen into their hands, combine for the purpose of enforcing a new maritime code, which might extend its advantages to the whole commerce of the belligerent states. The King of Sweden, young and high-spirited, entered, from the very first, warmly and readily into the views of the Emperor; but Denmark, which, during the long continuance of the war, had obtained a large share of the carrying trade, and the capital of which lay exposed to the first strokes of the English navy, was more reserved in her movements. The arrogance with which an immediate accession to their views was urged upon the court of Copenhagen by the cabinets of St

CHAP.  
XXXIII.1801.  
Sept. 15.  
1800.

Nov. 21.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. i.  
296, 297.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 237,  
and 99.  
State Pa-  
pers. Dum.  
vi. 127.21.  
He is joined  
by Sweden,  
Denmark,  
and Prussia.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

1801.

Oct. 4.

Sept. 4.  
1 Dum. vi.  
88. Bign. i.  
298.

22.  
His warm  
advances to  
Napoleon.

Petersburg and Stockholm, for some time defeated its own object; and Denmark even hesitated whether she should not throw herself into the arms of England, to resist the dictation of her imperious neighbours, and preserve the lucrative trade from which her subjects were deriving such immense advantages. But the Russians soon found means to assail her in the most vulnerable quarter. Prussia had lately become a considerable maritime power, and from regard to the same interests, she had warmly embraced the views of the northern confederacy. Her influence with Denmark was paramount, for the most valuable Continental possessions of that power lay exposed, without defence, to the Prussian troops. In the beginning of October, a Prussian vessel, the *Triton*, belonging to Emden, laden with naval stores, and bound for the Texel, was taken and carried into Cuxhaven, a port belonging to Hamburg, by a British cruiser. The Prussian government eagerly took advantage of that circumstance to manifest their resolution. They marched a body of two thousand men into the neutral territory, and took possession of Cuxhaven; and although the senate of Hamburg purchased the vessel from the English captain and restored it to the owners, and Lord Carysfort, the British ambassador at Berlin, warmly protested against the occupation of the neutral territory after that restitution, the Prussian troops were not withdrawn. A month before, a more unjustifiable act had been committed by the British cruisers off Barcelona, who took possession of a Swedish brig, and under its neutral colours sailed into the harbour of that town, and captured by that means two frigates which the King of Spain had built for the Batavian republic.<sup>1</sup>

Though everything was thus conspiring to forward the views of France, and augment the jealousy of the maritime powers towards Great Britain, the course of events by no means kept pace with the impatient disposition of the Czar. He suspected Prussia of insincerity, and

openly charged the cabinet of Denmark with irresolution, because they did not embark headlong in the projects which he himself had so recently adopted. Impatient of delay, he wrote in person to the First Consul in these terms :—"Citizen First Consul—I do not write to you to open any discussion on the rights of men or of citizens; every country chooses what form of government it thinks fit. Wherever I see at the head of affairs a man who knows how to conquer and rule mankind, my heart warms towards him. I write to you to let you know the displeasure which I feel towards England, which violates the law of nations, and is never governed except by selfish considerations. I wish to unite with you to put restraints upon the injustice of that government."<sup>1</sup> At the same time, with that mixture of candour and vehemence which distinguished his character, he published a declaration in the St Petersburg Gazette, in which he stated :—"Being disappointed in his expectations of the protection of commerce by the perfidious enterprises of a great power, which had sought to enchain the liberty of the seas by capturing Danish convoys, the independence of the northern powers appeared to him to be openly menaced; he consequently considered it to be a measure of necessity to have recourse to an armed neutrality, the success of which was acknowledged in the time of the American war." And shortly after he published a ukase, in which he directed that all the English effects seized in his states, either by the sequestration of goods on land or the embargo on goods afloat, should be *sold*, and their produce divided among all Russians having claims on English subjects! Napoleon was not slow in turning to the best account such an unlooked-for turn of fortune in his favour; and he redoubled his efforts with the neutral powers to induce them to join the maritime confederacy against Great Britain. To give the greater eclat to the union of France and Russia, an ambassador, Count Kalitcheff, was despatched from St Petersburg to Paris,<sup>2</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXIII.  
1801.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii.  
129.

Oct. 29,  
1800.

Nov. 17,  
1800.

Dec. 4,  
1800.

<sup>2</sup> Dum. vi.  
121, 123.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 98;  
1800, 260.  
State Pa-  
pers.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

1801.

23.  
General  
maritime  
confederacy,  
signed on  
Dec. 16,  
1800.

and was received there with a degree of magnificence well calculated to captivate the oriental ideas of the Scythian autocrat.

Pressed by Prussia on the one side and France on the other, and sufficiently disposed already to regard with a jealous eye the maritime preponderance of Great Britain, the fears and irresolution of the northern powers at length gave way. On the 16th December a maritime confederacy was signed by Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, and on the 19th of the same month by Prussia as an acceding party. The principles of this league were in substance the same as those of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, with a slight variation in favour of belligerent powers. A minute specification was given of what should be deemed contraband articles, which included only arms of all sorts, with saddles and bridles: "all other articles not herein enumerated shall not be considered as war or naval stores, and shall not be subject to confiscation, but shall pass free and without restraint." It was stipulated, "that the effects which belong to the subjects of belligerent powers in neutral ships, with the exception of contraband goods, shall be free;" that no harbour shall be deemed blockaded unless the disposition and number of ships of the power by which it is invested shall be such as to render it apparently hazardous to enter; that the declaration of the captains of ships of war having convoy, that the convoy has no contraband goods, shall be deemed sufficient; that "the contracting parties, if disquieted or attacked for this convention, shall make common cause to defend each other," and that "these principles shall apply to every maritime war by which Europe may unhappily be disquieted."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Convention, Dec. 16, 1800. Ann. Reg. 1800, 268, 270. State Papers.

24.  
Its threaten-  
ing conse-  
quences to  
England.

This convention was naturally regarded with the utmost jealousy by the British government. Under cover of a regard for the rights of humanity and the principles of justice, it went to introduce a system hitherto unheard of into naval warfare, eminently favourable to the weaker

maritime power, and calculated to render naval success to any state of little avail, by enabling the vanquished party, under neutral colours, securely to repair all its losses. It was evident that, if this new code of maritime law were introduced, all the victories of the British navy would go for nothing. France, in neutral vessels, would securely regain her whole commerce ; under neutral flags she would import all the materials for the construction of a navy, and in neutral ships safely exercise the seamen requisite to navigate them. At the close of a long and bloody war, waged for her very existence, and attended with unexampled naval success, England would see all the fruits of her exertions torn from her, and witness the restoration of her antagonist's maritime strength, by the intervention of the very powers for whose behoof, as well as her own, she had taken up arms.

England at this period was not, as at the close of the American war, obliged to dissemble her indignation at a proceeding which was evidently prejudicial to her national interests, and the first stroke levelled by Continental jealousy at her national independence. The statesman who still held the helm was a man who disdained all temporary shifts or momentary expedients ; who, fully appreciating the measure of national danger, boldly looked it in the face ; who knew that from humiliation to subjugation in nations is but a step ; and that the more perilous a struggle is, the more necessary is it to engage in it while yet the public resources are undiminished, and the popular spirit is not depressed by the appearance of vacillation on the part of government. On these prudent not less than resolute principles, Mr Pitt was no sooner informed of the signature of the Armed Neutrality, than he took the most decisive steps for letting the northern powers feel the disposition of the nation they had thought fit to provoke. On the 14th January 1801, the British government issued an order for a general embargo on all vessels belonging to any of the confederated powers,

CHAP.  
XXXIII.  
1801.

25.  
Measures of  
retaliation  
on the part  
of the British  
govern-  
ment.

Jan. 14.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

1801.

Prussia alone excepted, of whose accession to the league intelligence had not as yet been received. Letters of marque were at the same time issued for the capture of the numerous vessels, belonging to these states, which were working to the Baltic; and with such vigour were these proceedings followed up, that ere long nearly the one-half of the merchant ships belonging to the northern powers at sea found their way into the British harbours. These hostile proceedings led to a warm debate between the British ambassadors and those of the neutral powers, which was conducted with great ability on both sides. That between Lord Carysfort, the English ambassador at Berlin, and Count Haugwitz, the minister for foreign affairs at that capital, embraced the principal arguments urged in this important controversy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
103.

26.  
Diplomatic  
debates with  
the neutral  
powers.  
Argument  
of England.

It was stated by the British government:—"That a solemn treaty had been entered into between Russia and Great Britain, calculated completely to secure their trade, in which it was stipulated that, in case of a rupture, not only no embargo should be laid on, but the subjects on both sides should have a year to carry away their effects; that in violation of these sacred stipulations, the ships of British merchants had been seized, their crews sent to prison in the interior, and their property sequestered and sold by Russia; that these acts of violence, as well as the conclusion of a hostile confederacy, which the Emperor of Russia has formed for the express and avowed purpose of introducing those innovations into the maritime code which England has ever opposed, have led to an open war between Great Britain and Russia; that these measures openly disclose an intention to prescribe to the British empire, on a subject of the greatest importance, a new code of laws to which she never will submit; that the confederacy recently signed by the Baltic powers, had for its object the establishment of these novel principles of maritime law, which never had been recognised by the tribunals of Europe, which the Russian court, since 1780,



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1801.

had not only abandoned, but, by a treaty still in force, had become bound to oppose, and which were equally repugnant to the express stipulations of the treaties which subsist between the courts of Stockholm and Denmark and the British empire; that in addition to this, the parties to the confederacy were pursuing warlike preparations with the utmost activity, and one of them had engaged in actual hostilities with Great Britain. In these circumstances, nothing remained to the British government but to secure some pledge against the hostile attacks which were meditated against their rights, and therefore they have laid an embargo on the vessels of the Baltic powers, but under such restraints as would guard to the utmost against loss and injury to individuals; that the King of Great Britain would never submit to pretensions which were irreconcilable with the true principles of maritime law, and strike at the foundation of the greatness and maritime power of his kingdom; and that, being perfectly convinced that his conduct towards neutral states was conformable to the recognised principles of law and justice, and the decisions of the admiralty courts of all the powers of Europe, he would allow of no measures which had for their object to introduce innovations on the maritime law now in force, but would defend that system in every event, and maintain its entire execution as it subsisted in all the courts of Europe before the confederacy of 1780.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lord Carysfort's notes, Jan. 27, and Feb. 1. Ann. Reg. 229, 237. State Papers.

On the other hand, it was answered by Prussia and the neutral powers:—“The British government has in the present, more than any former war, usurped the sovereignty of the seas; and by arbitrarily framing a naval code, which it would be difficult to unite with the true principles of the law of nations, it exercises over the other friendly and neutral powers a usurped jurisdiction, the legality of which it maintains, and which it considers as an imprescriptible right, sanctioned by all the tribunals of Europe. The neutral sovereigns have never conceded to England the

27.  
Answer of Prussia and the neutral powers.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

1801.

privilege of calling their subjects before its tribunals, and of subjecting them to its laws, but in cases in which the abuse of power has got the better of equity—which, alas! are but too frequent. The neutral powers have always taken the precaution to address to its cabinet the most energetic remonstrances and protests; but experience has ever proved them to be entirely fruitless; and it is not surprising if, after so many repeated acts of oppression, they have resolved to find a remedy against it, and for that purpose to establish a well-arranged convention, which fixes their rights, and places them on a proper level with the powers at war. The naval alliance, in the manner in which it has just been consolidated, was intended to lead to this salutary end; and the King hesitates not to declare, that he recognises in it his own principles; that he is fully convinced of its necessity and utility; that he has formally acceded to the convention of the 16th December, and has bound himself not only to take a direct share in all the events which interest the cause of the neutral powers, but, in virtue of his engagements, to maintain that connexion by such powerful measures as the impulse of circumstances may require. It is not true that the confederated powers have for their object to introduce a new code of maritime rights hostile to the interests of Great Britain; the measures of the Danish government are purely defensive, and it cannot be considered as surprising that they should have adopted them, when it is recollected what menacing demonstrations that court had experienced from Great Britain, on occasion of the affair of the Freya frigate.”<sup>1</sup> The Prussian government concluded by urging the English government to take off the embargo on the Danish and Swedish vessels, as the first and necessary step to an amicable settlement of the difficult question, without making any such stipulation in regard to that laid on Russian ships, and thereby in effect admitting the justice of the measure of retaliation adopted in regard to the latter power.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Baron Haugwitz's answer. Ann. Reg. 241. State Papers.

<sup>2</sup> Nap. ii. 133.

These hostile declarations were soon followed up by measures which demonstrated that Prussia was not inclined to be merely a passive spectator of this great debate. On the 30th March a declaration was issued by the King of Prussia to the government of Hanover, in which he stated that he was to take possession provisionally of the English dominions in Germany; and the Hanoverian states being in no condition to resist such an invasion, they submitted, and the Prussian troops entered the country, laid an embargo on British shipping, and closed the Elbe and the Weser against the English flag. At the same time a body of Danish troops made themselves masters of Hamburg, and extended the embargo to that great commercial emporium; while Denmark and Sweden had a short time before done the same on all the ports of their dominions. Thus the British flag was excluded from every harbour, from the North Cape to the straits of Gibraltar; and England, which a year before led on the coalition against France, found herself compelled to make head against the hostility of combined Europe, with an exhausted treasury, and a population suffering under the accumulated pressure of famine.<sup>1</sup>\*

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

1801.

28.

Hanover is  
invaded by  
Prussia.

April 3.

March 25.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1800, 107.

Never did a British parliament meet under more depressing circumstances than that which commenced its sittings in February 1801. After ten years of a war, costly and burdensome beyond example, the power of France was so far from being weakened, that she had

29.  
Meeting of  
parliament.  
Perilous  
situation of  
England.

\* It deserves to be recorded to the credit of Prussia in this transaction, that being well aware how severely Great Britain was suffering at this time under an uncommon scarcity of provisions, she permitted the vessels having grain on board to proceed to the places of their destination, notwithstanding the embargo; a humane indulgence, which forms a striking contrast to the violent and cruel proceedings of the Emperor Paul on the same occasion. The conduct of the neutrals, with the exception of Russia, in this distressing contest, was distinguished by a moderation and firmness worthy of states contending for the introduction of a great general principle. That of the cabinet of St Petersburg was widely different; but it would be unjust to visit upon the gallant Russian people the sins of their chief, who about that period began to give symptoms of that irritability of disposition and mental alienation, which so soon brought about the bloody catastrophe that terminated his reign.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Dum.vi.167.  
Ann. Reg.  
1800, 107.

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extended her sway over all the south of Europe. The strength of Austria was, to appearance at least, irrecoverably broken; Italy and Switzerland crouched beneath her yoke, Spain openly followed her banners, and Holland was indissolubly united with her fortunes. Great Britain, it is true, had been uniformly, and to an unparalleled extent, victorious at sea, and the naval forces of her adversary were almost destroyed. But the northern confederation had suddenly and alarmingly altered this auspicious state of things; and not only were all the harbours of Europe closed against her merchant vessels, but a fleet of above a hundred ships of the line in the Baltic was preparing to assert principles subversive of her naval power. To crown the whole, the excessive rains of the preceding autumns had essentially injured two successive crops; the price of all sorts of grain had reached an unprecedented height;\* and the people, at the time when their industry was checked by the cessation of commercial intercourse with all Europe, were compelled to struggle with a famine of unusual severity.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
117.

30.  
Arguments  
on the sub-  
ject in par-  
liament by  
Mr Grey  
and the  
Opposition.

This subject of the northern coalition was fully discussed in the parliamentary debates which took place on the King's speech at the opening of the session. It was urged by Mr Grey and the Opposition, "That although without doubt the Emperor of Russia had been guilty of the grossest violence and injustice towards Great Britain in the confiscation of the property of its merchants, yet it did not follow that ministers were free of blame. He accuses them of having violated a convention in regard to the surrender of Malta to him as a reward for his co-operation against France: did such a convention exist? The northern powers have, along with Russia, subscribed a covenant, the professed object of which is to secure their

\* In the winter 1800-1801, wheat rose to £1, 4s. the bushel, or £9, 12s. a quarter, being more than quadruple what it had been at the commencement of the war, when it was 5s. 6d. a bushel, or 44s. a quarter; and all other species of food were high in proportion. Large quantities of maize and rice were imported, and contributed essentially to relieve the public distress.

commerce against the vexations to which it has hitherto been subject ; and it is impossible to discover, either in the law of nations or practice of states, any law or practice universally acknowledged, the denial of which is tantamount to a declaration of war against this country. It is a mistake to assert that the principles of the Armed Neutrality were never heard of till they were advanced in the American war. In 1740 the King of Prussia disputed the pretensions of this country on the same grounds as the Armed Neutrality ; and in 1762 the Dutch resisted the claim of right to search vessels under convoy. In 1780, these objections assumed a greater degree of consistency, from their principles being publicly announced by all the powers in Europe.

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“ There is one principle which should ever be considered as the leading rule by which all questions of this sort should be determined, and that is the maxim of *justice*. Can, then, the pretensions of Great Britain bear the test of this criterion ? Our naval ascendancy, indeed, should ever be carefully preserved, as the source of our glory and the bulwark of our safety ; but sorry should I be, if, to preserve the rights and interests of the British nation, we should be compelled to abandon the rules and maxims of justice, in which alone are to be found true and permanent greatness, true and permanent security.

31.  
Alleged in-  
justice of  
the preten-  
sions of  
England.

“ Even supposing the pretensions of England to be just, are they expedient ? Its maritime superiority is of inestimable value, but is this claim, so odious to our neighbours, essential to its existence ? Let the advantage, nay the necessity, of the privilege be clearly demonstrated before we engage in a universal war for its defence, and purchase it at the price of blood. Admitting even that the right were just and useful, circumstances may occur which would justify and warrant a relaxation in its rigour. Supposing the concession of the claim of the northern powers would have enabled them to supply France with many articles necessary for her navy, what

32.  
And their  
inexpedi-  
ency.

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would have been the inconvenience thence arising? France, destitute of seamen, her fleets without discipline, what the better would she be of all the naval stores of the north of Europe? What, on the other hand, is the consequence of our dispute with the northern powers? Do we not in a moment double her marine, and supply her with experienced sailors? Do not the navies of Europe now outflank us on every side? and has not France, therefore, gained the inestimable advantage of acquiring the seamen from the Baltic, which could not otherwise be obtained, and is not that the real object which she requires? And if our commerce is excluded from every harbour in Europe, if every market is shut against us, what is to become of the invaluable sources of our splendour and security? Independently of naval stores, can we forget how important it is, in the present distressed and starving situation of the country, that the supplies from the Baltic should not be lost? A little moderation in the instructions to our naval officers would have avoided all these dangers. Lord North was never arraigned as a traitor to his country, because he did not drive matters to extremities in 1780; and in the peace of 1783 the question of the Armed Neutrality was wholly passed by. In subsequent commercial treaties with different countries, the question of neutral rights has been settled on the principles of the Armed Neutrality; and there is at least as much reason for moderation now as there was at the close of the American war."

33.  
Arguments  
in reply by  
Mr Pitt.

To these arguments Mr Pitt and Sir William Grant replied: "It has only been stated as doubtful whether the maritime code contended for by Great Britain is founded in justice; but can there be the smallest hesitation as to the justice of a principle which has been acknowledged and acted upon by the whole courts, not only of this country, but of Europe, and on which all the wars, not of this island merely, but of every belligerent state in Europe, have been constantly conducted? The advocates for the neutral powers constantly fall into the error of

supposing that every exception from the general law by a particular treaty proves the law to be as stated in that treaty ; whereas the very circumstance of making an exception by treaty, proves that the general law of nations is the reverse. We made a concession of this description to France, in the commercial treaty of 1787, because it was supposed that that power would never be neutral when we were at war ; but was it ever for one moment imagined that, by so doing, we could be understood to have relinquished our maritime rights with reference to other states ?

“ With respect to the Baltic powers, the case of the neutral advocates is peculiarly untenable. Nobody here has to learn, that the treaties of 1661 and 1670 are in full force with respect to Sweden and Denmark, and in those treaties the right of carrying enemy’s property is expressly given up. With respect to Russia, the right of search was never abandoned. On the contrary, in the convention signed between this country and that power, at the commencement of the present war, the latter bound herself not merely to observe this principle herself, but to use her efforts to prevent neutral powers from protecting the commerce of France on the seas or in its harbours. Even, therefore, if the general principles of the maritime law were as adverse, as in reality they are favourable to Great Britain, still the treaties with the Baltic powers are in full force, and how can they now contend for a code of laws against England, in opposition to that to which they are expressly bound with her ? Denmark, in August last, with her fleets and her arsenals at our mercy, entered into a solemn pledge, not again to send vessels with convoy until the principle was settled ; and yet she has recently bound herself by another treaty, founded upon the principles of 1780, one of the engagements of which treaty is, that its stipulations are to be maintained by force of arms. Is this, or is it not, war ? When all these circumstances are accompanied by armaments, prepared at a period of

34.  
Rights of  
England  
conceded by  
existing  
treaties.

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35.  
Inexpedi-  
ence of  
succumb-  
ing before  
the coal-  
ition.

the year when they think they have time for preparation without being exposed to our navy, can there be the slightest doubt that in justice we are bound to take up arms in our own defence ?

“ As to the question of expediency, the matter is, if possible, still less doubtful. The question is, whether we are to permit the navy of our enemy to be supplied and recruited ; whether we are to suffer blockaded forts to be furnished with warlike stores and provisions ; whether we are to allow neutral nations, by hoisting a flag upon a sloop or a fishing-boat, to convey the treasures of South America to the harbours of Spain, or the naval stores of the Baltic to Brest or Toulon ? The honourable gentleman talks of the destruction of the naval power of France ; but does he imagine that her marine would have decreased to the degree which it actually has, if, during the whole of the war, this very principle had not been acted upon ? And if the commerce of France had not been destroyed, does he believe that, if the fraudulent system of neutrals had not been prevented, her navy would not now have been in a very different situation from what it actually is ? Does he not know, that the naval preponderance which we have by this means acquired, has since given security to this country amidst the wreck of all our hopes on the Continent ? If it were once gone, the spirit of the country would go with it. If, in 1780, we were not in a condition to assert the right of this country to a code of maritime law which for centuries has been acted upon indiscriminately by all the European states, we have not now, happily, the same reason for not persisting in maintaining our rights ; and the question now is, whether, with increased proofs of the necessity of acting upon that principle, and increased means of supporting it, we are for ever to give it up ? ” <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxv. 895,  
915.

<sup>2</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxv. 934.

The House of Commons supported ministers, by a majority of 245 to 63. <sup>2</sup>

The union of Ireland with England, from which such



important results were anticipated, proved a source of weakness rather than strength to the empire at this important crisis. By a series of concessions, which commenced soon after, and continued during the whole reign of George III., the Irish Catholics had been nearly placed on a level with their Protestant fellow-subjects, and they were now excluded only from sitting in parliament, and holding about thirty of the principal offices of the state. When Mr Pitt, however, carried through the great measure of the Union, he gave the Catholics reason to expect that a complete removal of all disabilities would follow the Union, not, indeed, as a matter of right, but of grace and favour; and he contemplated, and had made some progress in arranging, a competent provision for the Roman Catholic clergy both in Ireland and Great Britain, which he regarded as a most important step towards establishing tranquillity in the former, and cementing the union of both countries. This understood pledge, when the time arrived, he found himself unable to redeem. The complete removal of Catholic disabilities, it was soon found, involved many fundamental questions in the constitution; in particular, the Bill of Rights, the Test and Corporation Acts, and, in general, the stability of the whole Protestant Church establishment: and for that reason it might be expected to meet with a formidable opposition from the aristocratic party in both houses. In addition to this, it was discovered, when the measure was brought forward in the cabinet, that the King entertained scruples of conscience on the subject, in consequence of his oath at the coronation "to maintain the Protestant religion established by law," which the known firmness and integrity of his character rendered it extremely improbable he would ever be brought to abandon. So well was it understood that great difficulty would be experienced with the King on this subject,\* that it had been

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26.

Mr Pitt  
resigns in  
consequence  
of the Ca-  
tholic  
claims.

\* The King consulted Lord Chancellor Loughborough on the subject, who strongly advised him to resist:—"I stated to Mr Dundas, that Earl Spencer

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Feb. 10.

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxv. 966.  
Ann. Reg.  
117, 121.  
Pellew's  
Life of  
Sidmouth,  
i. 18, 25.

secretly discussed in the cabinet for six months before it was communicated to the royal ear. In these circumstances, Mr Pitt stated that he had no alternative but to resign his official situations. On the 10th February, it was announced in parliament that ministers only held the seals till their successors were appointed; and shortly after Mr Pitt, Lord Grenville, Earl Spencer, Mr Dundas, and Mr Windham, resigned, and were succeeded by Mr Addington,\* then Speaker of the House of Commons, as first lord of the treasury, Lord Hawkesbury as minister of foreign affairs, and a new ministry, taken, however, entirely from the Tory party.<sup>1</sup>

37.  
But this was  
only the  
ostensible  
ground of  
his resigna-  
tion.

It has long been the practice of the Administration of Great Britain, not to resign upon the real question which occasions their retirement, but to select some minor point, which is held forth to the public as the ostensible ground of the change; and this custom is attended with the great advantage of not implicating the crown or the government openly in a collision with either house of parliament. From the circumstance of Mr Pitt having so pro- had informed me, that the question of the Roman Catholics had been under consideration ever since the month of August last, though never communicated to me till Sunday last."—GEORGE III. to Mr ADDINGTON, Feb. 1, 1801.—PELLEW'S *Life of Sidmouth*, i. 298.

\* Henry Addington, afterwards Lord Viscount Sidmouth, was the fourth son of Dr Addington, descended from an old and respectable family in Oxfordshire, and who had been physician to the great Lord Chatham. He received the rudiments of his education at Winchester school, and being intended for the law, entered as a student at Brasen-Nose College, Oxford, where he obtained the prize for the English Essay. It was this early success which introduced him to Lord Mornington, afterwards Marquis Wellesley, with whom he ever after maintained an intimate friendship, which was of the utmost service to him in future life. On leaving college he began his legal studies at Lincoln's Inn, where he soon formed an acquaintance with Mr Pitt, with whose father, Lord Chatham, his father had been on intimate terms. This acquaintance soon ripened into friendship, and mainly contributed to his future elevation in life. In 1781 he married Miss Hammond, daughter and co-heiress of Leonard Hammond, Esq. of Cheam in Surrey; and in 1785 entered parliament as member for the borough of Devizes, with the electors of which he had some years before become acquainted, when on a visit at New Park with his brother-in-law Mr Sutton. Thus, like all the great men of the day, his entrance into parliamentary life was through a nomination borough. He early attached himself to Mr Pitt, who at that period sustained the wonderful contest with the Coalition, in which he proved victorious: and by his example, counsels, and encouragement, he was induced to aim at high political distinction and office.

minently held forth the Catholic question as the reason for his retirement, it was for long thought more than probable that this was not the real ground of the change; or that, if it was, he readily caught at the impossibility of carrying through any further concessions to the Catholics of Ireland as a motive for resignation, to prevent the approach to other and more important questions which remained behind. There was no necessity, it was observed, for bringing forward the Catholic claims at that moment, nor any reason for breaking up an administration at a period of unparalleled public difficulty, merely because the scruples in the royal breast prevented them from being at that time conceded.\* But the question of peace or war stood in a very different position. Mr Pitt could not disguise from himself that the country was now involved in a contest apparently endless, if the principles on which it had so long been conducted were rigidly adhered to; that the dissolution of the Continental coalition, and the formation of the northern confederacy, had immensely diminished the chances, not merely of success,

In 1789 he was, by Mr Pitt's influence, and with the general concurrence of the House, made Speaker, which office he held till called by his sovereign to the duties of prime minister in 1801.

His talents were of a solid and judicious, rather than a very high order; but in some of the essential qualities of government, he never was exceeded by any minister who ever directed public affairs in Great Britain. Without the brilliancy of an orator, or the cogency of a practised debater, his speeches always commanded respect, and insured attention, from the judgment they displayed, and the thorough acquaintance with the subject which they evinced. As prime minister, he was called to direct the counsels of his country in the most momentous and adverse period of its annals; and he delivered it over, unstained in honour, uninjured in fortune, to his successor. He had not the same deep foresight into coming events as Mr Pitt, and was far from possessing his influence or ascendancy with foreign powers; yet he carried the state triumphantly through the dangers of the Northern Confederacy, and fronted undismayed the terrors of Napoleon's invasion, when the country was far from being prepared to resist the threatened attack. His great characteristic was moral intrepidity and courage in the discharge of duty—rare but invaluable qualities, which shone forth with peculiar lustre when he was Home Secretary during the trying years from 1815 to 1822. It was a common saying of his, that "no man was fit to be a minister to whom it was not a matter of indifference whether he died in his bed or on the scaffold;" and he acted on every emergency up to that noble resolution.—See PELLEW's *Life of Lord Sidmouth*, i. 40, and iii. 469.

\* The King's objections to the measures which had begun in 1795, when

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but of salvation, during its future continuance. As it was possible, therefore, perhaps probable, that Britain might be driven to an accommodation at no distant period, and the principles he had so long maintained might prove an obstacle to such a necessary measure, it was often said Mr Pitt took the part of retiring with the leading members of his cabinet, and was succeeded by other inferior adherents of his party, who, without departing from his principles altogether, might feel themselves more at liberty to mould them according to the pressure of external circumstances. In doing this, the English minister acted, it was said, the part of a true patriot. "He sacrificed himself," says the chosen historian of Napoleon, "to the good of his country and a general peace. He showed himself more than a great statesman, a good citizen." It is now known, however, that these views were unfounded, and that if Mr Pitt, in resigning at this time, was influenced at all by considerations of external policy, it was in the secret recesses of his own breast, and probably unconsciously to himself. Certain it is that, in his most confidential communications to his friends at the time, both written and verbal, he assigned no other reason for his conduct but the Catholic question; and his known firmness and intrepidity of character render it to the last degree improbable that he would have receded before any difficulties, but those arising from the chivalrous feelings of honour in his own breast.\*<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bign. i.  
406. Ann.  
Reg. 1800,  
119, 120.  
Campbell's  
Chancellors,  
vi. 311, 312.

concession of the Catholic claims was first talked of, were thus expressed by himself in a letter to Lord Loughborough:—"I consider the coronation oath as a binding religious obligation on me to maintain the fundamental maxims on which our constitution is placed,—viz., that the Church of England is the established one, and that those who hold employments in the state must be members of it, and consequently must be obliged to take the oaths against Popery, and receive the communion agreeably to the rites of the Church of England. This principle of duty must prevent me from discussing any proposition tending to destroy the bulwark of our happy constitution, much more that now proposed by Mr Pitt, which is nothing less than an overthrow of the whole fabric."—CAMPBELL'S *Chancellors*, vi. 311. and 299.

\* In a paper circulated at this period in Mr Pitt's name, it was stated:—"The leading part of his Majesty's ministers, finding innumerable obstacles to the bringing forward measures of concession to the Catholic body while in office, have felt it impossible to continue in office under their inability to propose it,

But though Mr Pitt retired, he left his mantle to his successors. Neither timidity nor vacillation appeared in the measures of government towards foreign states. For both the land and sea forces, a larger allowance was provided than in any previous year since the commencement of the war. For the navy, there were voted 139,000 seamen and marines, and 120 ships of the line were put in commission. The land troops altogether amounted to 300,000 men;\* and the navy, in service and ordinary, amounted to the prodigious force of above 200 ships of

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38.

Vigorous  
measures of  
his succes-  
sors to pro-  
secute the  
war.

with the circumstances necessary to carry the measure with all its advantages, and they have retired from his Majesty's service, considering this line of conduct as most likely to contribute to its ultimate success. The Catholic body may with confidence rely on the zealous support of all those who retire, and of many who remain in office, where it can be given with a prospect of success. They may be assured that Mr Pitt will do his utmost to establish their cause in the public favour, and prepare the way for their finally attaining their objects." In his place in the House of Commons on February 16, Mr Pitt said, "With respect to the resignation of myself, and some of my friends, I have no wish to disguise from the House that we did feel it an incumbent duty upon us to propose a measure on the part of government, which, under the circumstances of the Union so happily effected between the two countries, we thought of great public importance, and necessary to complete the benefits likely to result from that measure; we felt this opinion so strongly that, when we met with circumstances which rendered it impossible for us to propose it as a measure of government, we equally felt it inconsistent with our duty and our honour any longer to remain a part of that government."—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 996, 970.

And so far from disapproving of an accommodation with France at this period, if it could be effected on honourable terms, on 5th September 1800, he wrote to Lord Loughborough:—"It seems to me of the *utmost* importance that we should not reject the proposal of M. Otto for an armistice, in any manner which our enemies, either at home or abroad, may make use of against us. For these reasons, I am strongly convinced that it is right to show a readiness to agree to the armistice, with such modifications as may prevent the principal mischief to be apprehended from it."—MR PITT to LORD LOUGHBOROUGH, Sept. 5, 1801; CAMPBELL'S *Chancellors*, vii. 301.

* Viz.—Regular Forces,	193,000
Militia,	78,000
Fencibles,	31,000

Total,	302,000
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The expense of maintaining which was estimated at £12,940,000. The total forces, both of land and sea, in 1792, were not 120,000: a signal proof how much greater efforts than she was generally supposed capable of, England could really make, and of the overwhelming force with which, at the commencement of the war, she might, by a proper exertion of her strength, have overwhelmed the revolutionary volcano.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, p. 142; and JOMINI, xiv. 251.

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the line and 250 frigates.\* Mr Pitt, on February 18th, brought forward the budget immediately before he surrendered the seals to his successors. The charges of the army and navy were each of them above £15,000,000; and the total expenditure to be provided for by the United Kingdom amounted to £42,000,000, besides above £20,000,000 as the interest of the debt. To provide for these prodigious charges, war-supplies to the amount of £17,000,000 existed; and to make up the difference he contracted a loan of £25,500,000 for Great Britain; while Ireland, according to the agreement at the Union, was to make good 2-17ths of the whole expense, or £4,300,000. To provide for the interest of the loan, and the sinking fund applicable to its reduction, new taxes, chiefly in the excise and customs, were imposed to the amount of £1,794,000.† These additional taxes, according to the admirable system of that great financier, were almost all laid on in the indirect form,<sup>1</sup> being intended to be a permanent burden on the nation till the principal was paid

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Deb.  
xxxv. 974,  
978.

* Ships of the line, in commission and ordinary,	205
Building,	36
Fifty-gun ships,	27
Frigates,	257
Brigs and sloops,	312
Total,	837

—See JAMES's *Naval Hist.* iii. Table ix.; and JOMINI, xiv. 252.

† Mr Pitt stated the War Revenue of the nation for the year 1801, exclusive of the permanent income, which was £27,400,000, as follows:—

Sugar, malt, and tobacco,	£2,750,000
Lottery,	300,000
Income-tax,	4,260,000
Duty on exports and imports,	1,250,000
Surplus of the consolidated fund,	3,300,000
Irish taxes and loan,	4,324,000
Balance not issued for subsidies,	500,000
Surplus of grants,	60,000

	£16,744,000
Loan,	25,500,000
Ways and Means,	42,244,000
Permanent income,	27,400,000
Total income,	69,644,000

off; and a sinking fund of £100,000 a-year was provided for this purpose in the excess of the additional taxes above the interest of the debt.

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Notwithstanding the unexampled difficulties which had beset Great Britain and Ireland, in the years 1799 and 1800, from the extreme severity of the scarcity during that period, and the vast expenditure which the campaigns of these two years had occasioned, the condition of the empire in 1801 was, to an unprecedented degree, wealthy and prosperous. The great loan of twenty-five millions of that year was borrowed at a rate of interest under six per cent, although loans to the amount of above two hundred millions had been contracted in the eight preceding years; the exports, as compared with what they were at the commencement of the war, had tripled, and the imports more than tripled, in addition to the vast sums of money which the nation required for its loans to foreign powers, and payments on account of its own forces in foreign parts. Nearly a fourth had been added to the tonnage of the shipping, and the seamen employed in it, during the same

39.  
Prosperous  
state of  
Great Bri-  
tain at this  
period.

<i>Charges.</i>	
Navy, . . . . .	£15,800,000
Army and extraordinary, . . . . .	15,902,000
Ordnance, . . . . .	1,938,000
Miscellaneous, . . . . .	757,000
Unforeseen emergencies, . . . . .	800,000
Permanent charges of Ireland, . . . . .	390,000
Deficiency of Income-tax, . . . . .	1,000,000
Discount on loan, . . . . .	200,000
Deficiency of malt duty, . . . . .	400,000
Deficiency of assessed taxes, . . . . .	350,000
Deficiency of consolidated fund, . . . . .	150,000
Exchequer bills of 1799, . . . . .	3,800,000
Sinking fund, . . . . .	200,000
Interest of exchequer bills, . . . . .	460,000

Charges, £42,147,000

Interest of debt, 19,945,624  
Sinking fund, 5,528,315

Total, £67,610,939

—*Ann. Reg.* 1801, p. 379; *Parl. Deb.* xxxv. 974, 975; and *Porter's Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

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period; while the national expenditure had risen to above sixty-eight millions, of which nearly forty millions were provided from permanent or war taxes.\* Contrary to all former precedent, the country had eminently prospered during this long and arduous struggle. Notwithstanding the weight of its taxation, and the immense sums which had been squandered in foreign loans or services, and of course lost to the productive powers of Great Britain, the industry of the nation in all its branches had prodigiously increased, and capital was to be had in abundance for all the innumerable undertakings, both public and private, which were going forward.

40.  
Its income,  
expendi-  
ture, ex-  
ports, and  
imports.

Agriculture had advanced in a still greater degree than population; the dependence of the nation on foreign supplies was rapidly diminishing; and yet the United Kingdom, which had added nearly a sixth to its inhabitants since 1791, numbered above fifteen millions of souls in the British isles.† The divisions and disaffection which prevailed during the earlier years of the war had almost entirely disappeared; the atrocities of the French Revolution had weaned all but a few inveterate democrats from Jacobinical principles; the imminence of the public danger had united the great body of the people in a strong attachment to the national colours; the young and active part of the population had risen into manhood since the commencement of the contest, and imbibed the enthusiastic feelings it was calculated to awaken; while the incessant progress and alarming conquests of France had generally diffused the belief, that no security for the national independence was to be found but in a

\* See Appendix A, Chap. XXXIII.

† Population in 1801:—

England,	.	.	.	8,331,000
Wales,	.	.	.	541,000
Scotland,	.	.	.	1,599,000
Ireland,	.	.	.	4,500,000
Army and Navy,	.	.	.	470,000

Total, . 15,441,000

—*Population Returns, 1801.*



steady resistance to its ambition. A nation animated with such feelings, and possessed of such resources, was not unreasonably confident in itself when it bade defiance to Europe in arms.

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England, however, had need of all its energies, for the forces of the maritime league were extremely formidable. Russia had eighty-two sail of the line and forty frigates in her harbours, of which forty-seven line-of-battle ships were in the Baltic and at Archangel; but of these not more than fifteen were in a state ready for active service, and the crews were extremely deficient in nautical skill. Sweden had eighteen ships of the line and fourteen frigates, besides a great quantity of small craft, in much better condition, and far better served, than the Russian navy; while a numerous flotilla, with ten thousand men on board, was prepared to defend its shores, and twenty thousand troops, stationed in camps in the interior, were ready to fly to any menaced point. Denmark had twenty-three ships of the line and fourteen large frigates, which the brave and energetic population of Zealand had made the utmost efforts to equip and man, to resist the attack which was shortly anticipated from the British arms. Could the three powers have united their forces, they had twenty-four ships of the line ready for sea, which might in a few months have been raised with ease to fifty, besides twenty-five frigates—a force which, combined with the fleet of Holland, might have raised the blockade of the French harbours, and enabled the confederated powers to ride triumphant in the English Channel.<sup>1</sup>

41.  
Naval forces  
of the con-  
federacy.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
109. Dum.  
vi. 169.  
172. Nap.  
ii. 137, 138.  
Southey's  
Life of  
Nelson,  
ii. 94.

In these circumstances, everything depended on England striking a decisive blow in the outset, and anticipating, by the celerity of her movements, that combination of force which otherwise might prove so threatening to her national independence. Fortunately the government were fully aware of the necessity of acting vigorously at the commencement; and by great exertions a powerful squadron

42.  
Prepara-  
tions of Bri-  
tain. Nel-  
son ap-  
pointed  
second in  
command.

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was assembled at Yarmouth in the beginning of March. It consisted of eighteen ships of the line, four frigates, and a number of bomb-vessels—in all fifty-two sail. This powerful force was placed under the command of Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson for his second in command. The hero of the Nile had good reason to be dissatisfied at finding himself placed in an inferior situation to an officer who, though respectable, and his superior in rank, was comparatively unknown in the annals of naval glory; but he was not a man to allow any personal feelings to interfere with his duty to his country. Though sensible of the slight, therefore, he, like Wellington on a similar occasion when placed after his Indian victories under the command of Sir H. Burrard in 1808, cheerfully accepted the subordinate command. When he arrived at Yarmouth he “found the admiral a little nervous about dark nights and fields of ice; but we must brace up,” said he; “these are not times for nervous systems. I hope we shall give our northern enemies that hail-storm of bullets which gives our dear country the dominion of the sea. All the devils in the north cannot take it from us, if our wooden walls have fair play.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Southey,  
ii. 95.

43.  
The British  
fleet sails  
from the  
Downs.  
March 12.

The British fleet sailed from Yarmouth on the 12th March; but soon after putting to sea it sustained a serious loss in the wreck of the *Invincible*, which struck on one of the sand-banks on that dangerous coast, and soon sank with a large part of the crew. Mr Vansittart accompanied the squadron in the capacity of plenipotentiary, to endeavour to arrange the differences by negotiation, which unfortunately proved totally impossible. It arrived on the 27th off Zealand, and Sir Hyde immediately despatched a letter to the governor of Cronenberg castle, to inquire whether the fleet would be allowed without molestation to pass the Sound. The governor having replied that he could not allow a force, whose intentions were unknown, to approach the guns of his fortress, the British admiral declared that he took this as a declaration of war. By the

earnest advice of Nelson it was determined immediately to attempt the passage—a resolution which, in the state of the northern powers, was not only the most gallant, but the most prudent that could have been adopted.\* On the 30th March the British fleet entered the Sound, with a fair wind from the north-west; and spreading all sail, proudly and gallantly bore up towards the harbour of Copenhagen.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Southey,  
ii. 100, 104.  
Ann. Reg.  
109, 110.

The scene which opened upon the British fleet when it entered this celebrated passage was every way worthy of the cause at issue, and the memorable events of which it was soon to become the theatre. Nothing in the north of Europe can be compared to the prospect afforded by the channel which lies between the opposite shores of Sweden and Denmark. On the left, the coast of Scandinavia exhibits a beautiful assemblage of corn-lands, pastures and copses, rising into picturesque and varied hills; while on the right, the shores of Zealand present a continued succession of rich plains, woods, meadows, orchards, villas, and all the accompaniments of long established civilisation. The isles of Huen, Saltholm, and Amack appear in the widening channel: the first celebrated as having borne the observatory of the great Tycho Brahe, and having been the spot where most of his discoveries were made—the last nearly opposite to Copenhagen. At the foot of the slope, on the Swedish side, is situated the old city of Helsingborg, with its picturesque battlements and mouldering towers; while on the south, the castle of Cronenberg and city of Elsinore rise in frowning majesty, to assert the dominion of Denmark over the straits. Both are associated with poetical and historical recollec-

44.  
Description  
of the  
Sound.

\* Nelson on this occasion addressed Sir Hyde as follows:—"The more I have reflected, the more I am confirmed in my opinion, that not a moment should be lost in attacking the enemy. They will every day be stronger and stronger; we shall never be so good a match for them as at the present moment. Here you are with almost all the safety, certainly all the honour of England, more intrusted to you than ever yet fell to the lot of a British officer. On your decision depends whether our country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or rear her head higher than ever."—See SOUTHEY, ii. 98, 99.

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<sup>1</sup> Southey,  
i. 108, 109.  
Ann. Reg.  
111.

45.  
Gay scene  
which the  
Sound usu-  
ally pre-  
sents.

tions. Elsinore is familiar to every reader of Hamlet, and has recently been celebrated in thrilling strains by the greatest of modern lyric poets ; \* while Cronenberg castle was the scene of a still deeper tragedy. There Queen Matilda was confined, the victim of a base court intrigue, and enlivened the dreary hours of captivity with nursing her infant ; there she was separated from that, the last link that bound her to existence ; and on these towers her eyes were fixed, as the vessel bore her from her country, till their highest pinnacle had sunk beneath the waves, and her aching sight rested on the waste of waters.<sup>1</sup>

To one approaching from the German ocean, the fortresses of Helsingborg, Elsinore, and Cronenberg seem to unite and form a vast castellated barrier on the north-east of an inland lake ; but as he advances the vista opens, the Baltic is seen, and the city of Copenhagen, with its Gothic spires and stately edifices, appears crowding down to the water's edge. Its harbour studded with masts ; its arsenals, bulwarks, and batteries ; its lofty towers and decorated buildings, render it one of the most striking cities in the north of Europe. During summer, the Sound exhibits an unusually gay and animated spectacle. Hardly a day elapses in which a hundred vessels do not pass the straits, and pay toll to Denmark at Elsinore ; and in the course of the season, upwards of ten thousand ships, of different nations, yield a willing tribute in this manner to the keeper of the beacons which warn the mariner from the dangerous shoals of the Cattegat. But never had so busy or brilliant a spectacle been exhibited there as on this

“ Now joy, old England, raise,  
For the tidings of thy might,  
By the festal cities' blaze,  
While the wine-cup shines in light !  
And yet amidst that joy and uproar,  
Let us think of them that sleep,  
Full many a fathom deep,  
By thy wild and stormy steep,  
Elsinore ! ”

CAMPBELL'S *Battle of the Baltic.*

day, when the British fleet prepared to force a passage where till now all ships had lowered their topsails to the flag of Denmark.

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Fifty vessels, of which seventeen were of the line, spread their sails before a favourable wind, and, pressing forward under a brilliant sun, soon came abreast of Cronenberg castle. The splendour of the scene, the undefined nature of the danger which awaited them, the honour and safety of their country intrusted to their arms, the multitudes who crowded every headland on the opposite shores, conspired to awaken the most thrilling emotions in the minds of the British seamen. Fear had no place in those dauntless breasts; yet was their patriotic ardour not altogether unmixed with painful feelings. The Danes were of the same lineage, and once spoke the same language as the English; the two nations had for centuries been united in the bonds of friendship; and numbers who now appeared in arms against them were sprung from the same ancestors as their gallant opponents. The effect of this common descent has survived all the divisions of kingdoms and political interest. Alone of all the Continental states, an Englishman finds himself at home in that part of Jutland from whence the Angles originally sprung;<sup>1</sup> and the British historian, in recounting the events in this melancholy contest, feels himself distracted by emotions akin to those with which he narrates the tale of civil warfare, and dwells with nearly the same exultation on the heroism of the vanquished as on the prowess of the victors.<sup>2</sup>

46.  
Splendid  
appearance  
of the British  
fleet  
as it approached  
the Straits.

<sup>1</sup> Clarke's  
Travels,  
i. 281.

<sup>2</sup> Southey, ii.  
108. Ann.  
Reg. 111.

Though they had enjoyed profound peace for nearly a century, and during that time had been ruled by a government in form absolute, the Danes had lost none of the courage or patriotism by which their ancestors, in the days of Canute and the Sea-kings, had been distinguished. Never was the public spirit of the country evinced with more lustre than in the preparations for, and during the perils of, this sanguinary struggle. All classes made the

47.  
Undaunted  
spirit of the  
Danes.

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utmost exertions to put their marine in a respectable condition; the nobles, the clergy, the burghers, and the peasants vied with each other in their endeavours to complete the preparations for defence. The Prince Royal set the example by presiding at the labours of his subjects; workmen presented themselves in crowds to take a share in the undertaking; children even concealed their age in order to be permitted to join in the patriotic exertions; the university furnished a corps of twelve hundred youths, the flower of Denmark. The merchants, including those whose fortunes were at stake from the English embargo, came forward with liberal offers; the peasants flocked from the country to man the arsenals; the workmen in the dock-yards refused to leave their stations, and continued labouring by torch-light during the whole night, with relays merely of rest, as in a man-of-war. Battalions were hastily formed; batteries manned by inexperienced hands; muskets made, and all kinds of warlike stores provided with astonishing celerity. History has not a more touching example of patriotic ardour to commemorate, nor one in which a more perfect harmony prevailed between a sovereign and his subjects for the defence of rights naturally dear to them all.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Southey, ii.  
115, 130.  
Dum. vi.  
172. Jom.  
xiv. 252,  
253.

48.  
Passage of  
the Sound  
by the Eng-  
lish fleet.

From a praiseworthy, but ill-timed desire to avoid coming to extremities, the British armament had given a long delay to the Danes, which was turned to good account by the indefatigable citizens, and occasioned in the end an unnecessary effusion of blood. They had arrived in the Cattegat the 20th March, and on the same day Mr Vansittart proceeded ashore, with a view to settle matters without having recourse to extremities; but nevertheless it was not till the 30th that the passage of the Sound was attempted. In the interval the Danes had powerfully strengthened their means of defence; the shore was lined with batteries, and Cronenberg castle opened a heavy fire, from above a hundred pieces of cannon, upon the leading ships of the squadron when they came within

range. Nelson's division led the van, Sir Hyde's followed in the centre, while Admiral Graves brought up the rear. At first they steered through the middle of the channel, expecting to be assailed by a destructive fire from both sides; but finding, as they advanced, that the batteries of Helsingborg did not open upon the squadron, they inclined to the Swedish shore, on which only a few guns were mounted, and were thus enabled to pass almost without the reach of the Danish guns. This was not owing to any lukewarmness, or treachery to the cause in which they were engaged, on the part of the cabinet of Stockholm, but to the unprepared state in which the rapidity of the British preparations had found their northern foes. The cannon-balls and shells from the Danish side fell short of the line-of-battle ships, and did little injury even to the smaller craft, which were placed nearer the southern coast, affording no small merriment to the sailors, whose minds were in an unusual state of excitement, from the novel and perilous character of the enterprise on which they had entered. The passage lasted four hours, and about noonday the fleet came to anchor opposite the harbour of Copenhagen.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Southey, ii.  
109, 111.  
Dum. vi.  
183, 184.  
Jom. xiv.  
252, 253.  
Thiers'  
Cons. et  
l'Emp. ii.  
1109, Ann.  
Reg. 110.

The garrison of this city consisted of ten thousand men, besides the battalions of volunteers, who were still more numerous. All possible precautions had been taken to strengthen the sea defences; and the array of forts, ramparts, ships of the line, fire-ships, gun-boats, and floating batteries, was such as would have deterred any other assailant but the hero of the Nile. Six line-of-battle ships, and eleven floating batteries, besides a great number of smaller vessels, were moored in an external line to protect the entrance to the harbour, flanked on one side by two islands, called the Crowns, on the smaller of which fifty-six, while on the larger, sixty-eight heavy cannon were mounted. To support these, four other sail of the line were moored within, across the harbour mouth; and a fort, mounting thirty-six heavy cannon, had been con-

49.  
Prepara-  
tion of the  
Danes.

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structed in a shoal, supported on piles. The fire of these formidable works crossed with that of the batteries on the island of Amack and the citadel of Copenhagen; it seemed hardly possible that any ships could endure, for a length of time, so heavy and concentric a discharge. But, tremendous as these dangers appeared, they were neither the only nor the greatest with which the British fleet had to contend. The channel, by which alone the harbour could be approached, was little known, and extremely intricate; all the buoys had been removed, and the sea on either side abounded with shoals and sand-banks, on which, if any of the vessels grounded, they would instantly be torn to pieces by the fire from the Danish batteries. The Danes considered this obstacle insurmountable, deeming the narrow and winding navigation impracticable for a large fleet in such circumstances. Nelson was fully aware of the difficulty of the attempt; and a day and a night were occupied by the boats of the fleet in making the necessary soundings, and laying down new buoys in lieu of those which had been taken away. He himself personally assisted in the whole of this laborious and important duty, taking no rest night or day till it was accomplished. "It had worn him down," he said, "and was infinitely more grievous than any resistance he could experience from the enemy."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Southey,  
ii. 112, 113.  
Ann. Reg.  
112, 113.  
Dum. vi.  
186, 187.  
Jom. xiv.  
256, 257.  
Nelson,  
Desp. iv.  
301.

50.  
Nelson's  
plan of  
attack.

No sooner were the soundings completed, than Nelson, in a council of war, suggested the plan of operations, which was, to approach from the south and make the attack on the right flank of the enemy. He asked for only ten sail of the line and the whole small craft of the fleet. Sir Hyde volunteered to give him twelve. The vigour of Nelson's mind was particularly conspicuous on this occasion. When the number of the confederated powers were mentioned, if they should unite together, he said, "The more numerous the better; I wish they were twice as many; the more easy the victory, depend upon it." He alluded, as he afterwards explained in private, to the



want of any knowledge of naval tactics among the northern fleets; and to his intention, whenever he should bring them to action, of attacking the head of their lines, and throwing the leading vessels in confusion back upon those in rear. It was just the tactics at sea, which at land had won for Frederick the battle of Leuthen. The approach of the Danish exterior line was covered by a large shoal, called the Middle Ground, exactly in front of the harbour, at about three quarters of a mile distant, which extended along the whole sea in front of the town. As this sand-bank was impassable for ships of any magnitude, he proposed to follow what is called the King's channel, lying between it and the town, and thus interpose, as at Aboukir, between the Danish line and the entrance of the harbour. This plan of attack was unanimously approved of. On the morning of the 1st April the whole fleet anchored within two leagues of the town, off the north-west end of the Middle Ground, and Nelson, having completed his last examination, hoisted the signal to weigh anchor. It was received with a loud shout from his whole division of the fleet, which consisted of twelve sail of the line, besides some smaller vessels. The remainder, under Sir Hyde Parker, were to menace the Crown batteries on the other side, threaten the four ships of the line at the entrance of the harbour, and lend their aid to such of the attacking squadron as might come disabled out of action. The small craft, headed by Captain Riou, led the way, most accurately threading the dangerous and winding course between the island of Saltholm and the Middle Ground; the whole squadron followed with a fair wind, coasting along the outer edge of the shoal, doubled its further extremity, and cast anchor, just as darkness closed, off Draco Point, not more than two miles from the right of the enemy's line. The signal to prepare for action had been made early in the evening, and the seamen passed the night in anxious expectation of the dawn which was to usher in the eventful day.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Southey,  
ii. 113, 115.  
Ann. Reg.  
112. Dum.  
vi. 187.  
Jom. xiv.  
257, 258.  
James, iii.  
99, 100.  
Clarke's  
M'Arthur,  
ii. 260, 261.  
Nelson,  
Desp. iv.  
303.

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51.  
Prepara-  
tions on  
both sides  
for the  
battle.

This was a night of anxiety and trepidation, but not of unmanly alarm, in Copenhagen. The citizens saw evidently that the attack would be made on the following day, and, amidst the tears of their mothers and children, bravely repaired to their appointed stations. Few eyelids were closed, save among those about to combat, in all its peopled quarters; so strongly was the solemnity of the occasion, and the coming dangers to all they held dear, impressed on the minds of the citizens. Nelson sat down to supper with a large party of his officers. He was, as he was ever wont to be on the eve of battle, in high spirits; the mortal fatigue of the preceding days seemed forgotten, and he drank to a leading wind, and the success of the morrow. After supper, Captain Hardy went forward in a boat to examine the channel between them and the enemy. He approached so near as to sound round their leading ship with a pole, lest the noise of throwing the lead should alarm its crew, and returned about eleven with a valuable report to the admiral. Meanwhile Nelson, though he lay down, was too anxious to sleep. He dictated his orders from his cot till past one, and during the remainder of the night incessantly inquired whether the wind was south. These orders remain a memorable monument both of the sagacious foresight of that great commander, and of the arduous nature of the service on which he was engaged.\* At daybreak it was announced that the wind had become perfectly fair; the order was given for all the captains to come on board, and when they had received their final instructions, he made the signal for action.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Southey, ii. 117, 119. Ann. Reg. 112. James, iii. 99, 100. Nelson, Desp. iv. 303, 304.

52.  
Great diffi-  
culty expe-  
rienced by  
the pilots.

The pilots who were to conduct the fleet had been ordered on board Nelson's ship between eight and nine; but they soon showed by their indecision, that, in absence of the buoys to which they had been accustomed to look, they hardly knew what course to follow; and Nelson experienced the utmost agony of mind from their failure, as

\* See them given at length in NELSON'S *Despatches*, iv. 305, 306.

the wind was fair, and there was not a moment to lose. He urged them to be steady, to be resolute, and to decide. At length Mr Briarly, the master of the Bellona, declared he was prepared to lead the fleet, and put himself at its head accordingly. Captain Murray in the Edgar led the line-of-battle ships, and proceeded in a noble manner through the intricate and dangerous passage. There was some delay in the next ships following the Edgar, but she proceeded into action unsupported, and though fired at by the Provosteen did not return a shot, till she came opposite the vessel assigned her in the instructions, a 64-gun hulk, when she poured in her broadside with terrible effect. The Agamemnon was next in order; but in attempting to weather the shoal, she struck aground, and became immovable, at the time her services were most required. Signal was then made to the Polyphemus to take her place, which order was most promptly and accurately obeyed. The Isis was next in order, and she took her station successfully, and sustained a most gallant part throughout the action. The Bellona and Russell soon after grounded also, but in a situation which enabled them to take a part, though not the one assigned them, in the battle. The want of these three grounded ships at their appointed stations was severely felt in the action, as they were intended to have silenced the Crown batteries, and would have thereby prevented a heavy loss on board the Defiance and Monarch, which were exposed to their fire without the possibility of making any return. In advancing to take up its ground, each ship had been ordered to pass her leader on the starboard, because the water was supposed to get deeper on that side, and to shoal to the larboard. Nelson, while advancing in the Elephant, after those two ships which had struck on the sandbank, signalled them to close with the enemy, not knowing that they were aground;<sup>1</sup> but when he perceived they did not obey the signal, he ordered the Elephant's helm to starboard, left the prescribed order of sailing,

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<sup>1</sup> Southey, ii. 119, 123.  
Ann. Reg. 112. Dum. vi. 189.  
James, iii. 101. Nelson's Despatch, iv. 307.  
Clarke's M'Arthur, ii. 301, 302.

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53.  
Battle of  
Copen-  
hagen.  
Great dan-  
ger of the  
British  
fleet.

and passed to the larboard of these ill-fated vessels. By this happy act of presence of mind he saved the whole fleet from destruction ; for the other ships followed the admiral's track, and, thereby keeping in deep water, arrived opposite to their appointed stations, anchored by the stern, and presented their broadsides, at the distance of half a cable's length from the Danes.

The action began at five minutes past ten, and was general soon after eleven. Nine only of the line-of-battle ships could reach the stations allotted to them ; only one of the gun-brigs could stem the current so as to get into action ; and only two of the bomb-vessels were able to take up their appointed position on the Middle Ground. Captain Riou, with his squadron of frigates, undertook the perilous task of fronting the Trekroner batteries—a duty to which the three ships of the line which had been lost by grounding would have been hardly adequate, and in the discharge of which that gallant and lamented officer lost his life. Nelson's station was in the centre, opposite the Danish commodore, who commanded the Dannebrog, bearing sixty-two guns. His agitation was extreme when, at the commencement of the action, he found himself deprived of three of his best ships of the line ; but no sooner had he reached the scene of danger, where his squadron was assailed by the fire of above eight hundred guns, than his countenance brightened, and he appeared animated and joyous. The cannonade soon became tremendous ; fifteen hundred pieces of artillery on the two sides poured forth death within a space not exceeding a mile and a half in breadth ; from the city on the one side, and the remainder of the squadron, under Sir Hyde, on the other, the hostile fleets seemed wrapped in one dazzling conflagration. The ships took their stations with admirable precision ; but the action was fought generally at above a cable's length from the enemy, as the pilots, fearing that the water shoaled on that side, would not approach nearer. Its long duration was mainly owing to this cause ; for if the English had

been able to combat yard-arm to yard-arm, it would not have lasted an hour. As it was, for three hours the fire continued without any appearance of diminution on either side ; and Sir Hyde, seeing three ships aground, and being unable from the wind and current to render any assistance, made the signal of recall—generously supposing that, if Nelson was in a situation to continue the contest, he would disobey the order ; but that if he was not, his reputation would be saved by the signal for retreat having been made by his superior officer.<sup>1\*</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Southey, ii. 125.  
Ann. Reg. 112. Dum. vi. 189, 190.  
Jom. xiv. 259. James, iii. 101, 104.  
Nelson's Desp. iv. 348.

In the midst of this terrific cannonade, Nelson was rapidly walking the quarter-deck. Several of his ships had suffered severely ; the *Isis* with difficulty sustained the superior fire of the *Provesteen*, and both that vessel and the *Bellona* had been much weakened by the bursting of some of their guns. The *Elephant* itself was warmly engaged with the *Dannebrog*, and two heavy praams on her bow and quarter. Signals of distress had been made from the *Bellona* and *Russell*, of inability from the *Agamemnon*, these vessels being still all three aground under a heavy fire. Nelson, however, though anxious, was undismayed. A shot through the mainmast scattered splinters around : he observed to one of his officers with a smile,—“ This is warm work ; and this day may be the last to any of us in a moment : but, mark me, I would not be elsewhere for thousands.” About this time, the signal-lieutenant called out that the signal for discontinuing the action had been thrown out by the commander-in-chief, and asked if he should repeat it. “ No,” he replied ; “ acknowledge it.” He then continued walking about in great emotion, and meeting Captain Foley, said, “ What think you, Foley ? the admiral has hung out No. 39.† You know I have only one eye ; I have a right to be

54.  
Coolness and determination of Nelson, who disobeys orders and continues the action.

\* “ The fire,” he said, “ is too hot for Nelson to oppose ; a retreat must be made. I am aware of the consequences to my own personal reputation, but it would be cowardly in me to leave Nelson to bear the whole shame of the failure, if shame it should be deemed.”—See SOUTHEY, ii. 125.

† The signal for discontinuing action.

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<sup>1</sup> Southey,  
ii. 126, 129.  
Jom. xiv.  
259. Ann.  
Reg. 112.  
James, iii.  
104, 107.  
Nelson's  
Desp. iv.  
307, 309.  
Clarke's  
M<sup>r</sup>Arthur,  
ii. 301, 304.

55.  
Heroic  
deeds on  
both sides.

blind sometimes." And then putting the glass to his blind eye, he exclaimed, "I really don't see the signal. Keep mine for closer battle still flying. That's the way I answer such signals. Nail mine to the mast." Admiral Graves and the other ships, looking only to Nelson, continued the combat with unabated vigour; but the order to retire was seen in time to save Riou's little squadron, though not to preserve its gallant commander. "What will Nelson think of us?" was that brave man's mournful exclamation, as with a heavy heart he gave orders to draw off. His clerk was soon after killed by his side, and several marines swept away, by a discharge from the Crown batteries. "Come then, my boys! let us all die together," said Riou; and, just as the words were uttered, he was cut in two by a chain-shot.<sup>1\*</sup>

But it was not on the English side alone that heroic deeds were performed; the Danes in that trying hour sustained the ancient reputation of the conquerors of the north. From the Prince-Royal, who, stationed on one of the principal batteries, was the witness of the glorious resistance of his subjects, to the humblest citizen, one heroic mind and purpose seemed to animate the whole population. As fast as the crews of the guard-ships were mown down by the English fire, fresh bands of undaunted citizens crowded on board, and, unappalled by the dreadful spectacle, calmly took their station on decks choked by the dying and flooded with blood. Captain Lassen, in the Provosteen, continued to fight till he had only two pieces standing on their carriages, and a few men to work them; he then spiked these guns, and throwing himself into the sea, swam at the head of his brave followers towards the isle of Amack. Captain Thura, in the Indosforethen, fell early in the action; her colours were shot

\* It is needless to say from whom the chief incidents in the action of Copenhagen are taken. Mr Southey's incomparable Life of Nelson is so deservedly popular, that his descriptions have become almost as firmly rooted in the public memory as the events they describe, and deviation from the one is as unpardonable as from the other.

away ; and a boat was despatched to the Prince-Royal to inform him of her situation. "Gentlemen," said he, "Thura is killed, which of you will take the command?"—"I will," exclaimed Schroedersee, a captain who had recently resigned on account of extreme ill health, and instantly hastened on board. No sooner had he arrived on the deck than he was struck on the breast by a ball, and perished ; a lieutenant who had accompanied him then took the command, and fought the ship to the last extremity. The Dannebrog sustained for two hours with great constancy the terrible fire of Nelson's ship ; at length, after two successive captains and three-fourths of the crew had been swept away, she took fire, and the gallant survivors, precipitating themselves into the sea, left the vessel to its fate.\* But all these efforts, how heroic soever, were of no avail ; the rapidity and precision of the British fire were irresistible. Soon after one o'clock the cannonade of the Danish fleet began to slacken ; the carnage on board of them, as their crews were successively renewed by gallant crowds from the shore, was truly dreadful ; and to complete the scene of horror, the Dannebrog on fire got loose, and, drifting while burning fiercely through the enemy's line, spread universal consternation. Soon after she blew up with a tremendous explosion. Loud cheers from the English sailors announced every successive vessel which struck ; and before two the whole front line, to the south of the Crown batteries, consisting of six sail of the line and eleven huge floating batteries, was all either taken, sunk, burnt, or silenced.<sup>1</sup> But the Trekroner battery still kept up a tremendous fire on the ships which formed the head of the British squadron, and as it had

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<sup>1</sup> *Jom.* xiv.  
259, 260.  
*Southey*, ii.  
130, 134.  
*Dum.* vi.  
190. *Ann.*  
*Reg.* 112.  
*James*, iii.  
105, 111.  
*Nelson's*  
*Desp.* iv.  
309, 311.

\* The gallant Welmoes, a stripling of seventeen, stationed himself on a small raft, carrying six guns, with twenty-four men, right under the bows of Nelson's ship ; and though severely galled by the musketry of the English marines, continued, knee-deep in dead, to keep up his fire to the close of the heroic conflict. Nelson embraced him at the repast which followed in the palace ashore, and said to the Crown-Prince he should make him an admiral. "If, my lord," replied the prince, "I were to make all my brave officers admirals, I should have no captains or lieutenants in my service."—*Naval Chronicle*, xiv. 308.

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56.  
Nelson's  
proposal for  
an armistice.

been recently manned by fifteen hundred men, all thought of storming it was laid aside.

The victory now gained, the line had completely ceased firing; but the shot from the Crown batteries and the isle of Amack still continued to fall on both fleets, doing as much injury to their friends as enemies; while the English boats sent to take possession of the prizes were fired on by the Danish batteries, and even the vessels themselves were unable to extricate them from destruction. The three ships ahead of Nelson—viz., the *Monarch*, *Ganges*, and *Defiance*—were still actively engaged with the Crown batteries; the loss on board of the first had been very great, and though the result was secured, it might have been attended with a very serious loss to the fleet; as, from the strength of the current, none of the other ships under Sir Hyde Parker could be worked up to their relief. Nelson, seeing this, said that, if the Danes continued to fire from their batteries, he would be obliged to send the fire-ships among the prizes; but being unwilling to destroy the brave men who had defended them, he resolved first to attempt a negotiation. He accordingly retired into the stern galley, and wrote to the Crown-Prince in these terms: “Lord Nelson has been commanded to spare Denmark when she no longer resists. The line of defence which covered her shores has struck to the British flag; but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, he must set fire to all the prizes he has taken, without having the power of saving the men who have so nobly defended them. The brave Danes are the brothers, and should never be the enemies, of the English.” A messenger was despatched for sealing-wax; while returning with it, his head was carried off by a cannon-ball. A wafer was then presented; but he said, “Send another messenger for the wax.” It was brought, and he sealed the letter deliberately with wax, affixing a larger seal than usual.<sup>1</sup> “This is no time,” he said, “to appear hurried and informal.”

<sup>1</sup> Southey, ii. 135, 137.  
Ann. Reg. 113. *Jorn.* xiv. 260.  
*Dum.* vi. 191, 192.  
*James*, iii. 109, 111.  
Nelson's *Desp.* iv. 309, 310.  
*Clarke's M'Arthur*, ii. 495.



He afterwards assigned as his reason, "The wafer would have been still wet when presented to the Crown-Prince, and he would have inferred we had reasons for being in a hurry; the wax tells no tales." At the same time the Ramilies and Defence, from Sir Hyde's squadron, worked up near enough to silence the remainder of the Danish line to the northward of the Trekroner battery; but that tremendous bulwark was comparatively uninjured, and to the close of the action continued to exert with unabated vigour its giant strength.

In half an hour the flag of truce returned: the Crown batteries ceased to fire; and the action closed after four hours' continuance. The Crown-Prince inquired what was the English admiral's motive for proposing a suspension of hostilities. Lord Nelson replied, "Lord Nelson's object in sending the flag of truce was humanity; he therefore consents that hostilities shall cease, and that the wounded Danes may be taken ashore. And Lord Nelson will take his prisoners out of the vessels, and burn or carry off the prizes as he shall think fit. Lord Nelson will consider this the greatest victory he has ever gained, if it shall be the means of re-establishing a good understanding between his own sovereign and the King of Denmark." The Danish prince made a reply, which was forwarded to the commander-in-chief; and Nelson, skilfully availing himself of the breathing time thus afforded, made the signal for the ships to weigh anchor in succession. The Monarch led the way, and touched in rounding the shoal, but was got off by being taken in tow by two other ships; but Nelson's own ship, the Elephant, and also the Defiance, grounded about a mile from the Crown batteries, and remained fast for some hours, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of their wearied crews. The Desirée also, at the other end of the line, having gone to assist the Bellona, got aground on the same shoal as that ship, though the latter soon after got off.<sup>1</sup> With these exceptions, however, the whole fleet got clear off

<sup>57.</sup>  
Which the  
Danes agree  
to.

<sup>1</sup> Southey,  
ii. 140, 141.  
Jom. xiv.  
261. James,  
iii. 115.  
Ann. Reg.  
113.

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from the perilous shoals, and rejoined Sir Hyde's squadron in the middle of the straits—a fact which demonstrates that, though some of the British ships might have been lost if the action had continued, it could have made no difference in the ultimate result after the Danish line of defence had been destroyed.

58.  
Melancholy  
appearance  
of the Danes  
after the  
battle.

The scene which now presented itself was heartrending in the highest degree. The sky, heretofore so brilliant, became suddenly overcast; white flags were flying from the mast-heads of the Danes; guns of distress were occasionally discharged from those scenes of woe; while the burning vessels which had floated to a distance threw an awful and lurid light over the melancholy scene.\* The English boats, with generous but not undeserved humanity, covered the sea, rendering all the assistance in their power to the Danes who had escaped from the flaming wrecks; and the wounded men, as fast as the ships could be evacuated, were sent ashore. But great numbers perished; for such had been the unprepared ardour of the enemy, that hardly any surgeons were provided to stanch the wounds of the numerous victims to patriotic duty. At daybreak on the following morning, the *Elephant*, to the infinite joy of Nelson, was got afloat; and the boats of the fleet being all manned, the prizes were brought away, including the *Zealand* of seventy-four guns, from under the cannon of the redoubted *Trekroner* battery. The British ships, as in the battle of Camperdown, were chiefly injured in the hull and decks; very little in the rigging.<sup>1</sup> Thus terminated this murderous battle, one of the most obstinately contested

<sup>1</sup> Southey,  
ii. 143, 147.  
Clarke's  
M<sup>r</sup> Arthur,  
ii. 268, 274.  
Ann. Reg.  
113.

\* "Again, again, again,  
And the havoc did not slack,  
Till a feeble cheer the Dane  
To our cheering sent us back:  
Their shots along the deep slowly boom:—  
Then ceased and all is wail,  
As they strike the shatter'd sail,  
Or, in conflagration pale,  
Light the gloom."

CAMPBELL'S *Battle of the Baltic*.

ever fought by the British navy. Nelson said, "he had been in above a hundred engagements, but that of Copenhagen was the most terrible of them all."\*

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Next day was Good Friday; but all distinctions were forgotten in the universal grief which prevailed in the capital of Denmark. Every house was filled with mourners; the streets were occupied with the weeping crowds who attended the dead to their long home, or the still more distracted bands who bore the wounded back to the hearths which they had so nobly defended. At mid-day, Nelson landed, attended by Captains Hardy and Freemantle: he walked slowly up from the quay through the crowded and agitated streets. The behaviour of the people was such as became a gallant nation, depressed, but not subdued by misfortune. "They did not," says the Danish chronicler, "either disgrace themselves by acclamations, or degrade themselves by murmurs; the admiral was received as one brave enemy ever should receive another—he was received with respect." During the repast which followed, the particulars of the convention, which ultimately took place, were arranged. Nelson told the prince the French fought bravely, but they could not have stood for one hour the fight which the Danes had supported for four. Melancholy tributes were paid by the people of Copenhagen to the brave men who had fallen in the conflict: a public mausoleum was erected on the spot where the slain had been interred; a monument raised in the principal church, surmounted by the Danish colours; young maidens, clothed in white, stood round its base, with the widows or the orphans of those who had fallen;<sup>1</sup> while a funeral sermon was delivered, and suitable

59.  
Impressive  
scene at  
Copenhagen  
on Good  
Friday.

<sup>1</sup> Southey,  
ii. 146, 147.  
Ann. Reg.  
114.

\* The comparative force on the two sides was as follows:—

BRITISH.		DANISH.		BATTERIES.	
32-Pounders,	140	36-Pounders,	48	Crown,	66
24 Do.,	74	24 Do.,	360	Amack,	100
Lesser,	586	Lesser,	220		
	700		628		166
					628

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patriotic strains were heard. The people were in that state of mingled grief and exultation, when the bitterness of individual loss is almost forgotten in the sympathy of general distress, or the pride of heroic achievement.

In this desperate battle the loss on board the British fleet was very severe, amounting to no less than 1200—a greater proportion to the number of seamen engaged than in any other general action during the whole war. On board the *Monarch* there were 220 killed and wounded; she had to support the united fire of the *Holstein* and *Zealand*, besides being raked by the Crown battery.\* But the situation of the crews of the Danish vessels was still more deplorable. Their loss in killed and wounded had been nearly double that of the British; including the prisoners, it amounted to 6000. Of all the vessels taken, the *Holstein*, of sixty guns, was alone brought to England; the remainder, being rendered unserviceable by the fire, were sunk or burned in the roads of Copenhagen. The negotiation which followed was attended with considerable difficulty, and Nelson was obliged to threaten to renew hostilities that very night unless the armistice was concluded. The Danes candidly stated their fears of Russia; and the English admiral avowed that his object in wishing to make the armistice as long as possible, was, that he might have time to go to Cronstadt before returning to Copenhagen. At length it was agreed that it should last for fourteen weeks, and not be broken without a fortnight's previous notice; that the armed ships of Denmark should remain, during its continuance, *in statu quo*; that the principles of the armed neutrality should, in the mean time, be suspended as to Danish vessels; that the British fleet should obtain supplies of every sort from the island of Zealand;<sup>1</sup> and that the prisoners and wounded

60.  
Loss on  
either side,  
and armis-  
tice agreed  
on for four-  
teen weeks.

<sup>1</sup> Southey,  
ii. 149, 153.  
Dum. vi.  
193, 194.  
Ann. Reg.  
114.

\* "A singular example of coolness occurred on board this vessel. A four-and-twenty pounder from the Crown battery struck the kettle and dashed the peas and pork about; the sailors picked up the fragments and ate while they were working the guns."—SOUTHEY, ii. 130.

should be sent ashore, to be carried to the credit of England, in the event of hostilities being renewed.

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61.  
Hanover  
overrun by  
Prussia.  
March 25.

On the same day on which the English fleet forced the passage of the Sound, the Prussian cabinet, as already mentioned, made a formal demand on the regency of Hanover, to permit the occupation of the electorate, and disband a part of their forces, and supported the proposition by an army of twenty thousand men. The Hanoverian government, being in no condition to withstand an invasion from such a force, was compelled to submit; and Hanover, Bremen, and Hameln were immediately occupied by the Prussian troops. At the same time the Danes took possession of Hamburg and Lubeck, so as to close the mouth of the Elbe against the English commerce; while, on the other hand, a British squadron, under Admiral Duckworth, reduced all the Swedish and Danish islands in the West Indies. In order more effectually to secure Prussia in the confederacy against England, Napoleon shortly after made offers to Prussia of the permanent cession of Hanover to its dominions; observing, at the same time, that he could feel no jealousy at the acquisition of even a considerable increase of power by so friendly a state. He hoped Hanover would prove as tempting a bait to the cabinet of Berlin as Malta had been to the Emperor Paul. The King of Prussia was sorely tempted by the glittering prize: but being doubtful of the event of the war, he deemed it prudent to return an ambiguous answer, that he was fully sensible of the good dispositions of the First Consul, but that in the mean time he would merely keep possession of that electorate. and reserve the final disposal of it for a general peace.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
261, 262.  
Southey, ii.  
151, 153.  
Ann. Reg.  
114. Thiers,  
ii. 443, 444.

During the brief period the alliance between Paul and Napoleon lasted, they had made great progress in maturing the favourite project of both these potentates for the overthrow of the British power in India. A formal agreement for this purpose had been made between the two cabinets. Thirty-five thousand French, under Massena,

62.  
Designs of  
Paul and  
Napoleon  
against  
British  
India.

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were to have embarked at Ulm, on the Danube, and to have been joined by twenty-five thousand Russian troops, and fifty thousand Cossacks. The King of Persia had agreed to give them a passage through his dominions; and they were to have proceeded by land, or embarked on the Persian Gulf, according to circumstances. Whether this plan would have succeeded, if attempted entirely with land forces, must always be considered extremely doubtful, when it is recollected what formidable deserts and mountains must have been overcome, which have never been attempted by an army encumbered with the artillery and caissons necessary for modern warfare. But that it was perfectly practicable, if accomplished by embarking in the Persian Gulf, is self-evident; and it is extremely doubtful whether, if the northern confederacy had not been dissolved, Great Britain could have relied upon maintaining a permanent naval superiority in the Indian seas.<sup>1</sup>\*

<sup>1</sup> Nap. in  
O'Meara, i.  
381. Hard.  
vii. 479.

63.  
Death of  
Paul. Cause  
of that  
event.

But while everything thus announced the commencement of a desperate and bloody war between England and the northern powers, an event took place within

\* The plan agreed on was in these terms:—

Feb. 28.

"A French army, 35,000 strong, with light artillery, under the command of Massena, shall be moved from France to Ulm, from whence, with the consent of Austria, it shall descend the Danube to the Black Sea.

"Arrived there, a Russian fleet will transport it to Taganrok, from whence it shall move to Taritzin, on the Volga, where it will find boats to convey it to Astrakan.

"There it will find a Russian army of 35,000 men, composed of 15,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 10,000 Cossacks, amply provided with artillery and the horses necessary for its conveyance.

"The combined army shall be transported by the Caspian Sea, from Astrakan to Astrabat, where magazines of all sorts shall be established for its use.

"This march from the frontiers of France to Astrabat will be made in eighty days; fifty more will be requisite to bring the army from the banks of the Indus, by the rout of Herat, Ferah, and Candahar."—Paul afterwards agreed to increase the Cossacks to 50,000.—See HARDENBERG, vii. 497.

In forming an opinion on the probable result of such an expedition, no conclusion can be drawn from the successful irruptions of Alexander, Timour, Gengis Khan, or Nadir Shah, because their armies were unencumbered with the artillery and ammunition waggons indispensable to modern warfare. It appears from Colonel Conolly's Travels over this country, that for ten days' journey the animals of the army must subsist only on chopped straw, carried with itself, and that in that desert there is little or no water, and no road for wheel carriages. Still the difficulties of the transit, according to him, are great rather than insuperable. The point is most ably discussed in a learned article in the

the palace of St Petersburg, which at once dissolved the northern confederacy, defeated the sanguine hopes of Napoleon, and changed the face of the world. This was the death of the Emperor Paul, which took place on the night of the 23d March, and led immediately to the accession of his son ALEXANDER, and a total change of policy on the part of the cabinet of St Petersburg. Napoleon announced this important event to the French in these words, "Paul I. died on the night of the 23d March. The English fleet passed the Sound on the 30th. History will unveil the connexion which may have existed between these events." In truth there was a connexion, and an intimate one, between them, though not of the kind insinuated by the First Consul. The connexion was that between flagrant misgovernment and oriental revolution. In every country, how despotic soever, there is some restraint on the power of government. When oppression or tyranny has reached a certain height, a spirit of resistance is inevitably generated, which leads to convulsion, and this is the case equally in oriental as in

*United Service Journal*, where all the authorities and historical facts bearing on the subject are accumulated, and the conclusions drawn apparently equally just and irresistible.<sup>1</sup> If any doubt could exist on the subject, it has been removed by the successful march of the British to Candahar and Cabul in 1839; for if England in the face of enemies could march up, unquestionably Russia supported by allies could march down. In considering the probable success of Russia in such an undertaking, it is worthy of notice, that she never brought more than 35,000 men into the field at any one point in the late war with Turkey, nor so many as 10,000 in that with Persia—facts singularly illustrative of the difficulty of pushing forward any considerable force to such distant regions by overland passage. On the other hand, the red coats, natives and Europeans, assembled for the siege of Bhurtpore, were as numerous as those which fought at Waterloo (36,000 men) and 180 cannons were planted in the trenches, and that too during the hottest of the struggle in the Burmese empire. Still, as the population of Russia is doubling every half century, and she will soon have the force of Persia at her command, the British government cannot too soon take measures, by alliance and otherwise, to guard against such a danger. Perhaps, however, the real peril lies nearer home, and our splendid Indian empire is destined to be dissolved by domestic rather than foreign causes. Considering the slender tenure which we have of that magnificent dominion, and its direct exposure, since the dissolution of the India Company, to British legislation, in an assembly where its interests are neither directly nor indirectly represented, it is impossible to contemplate without alarm the probable effect upon its future destinies of the democratic influence which has recently received so great an increase.

<sup>1</sup> *United Service Journal*, No. 52.

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. vi.  
193. Jom.  
xiv. 263.  
Bign. i. 47.  
Ann. Reg.  
115.

64.  
General  
irritation  
against the  
Czar.

European monarchies; in the age of Nero as in that of James II. It is the highest glory and chief benefit of representative governments, to have given a regular and constitutional direction to this necessary element in the social system; to have converted a casual and transitory burst of revenge into a regular and pacific organ of improvement; to have substituted a hostile vote in the national assembly for the dagger or the bowstring; and, instead of the revolutions of the seraglio, introduced the steady Opposition of the British parliament.<sup>1</sup>

In Russia, this important element was unknown. No regular or useful check upon the authority of government existed; the will of the Czar was omnipotent. Measures the most hurtful might emanate from the palace without any constitutional means of redress existing; and if the conduct of the emperor had risen to a certain degree of extravagance, no means of arresting it existed but his destruction. Many concurring causes had conspired to irritate the Russian noblesse against the Emperor Paul, and yet the vehemence of his character precluded all hope of a return on his part to more rational principles of administration. The suspension of the commercial intercourse with England, by cutting off the great market for their produce, had injured the vital interests of the Russian landed proprietors; the embargo on English shipping, laid on in defiance of all the laws of war as well as the usages of humanity, had inflicted as deep a wound on the mercantile classes. The aristocracy of the country beheld with undisguised apprehension all the fixed principles of Russian policy abandoned, and a close alliance formed with a formidable revolutionary Continental state, to the exclusion of the maritime power on whom they depended for the sale of almost all the produce which constituted their wealth; while the merchants felt it to be impossible to enter into any safe speculation, when the conduct of the Czar was so variable, and equal vehemence was exhibited in conducting war against an old ally as in making



peace with a deadly foe. The internal administration of the empire was, in many respects, tyrannical and capricious; and although that might not by itself have led to a revolt in a country so habituated to submission as Muscovy, yet, combined with other and deeper causes of irritation, it produced a powerful effect. The French dress had been rigidly proscribed at the capital; the form of a coat might bring the wearer into peril of a visit to Siberia; and the Czar had renewed the ancient custom, which the good sense of preceding sovereigns had suffered to fall into desuetude, of compelling the noblesse, of whatever rank or sex, to stop their carriages and alight when they met any of the Imperial family. These causes, affecting equally the interests, the habits, and the vanity of the most powerful classes, had produced that general feeling of irritation against the government which in free states leads to a change of ministers, in despotic, to a dethronement of the sovereign.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. i.  
430, 433.  
Nap.ii.152,  
153.

Latterly, the conduct of the Emperor had been so extravagant, as to have given rise to a very general belief that he laboured under a certain degree of insanity. This was confirmed, not less by his private than his public conduct. The state papers and articles in the St Petersburg Gazette, which avowedly issued from his hand, or were prepared under his direction, bore evident marks of aberration. When despatches of importance were presented to him from the British government, containing terms of conciliation, he returned them unopened, after piercing them with his penknife. In the Court Gazette of December 30, 1800, he published an invitation to all the sovereigns of Europe to come to St Petersburg, and settle their disputes by a combat in a *champ-clos*, with their ministers, Pitt, Thugut, Bernstorff, and Talleyrand, for esquires.<sup>2\*</sup> He was so much enraged at Prussia for not instantly falling in with his vehement hostility towards Great Britain, that he threatened some months before to

65.  
Symptoms  
of insanity  
in his con-  
duct.

<sup>2</sup> Ann. Reg.  
114, 115.  
Jom. xiv.  
265. Hard.  
vii. 41.

\* "Latterly," said Napoleon, "I think Paul was mad."—O'MEARA, 380.

Paul was not mad. Thugut

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put a stop to all intercourse between his subjects and the north of Germany, and, immediately before his death, entertained seriously the project of closing all the harbours in Europe against the British commerce, and overwhelming her Indian possessions by a cloud of Tartars and Kalmucks.

66.  
Conspiracy  
among the  
nobles for  
his de-  
thronement.

Alarmed at this perilous crisis of public affairs, several of the leading nobles in Russia entered into a conspiracy, the object of which, at first, was to dethrone the Czar merely, without depriving him of life; but experience in every age has confirmed the adage, that from the prison to the grave of princes is but a step. The governor of St Petersburg, Count Pahlen, a minister high in the confidence of the Emperor, was deeply implicated in the conspiracy; and General Benningsen, who afterwards bore a distinguished part in the war against France, took a leading share in carrying it into execution. Benningsen, however, was only informed of the design to depose the Emperor, without any information that his life was to be put in danger. The plot was communicated to Paul's two sons, the Grand-dukes Alexander and Constantine, though without any insinuation that it would be attended with danger to their father's life—it being merely held out that the safety of the empire indispensably required that the Emperor's insanity should be prevented from doing any further detriment to the public interests. The apprehension of private danger induced the young princes to lend a more willing ear than they might otherwise have done to these proposals; for, independent of the natural violence of their father's temperament, with which they were well acquainted, they were aware that he had become lately prejudiced against his nearest relations, and had dropped hints to the Princess Gargarin, the object of his chivalrous devotion, of his intention of sending Alexander to Siberia, immuring Constantine in a fortress, and the empress-mother in a cloister.<sup>1</sup> But, notwithstanding this danger, it was with great difficulty that the

<sup>1</sup> Bign. i.  
434, 435.  
Hard. viii.  
83, 84.  
Thiers'  
Cons. et.  
l'Emp. ii.  
427, 428.

young princes could be brought to give their consent to the conspiracy ; and Alexander in particular, the eldest son, only yielded on express condition that his father's life should be spared.

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On the evening before his death, Paul received a note, when at supper with his mistress, warning him of the danger with which he was threatened. He put it in his pocket, saying he would read it on the morrow.\* He retired to bed at twelve. On that day Pahlen wrote to M. Krudener, in a postscript to a despatch from Paul, urging the immediate adoption of measures against England—" *His Imperial Majesty is indisposed to-day ; that may lead to consequences.*" The two Suboffs, and several other officers on whom they could rely, dined with Pahlen and Benningsen ; and after they were sufficiently warmed with wine, of which he himself and Benningsen did not partake, they were initiated into the plot, being assured, at the same time, that the deposition of the Emperor only was intended, and that the Grand-duke Alexander was aware of these designs, and approved of them. The conspirators, to the number of sixty, set out at midnight for the palace, one half under the direction of Benningsen, the other under Pahlen, all armed with drawn swords. The Emperor was in the Michael Palace, which was constructed as a species of fortress ; but the gates were all thrown open to the well-known chiefs who led the conspirators. Benningsen's division entered first ; Pahlen remained a little behind, in reserve. At two in the morning Prince Suboff, whose situation and credit in the palace gave him access at all times to the imperial chambers, presented himself with the other conspirators at the door. A hussar, who refused admission,

67.  
His assassination.  
Its particulars.  
23d March.

\* Prince Mechercki wrote a letter to Paul in the early part of that day, to warn him of his danger, and revealed the names of the conspirators. He delivered the letter into the hands of Koutaitsoff, another courtier, who put it in his coat pocket, and forgot it there when he changed his dress to dine with the Emperor. He returned to get it ; but Paul, growing impatient, sent for him in a hurry, and the trembling courtier came back without the epistle on which so much depended.—HARD. viii. 6.

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was cut down on the spot, another posted at the door fled, calling out for assistance; and the whole party entered, and found the royal apartments empty. Paul, hearing the noise, had got up, and hid himself under the bed. "He has escaped," said some of the conspirators. "That he has not," returned Benningsen. "No weakness, or I will put you all to death." At the same time Benningsen, who never lost his presence of mind, put his hand on the bed-clothes, and feeling them warm, observed that the Emperor could not be far off; and he was soon discovered, and dragged from his retreat. They presented to the Emperor his abdication to sign. Paul refused. A contest arose; and while it was going on, the sound of feet was heard coming forward, which was that of the second division of conspirators under Pahlen approaching. Those engaged with Paul, struck with terror, fled in different directions, except Benningsen, who remained alone with Paul, holding him with one hand, and with his drawn sword in the other. The conspirators, recognising each other, soon returned and surrounded the unhappy monarch, who attempted to resist. In the struggle the lamp which alone lighted the apartment, was overturned, and the room was left in total darkness. Benningsen ran out to get another, and on returning found the Emperor in the agonies of death. In the struggle an officer's sash was passed round the neck of the unhappy monarch, and he was strangled after a desperate resistance, his brains being previously nearly beat out with the pommel of a sword.\* The two grand-dukes were in the room above: Pahlen, who had remained with the assassins, as soon as he heard of the event, went to inform them. Alexander eagerly inquired, the moment it was over, whether they had saved his father's life.<sup>1</sup> Pahlen's silence told too plainly the melancholy tale, and the young prince tore his hair in an agony of grief,<sup>1</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> Bign. i. 438, 439.  
O'Meara, i. 380. Hard. viii. 86, 87.  
Thiers, ii. 430, 434.

\* The dress of Ouvaroff, one of the conspirators, caused him to be mistaken by the Emperor for his son Constantine; and the last words which the unhappy monarch uttered were, "And you too, my Constantine!"—BIGNON, i. 438.

broke out into sincere and passionate exclamations of sorrow at the catastrophe which had prepared the way for his ascent to the throne. The despair of the Empress and the Grand-duke Constantine was equally vehement; but Pahlen, calm and collected, represented that the empire indispensably required a change of policy, and that nothing now remained but for Alexander to assume the reins of government.

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The evident symptoms of insanity which this ill-fated monarch evinced towards the close of his reign, his fickleness of conduct, tyrannical usage of British seamen, and general extravagance of demeanour, must not throw into the shade the good qualities which at an early period he displayed, and the important ameliorations which he effected in his country. He first established the hereditary succession to the crown—a matter of infinite importance in a government partaking so largely of the oriental character. His improvements in the administration of the army were immense, and laid the foundation of the rapid strides which it made under his more fortunate successor. His prodigalities even contributed to the circulation of wealth, and sensibly augmented the public improvement. He was vehement, inconstant, and capricious, but not without a large intermixture of generous feeling, and occasionally capable of heroic actions.<sup>1</sup>

68.  
His mixture  
of good and  
bad quali-  
ties.

<sup>1</sup> Hard. viii.  
91.

The effect of the causes which had occasioned this violent and frightful revolution speedily appeared, in the measures which the young Emperor pursued on his accession to the throne. The influence of Pahlen and Benningsen secured the concurrence of the guards, and Alexander was proclaimed. The conspirators were invested with the chief offices of state, and the Czar was compelled to take counsel from those whose hands had recently been imbrued in his father's blood, in everything connected with the government of the empire.\* The new Emperor,

69.  
Accession of  
Alexander,  
and imme-  
diate ap-  
proach to an  
accommoda-  
tion with  
England.

\* A lady of rank and wit wrote to Fouché, on occasion of a public ceremony at which the Emperor was present soon after his accession—"The young Emperor walked, preceded by the assassins of his grandfather, followed by

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<sup>1</sup> *Jom.* xiv.  
268, 269.  
*Ann. Reg.*  
116. *Thiers*,  
ii. 435.

70.  
His charac-  
ter.

on the day succeeding his elevation to the throne, issued a proclamation, declaring his resolution to govern according to the maxims and system of his august grandmother, Catherine; and one of the first acts of his reign was to give orders that the British sailors and captains, who had been taken from the ships laid under sequestration, and marched into the interior, should be set at liberty, and carefully conducted, at the public expense, to the ports from which they had been severally taken. At the same time, all prohibitions against the export of corn were removed—a measure of no small importance to the famishing population of the British isles, and hardly less material to the gorged proprietors of Russian produce. The young Emperor shortly after wrote a letter with his own hand to the King of Britain, expressing, in the warmest terms, his desire to re-establish the amicable relations of the two empires—a declaration which was received with equal shouts of joy in London as St Petersburg.<sup>1</sup>\*

Perhaps no sovereign since the days of the Antonines ever was called to higher destinies, or more worthily filled an important place in the theatre of the world, than the Emperor Alexander. Placed at the head of the most powerful and rising empire in existence, stationed midway between ancient civilisation and barbaric vigour, he was called to take the lead in the great struggle for European freedom; to combat with the energy and enthusiasm of the desert the superiority of advanced information, and meet

those of his father, and surrounded by his own.”—“There,” said Fouché, “is a woman who speaks Tacitus.”—See *Bienon*, i. 445; *HARD*. vii. 103.

\* The empress-mother, a woman of heroic spirit and noble character, and who possessed the greatest influence through life over her son, openly and uniformly avowed her horror at Paul's murder; and shortly after that event, had a picture painted, representing the death-scene, and publicly exposed at the Foundling Hospital, which was under her peculiar charge. Prodigious crowds having been attracted by the sight, Count Pahlen became alarmed at the consequences, and prevailed on Alexander to request his mother to have it removed. But the princess was not to be shaken. “My son,” said she, “you must choose between Pahlen and me.” The painting remained, and the minister was soon after dismissed from his situations.—*D'ABRANTES*, vi. 342.

the condensed military force of a revolution, which had beaten down all the strength of Continental power, with the dauntless resolution and enduring fortitude which arise in the earlier ages of social existence. Well and nobly he fulfilled his destiny. Repeatedly defeated, never subdued, he took counsel, like his great predecessor Peter, from misfortune, and prepared in silence those invincible bands which, in the day of trial, hurled back the most terrible array which ambition had ever marshalled against the liberties of mankind. A majestic figure, a benevolent expression of countenance, gave him that sway over the multitude which ever belongs to physical advantages in youthful princes; while the qualities of his understanding and the feelings of his heart secured the admiration of all whose talents fitted them to judge of the affairs of nations. Misunderstood by those who formed their opinion only from the ease and occasional levity of his manner, he was early formed to great determinations, and evinced in the most trying circumstances, during the French invasion and the Congress of Vienna, a solidity of judgment equalled only by the strength of his resolution. He had formed, early in life, an intimacy with the Polish prince, Czartorinski, and another attachment, of a more tender nature, to a lady of the same nation; and in consequence he considered the Poles so dear to him, that many of the best-informed patriots in that country hailed his accession to the throne as the first step towards the restoration of its nationality. A disposition naturally generous and philanthropic, moulded by the precepts of Laharpe, had strongly imbued his mind with liberal principles, which shone forth in full and perhaps dangerous lustre when he was called on to act as the pacificator of the world after the fall of Paris. But subsequent experience convinced him of the extreme danger of prematurely transplanting the institutions of one country into another in a different stage of civilisation;<sup>1</sup> and his latter years were chiefly directed to objects of practical improvement, and the preparation of his

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
270. Hard.  
viii. 96, 104.  
Thiers, iii.  
10, 11.

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XXXIII.

1801.

71.  
His early  
pacific and  
popular  
measures.

subjects, by the extension of knowledge and the firmness of government, for those privileges which, if suddenly conferred, would have involved in equal ruin his empire and himself.

The first measures of his administration were eminently calculated to win that popularity which, notwithstanding the proverbial fickleness of the multitude, never afterwards forsook him. By a ukase, published on the 14th April, he restored to the nobility their privileges and prerogatives, such as they had been in the time of the Empress Catherine ; re-established the rights of municipalities ; abolished secret proceedings in criminal cases ; awarded a general amnesty, and stopped all the state prosecutions which had been commenced. Indulgences were at the same time granted to the clergy, and measures taken to reopen those outlets for the raw produce of the state, the closing of which had occasioned so much alarm. Independent of his letter to the King of England, the Emperor wrote to Sir Hyde Parker, expressing an anxious wish to close with the amicable propositions made by the British government to his predecessor, provided it could be done without violating his engagements to his allies, and entreating him in the mean time to suspend hostilities, and conveying the pleasing intelligence that orders had been given that the British seamen sent to prison by Paul were set at liberty.<sup>1</sup> At the time when this letter arrived at the British fleet, Sir Hyde had not been recalled by the English ministry, and Nelson, wisely judging that the best way of forwarding a pacific negotiation was to support it by a hostile demonstration, made sail with all his squadron to Carlscrona, where, in answer to a message inquiring whether the Swedish government was willing to be included in the armistice concluded with Denmark, he received an answer that they "could not listen to separate proposals, but would close with any equitable offers made by Great Britain to the united northern powers." This reply, coupled with the well-

<sup>1</sup> Ukase, April 7, State Papers, 256.



known pacific inclinations of the court of Stockholm, led the English admiral to conclude that he would experience no difficulty in arranging an accommodation with the whole Baltic states, if the disputes with the cabinet of St Petersburg could be adjusted; and therefore he proposed instantly to sail for Revel, where a large portion of the Russian fleet lay in an open bay, exposed to his attacks, and unable from the ice to make their escape. But Sir Hyde, who trusted that the death of Paul would immediately lead to a settlement of all the differences, insisted upon returning to Kioje bay, where he cast anchor, and remained till the 5th May, when he was recalled by the British government, and Nelson appointed to the command in chief.<sup>1</sup>

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1801.

<sup>1</sup> South, ii.  
162. Jom.  
xiv. 272,  
273. May 7.

No sooner was Nelson the unfettered master of his own actions, than he set sail for the gulf of Finland. But when he arrived there, he found that in the interval the enemy had escaped; they had cut through the ice in the mole, six feet thick, on the 3d May, and were now safe under the cannon of Cronstadt. Thither they were followed by the indefatigable admiral, who saluted the forts when he approached, and wrote to the Emperor, congratulating him on his accession, and urging the immediate release of the British subjects and property. A friendly intercourse was immediately established between the British admiral and the Russian authorities; but as the Emperor expressed great uneasiness at the presence of the English squadron, and it was evident that the negotiation would proceed more favourably if this cause of irritation was removed, Nelson stood out to sea, and proceeded down the Baltic, leaving only a brig to bring off the provisions which had been contracted for. This judicious and conciliatory conduct was met by a corresponding disposition on the part of Russia. When at anchor off Rostock, he received an answer to his letter to the Emperor, couched in the most flattering terms, and containing the important intelligence, that the British

72.  
Nelson sails  
for Cron-  
stadt. His  
conciliatory  
measures  
there.

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XXXIII.

1801.

vessels and crews which had been detained were ordered to be liberated. On his return to Copenhagen, he found that the conduct of Denmark during his absence had been actuated by very different principles; the most hostile preparations had been going forward, in defiance of the armistice; and ample grounds existed, if the English government had been so inclined, to renew hostilities, and utterly destroy what remained of the Danish naval power. But the death of Paul had dissolved the confederacy; conciliatory measures were now the most prudent course which could be adopted; and Nelson, wisely dissembling his resentment, proceeded to England to receive the thanks of a grateful nation, which his valour and skill had brought victorious out of a state of unprecedented danger.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Southey, ii. 162, 171.  
Bign. i. 443, 446. Jom. xiv. 272, 274. Nap. ii. 154, 156.

73.  
Peace with Russia, and abandonment of the principles of the armed neutrality.

The British cabinet immediately sent Lord St Helens to St Petersburg; and soon after his arrival at that capital, he signed a treaty as glorious to England as it was confirmatory of the correctness of the view she had taken of the law of nations in this great question. By this convention it was provided, "That the right of searching merchant-ships belonging to the subjects of one of the contracting powers, and navigating under a ship of war of the same power, shall only be exercised by ships of war of the belligerent party, and shall never extend to the fitters-out of privateers or other vessels which do not belong to the imperial or royal fleet of their majesties, but which their subjects shall have fitted out for war; that the effects on board neutral ships shall be free, with the exception of contraband of war and of enemy's property; and it is agreed not to comprise in the number of the latter the merchandise of the produce, growth, or manufacture of the countries at war, which should have been acquired by the subjects of the neutral power, and should be transported for their account." And the contraband articles between the two powers were declared to be the same as those specified in the treaty 10th Feb-

ruary 1797; viz. "cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bombs, grenades, balls, bullets, firelocks, flints, matches, sulphur, helmets, pikes, swords, sword-belts, pouches, saddles and bridles, excepting such quantity of the said articles as may be necessary for the defence of the ship and crew." It was further provided, "that, in order to determine what shall be deemed a blockaded port, that denomination only is given to such a one where there is, by the disposition of the power which attacks it, with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering." By this treaty the right of search was placed upon its true footing; it was divested of the circumstances most likely to occasion irritation in neutral vessels, and not stipulated in favour of either party as a new right, but merely recognised as a privilege already existing, necessarily inherent by the practice of maritime states in every belligerent power, and subjected to such restraints as the enlarged experience of mankind had proved to be expedient.<sup>1</sup>

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XXXIII.  
1801.

<sup>1</sup> Convention, June 17. Articles 3, 4. State Papers, 213. Ann. Reg.; and Martens, vii. 260.

Napoleon has observed upon this agreement: "Europe beheld with astonishment this ignominious treaty signed by Russia, and which, by consequence, Denmark and Sweden were compelled to adopt. It was equivalent to an admission of the sovereignty of the seas in the British parliament, and the slavery of all other states. This treaty was such that England could have desired nothing more, and a power of the third order would have been ashamed to have signed it." A stronger panegyric could not have been pronounced on this memorable convention, so far as England is concerned, or a more valuable eulogium on the firmness of the cabinet and the intrepidity of the seamen by whom these important advantages had been secured. The First Consul early despatched Duroc to St Petersburg, to endeavour to counterbalance the influence of Great Britain, and bring Alexander back to the footsteps of his predecessor; but though he received the most flattering reception, he could effect nothing against the ascendancy of Nelson; and the treaty was signed, to the

74.  
Napoleon's indignation at it.

CHAP.  
XXXIII.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Nap. ii.  
159. Bign.  
i. 451, 452.  
Hard. viii.  
62. Thiers'  
Cons. et  
l'Emp. iii.

universal joy of both nations. Duroc, however, received some compensation for his disappointment in diplomacy from the secret assurances he received from the Emperor of his admiration for the First Consul, and his anxious desire to re-establish friendly relations with France. Already were to be discerned symptoms of that impassioned admiration on the part of the Czar for Napoleon, which afterwards so deeply affected the destinies of the world at Tilsit and Erfurth.<sup>1</sup> \*

75.  
Dissolution  
of the naval  
confederacy.  
May 19.

Sweden and Denmark were not expressly included in the convention of the 17th June; but they were compelled to follow the example of Russia. Unable of themselves to contend with the naval power of England, the anticipated loss of all their colonies, and the certainty of being deprived of their whole commerce, if they continued the contest, ultimately overcame the influence of France, and the recollection of their recent wounds at Copenhagen. On the 20th May, a convention was agreed to by the Danish government, in virtue of which the city of Hamburg was, three days afterwards, evacuated by the Danish troops, and the free navigation of the Elbe restored; on the 19th, the embargo on British vessels had been taken off both in Russia, Sweden, and Denmark. These measures were immediately met by corresponding steps on the part of the British government; the embargo on all the ships

\* "Après les audiences d'apparat, Duroc obtint plusieurs entretiens particuliers, dans lesquels Alexandre mit une sorte de coquetterie, à se montrer à découvert devant le représentant du Premier Consul. Un jour, l'Empereur fit éloigner ses officiers, et, le conduisant dans un lieu écarté, sembla s'expliquer avec un complet abandon. 'Je suis,' lui dit-il, 'ami de la France, et depuis longtemps. J'admire votre nouveau chef; j'apprécie ce qu'il fait pour le repos de son pays, et l'affermissement de l'ordre social en Europe. Ce n'est pas de moi qu'il pourra craindre une nouvelle guerre entre les deux empires. Mais qu'il me seconde, et cesse de fournir des prétextes à tous les jaloux de sa puissance. Vous le voyez, j'ai fait des concessions. Je ne parle plus de l'Egypte. J'aime mieux qu'elle soit à la France qu'à l'Angleterre; et si, par malheur, les Anglais s'en emparaient, je me joindrais à vous pour la leur arracher. J'ai renoncé à Malte, afin de supprimer l'une des difficultés qui entravaient la paix de l'Europe. On ne l'accuse pas le Premier Consul, comme les gouvernements qui l'ont précédé, de menacer l'ordre social; mais on l'accuse de vouloir envahir tous les états. Qu'il fasse cesser entre nous ces difficultés, et nous vivrons à l'avenir en parfaite intelligence.'"—THIERS' *Consulat et l'Empire*, iii. 15.

of the Baltic powers in the harbours of Great Britain was raised; and the expense both of putting it on and taking it off, as far as Danish vessels were concerned, defrayed by the English treasury. Prussia had been unwillingly drawn into the struggle, and took the first opportunity of escaping from its effects. Under the mediation of Russia, an arrangement was concluded, by which the Prussian troops were to evacuate Hanover, and restore the free navigation of the Weser.<sup>1</sup>\*

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XXXIII.  
1801.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
275, 276.  
Bign. i. 451,  
452. Ann.  
Reg. 116.

Thus was dissolved, in less than six months after it had been formed, the most formidable confederacy ever arrayed against the English maritime power. Professedly contracted in order to secure the liberty of the seas, it was really directed against the grandeur and prosperity of Great Britain; breathing only the sentiments of freedom and justice, it was, in truth, intended to divide among the coalesced states the power and the ascendancy of a more fortunate rival. The rapidity with which this powerful alliance was broken up by England, toward the conclusion of a long and burdensome war, and when her people were labouring under the combined pressure of severe want and diminished employment, is one of the most remarkable features of this memorable contest; and, perhaps more than any other, characteristic of the vast ascendancy, moral as well as political, which she has acquired among

76.  
Reflections  
on these  
events.

\* After Nelson's return, he had a conversation with Mr Addington, then First Lord of the Treasury, on the battle of Copenhagen, which was highly interesting. "The conversation turned on the circumstance of Nelson's having continued the action after the admiral had made the signal of recall. Mr Addington told him he was a bold man to disregard the orders of his superior: to which he replied that any one may be defeated under ordinary circumstances, but that the man of real value was he who would persevere under all risks, and under the heaviest responsibility. 'But,' he added, 'in the midst of it all I depended upon you; for I knew that, happen what might, if I did my duty you would stand by me.'"—PELLEW'S *Life of Lord Sidmouth*, i. 465. This mutual confidence of minister and commander was not misplaced; for among Mr Addington's many excellent qualities, none was more worthy of admiration than the resolute moral courage which made him on all occasions support an inferior functionary, if acting *bona fide*, though with doubtful prudence, in the discharge of duty. A memorable instance of this occurred in his instantaneous approval, as home secretary, of the conduct of the yeomanry at Peterloo near Manchester, in 1819.

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1801.

the other nations of the world. It is in vain to say, the dissolution of the confederacy was owing to the death of Paul. The revolution at St Petersburg was itself the result of the influence of Great Britain ; of that vast commerce, which had made her intercourse essential to the very existence of the most haughty Continental states ; and that moral sway, which ranged under her banners the most powerful and important classes of distant nations.

77.  
Glorious  
conduct of  
the British  
government at this  
crisis.

The conduct of the British government and people, during this trying crisis, was a model of firmness and moderation, and was deservedly crowned by one of the most glorious triumphs recorded in their history. Disdaining to submit to the menaces even of combined Europe, they boldly fronted the danger ; anticipated by the rapidity of their movements the junction of their adversaries, paralysed by the thunder of their arms the first of their opponents, and at the same time holding out the olive branch, succeeded in detaching the greatest power from the confederacy, and ultimately dissolving it, without the abandonment of one principle for which the war had been undertaken. The convention of 17th June fixed the maritime question upon its true basis ; it arrogated no peculiar privilege to Great Britain, subjected to no exclusive humiliation the neutral states ; but, prescribing one equal rule for all belligerent powers, and imposing one equal obligation upon all neutrals, settled the right of search and blockade upon that equitable footing, which, alike obligatory upon England and inferior nations, must ever remain the law of the seas, while ambition and revenge continue to desolate the world.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

EXPEDITION TO EGYPT—CONCLUSION OF THE WAR.—

AUG. 1799—OCT. 1801.

WHEN Napoleon quitted the Egyptian shores and the career of Asiatic glory, to follow his fortunes on the theatre of Europe, he left Kleber in the command of the army, and addressed to him a long letter, containing minute directions for the regulation of his conduct in all possible emergencies which might occur. As it was evident that the victory of the Nile had completely cut off all chance of maintaining a regular intercourse with France, and it was therefore more than probable that the Egyptian army would be compelled to capitulate, he distinctly authorised his successor to conclude a convention for the evacuation of Egypt, provided only that he received no succours or assistance from France during the following year, and the deaths by the plague should amount to above fifteen hundred persons. Immediately after being invested with the command, Kleber wrote a letter to the Directory, in which he gave the most desponding view of the situation of the army; asserted that it was reduced to half its former amount; was destitute of everything, and in the lowest state of depression; that the manufactories of powder and arms had totally failed; that no resources existed to replace the stores which had been expended; that General Buonaparte, so far from leaving any money behind him to maintain the troops,

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

1799.

1.

State of the  
Egyptian  
army when  
left by Napo-  
leon. Kle-  
ber's des-  
ponding  
views re-  
garding it.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

1799.

had bequeathed to them only a debt of twelve millions of francs (£480,000,) being more than a year's revenue of the province; that the soldiers were four millions (£160,000) in arrear of their pay; that the Mamelukes were dispersed, not destroyed; and that the Grand Vizier and Djezzar Pasha were at Acre at the head of thirty thousand men. He concluded in these terms:—"Such are, Citizen Directors, the circumstances under which General Buonaparte has laid upon me the enormous burden of the Army of the East. He saw the fatal crisis was approaching; your orders doubtless prevented him from attempting to surmount it. That the crisis was at hand is attested equally by his letters, his instructions, his negotiations. It is notorious to all the world, and unhappily as well known to our enemies as to the French in Egypt. In these circumstances, I think the best thing I can do is to continue the negotiations commenced by Buonaparte, even if this should lead to no other result than the gaining time. I have annexed the letter I have written to the Grand Vizier, sending him at the same time the duplicate of that of Buonaparte." <sup>1</sup> \*

<sup>1</sup> Napoleon's and Kleber's letters, in *Dum.* iv. 110, 125.

Aug. 17,  
1799.

\* The letter which Napoleon had addressed to the Grand Vizier previous to his departure from the East, is one of the most characteristic of all his compositions. "Alas!" said he, "why are the Sublime Porte and the French nation, after having been friends for so many years, now at war with each other? Your excellency cannot be ignorant that the French nation has ever been warmly attached to the Sublime Porte. Endowed as your excellency is with the most distinguished talents, it cannot have escaped your penetration, that the Austrians and Russians are united in a perpetual league against the Turkish empire, and that the French, on the other hand, have done everything in their power to arrest their wicked designs. Your excellency knows that the Russians are the enemies of the Mussulman faith; and that the Emperor Paul, as Grand Master of Malta, has solemnly sworn enmity to the race of Osmanlis. The French, on the other hand, have abolished the order of Malta, given liberty to the Mahometan prisoners detained in that fortress, and profess the same belief as themselves, 'That there is no God but the true God.' Is it not strange, then, that the Sublime Porte should declare war on the French, its real and sincere friends, and contract alliance with the Russians and Germans, its implacable enemies?"

"As long as the French were of the sect of the Messiah, they were the friends of the Sublime Porte; nevertheless that power declares war against them. This has arisen from the error into which the courts of England and Russia have



That this letter contained an exaggerated picture of the circumstances and sufferings of the army, is abundantly proved by the condition in which it was found by the English troops, when they landed at Alexandria eighteen months afterwards. In truth, Kleber wrote under a bitter feeling of irritation at Napoleon for having deserted the Egyptian army; and his letter is tinged by those gloomy colours in which all exiles, but in an especial manner the French, regard the country of their banishment. It fell into the hands of the English, during its passage across the Mediterranean, in a curious way. The vessel in which it was conveyed being chased by the English cruisers, the captain threw the packet containing the despatches overboard; but it floated on the surface of the waves, was seen by the English pursuers, and picked up. It was forwarded directly to London, and contributed in no small degree to confirm the British cabinet in their resolution to send an expedition to Egypt. It was afterwards sent by them to the First Consul, after his accession to supreme authority; and it is not the least honourable trait in that great man's character,<sup>1</sup> that he made allowance for the influence of the desponding

CHAP.  
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1799.

2.

His letter falls into the hands of the English, who forward it to Napoleon.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. iv. 130, 131.  
Jom. iv. 376. Nap. in Month. ii. 215.  
Thiers' Cons. et l'Emp. iii. 5, 7.

led the Turkish Divan. We had informed it by letter of our intended expedition *into Arabia*; but these courts found means to intercept and suppress our letters; and although I had proved to the Sublime Porte that the French Republic, far from wishing to deprive it of any part of its dominions, had not even the smallest intention of making war on it, his most glorious majesty, Sultan Selim, gave credit to the English, and with unaccountable precipitance declared war on the French, his ancient allies. Though informed of this war, I despatched an ambassador to avert it; but he was seized and thrown into prison, and I was obliged, in spite of myself, to cross the desert and carry the war into Syria.

"Though my army is as innumerable as the sands of the sea, full of courage; though I have fortresses and castles, of prodigious strength; though I have no fear or apprehension of any sort; yet, out of commiseration to the human race, and, above all, from a desire to be reunited to the first and most faithful of our allies, the Sultan Selim, I now make known my disposition for peace. If you wish to have Egypt, tell me so. France never entertained an idea of taking it out of the hands of the Sublime Porte and swallowing it up. Give authority to your minister who is at Paris, or send some one to Egypt with full powers, and all shall be arranged without animosity, and agreeably to our desires."

Under such a specious guise did Napoleon conceal his ambitious designs on

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

1799.

feelings which he had so repeatedly witnessed in the Egyptian officers, and never sought to revenge upon his absent lieutenant the depreciatory expressions which, in an official despatch to government, he had used in reference to himself.

3.  
Mourad Bey  
issues from  
the desert,  
and is de-  
feated.  
Aug. 6,  
1799.

But although Kleber, under the influence of these gloomy views, addressed proposals of accommodation to the Grand Vizier, he made the most vigorous preparations to repel the attack with which he was threatened by the Ottoman army. The greater part of the French troops were stationed at El-Arish and the eastern frontier, to watch the motions of the Syrian host, while six thousand were scattered along the course of the Nile, from the cataracts to the ocean, to overawe the Mamelukes, and guard the sea-coast from Turkish invasion. Encouraged by the approach of the Grand Vizier's army, the indefatigable Mourad Bey again issued from the desert, at the head of two thousand Mamelukes; but he was attacked by Desaix, early in August, at Syout, and obliged to fall back. Following up his success, the French general mounted his infantry on dromedaries, and, at the head of a chosen band, pursued the Mameluke chief into his furthest recesses. The latter, conceiving he had only to deal with horsemen, charged the attacking column with great impetuosity; but the cavaliers instantly dismounted, placed their dromedaries in the centre, and formed a square, with the front rank kneeling, as at the battle of the Pyramids. The Mamelukes were received with the murderous rolling fire of Sultaun Kebir, and, after charging repeatedly on every side, they fled in disorder into the desert, and did not again appear on the theatre of Egyptian warfare.<sup>1</sup>

Oct. 8.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
377, 378.  
Dum. iv.  
151. Berth.  
198.

the East; his resolution, so early formed and steadily adhered to, of making Egypt a French colony; his unprovoked seizure of that country while at peace with the Ottoman empire, and his attempt, which, but for the repulse at Acre, would in all probability have succeeded, of revolutionising the whole of Asia Minor, and mounting himself on the throne of Constantine.—See the *Original Letter in Ann. Reg.* 1800, 218, 219.

The Turkish army which Napoleon destroyed at Aboukir, was but the advanced guard of the vast force which the Sublime Porte had collected to recover Egypt from the Republican arms. Their main body, consisting of twenty thousand Janizaries and regular soldiers, and twenty-five thousand irregular troops, arrived in the end of October in the neighbourhood of Gaza, on the confines of the desert which separates Syria from Egypt. At the same time a corps of eight thousand Janizaries, under the convoy of Sir Sidney Smith, made their appearance at the mouth of the Nile, to effect a diversion in that quarter. The leading division, consisting of four thousand men, landed, and soon became masters of the tower of Bogaz, at the entrance of one of its branches, where they immediately began to fortify themselves; but before their works had made any progress they were attacked by General Verdier, at the head of a thousand French, routed, and driven into the sea, with the loss of five pieces of cannon, and all their standards.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

1799.

4.

Advance of  
the Turkish  
force. Defeat  
of a detach-  
ment at the  
mouth of the  
Nile. Nov. 1.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1799, 217.  
Dum. iv.  
132, 133.  
Jom. xliii.  
396, 397.

Relieved by this decisive victory from all apprehensions in that quarter, Kleber turned his whole attention to the great array which was approaching from the Syrian desert. The check at the mouth of the Nile rendered the Grand Vizier more disposed to enter into negotiations; while the declining numbers and desponding spirits of the French rendered them desirous on any terms to extricate themselves from a hopeless banishment, and revisit their beloved country. Napoleon had made proposals for an accommodation so early as 17th August; and Sir Sidney Smith had warned Kleber that, in virtue of the treaty 5th January 1799, Turkey could no longer make peace with France, except in concert with Russia and Great Britain. An unexpected reverse facilitated the negotiations—the Grand Vizier, having crossed the desert, laid siege to El-Arish. The operations were conducted by Major Douglas and other British officers; and the fort was carried, during a tumult of insubordination

5.  
Convention  
of El-Arish.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.1799.  
Dec. 29.Jan. 24,  
1800.<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
402. Ann.  
Reg. 1800,  
219. State  
Papers, 223.  
Berth. 310,  
313.6.  
The British  
govern-  
ment had  
previously  
prohibited  
such a con-  
vention, and  
hostilities  
are in conse-  
quence re-  
newed.

on the part of the garrison, on the 29th December. After their means of defence were exhausted, the garrison capitulated; but the terms were disregarded by the unruly crowd of Mussulmans, and in spite of the utmost efforts of the British officers, above three hundred French were barbarously put to the sword. The capture of this stronghold, which Napoleon termed one of the keys of Egypt, and the proof it afforded of the degree to which the spirit of the troops had been shaken, had a powerful effect in accelerating the negotiations; and a convention was signed at El-Arish about a month afterwards, by which it was stipulated, that the French army should return to Europe with its arms and baggage, on board its own vessels, or those furnished by the Turkish authorities; that all the fortresses of Egypt, with the exception of Alexandria, Rosetta, and Aboukir, where the army was to embark, should be surrendered within forty-five days; that the prisoners on both sides should be given up, and that the Grand Vizier should pay £120,000 during the three months that the evacuation was going forward.<sup>1</sup>

This convention was not signed by the British admiral, Sir Sidney Smith; nor was he vested either with express authority to conclude such a treaty, nor with such a command as necessarily implied a power to do so. It was, however, entered into with his concurrence and approbation, and, like a man of honour, he felt himself as much bound to see it carried into effect as if his signature had been affixed to the instrument. But the British government had, six weeks before, sent out orders to Lord Keith, commanding the English fleet in the Mediterranean, not to consent to any treaty in which it was not stipulated that the French army were to be prisoners of war; and Lord Keith, on the 8th January, a fortnight before the convention of El-Arish was signed, had sent a letter from Minorca to Kleber, warning him, that any vessels having on board French troops, returning home in virtue of a capitulation, other than an unconditional sur-

render, would be made prisoners of war.<sup>1\*</sup> No sooner was this letter received by General Kleber, in February following, than he was filled with indignation, despatched instant orders to put a stop to the evacuation of the country, which had commenced, and resolved to resume hostilities. In an animated proclamation to his troops, he declared: "Soldiers! we can only answer such insolence by victories—prepare to combat." This announcement was received with loud shouts by the soldiers, who had already become highly dissatisfied at the humiliating convention which had been concluded, and they joyfully prepared to forget all their cares in the excitement of battle.<sup>2</sup>

Kleber drew up his army, which had now arrived from all parts of Egypt, and was twelve thousand strong, by moonlight, on the night of 19th March, in four squares, in the plain of Koubbe, in front of the ruins of Heliopolis. The heavens, ever serene in those latitudes, and the bright rays of the Queen of night, which poured through the unclouded vault, enabled them to perform the movement with precision; though the light was too feeble to permit the enemy to perceive what was going forward.

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<sup>1</sup> See Lord Keith's letter in Berthier, 391.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xiv. 404, 405. Dum. iv. 126. Berth. 392.

7.  
Position of the two armies.

\* The Continental historians of every description are loud in their abuse of the British government for what they call its bad faith in refusing to ratify the convention of El-Arish. The smallest attention to dates must be sufficient to prove that these censures are totally destitute of foundation. The convention was signed at El-Arish on 24th January 1800, and Lord Keith's letter, announcing that the British government would agree to no capitulation, was dated Minorca, 8th January 1800, or *sixteen days before the signature of the treaty*. This letter was founded on instructions sent out by the British cabinet to Lord Keith, dated 17th December, in consequence of the intercepted letters of Kleber, which had fallen into their hands immediately after Napoleon's return. Kleber no sooner received Lord Keith's letter than he resumed hostilities, and fought the battle of Heliopolis with his wonted precipitance, without once reflecting on the fact, that the letter on which he founded so much was written, not only long before intelligence of the treaty had reached England, but from Minorca, *sixteen days before the treaty itself was signed*. "No sooner, however," said Mr Pitt in his place in parliament, "was it known in England that the French general had the faith of a British officer pledged to him, and was disposed to act upon it, than instructions were sent out to have the convention executed, though the officer in question had, in fact, no authority to sign it."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Parl. Hist. xxxv. 590.

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—— Homines, volucresque, ferasque  
 Solverat alta quies: nullo cum murmure sepes  
 Immotæque silent frondes: silet humidus aër:  
 Sidera sola micant.\*

In front were stationed the four squares, with the artillery at the angles, and the cavalry in the intervals. Companies of grenadiers doubled the corners of each square, and were ready to be employed either in resisting an attack or in offensive movements. Order, silence, and regularity, prevailed in the European army: the solemnity of the occasion had subdued the usual vivacity of the French character; they felt that the moment had arrived when they must either conquer or die. The Turks, on the other hand, were encamped, after the manner of Asiatics, in confused masses, in the neighbourhood of El-Hanka; six thousand Janizaries lay in the village of Matarieli, where they had thrown up some rude fortifications; their numerous cavalry, with the Mamelukes of Ibrahim Bey, extended on the right of that advanced guard as far as the banks of the Nile. Their whole force amounted to nearly fifty thousand men; but more than half of this array consisted of irregulars, upon whom little reliance was to be placed; and the situation of the regular corps in the village suggested the hope that they might be cut off before the remainder of the army could come up to their support.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Berth. 399.  
 Dum. iv.  
 187. Jom.  
 xiii. 406.  
 Thiers'  
 Cons. et  
 l'Emp. xii.  
 9, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xii.  
 421.

Orders, accordingly, were sent out to execute the treaty, and they arrived in Egypt in May 1800, long after the battle of Heliopolis; and Kleber had consented to a renewal of the treaty, when it was interrupted by his assassination at Grand Cairo, on 14th June 1800.<sup>2</sup> Sir Sidney Smith had no authority to agree to the convention, nor was he the commanding officer on the station, in whom that power necessarily resided, but a mere commodore in command of a ship of the line and two frigates—Lord Keith being at the head of the squadron in the Mediterranean. This conduct, in agreeing, contrary to their obvious interests, to restore to France a powerful veteran army, irrecoverably separated from the Republic at the very time when it most stood in need of its assistance, in consequence of a convention acceded to, without authority, by a subordinate officer, is the strongest instance of the good faith of the British cabinet; and affords a striking contrast to the conduct of Napoleon soon after, in refusing to ratify the armistice of Treviso, concluded with full powers by his general, Brune—a proceeding which the French historians mention, not only without disapprobation, but with manifest satisfaction.—See *Ann. Reg.* 1800, 220; and *NAPOLEON*, ii. 134.

\* OVID, *Metamorphoses*, vii. 155.

For this purpose, General Friant advanced before day-break straight towards that village; while Reynier, with his division, moved forward in front of the ruins of Heliopolis, to cut off the communication between their detached corps and the bulk of the Turkish army. No sooner did the Janizaries perceive that the enemy were approaching their intrenchments, than they sallied forth with their redoubtable scimitars in their hands, and commenced a furious attack on the French squares. But Asiatic valour could effect nothing against European steadiness and discipline; the Ottomans were received in front by a murderous rolling fire, and charged at the same time, while disordered by their rush forward, in flank. In a few minutes they were mown down and destroyed, the ditches filled by their wounded fugitives, and over the breathing and bleeding mass the French grenadiers pressed on and scaled the works. Instantly the camp of the Janizaries was carried; cannon, ammunition, tents, all fell into the hands of the victors; and the small remnant who fled towards the main army were swept away by the fire of Friant's division, or cut down by the charges of the French cavalry.<sup>1</sup>

The Grand Vizier no sooner saw his advanced guard destroyed, than he moved forward with his whole army to avenge their loss. The French were reposing after the fatigues of their first onset, when the rays of the newly risen sun were intercepted by a cloud of dust in the east. It was the Ottoman army, still forty thousand strong, which was approaching to trample under their horses' hoofs the diminutive band of Franks who had dared to await their charge. Immediately the French order of battle was formed; the troops were drawn up in squares—Friant on the left, Reynier on the right; the guns were advanced into the intervals between the masses; the cavalry remained close behind, ready to break through the moment a favourable opportunity occurred. The cannonade soon became extremely warm on both sides;

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8.  
Battle of  
Heliopolis.  
March 20.

<sup>1</sup> Berth. 399,  
400. Jom.  
xiii. 406,  
407. Dum.  
iv. 137, 138.

9.  
Advance of  
the Grand  
Vizier.

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<sup>1</sup> Berth. 400.  
Dum. iv.  
138. Jom.  
xiii. 407.

but the balls of the Ottomans, ill directed, flew over the heads of the Republicans, while their artillery was rapidly dismounted by the well-directed fire of their adversaries, and even the Grand Vizier's staff was melting away under the deadly tempest of shot. Torn to pieces by the hail-storm of bullets, which their undisciplined valour was ill qualified to bear, the Osmanlis prepared for a general charge.<sup>1</sup>

10.  
Terrible  
charge of  
the Turks,  
and its  
defeat.

The concentration of their standards along their whole line gave the French warning that it was approaching. Soon a cloud of dust filled the sky; the earth trembled as if shaken by an earthquake, and the roar of twenty thousand horsemen at full speed was enough to have struck terror into the most dauntless breasts. But nothing could break the firm array of the Republicans. As the enemy approached, they were received by a terrible discharge of grape-shot; their front rank almost all fell under the fatal storm—the rear wheeled about and fled; and in a few minutes the mighty array had disappeared, without a single musket having been fired by the French infantry. The Vizier rallied his troops, and brought them up again to the attack; but they were unable to break those flaming citadels, from which a devouring fire issued on every side. Surrounded by an innumerable multitude, not one of the balls from the French squares fell without effect; in a short time the carnage became intolerable, and the Ottomans fled in indescribable confusion towards the desert. Kleber, following up his success, advanced rapidly to El-Hanka: the Turks fled the moment the French bayonets appeared; the whole army pressed forward, and before nightfall they had made themselves masters of the Ottoman camp, and reposed in the splendid tents where the luxury of the East had displayed all its magnificence.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Berth. 400,  
403. Jom.  
xiii. 407,  
408. Dum.  
iv. 138.

While these important events were going forward in the plain of Heliopolis, the garrison of Cairo was reduced to the last extremity. Two thousand men had been left



in that city, under the command of Generals Verdier and Zayoncheck, with orders, if a general insurrection broke out, to retire into the forts which had been constructed to overawe its turbulent population. A corps of Mamelukes and Turks was detached during the battle, and by a circuitous route reached Cairo, where it excited a revolt. The French were shut up in the forts, and it was only by a vigorous defence that they maintained themselves against the furious attacks of the Mussulmans. When the firing had ceased on the plain of Heliopolis, the sound of a distant cannonade, in the direction of Cairo, informed the victors of what was going forward at the capital. They instantly despatched a corps at midnight, which, traversing the desert by starlight, arrived in time to rescue the brave garrison from their perilous situation. Kleber at the same time pursued the broken army to Balbeis, which surrendered, though strongly garrisoned, at the first summons; and soon after, the Grand Vizier, abandoning all his artillery, baggage, and ammunition, retired across the desert, actively pursued by the Arabs, and his mighty host was speedily reduced to a slender train of followers.<sup>1</sup>

The Turks, under Ibrahim Bey, who had been detached to Cairo, agreed to evacuate the town when they were informed of the result of the battle of Heliopolis; but it was found impracticable to bring the insurgent population to terms of surrender, and it was necessary, at all hazards, to strike terror into the country by a sanguinary example near the capital. Boulak, a fortified suburb of Cairo, was surrounded, and, the inhabitants having refused to capitulate, it was carried by storm, and every soul within the walls put to the sword. The French troops, who came back from the pursuit of the Grand Vizier, soon after surrounded the city of Cairo, and summoned it to surrender. A refusal having been returned, a severe bombardment and cannonade were kept up for some hours, until several practicable breaches were made, when

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1800.

11.

Desperate  
situation of  
the garrison  
at Cairo.

March 23.

<sup>1</sup> Berth. 403,  
405. Jom.  
xiii. 409,  
410. Dum.  
iv. 140, 142.

12.

Storm and  
massacre at  
Boulak, and  
defeat of the  
Turks in  
every quar-  
ter.

April 15.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.1800.  
April 18.

April 19.

a general assault took place. In vain the Mussulmans defended the walls with the courage which they have so often displayed in similar situations; after a bloody contest the French entered on all sides, and a desperate struggle took place in the streets and houses, which was only terminated by the approach of night. On the following morning, however, the Turkish leaders, seeing their defences forced, and being apprehensive of meeting with the fate of Boulak, if the resistance was any longer continued, made offers of capitulation; and Kleber, delighted at the prospect of terminating so bloody a strife, granted them favourable terms. Soon after, the Turkish division which had entered Cairo took the route of the desert, escorted by the French troops, and the insurgents of the capital purchased their lives by consenting to an enormous contribution. At the same time the Turks who had landed in the Delta were driven into Damietta, where they surrendered to General Belliard; and Mourad Bey, seeing all hope at an end, concluded an honourable convention with Kleber, in virtue of which he was permitted to retain the command of Upper Egypt. Within a month after the battle of Heliopolis, the crisis was entirely surmounted, and the French had quietly resumed possession of all their conquests.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Berth. 413,  
427. Jom.  
xiii. 414,  
415. Dum.  
iv. 141, 142.

13.  
Improved  
condition of  
the French  
army.

This great victory completely re-established the French affairs on the banks of the Nile. The troops, recently so gloomy and depressed, returned to their quarters joyous and triumphant; the stores and ammunition were repaired from the spoils of the defeated army; the booty obtained by the soldiers was immense, and from the contributions levied on the rebellious cities funds were obtained to clothe and equip the whole army anew. Animated by victory, the soldiers ceased to pine for a return to France: they formed connexions with Asiatic women, homes arose, and the endearments of domestic life began to be felt in that remote station. Cairo expiated its offence by a contribution of twelve million francs, or £480,000; the

other towns paid in the same proportion ; and from the money thus acquired means were obtained, not only to discharge all the arrears due to the troops, but to remount the cavalry and artillery, restore the hospitals, and replace all the other establishments requisite for the comfort of the soldiers. Such was the affluence which prevailed at headquarters, that Kleber was enabled to make his captives participate in his good fortune ; and, by promising half-pay to the Turks made prisoners at Aboukir and Heliopolis, recruited his army by a crowd of active horsemen, anxious to share in the fortunes of the victorious army. The Egyptians, confounded by the astonishing successes of the French, quietly resigned themselves to a fate which seemed inevitable, and their dominion was more firmly established than it had ever been since the disastrous expedition into Syria.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Berth. 427,  
433. Jom.  
xiii. 416,  
417. Dum.  
iv. 145, 146.  
Reyn. 84.

It was in the midst of these pacific labours, and when he was just beginning to reap the fruits of his intrepidity and judicious conduct, that Kleber was cut off by an obscure assassin, named Souleyman. This fanatic was stimulated to the atrocious act by religious conviction, and the prospect of obtaining a sum of money to liberate his father, who was in confinement. He remained a month in Cairo, watching his opportunity, and at length concealed himself in a cistern in the garden of the palace which the general occupied, and, darting out upon him as he walked with an architect, stabbed him to the heart. The assassin was brought before a military commission, and ordered to be impaled alive—a shocking punishment, disgraceful to the French generals, and in no degree justified either by the atrocity of his crime, or the customs of the country where it was perpetrated. Even murder is no excuse for torture ; and it is the duty of civilised nations to give an example of justice to barbarous, not to imitate their savage customs.<sup>2</sup> The frightful punishment was endured with unshrinking fortitude for three days together, the criminal evincing alike in his

14.  
Assassina-  
tion of Kle-  
ber.

June 14,  
1800.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Robert  
Wilson's  
Egyptian  
Campaign,  
184. Dum.  
vi. 148.

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XXXIV.

1800.

15.  
Designs of  
Kleber when  
he fell.

examinations and his last moments a mixture of fanatical spirit and filial piety, which would be deemed incredible if it had not occurred in real life.

The premature death of this distinguished general was a clap of thunder to the Egyptian army, and was attended with important effects upon the issue of the war. He had formed many important designs for the regulation of the colony, which, if they could have been carried into effect, might perhaps have long preserved that important acquisition to the French empire. It was his intention to have distributed the lands of the conquered country among his soldiers, after the manner of the Romans; to have enlisted the Greeks, Mamelukes, and Copts extensively in his service; disciplined them after the Western fashion; and on the stock of a formidable European infantry engrafted the fire and celerity of the Asiatic horse. These designs were calculated unquestionably to have formed a native force on the banks of the Nile, which might in time have rivalled that which England has brought to such perfection on the plains of Bengal; and the revenue of Egypt, under a regular government, would soon have been equal to the support of thirty or forty thousand auxiliary troops of that description.\* But it is extremely doubtful whether, by these or any other measures, it would have been possible to have preserved this colony while England held Malta, and retained the command of the sea, if she were resolutely bent upon rescuing it from the hands of France. Nor has the result of the establishment of the French at a subsequent period in Algiers warranted the belief that their genius is adapted for colonisation, or that any durable benefit either to themselves or others is to arise from their conquests in the East.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiii.  
422. Reyn.  
85, 86.

Upon Kleber's death, Menou, the governor of Cairo, and the oldest of the generals of division, assumed the

\* The revenue obtained by Menou from Egypt, even after all the disasters of the war, amounted to twenty-one million francs, or £840,000. The present Pasha has raised it to £2,500,000.—See REYNIER, 122.

command. Intoxicated with the prosperity of his situation, and carried away by the idea that he would succeed in amalgamating the French and Egyptians, so as to render them proof against any foreign attacks, he declined all steps towards an accommodation, rejected the new overtures of the Grand Vizier to evacuate the country at the conclusion of a general peace, and refused to listen to the proposals of Sir Sidney Smith, who was now empowered by his government to carry into effect the previously unauthorised convention of El-Arish. At the same time he exasperated the inhabitants by the imposition of additional imposts to meet the expenses of government, which had increased four hundred thousand francs (£16,000) a-month since the death of his predecessor; and vainly flattered himself that, by assuming the title of Abdallah, (the servant of God,) wearing the oriental costume, marrying a Turkish wife, and embracing the religion of Mahomet, which he publicly did, he would succeed in maintaining the country against the united hostility of the Turks and English.<sup>1</sup>\*

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1800.

16.

Menou  
takes the  
command.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. iv.  
150, 151.  
Reyn. 93,  
97. Jom.  
xiv. 312.  
Bign. ii. 23.

But the time was now approaching when the Republicans were to pay dear for their resolution to maintain

\* The admission of the French themselves will show with whom the blame of resiling from the convention of El-Arish really rests. The convention was signed at El-Arish on January 24, 1800; and Lord Keith's letter, announcing that he could agree to no capitulation, was dated Minorca, *January 8th*, more than a fortnight before the convention was signed, founded on orders dated 15th December 1799, from the British government. Sir Sidney Smith, on the 21st February 1800, stated, in a letter to General Kleber, that he had received such instructions as prevented him from acquiescing in the convention of El-Arish. He adds, "You will observe that the despatches I enclose are of old date (1st January,) written after orders transmitted from London on the 15th or 17th December, evidently dictated by the idea that you were about to treat separately with the Turks, and to prevent the execution of any measure contrary to our treaty of alliance. But now that my government is better informed, and that the convention is really ratified, I have not the slightest doubt that the restriction against the execution of the treaty will be removed before the arrival of the transports."<sup>2</sup> In this expectation of what he might expect from the probity of the English cabinet, Sir Sidney was not mistaken; for Mr Pitt stated in parliament, that though they had previously resolved to agree to no treaty between the Turks and French, in which the latter did not surrender as prisoners of war, yet, "the moment we found that a convention had been assented to by a British officer, though we disapproved of it, we sent orders to conform to it."<sup>3</sup> Lord Keith communicated the *previous* orders he had received, not only to the

<sup>2</sup> Berth. 354,  
355.

<sup>3</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxv. 586,  
597.

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1800.

17.

Prepara-  
tions for the  
English ex-  
pedition,  
and magni-  
ficent con-  
ception of  
the attack.

themselves in Egypt, and that glorious train of military triumphs was to commence which was destined to throw into the shade the disasters of former years, and terminate in the final overthrow of Napoleon on the field of Waterloo. The British government no sooner received intelligence of the resolution of Menou to decline the execution of the convention of El-Arish, than they put in motion all their resources to effect the expulsion of the French from the important settlement they had conquered. For this purpose their ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Elgin, received orders to use his utmost efforts to induce the Turks to make a grand exertion, in conjunction with the forces of Great Britain: the corps of Abercromby, so long condemned to hurtful inactivity in the Mediterranean, was to bear the brunt of the contest; and an English expedition from India received orders to ascend the Red Sea, cross the desert, descend by the waters of the Nile, and display their standards on the shores of Alexandria. The merit of this plan, and of the whole expedition to Egypt, belongs to Lord Melville, who singly at first supported it in the cabinet, till the vigorous mind of George III. gave it the weight of his sanction.\* So

Turks, but to the French on the same day; but the English did nothing to dissolve the treaty; the French broke the armistice, and the battle of Heliopolis was the consequence. These orders to ratify the treaty as soon as they had heard it had been assented to by an English officer, arrived in due time in Egypt, and were communicated by Sir Sidney Smith to General Menou. Let us hear his conduct from the mouth of General Reynier. "On the 9th Messidor (22d August) Mr Wright, lieutenant on board the *Tiger*, arrived with a flag of truce from the desert, with despatches from the Grand Vizier and Sir Sidney Smith. He announced that England had given to him the authority necessary to carry into execution the treaty of El-Arish. He had presented himself at Alexandria, but was refused admittance, and he had come round by the desert. He had endeavoured to induce the troops to revolt against the generals who refused to lead them back to France. *He was sent back.*" And this is what the French called the British want of faith in refusing to ratify the treaty of El-Arish! and yet their declamations on this subject received frequent and able support from the Opposition in the English parliament.—See *Parl. Debates*, xxxv. 595, 598, and 1436, 1438.

\* *PELLEW'S Life of Sidmouth*, i. 393.—Subsequently George III. proposed, on one occasion, the health of Lord Melville, as "the minister who had at first, in opposition to the opinion of the whole cabinet, suggested and supported the expedition to Egypt."—*Personal knowledge*.

great and extensive a project had never been formed by any nation, ancient or modern ; and it was not the least marvellous circumstance of this eventful period, that a remote province of the Roman empire should have assembled at the foot of the Pyramids the forces of Europe, Asia, and Africa in one combined enterprise, and brought to the shores of the Nile tribes unknown to the arms of Cæsar and Alexander.<sup>1</sup>

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1801.

<sup>1</sup> Wilson's  
Egypt, 3.  
Jom. xiv.  
308.

Agreeably to this plan, the corps of SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY, which had so long been tossed about by the winds in the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean sea, set sail from Malta on 10th December, and after a tedious voyage of six weeks, and remounting two hundred of its cavalry with Turkish horse, arrived at Marmorice in the Levant in the beginning of February. Eight thousand men, under Sir David Baird, were ready to embark at Bombay at the same time, and proceed by the Red Sea to Suez ; while the army of the Grand Vizier, which had been reinforced since its late disasters, was to break up from Acre, and again cross the desert which separates Egypt from Syria. The project was magnificently conceived, but it presented almost insurmountable difficulties in the execution ; and it was easy to perceive that the weight of the contest would fall upon Abercromby's forces. To combine an attack with success from various quarters, on an enemy in possession of a central position from whence he can at pleasure crush the first who approaches, is at all times a difficult and hazardous operation. But what must it be when the forces brought together for the enterprise are drawn from different quarters of the globe, and the tumultuary levies of Asia Minor are to be supported by the infantry of England proceeding up the Mediterranean, and the sable battalions of Hindostan wafted from the shores of India by the Red Sea ? To oppose this array of force, the French general had at his command above 25,000 veteran soldiers, including 1250 cavalry superbly mounted, and

18.  
Formation  
of the Eng-  
lish expedi-  
tion. Forces  
of the  
French.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Wilson,  
4, 5. Ann.  
Reg. 1801,  
226. Jom.  
xiv. 309.  
Thiers, iii.  
81.

19.  
The whole  
contest falls  
on Aber-  
cromby's  
corps.

rivalling the Mameluke horse in splendour of accoutrements. An entire regiment was mounted on dromedaries, and on these swift and hardy animals had acquired a surprising degree of efficiency. After providing fully for garrisons and detachments, the French, on the admission of their own historians, had 18,000 disposable troops\* occupying a central position—a force much greater than that which any of the enemy's generals, taken singly, could by possibility bring against them; and in point of warlike strength more powerful than them all put together.<sup>1</sup>†

The English army had long delayed the commencement of operations in Egypt, in order to await the re-organisation of the Turkish forces, and give time to the Grand Vizier to collect an armament of the promised strength on the Syrian side of the desert. But when the fleet approached the Levant, they learned that no reliance could be placed on any co-operation in that quarter. The

\* THIERS' *Consulat et l'Empire*, iii. 51.

† The forces on board the British fleet, and those to which they were opposed in Egypt, stood as follows:—

BRITISH.		FRENCH.	
Infantry,	15,463	Infantry,	23,690
Cavalry,	472	Cavalry,	1,250
Artillery,	578	Artillery,	1,100
		Dismounted cavalry,	480
	16,513		
Sick,	999		26,520
		Sick,	996
Total,	17,512 <sup>2</sup>	Total,	27,516 <sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Sir Ralph  
Abercrom-  
by's Return.  
Wilson, 270,  
273.

<sup>3</sup> Jom. xiv.  
316.

There were 999 sick in the British army when it landed, and 996 in the French, so that this diminution left the relative forces of the two nations the same as before.

The French troops who capitulated at Cairo were	13,672
And at Alexandria,	10,508

24,180

So that, supposing 4000 had been lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners, during the campaign, the total force at its commencement must have been from 27,000 to 28,000 men. The force under Sir David Baird, which ultimately landed at Suez, was 5500 men, and as they could not be entirely neglected, and the French required to maintain garrisons in the interior, the active forces that could be relied on for immediate operations were nearly equal, and they proved so in the decisive battle of Alexandria.—See JOMINI, xiv. 316; Sir R. WILSON, 167; and REYNIER, p. 412—*Tableau*, No. 2.



Ottoman forces, notwithstanding the levies ordered in Asia Minor, did not yet amount to twelve thousand men, and they were all in the most wretched state of discipline and equipment. So completely had their spirit been broken by their recent disasters, that they anticipated with the utmost dread a renewal of the contest; and it was extremely doubtful whether they ever could be brought to face the French infantry. To complete their inefficiency, the plague had broken out in the camp, and rendered their co-operation a subject of dread rather than desire; a frightful epidemic, the bequest of the desolation produced by war, ravaged Palestine; the most violent discord raged between the Grand Vizier and the Pasha of Acre; and a reinforcement of ten thousand men, who had been collected at Aleppo to repair their losses, received a different destination, from the alarming rebellion of Oglou Pasha, one of the eastern satraps of the Turkish empire.<sup>1</sup>

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XXXIV.  
1801.

<sup>1</sup> Wilson, 6.  
Dum. iv.  
154. Reyn.  
146.

Deprived of all hope of co-operation in this quarter, and unable to rely on the distant and uncertain aid of the Red Sea expedition, Sir Ralph Abercromby perceived that the success of this great enterprise, on which the hopes of the nation had so long been set, and in which, in some measure, the fate of the war was involved, would depend on his own troops. Fortunately, he was of a character not to be intimidated by the prospect of danger, and although the forces at his disposal were little more than half of those which, it was ultimately proved, were in the hands of his adversary, he gallantly resolved, alone and unaided, to make the attempt. Orders, therefore, were given to the fleet to weigh anchor; and although the weather was still very tempestuous, and the Greek pilots unanimously declared that it was impracticable to attempt a landing on the Egyptian coast till the equinoctial gales were over, the admiral stood out to sea, bearing with him a noble array of two hundred ships.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>20.</sup>  
Sir Ralph  
resolves to  
make the  
attack alone.  
Feb. 23,  
1801.

<sup>2</sup> Wilson, 7.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 226.

On the 1st March, the leading frigate made a signal for land, and on the following morning the whole fleet

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XXXIV.

1801.

21.

Arrival of  
the expedi-  
tion on the  
coast of  
Egypt, and  
landing of  
the troops.  
March 1.

March 8.

anchored in Aboukir Bay, precisely on the spot where Nelson's great victory had been gained three years before. The remains of that terrible strife were still visible; the Foudroyant chafed her cables against the Orient's wreck, and soon after fished up her anchor. A nobler sight could hardly be imagined: two hundred vessels covered the ocean almost as far as the eye could reach; the sand-hills of Egypt were already crowded with cannon and hostile troops; while every heart beat high with exultation at the prospect of soon measuring their strength with the enemy, and engaging in a contest on which the eyes of the whole world were fixed. The state of the weather for several days prevented the possibility of landing; but the wind having at length abated, the preparations were completed on the evening of the 7th; and on the morning of the 8th, at two o'clock, the first division, five thousand five hundred strong, assembled in the boats, one hundred and fifty in number, which were prepared to convey them to the shore. The clear heavens and unbroken silence of the night, the solemnity of the scene, the magnitude of the enterprise on which they were engaged, the dark outlines of the troops and guns on the sand-hills in their front, the unknown dangers to which they were approaching, filled every mind with anxious suspense; and thousands of brave hearts then throbbed with emotion, who were yet destined to astonish Europe by their gallant bearing, when the hour of trial had come. But not a vestige of confusion or trepidation appeared in the conduct of the debarkation; silently the troops descended from their transports, and took the places assigned them in the boats: and not a sound was heard as they approached the coast, but the measured dip of hundreds of oars in the water, incessantly urging towards the shore the flower of the British army.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1804, 207.  
Wils. 12, 13.  
Jom. xiv.  
322.

The French on the heights were about two thousand strong, posted in a concave semicircle, about a mile in length, supported by twelve pieces of artillery on the one

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XXXIV.

1801.

22.

Severe ac-  
tion on the  
sand-hills.

side and the castle of Aboukir on the other. The boats remained for some time in the middle of the bay, menacing different points of the coast; and at length, the whole being assembled, the signal was made to advance at nine o'clock. One hundred and fifty boats, each bearing fifty men, instantly moved forward with extraordinary rapidity; while the armed vessels, which covered their flanks, began to cannonade the batteries on shore. The French allowed them to approach within easy range, and then opened at once so heavy a fire that the water seemed literally to be ploughed up with shot, and the foam raised by it resembled a surf rolling over breakers. Silently the boats approached the tempest—the sailors standing up and rowing with uncommon vigour, the soldiers sitting silent and steady, with their arms in their hands, anxiously awaiting the moment to use them. When they reached the fire, several boats were sunk, and the loss among their crowded crews was very severe; but notwithstanding this, the line pressed forward with such precision, that the prows of almost all the first division struck the sand at the same time. The troops instantly jumped out into the water, and, rapidly advancing to the beach, formed before they could be charged by the enemy; the 42d, 23d, and 40th regiments rushed up the steep front of the heights with fixed bayonets, and carried them in the most gallant style; the Guards followed, and though disordered for a moment by a charge of horse before their formation was completed, made good their ground, and drove back the enemy. Soon after the 54th and Royals landed just in time to defeat a column which was advancing through a hollow against the flank of the newly established line. A third division completed the debarkation; and then the French, despairing of the success of further resistance, retired on all sides. In an hour the whole division was established on the heights, though weakened by five hundred men killed and wounded;<sup>1</sup> the enemy retired with the loss of three hun-

<sup>1</sup> Reyn. 205,  
209. Wils.  
14, 15. Ann.  
Reg. 1801,  
227, 228.

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1801.

23.

Effects of  
this first  
success.

dred, and left eight pieces of cannon in the hands of the victors.\*

This brilliant opening had the most important effects on the fate of the campaign. The gallant conduct of the troops, the splendid spectacle which their landing in presence of the enemy had afforded, the rapidity of their success in the sight of the whole fleet, filled both the soldiers and sailors with exultation, and already began to produce that confidence in their own prowess which in military affairs, as well as elsewhere in life, is not the least important element towards success. Sir Ralph hastened to profit by his good fortune, by disembarking the other divisions of the army, which was effected during the remainder of the day with the greatest expedition. Some uneasiness was at first experienced by the want of water; but Sir Sidney Smith soon relieved their anxiety, by telling them that wherever date-trees grew, water must be near—a piece of grateful information, which, like every other furnished by that enterprising officer, proved to be correct.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Wils. 17,  
18. Ann.  
Reg. 1801,  
228.

24.  
Cautious  
measures of  
the English  
general.

<sup>2</sup> Reyn. 209.  
Dum. iv.  
157.

It is now ascertained, that if the English army had pushed vigorously on before the enemy had time to recover from their consternation, they might have taken Alexandria with very little difficulty; and had they been as well aware of their prowess as they have since become, they would probably have done so.<sup>2</sup> But they were then only novices in the military art, and naturally distrustful of themselves when opposed to the far-famed veterans of France. Abercromby, therefore, advanced with caution. His first care was to complete the disembarkation of the troops, cannon, and stores—a service of considerable difficulty and danger, from the tempestuous state of the weather, and which occupied the three following days. The castle of Aboukir was at the same time invested, and

\* "This debarkation," said General Bertrand, "was admirable: in less than five or six minutes they presented 5500 men in battle array; it was like a movement on the opera-stage; three such completed the landing of the army." LAS CASES, i. 242.

intrenchments thrown up round the camp. It then appeared how much reason the British had to congratulate themselves on the supineness of Menou in retaining his principal force at Cairo, when so formidable an enemy was establishing himself in his colony. Had he appeared with his disposable force, eighteen thousand men, on the heights of Aboukir, the only point on the coast where a descent was practicable, the landing could never have been attempted, and even if effected, it would in all probability have terminated in disaster. The truth is, the French general, like all his contemporaries at that period, greatly underrated the British military forces; and he gladly heard of their debarkation, from a belief that they would soon become prisoners of war. Thus, while the British, from not being aware of their own strength, lost the opportunity of taking Alexandria in the outset of the campaign, the French, from an overweening confidence in theirs, reduced themselves, in the end, to the humiliation of the Caudine forks.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dum. iv.  
158. Wils.  
18, 19. Jom.  
xiv. 324,  
325.

The preparations being at length completed, the army moved forward, on the evening of the 12th, to Mandora tower, where they encamped in three lines. The enemy had by this time been considerably reinforced from Cairo and Rosetta; so that their force amounted to five thousand four hundred infantry, six hundred cavalry, and twenty-five pieces of cannon. Notwithstanding the smallness of their numbers, Generals Friant and Lanusse resolved to make good their ground against the invaders—trusting to their great superiority in cavalry, the strength of their position in front of an old Roman camp, and the facility of retiring to Alexandria in case of disaster. It was of the highest importance to maintain their ground, for it covered the end of the dyke which, in the low ground adjoining the sea, led to Ramanieh, and commanded the only direct communication with Cairo and the interior of Egypt. The British general advanced cautiously, at daybreak on the morning of the 13th, in three lines; the

25.  
Bloody encounter with  
the French  
vanguard.

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XXXIV.

1801.

enemy's force was unknown, and it was in an especial manner necessary to take precautions against his decided superiority in horse. The first line, when it came within range of the French, was received with a heavy fire of grape and musketry, while a regiment of cavalry impetuously charged its flank ; but both attacks were gallantly repulsed by the 90th and 92d regiments ; the murderous fire of the British infantry threw the Republicans into disorder, and the advance of the second line soon compelled them to retreat. Then was the moment to have followed up their success, and by a rapid charge completed the defeat of the enemy, in which case Alexandria would probably have fallen an easy conquest ; but the British were still ignorant of their own power, and the want of cavalry prevented them from taking the advantage which they might have derived from their victory.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Reyn. 215,  
217. Wils.  
20. Jom.  
xiv. 327.  
Thiers, iii.  
79, 82.

26.  
Ultimate  
success, but  
great loss of  
the British.

They contented themselves, therefore, with occupying the ground so easily won, and halted within cannon-shot of the second line of defence ; and it was not till the enemy had established themselves on the heights in their rear, in front of Alexandria, that they again moved forward to the charge. They then advanced with admirable coolness, and in parade order, but in ordinary time only, as if at a review, under a murderous fire of cannon-shot. The attack was not conducted with the vigour and rapidity necessary to insure decisive success, nor was any attempt made to turn a position which his great superiority of numbers would have enabled the British general so easily to outflank. The consequence was, that the British sustained a loss double that of their adversaries ;\* and though the second position was at length abandoned by the French, who withdrew the bulk of their forces within the walls of the town,<sup>2</sup> thus abandoning the

<sup>2</sup> Wils. 20,  
23. Reyn.  
215, 219.  
Jom. xiv.  
327, 328.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 229.  
Thiers, iii.  
83, 84.

\* The English lost 1200, the French 500 men in this affair. It is impossible to refuse a tribute of admiration to the skill of the generals and valour of the soldiers, which, with such inferior forces, enabled the Republicans, at so slight a cost, to inflict so serious a loss upon their adversaries.—See WILSON, 23 ; REYNIER, 217, 219 ; and *Ann. Reg.* 1801, 227.

head of the dike and road to Ramanieh, for which they had fought ; yet this was done in perfect order, and without any loss of artillery ; whereas, had Abercromby possessed the confidence in himself and his soldiers which subsequent triumphs gave to Wellington and Picton, he would have carried the position of the enemy, by a combined attack in front and flank, in half an hour, and entered Alexandria along with their broken battalions.

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1801.

The position now occupied by the British was by nature strong. The right was advanced before the rest of the line nearly a quarter of a mile, on high ground, and extended to the large and magnificent ruins of a Roman palace within fifty yards of the sea ; their left rested on the lake Maadieh ; the intervening space, about a mile in breadth, consisted of a succession of low sandhills. These sandhills, which are higher than such as are usually found on the shores of the ocean, had been formed in a succession of ages by the meeting of the waves of the sea, with the inundations of the Nile descending from the land side, and spreading over the level expanse of the Delta. In front of the position was a level sandy surface, which commenced before the left, and extended as far as the French lines ; on this plain cavalry could act, but as they approached the British videttes, they found the ground strewn with large stones, the remains of Roman edifices which formerly had covered all that part of the shore. Gunboats in the sea, and the lake Maadieh, protected each flank ; on the left, in front of the lines occupied by the troops, was a redoubt mounted by twelve pieces of cannon ; two were placed on the ruins of the Roman palace, and in the centre slight works were thrown up to aid the fire of the musketry. In this position the British army, now reduced by sickness, the sword, and detachments to the rear, to eleven thousand five hundred men, with thirty-six pieces of cannon, awaited the attack of the enemy.<sup>1</sup>

27.  
Description  
of the ground  
now taken  
up by the  
British  
army.

<sup>1</sup> Wils. 24,  
25, 30.  
Reyn. 220,  
222. Jom.  
xiv. 330.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 232.  
Thiers, iii.  
72, 73, 87.

The position of the French was still stronger. A high

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1801.

28.

Position of  
the French.

ridge of hills extended from the sea to the canal of Alexandria; along this elevated ground their troops were placed, with fort Cretin rising in deceitful grandeur in the centre, and fort Caffarelli in the rear of the left. Their generals were at first fearful that the advance of the British had entirely cut them off from the dikes which formed their line of communication with Menou; but that commander discovered a circuitous route, by which he was enabled to reach Alexandria; and on the evening of the 19th the whole disposable French troops, eleven thousand strong, including fourteen hundred cavalry, with forty-six pieces of cannon, were drawn up in this imposing position. Everything conspired to recommend early and decisive operations; the ancient fame and tried prowess of the Egyptian army left no room for doubt that they would speedily drive the presumptuous islanders into the sea; while, by protracting operations, time would be afforded for the Grand Vizier to cut off the garrisons on the frontier of Syria, and for the Indian army to menace their rear from the Red Sea.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Wils. 25.  
Jom. xiv.  
329, 330.  
Reyn. 222.  
223. Hard.  
viii. 1:2.  
Thiers, iii.  
72, 73.

29.

Interesting  
recollections  
connected  
with the  
spot.

The ground occupied by the two armies was singularly calculated to awaken the most interesting recollections. England and France were here to contend for the empire of the East in the cradle of ancient civilisation, on the spot where Pompey was slain to propitiate the victorious arms of Cæsar, and under the walls of the city which is destined to perpetuate, to the latest generations, the prophetic wisdom of Alexander. Every object which met the eye was fraught with historic renown. On the right of the French line rose Pompey's Pillar, on the left Cleopatra's Needle; in the distance were seen the mouldering walls and Eastern domes of Alexandria, while on the extreme horizon, stretching into the sea, appeared the far-famed tower of Pharos. The British, as well as their antagonists, felt the influence of the scene and the grandeur of the occasion;<sup>2</sup> and these ancient rivals in military renown prepared to join in their first serious contest since

<sup>2</sup> Wils. 25.



the Revolution, with a bravery worthy of the cause in which they were engaged, and the animating scenes amid which they stood.

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On the 20th, the castle of Aboukir, with its garrison of one hundred and ninety men, surrendered. On the morning of the 21st, the army was under arms at three o'clock, eagerly expecting the attack which the movements of the preceding evening had led them to anticipate. A gloomy mist covered the plain, through which every eye was painfully striving to pierce; every ear was straining to catch the smallest sound; the eastern horizon was anxiously regarded, but though the gray of the morning was perceptible, it seemed reluctant to break. Suddenly the report of a musket was heard, followed by two cannonshots on the left: it was occasioned by the French dromedary corps, which stole unperceived through the mist, passed over a dried part of the lake Maadich, and made themselves masters of the guns on that flank. The field-officers, thinking the attack was to commence there, were already galloping in that direction, when a sharp rattle broke out on the right, followed by loud shouts, which too surely announced that the action had begun in good earnest in that quarter. In fact the enemy, under Lanusse, were advancing in great force against the Roman ruins, where the 58th and 23d regiments were placed. The British officers no sooner saw the glazed hats of the Republicans emerging through the mist, than they ordered a discharge, and the troops poured in a fire by platoons, so heavy and well-directed, that the French were compelled to swerve to the left, and in making this movement the brave Lanusse received a mortal wound. His division was so disconcerted by this event, and by the fire of the British, which was kept up with uncommon vigour, both on their front and flank, that they broke and fled in confusion behind the sandhills.<sup>1</sup>

30.  
Battle of  
Alexandria.  
Repulse of  
the French  
on the right.

<sup>1</sup> Wilson,  
31, 32. Ann.  
Reg. 1801,  
230. Reyn.  
226. Jom.  
xiv. 334,  
335. Thiers,  
iii. 80, 89.

But at this instant General Rampon advanced at the head of a fresh column, two thousand strong, and, joining

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1801.

31.

Rampon  
restores the  
combat on  
the right.  
Desperate  
conflict be-  
tween the  
Highlanders  
and Invinci-  
bles.

the broken remains of Lanusse's division, renewed the attack with greater force, and succeeded in turning the Roman ruins so as to take the troops who defended them both in front and flank. Menou supported this attack by a grand charge with all his cavalry against the right and right centre. No sooner did Sir Ralph perceive the cavalry advancing, than he moved up the 42d and 28th regiments from the second line to the support of the menaced wing; but soon after it arrived in the fire, the first of these corps was suddenly charged in flank by the Republican horse, and broken. Notwithstanding this, the brave Highlanders formed in little knots, and, standing back to back, resisted the cavalry when they endeavoured to cut them down. The 28th regiment was maintaining a severe action in front, when they were startled by hearing French voices behind their line; the rear rank had just time to face about, when it was assailed by a volley from a regiment which had got round under cover of the mist; and these gallant troops, without flinching, stood back to back, and maintained this extraordinary contest for a considerable time. But this bold irruption of the French soon exposed them to the same dangers with which they had threatened the British. The British reserve advanced in admirable order, and threw in a close and well-directed fire upon the attacking column; the Republicans, in their turn, were assailed at once in front and flank, and driven into the ruins, where a battalion which, by its great success in the Italian wars, had acquired the surname of the Invincibles, was obliged to lay down its arms, after having lost above two-thirds of its numbers.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Wils. 31.  
33. Ann.  
Reg. 1801,  
230, 231.  
Reyn. 226,  
227. Jom.  
xiv. 334,  
335. Thiers,  
iii. 89, 90.

32.

Defeat of  
the French:

The French cavalry also, having now lost half their numbers by the close and well-directed fire of the English infantry, prepared to cut their way back to their own lines. For this purpose they charged the English reserve with the utmost fury; but those steady men, with admirable coolness, opened their ranks so as to let the squadrons

sweep through, and instantly closing them again, and wheeling about, threw in so deadly a volley upon the disordered horsemen, that they almost all, with their commander Roize, perished on the spot. The remnant, both foot and horse, of the force which had made this formidable attack, escaped in confusion from the scene of slaughter, and regained in dismay the French position. The defeat of this desperate attack terminated the important operations of this eventful day. On the left of the British position the operations of the Republicans were confined to a distant cannonade; and a more serious attack on the centre was repulsed by the rapid and destructive fire of the British Guards. At length Menou, finding that all his efforts had proved unsuccessful, ordered a general retreat, which was effected in the best order to the heights of Nicopolis in his rear, under cover of the cannon placed on that formidable position. The loss of the British amounted to fifteen hundred killed and wounded; that of the French to above two thousand; but this was of comparatively little importance. They had lost the character of invincibility; the charm which had paralysed the world was broken; and on the standards taken by the victors, they pointed with exultation to the names, "Le Passage de la Scrivia, le Passage du Tagliamento, le Passage de l'Isonzo, la Prise de Gratz, le Pont de Lodi."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Wils. 33,  
38. Reyn.  
228, 231.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 232.  
Jem. xiv.  
337, 345.  
Hard. viii.  
153, 154.  
Thiers, iii.  
92.

But this important triumph was mingled with one mournful recollection. Sir Ralph Abercromby, who had the glory of first leading the British to decisive victory over the arms of revolutionary France, received a mortal wound in the early part of the day, of which he died a few days afterwards. No sooner did that gallant veteran hear of the furious irruption of the French cavalry into the lines on the right, than he mounted his horse and galloped in that direction. He arrived while it was yet dark—when almost unattended by his aides-de-camp, whom he had despatched in various directions—on the

33.  
Wound and  
death of Sir  
Ralph Aber-  
cromby.

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XXXIV.

1801.

ground over which the cavalry were sweeping, and was assailed by the French dragoons, one of whom he disarmed in a personal conflict. Soon after, however, he received a wound from a musket-shot in the thigh, which compelled him to dismount, and make the best of his way on foot to the redoubt on the right of the Guards, where he remained for the rest of the day, walking about, exposed to a terrible cannonade, insensible alike to the pain of his wound and the danger of his situation. With anxious hopes he watched the progress of the action, every part of which was visible from that elevated station, and had the satisfaction of seeing the French retire, and the victory finally decided, before the loss of blood began to darken his eyes. He lived till the morning of the 29th, expressing no solicitude but for the issue of the struggle; and bore a painful operation for the extraction of the ball with the greatest firmness. But it had penetrated so far, that it could not be reached by the skill of the surgeons, and he sank at length in the arms of glory, leaving a name enshrined in the grateful recollection of his country.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Wils. 48.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 232.

34.  
Immense  
moral con-  
sequences of  
this victory.

The battle of Alexandria not only delivered Egypt from the Republican yoke; it decided, in its ultimate consequences, the fate of the civilised world. The importance of a triumph is not always to be measured by the number of troops engaged: twenty-four thousand Romans, under Cæsar at Pharsalia, changed the face of antiquity; thirty-five thousand Greeks under Alexander subverted the empires of the East; thirty thousand Republicans at Marengo seated Napoleon on the consular throne, and established a power which overturned nearly all the monarchies of Europe. The contest of twelve thousand British, with an equal number of French, on the sands of Alexandria, in its remote effects, overthrew a greater empire than that of Charlemagne, and rescued mankind from a more galling tyranny than that of the Roman emperors. It first elevated the hopes and confirmed the

resolution of the British soldiers; it first broke the charm by which the Continental nations had been so long enthralled; it first revived the military spirit of the British people, and awakened the pleasing hope, that the descendants of the victors at Cressy and Azincour had not degenerated from the valour of their fathers. Nothing but the recollection of this decisive trial of strength could have supported the British nation through the arduous conflict which awaited them on the renewal of the war, and induced them to remain firm and unshaken amidst the successive prostration of every Continental power, till the dawn of hope began to appear over the summit of the Pyrenees, and the eastern sky was reddened by the conflagration of Moscow. The Continental nations, accustomed to the shock of vast armies, and to regard the British only as a naval power, attached little importance to the contest of such inconsiderable bodies of men on a distant shore; but the prophetic eye of Napoleon at once discerned the magnitude of its consequences, and he received the intelligence of the disaster at Alexandria with a degree of anguish equalled only by that experienced from the shock of Trafalgar.<sup>1\*</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXIV.  
1801.

<sup>1</sup> Bour. iv.  
299. D'Abr.  
v. 302. Jom.  
xiv. 336.

But though destined in its ultimate effects to produce these important consequences, the victory of Alexandria was not at first attended by results at all commensurate to the ardent anticipations of the British people. The movements of the British army were for long cautious and dilatory. But though their operations were not

35.  
Its first  
effects are  
not very  
decisive.  
Surrender of  
Damietta.

\* "I can with safety affirm," said Junot, "that Napoleon's design was to have made Egypt the point from which the thunderbolt was to issue which was to overwhelm the British empire. I can easily sympathise, therefore, with the cruel agony which he underwent when he pronounced these words, 'Junot, we have lost Egypt.'" The First Consul never let those around him know to what a degree he was afflicted by the stroke which he received from England on that occasion. Junot alone was fully acquainted with it; it was only to the eyes of those who had enjoyed his early intimacy that he raised the veil which concealed the anguish of his heart. Junot wept like a child when he recounted what the First Consul had said during the two hours that he was with him, after he received intelligence of that disastrous event. "My projects and my dreams alike have been destroyed by England," said that great conqueror.—DUCHESS OF ABRANTES, v. 202, 203.

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1801.

brilliant, they were skilful, and ultimately produced the desired results. For some days after the battle, they remained on the ground where they had so bravely combated, and the French occupied the heights of Nicopolis—both parties being busied in repairing their losses, and restoring the strength of their forces. At length a reinforcement of six thousand Albanians having arrived in the bay of Aboukir, they were joined by a British detachment of a thousand men, and the combined forces approached Rosetta, situated on one of the mouths of the Nile. On their approach, the French garrison retired to Damietta, leaving a hundred and fifty men in fort Julien, who, after a spirited resistance, surrendered on the 19th April. Shortly after the British army was reinforced by three thousand men, who landed at Aboukir in the beginning of May; and General Hutchinson, who had now succeeded to the command, resolved to commence offensive operations.<sup>1</sup>

May 9.  
1 Ann. Reg.  
1801, 233.  
Jom. xiv.  
338, 339.

36.  
Divisions  
break out  
among the  
French ge-  
nerals: in-  
decisive  
measures of  
Menou.

Meanwhile divisions, the natural result of such unwanted disasters, broke out among the French generals. General Reynier strongly urged the expedience of leaving garrisons only in Alexandria, Cairo, and other important points, and concentrating the mass of the troops at Ramanieh, in a situation either to fall upon the British army, if they should leave their lines to attack Rosetta or Alexandria, or to crush the Grand Vizier if he should attempt to cross the desert. But nothing could induce Menou to adopt anything but half measures. He detached four thousand troops under la Grange to relieve Rosetta, who arrived on the Nile too late to disengage that place, and retired to El-Aft, where they threw up intrenchments, and awaited the movements of the British; but he himself remained at Alexandria, obstinately persisting in the belief that the Grand Vizier would never cross the desert, that the British would not venture to quit their position, and that if he remained firm a little longer, they would again betake themselves to their vessels. Meanwhile

April 13.

General Hutchinson was rapidly circumscribing his limits at Alexandria: he cut the isthmus which separated the lake Maadieh from the dried bed of the lake Marcotis, and filled with the sea that monument of ancient industry, thereby almost isolating Alexandria from the rest of Egypt; while the British flotilla ascended the Nile, and captured an important convoy descending that river for the use of its garrison. These disasters produced the greatest discouragement in the French army; the dissensions among the officers increased in vehemence; and General Reynier's language in particular became so menacing, that the commander-in-chief, apprehensive that he might, with the concurrence of the army, assume the command, had him arrested and sent back to France.<sup>1\*</sup>

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XXXIV.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> *Jom. xiv.*  
339, 340.  
*Reyn. 235,*  
*252. Wils.*  
56.

The detachment of la Grange, with four thousand men, having reduced the garrison of Alexandria to little more than six thousand, General Hutchinson at length moved forward, with the main body of his forces, towards Ramanieh, in order to menace Cairo, and carry the war into the central parts of Egypt. Four thousand British and six thousand Turks, in the first instance, advanced against the intrenched position of la Grange at El-Aft. On the approach of such considerable forces, the French general retired to the fortified position of Ramanieh—an important post on the Nile, from which the canal branches off which connects it with Alexandria—where he collected four thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and forty pieces of cannon. After a sharp skirmish, however, this position was abandoned; and the advance of Hutchinson having cut off their retreat to Alexandria, the Republi-

37.  
General  
Hutchinson  
advances to-  
ward Cairo,  
and takes  
Ramanieh.

May 7.

\* The characters of Menou and Reynier are thus given by Napoleon:—"Menou appeared to have all the qualities fitted for the command; he was learned, upright, and an excellent civil governor. He had become a Mussulman, which, how ridiculous soever, was agreeable to the natives of the country; a doubt hung over his military capacity, but none over his personal courage; he had acted well in la Vendée and at the assault of Alexandria. General Reynier was more habituated to war; but he wanted the chief quality in a general-in-chief; excellent when second in command, he was unfit to take the lead. His character was silent and solitary, having no knowledge of the means of electrifying, ruling, or guiding mankind."—*NAP. in MONTH.* i. 73, 74.

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XXXIV.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
339. 341.  
Wils. 84,  
96. Ann.  
Reg. 1801,  
234.

38.  
General  
Belliard is  
defeated  
near Cairo.

cans were compelled to fall back upon Cairo, which they reached a few days afterwards. The capture of Ramanieh was an important step in the campaign, as it completely isolated the troops at Cairo from those at Alexandria, cut off the chief supplies from the latter city, and rendered all attempt at co-operation impossible between them. The fruits of this acquisition soon appeared in the capture of a convoy of four hundred men and six hundred camels, bound for Alexandria, which, in the solitudes of the desert, fell a prey to the activity and vigilance of the British cavalry.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile the Grand Vizier, encouraged by the unwonted intelligence of the defeat of the French forces, and relieved by the cessation of the plague in his army, one great cause of his weakness, mustered up courage to cross the desert which separates Syria from Egypt, and in the middle of April drew near to the French fortified position on the frontiers of the former province, at the head of twelve thousand men. At his approach, the Republicans evacuated Salahieh and Balbeis, on the edge of the desert, and Damietta, at the mouth of one of the branches of the Nile, and drew back all their forces to Cairo. The arrival of la Grange with the troops from Ramanieh having increased the disposable force of General Belliard to ten thousand veterans, he moved forward at the head of six thousand chosen troops to El-Hanka, to meet the Turkish force. But the Mussulmans were now under very different direction from that which led them to destruction at Heliopolis. Major Hope,\* afterwards one of the most distinguished lieutenants of Wellington, was with the artillery, and Major Holloway directed all the movements of the Grand Vizier. These able officers brought up the Turkish artillery and infantry to the fight in a wood of date-trees, where the superiority of European discipline was not so decisive as in the open plain; while a skilful

\* Afterwards General Sir John Hope and Earl of Hopetoun, who commanded Wellington's left wing during the campaign in the south of France.



movement of the cavalry towards the enemy's rear threatened to cut off their retreat to Cairo. The consequence was, that after an indecisive action of five hours, Belliard retreated to the capital; a result so different from any which had yet attended their warfare with the Republicans, that it elevated immensely the spirits of the Ottomans, and, what was of still greater consequence, disposed them to resign themselves implicitly to the guidance of the British officers attached to their staff.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
342, 343.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 235.  
Wils. 110,  
111.

This important advantage having thrown the enemy on all sides back into Cairo, and the success of the Turks having proved that under proper guidance some reliance could be placed upon them in active operations, General Hutchinson resolved to advance immediately against that capital, although the promised co-operation of the troops from the Red Sea could not be calculated upon, as, from the prevalence of contrary winds in that dangerous strait, they had been detained much beyond the appointed time. The British army invested the metropolis on the 20th May on the left, while the Grand Vizier did the same on the right bank of the Nile. The fortifications of the town, begun by Kleber, had been assiduously continued by Menou; but they were too extensive, stretching over a circumference of fourteen miles, to be adequately guarded by nine thousand men, to which the effective part of the garrison was now reduced. Although, therefore, General Baird, with the Indian army, had not yet arrived, there could be no doubt that he would make his appearance in the rear if the siege were continued for any length of time. Impressed by these considerations, and fearful that by delay he might not obtain equally favourable terms, Belliard, on the day following, proposed a capitulation on the same conditions as had been agreed to the year before at El-Arish, viz. that the army should be conveyed to France within fifty days, with its arms, field-artillery, and baggage. This was immediately agreed to. The troops embarked on the Nile, in virtue of this capitula-

39.  
Cairo is invested, and its garrison capitulates.

May 20.

May 22.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
345, 346.  
Wils. 157.  
265. Ann.  
Reg. 1801,  
236, 237.

tion, amounted to 13,672, besides the civil servants; and they left in the hands of the British 320 pieces of heavy cannon, exclusive of the field-pieces of the corps which they carried with them—an astonishing conquest to have been achieved by a European force of similar amount, and a lasting monument to the importance of the triumph gained by the British arms on the sands of Alexandria.<sup>1</sup>

40.

Advance of  
Sir David  
Baird's divi-  
sion from the  
Red Sea.

Shortly after this capitulation was signed, the army of General Baird, 6400 strong, of whom 3600 were British and 2800 Sepoys, appeared on the banks of the Nile from India. They had sailed from Bombay in the end of December, but unfortunately the monsoon had set in before they arrived at the mouth of the Red Sea, which rendered it impossible for them to reach their original destination, which was Suez, in time to operate as a diversion to the British force when it first landed at the mouth of the Nile. After struggling hard with contrary winds for above two months, in the course of which two transports were lost, the expedition arrived at Cosseir, in Upper Egypt, in the beginning of July, and preparations were instantly made for crossing the desert which separates the Red Sea from Thebes. This passage is one hundred and forty miles long; and as it was the first instance recorded in history of a European army, with the artillery and encumbrances of modern warfare, crossing one of the Eastern deserts, it is in a peculiar manner worthy of observation.<sup>2</sup>

July 9.

<sup>2</sup> Wils. 171,  
172. Ann.  
Reg. 1801,  
237.

41.

Their march  
from Cosseir  
to Thebes  
across the  
Desert.  
July 29.

The first detachment began its march from Cosseir, and in nine days it arrived at Kinneh on the Nile. The road across the arid wilderness lies almost the whole way through a succession of ravines, winding amongst hills varying from five to fifteen hundred feet in height. These hills are very remarkable, rising often perpendicularly on either side of the valley, as if scarpd by art—in other places rather broken and overhanging, like the lofty banks of a mighty river, the traveller traversing its dry and naked bed. Now you are quite land-locked; soon you

open on lateral valleys, and see upon heights in their distance small square towers. Depots of provisions had been provided at the eight stations where the army halted, and wells dug by the Arabs, from which a tolerable supply of water was obtained, though in many places rather of a brackish quality. Not a dwelling was to be seen, and hardly any traces of vegetation were discovered along this dreary tract; nothing met the eye but bare and arid rocks in the mountains, and loose sand or hard gravel in the hollows. The sufferings of the soldiers from heat and thirst were very great; for though they marched only during the night, yet the atmosphere, heated to 115 degrees of Fahrenheit in the shade during the day, was at all times sultry and oppressive in the highest degree. It was soon found that it was impossible by drinking to allay the thirst, and that indulgence in that respect only augmented the desire; a little vinegar mixed with water proved the only effectual relief. Everywhere the cannon and ammunition-waggons passed with facility over the hard surface, drawn by oxen brought from India. No words can describe the transports of the soldiers when at Rensch they first came in sight of the Nile, flowing in a full majestic stream in the green plain at their feet. The bonds of discipline were unavailing to prevent a tumultuous rush of men, horses, camels, and oxen, when they approached its banks, to plunge into the waves. With speechless delight the parched men and animals plunged their heads, arms, and bodies, into the cool stream, and drew in long draughts of its delicious water.\* At length, by great efforts, the army was assembled at Thebes with very little loss, considering the arduous service they had undergone. They there gazed with wonder at the avenues

\* ——— “A ciascun giova

La chioma averne, non che 'l manto aspersa.

Chi bee ne' vetri, e chi negli elmi a prova:

Chi tien la man nella fresca onda immersa.

Chi se ne spruzza il volto, e chi le tempie;

Chi scaltro a miglior uso i vasi n' empie.”—*Ger. Lib. xiii. 77.*

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XXXIV.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Scherer's  
Egypt, 68,  
69. Wils.  
171, 173.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 237.

of sphinxes and the stately temples which are destined to transmit to the latest posterity the wonders of ancient Egypt: and, embarking on the Nile, fell down in boats in nine days, a distance of three hundred miles, to Grand Cairo, where they arrived on the 10th August. There, for the first time in the history of the world, the sable Hindoos from the banks of the Ganges, the swarthy Asiatics from the plains of the Euphrates, and the blue-eyed English from the shores of the Thames, met in arms at the foot of the Pyramids.<sup>1</sup>\*

42.  
General  
Hutchin-  
son moves  
against  
Menou at  
Alexandria.

When Menou was informed of the capitulation of Cairo, he professed himself highly incensed at its conditions, and loudly proclaimed his resolution to bury himself under the ruins of Alexandria. He refused to take advantage, in consequence, of the proposal made to him to accede to the capitulation of the capital, and embark on the same terms for France. This determination was founded on intelligence he had received by the brig Lodi, which had eluded the vigilance of the British cruisers and penetrated into Alexandria, of the approach of Admiral Gantheaume, with seven sail of the line and five thousand men, accompanied by the most peremptory orders from the First Consul to hold out to the last extremity. Finding that the reduction of this last stronghold could only be effected by force, General Hutchinson, after the embarkation of General Belliard and his division, brought down the greater part of his troops from Cairo; and, in the beginning of August, commenced active operations, at the head of sixteen thousand men, against Alexandria. A flotilla was rapidly collected on the lake Mareotis; but, to complete the investment of the place, it was necessary to reduce fort Marabon,<sup>2</sup> situated on a tongue of land which unites the town to the opposite

<sup>2</sup> Wils. 194,  
200. Jom.  
xiv. 850,  
851. Reyn.  
280, 284.  
Aug. 17.

\* A singular incident occurred on this occasion. When the Sepoy regiments came to the monuments of ancient Egypt, they fell down and worshipped the images—another proof, among the many which exist, of the common origin of these early nations. I have heard this curious fact from several officers who were present on the occasion.

side of the lake, and the inlet by which the garrison received supplies of provisions from the Arabs. Four thousand men were embarked in the flotilla, and landed near the fort on the 17th, while a feint was made of a general attack on the heights of Nicopolis by General Hutchinson.

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XXXIV.  
1801.

These operations were completely successful. The landing of the troops was effected with very little opposition : batteries were rapidly constructed, and so heavy a fire kept up, both by land and sea, that the fort was soon reduced to a heap of ruins; and the garrison, consisting of a hundred and sixty men, was compelled to capitulate. At the same time, some of the advanced redoubts of the Republicans were carried on the heights near the sea; and a column of six hundred men, detached by Menou to recover them, was driven back by Colonel Spencer, at the head of seven companies of the 30th, with the most distinguished gallantry. In endeavouring to set fire to the British flotilla, the French burned their own schooners on the lake; while the light vessels of the fleet boldly sailed into the harbour of Alexandria, and opened a cannonade upon the enemy's squadron in the inner port. On the following day General Coote followed up these successes; and, advancing along the isthmus beyond Marabon, opened his trenches in form against Fort le Turc, which was soon breached by a formidable artillery. These disasters at length wakened Menou from his dream of security; the promised succour under Gantheaume had proved elusory; he forgot his resolution to conquer or die, and consented to a capitulation, in virtue of which the French were to surrender Alexandria, with all its artillery, and be transported back to France, with their arms, baggage, and ten pieces of cannon only. It was agreed between the military commanders, that the collections of antiquities and drawings which had been made by the artists and learned men who accompanied the expedition should be surrendered to the British; but as the French *savans*

43.  
Progress of  
the siege,  
and surren-  
der of  
Menou.

Aug. 27.

Aug. 31.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1801, 238,  
239. Wils.  
194, 212.  
Jom. xiv.  
850, 853.  
Reyn. 280,  
288.

44.  
Results of  
this cam-  
paign.

<sup>2</sup> Wils. 179,  
216, 217.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 239.  
Jom. xiv.  
852, 853.  
Reyn. 280,  
289.

<sup>3</sup> Wilson,  
179, 217.

<sup>4</sup> Nap. in  
Month. i. 80,  
81, and ii.  
216.

<sup>5</sup> Wilson,  
270, 308.

made the most vigorous remonstrances against such a condition, and threatened to destroy them rather than that they should fall into the hands of the victors, General Hutchinson, with a generous regard to the interests of science, and the feelings of these distinguished persons, agreed to depart from the stipulation, and allow those treasures of art to be forwarded to France. The sarcophagus of Alexander, now in the British Museum, was, however, retained by the British, and formed the glorious trophy of their memorable triumph.<sup>1</sup>

The military results of this conquest were very great. Three hundred and twelve pieces of cannon, chiefly brass, were found upon the works of Alexandria, besides seventy-seven on board the ships of war. No less than 195,000 pounds of powder, and 14,000 gun-cartridges were taken in the magazines; while the soldiers who capitulated were 10,011, independent of 517 sailors and 665 civil servants.<sup>2</sup> The total troops included in the conventions of Cairo and Alexandria were above 24,000,\* all

\* The troops who capitulated at Cairo, exclusive of civil servants, were—

At Alexandria,	13,672
	10,528

24,200<sup>3</sup>

which, supposing 4000 lost in the previous engagements, leaves a total of 28,000 men to oppose the British in Egypt, having at their command, in heavy cannon and field-pieces, above 700 guns. The amount of the force which the French had in this contest, is ascertained by the best possible evidence, that of an unwilling witness, perfectly acquainted with the facts, and never disposed to exaggerate the amount of his beaten troops. "In March 1801," says Napoleon, "the English disembarked an army of 18,000 men, without artillery or cavalry horses: it should have been destroyed. The army, vanquished after six months of false manœuvres, was disembarked on the shores of Provence still 24,000 strong. When Napoleon quitted it, in the end of August 1799, it amounted in all to 28,500 men. As the British and Allied forces did not enter simultaneously into action, but, on the contrary, at an interval of several months from each other, the victory must have remained with the French if they had had a general of capacity at their head, who knew how to avail himself skilfully of the advantages of his central position."<sup>4</sup> The British forces which came with Sir Ralph Abercromby were—

Landed in April,	16,599
Came with Sir David Baird,	3,000
	5,919

Total British and Indian troops, 25,518<sup>5</sup>

The army of the Grand Vizier, which advanced against Cairo after the battle

tried veterans of France; an astonishing success to have been achieved by a British force which had hardly ever seen a shot fired, and which, even including those who came up from India six weeks after Cairo had surrendered, never amounted to the same numerical strength.

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1801.

After the reduction of Alexandria, the greater part of the army, with General Hutchinson, returned to England, leaving twelve thousand men, including the Indian troops, to secure the country until a general peace. The European officers and soldiers were much struck by the luxury of their comrades in the Indian service, and, accustomed to sleep on the bare sand, with no other covering than a tented canopy, beheld with astonishment the numerous retainers and sumptuous equipages which attested the magnificence of Asiatic warfare. But Sir David Baird soon showed that, if his troops had adopted the pacific habits of the soldiers of Darius, they had not forgotten the martial qualities of those of Alexander,<sup>1</sup> and their morning exercises in the camp of

45.  
Sir David  
Baird with  
half the  
army is left  
in Egypt.

<sup>1</sup> Wilson,  
177. Ann.  
Reg. 1801,  
239.

of Alexandria, was only 14,000 strong, and in such a state of disorganisation as to be capable of effecting very little in the field;<sup>2</sup> and the corps which landed at Rosetta numbered only 6000 men, and effected very little against the enemy. When, therefore, it is recollected that the campaign was really concluded by the capitulation of General Belliard at Cairo on the 26th June, that the forces from the Red Sea only landed at Cosseir on the 8th July, and arrived at Cairo on the 10th August, and consequently that the contest was decided by 19,500 British against 23,000 French, having the advantage of a central position, and possession of all the fortified places in the country, it must be admitted that modern history has few more glorious achievements to commemorate.

<sup>2</sup> Wilson,  
116.

This being the first great disaster which the Republicans had sustained by land since the commencement of the Revolution, and it having fallen on so distinguished a portion of their army as that which had gone through the Italian and Egyptian campaigns, they have been indefatigable in their endeavours to underrate the credit due to the English troops on the occasion; forgetting, that if the British acted feebly, what must the French have done, when, with such a superiority of force, they were compelled to capitulate? It is true, that the movements of Hutchinson after the battles of 21st March were slow and cautious; but that they were not unreasonably so, is proved by the consideration that he had to advance with less than half his army against a force at Grand Cairo which amounted to 13,000 men, and could send 10,000 into the field, and that even after all he arrived at the scene of action, and concluded the capitulation of Cairo, six weeks before the arrival of the troops from the Red Sea, with no more than 4500 Europeans, and a disorderly rabble of 25,000 Turks, hardly provided with any battering train.<sup>3</sup> All the ingenuity of

<sup>3</sup> Wilson,  
158.

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XXXIV.  
1801.

Alexandria exhibited a combination of activity and discipline never surpassed by the finest troops of the western world.

46.  
Attempted  
treachery of  
the Turks.

The expulsion of the French from Egypt was followed by a piece of treachery on the part of the Ottomans, which, if not firmly resisted by the English commander, would have brought indelible disgrace on the British name. The Turkish government, aware of the insecure tenure by which their authority in Egypt was held, as long as the beys retained their ascendancy in the country, had secretly resolved upon extirpating them; and in order to carry this design into effect, seven of the chiefs were invited to Alexandria, to hold a conference with the Capitan Pasha, by whom they were received with every demonstration of respect, and invited on board a British vessel. But when they got into the boats which were to convey them thither, they took fright, and desired to be returned ashore; and this having been refused, a struggle ensued, in the course of which three of the beys were killed, and four wounded. This frightful violation of all public faith, though by no means unusual among Asiatic despots, excited the most lively indignation in the British army. General Hutchinson immediately put his troops under arms, and made such

the French cannot get rid of the important fact, that, by Hutchinson's advance to Ramanieh, he separated their armies at Cairo and Alexandria from each other, and enabled him, with a force greatly inferior to the two taken together, to be superior to both at the point of attack—the surest test, as Napoleon justly observes, of a good general. The British officers, after Alexandria was taken, discovered that the works on the heights of Nicopolis, and, in particular, forts Cretin and Caffarelli, were in such a state that they could have opposed no effectual resistance to a vigorous attack, and they were thus led to regret that they had been induced by their imposing appearance to relinquish the active pursuit of their advantages before Menou's arrival on the 13th March;<sup>1</sup> but if they had done so, and Alexandria had thereby fallen, it is doubtful whether the ultimate success of the expedition would not have been endangered; as it would have only deprived the enemy of 4000 men, and led to the concentration of the remainder, above 20,000 strong, in the central position at Cairo, from whence they might have destroyed either the Grand Vizier, Sir D. Baird, or General Hutchinson, as they successively approached the interior of Egypt, whereas, by the retention of Alexandria, that dispersion of force was occasioned which ultimately proved fatal to them in the campaign.

<sup>1</sup> Wilson,  
212.



energetic remonstrances to the Capitan Pasha, that he was obliged to surrender up the four beys who had been wounded, and the bodies of the slain, who were interred with military honours at Alexandria. This resolute conduct completely cleared the British from all imputation of having been accessory to the intended massacre, though it was far from allaying the indignant feelings of the English officers, many of whom openly declared that the Capitan Pasha should have been seized in the centre of his camp, and hung by the yard-arm of the frigate to which he intended to have conveyed the victims of his treachery.<sup>1</sup>

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

1801.

<sup>1</sup> Wilson,  
245. Ann.  
Reg. 1801,  
240. Dum.  
iv. 173, 174.

When left to their own resources, however, the Mameluke chiefs were totally unable to maintain their former government in Egypt. Many of them had fallen in the contest with France: their redoubtable cavalry had perished; and out of the whole militia of the province, scarcely two thousand could be mustered in arms when the Europeans withdrew. They were compelled to relinquish, therefore, their old sovereignty on the banks of the Nile, and accept the offer of the Grand Seignior, to surrender on favourable terms the province into the hands of the Osmanlis. A pasha was established, who soon became the real sovereign of the country, and long contrived, by the regular payment of his tribute, to maintain himself undisturbed in his dominions. Under his able and undivided administration, order began to reappear out of chaos; life became comparatively secure; though excessive taxation was established, and the national resources were prodigiously augmented. By this means one singular and lasting consequence resulted from the French residence in Egypt. The old anarchical tyranny of the Mamelukes was destroyed; a powerful government established on the banks of the Nile, which, in the end, crushed the Wahabees in Arabia, extended itself over Syria as far as the defiles of Mount Taurus, and was only prevented, by the intervention of France and Russia,

47.  
Change in  
the govern-  
ment of  
Egypt,  
which falls  
to the Turks.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

1801.

from utterly overturning the dominion of the Osmanlis. Thus everything conspired to bring about the great Oriental Revolution of the nineteenth century. The power of the Turks, the chief bulwark of Mahometanism, was weakened alike by the victories of the French and the conquests of their opponents; and the Crescent, long triumphant in the East, was at length struck down, not less by the ultimate effects of the ambition of the Republicans, who ridiculed every species of devotion, than by the enthusiasm of the Muscovites, who sought an entrance to Paradise through the breach of Constantinople.

48.  
Extrava-  
gant rejoic-  
ings in Con-  
stantinople  
and London  
at these  
events.

But neither of the victorious states foresaw these remote consequences, which as yet lay buried in the womb of fate; and the demonstrations of joy at the surrender of Alexandria were as ardent on the shores of the Bosphorus as on the banks of the Thames. The cannon of the Seraglio were fired, the city was splendidly illuminated, medals were struck to be distributed among the English who had served in Egypt; and a palace was built for the British ambassador at Pera, as a lasting monument of the gratitude of the Ottoman empire. In London, the public thankfulness, if less noisy, was still more sincere. The people of England hailed this great achievement as a counterpoise to all the disasters of the war; as a humiliation of France on that element where it had been so long victorious, and a check to its ambition in that quarter where its hopes had been most sanguine; as the harbinger of those greater triumphs which would await them, if the enemy should carry into execution their long-threatened invasion of the British islands. Under the influence of these sentiments the early disasters of the war were forgotten; the fears, the asperity of former times, were laid aside; and the people, satisfied with having redeemed their honour in military warfare by one great triumph, looked forward without anxiety to the cessation of the contest,<sup>1</sup> in the firm belief that they could

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1801, 239.

renew it without apprehension whenever the national safety required that it should be resumed.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

1801.

49.

Great naval  
exertions of  
Napoleon to  
preserve  
Egypt.

Although the French were thus expelled from Egypt, it was not without the greatest efforts on the part of Napoleon to preserve so important an acquisition, that it eluded his grasp. By great exertions a squadron of seven ships of the line and five frigates, having on board six thousand men and vast supplies of all sorts, had been made ready for sea, and sailed from Brest in the beginning of January; it eluded the vigilance of two British squadrons, the first of four, the second of five ships of the line, which were detached in pursuit under Sir John Borlase Warren and Sir Richard Bickerton, passed the Straits of Gibraltar, and crept along the coast of Africa, almost to within sight of the Pharos of Alexandria. But there one of its frigates, the *Africaine*, was encountered and captured by the English frigate *Phoebe*, of equal force; and the admiral, discouraged by this disaster, and alarmed at the accounts he received of the strength of Lord Keith's squadron off the coast of Egypt, which, united to that of Bickerton, now amounted to seventeen sail of the line, renounced his enterprise, and returned to Toulon. The frigates of the two squadrons came in sight of each other; but though Warren had only four sail of the line, Gantheaume persisted in thinking it was a much larger force, and hastened back. One of his frigates, however, the *Régénééré*, passed, under false colours, through the British fleet, and made its way into Alexandria: and two other frigates, the *Justice* and *Egyptienne*, set sail from Toulon, and succeeded in reaching Alexandria with four hundred soldiers on board, without encountering any of the English squadrons. This the First Consul considered as decisive evidence that the whole, if directed with equal skill, might have reached the same destination. Gantheaume, therefore, received positive orders to put again to sea, and at all hazards to attempt the relief of Egypt. He set sail accordingly on

Jan. 7.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.

1801.  
March 20.

<sup>1</sup> Thiers, iii.  
41, 42.

50.  
Third un-  
successful  
attempt of  
Napoleon  
for the relief  
of Egypt.  
May 20.

June 24.

<sup>2</sup> Thiers, iii.  
41, 45. Bign.  
ii. 34, 36.  
Jom. xiv.  
363, 365.  
Dum. vii.  
108, 112.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 248.

the 20th March, avoided Sir John Borlase Warren's squadron, which he met off Sardinia, and continued his route towards the coast of Africa ; but Warren instantly made sail in the same direction, and arrived off Alexandria on the 23d April. No sooner was the French admiral informed of this, than he again turned about, and regained Toulon without any disaster.<sup>1</sup>

Irritated beyond measure by these repeated failures, Napoleon transmitted peremptory orders to the admiral to put to sea a third time, and endeavour, at all hazards, to convey the reinforcements he had on board into Alexandria. He set sail accordingly on the 20th May, threw succours in passing to the Republican force besieging Porto Ferraio in the isle of Elba ; increased his squadron by three frigates prepared for him by General Soult at Brundisium, and arrived in sight of the coast of Egypt, for the third time, on the 8th June. One of his brigs, the Heliopolis, reached Alexandria on the day following ; but when Gantheaume was beginning preparations for landing the troops on the sands to the westward of that town, his look-out frigates made signals that the English fleet, consisting of forty sail, of which eighteen were of the line, was approaching. It was no longer possible to effect the object of the expedition ; in a few hours longer the squadron would be enveloped in the enemy's fleet, and the landing of the troops on the desert shore, without stores or provisions, would expose them to certain destruction. Gantheaume, therefore, refused to accede to the wishes of the officers of the army, who were desirous to incur that perilous alternative, and made sail again for the coast of France. On his route homewards he fell in with the Swiftsure, of seventy-four guns, which Captain Hallowell defended long with his accustomed gallantry ; but he was at length obliged to surrender to the vast superiority of the Republican force, and with this trophy the admiral regained the harbour of Toulon.<sup>2</sup> The French journals, long accustomed to continued disasters

at sea, celebrated this gleam of success as a memorable triumph, and loudly boasted of the skill with which their fleet had traversed the Mediterranean and avoided the English squadrons: "a melancholy reflection," says the historian of Napoleon, "for a country and its admirals, when skill in avoiding a combat is held equivalent to a victory."

CHAP.  
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This effort, however, was not the only one made by the First Consul for the relief of Egypt. His design was to support Gantheaume by a combined squadron of fifteen ships of the line, drawn from the harbours of France and Spain. For this purpose great efforts had been made by the Spanish marine: six ships of the line at Cadiz had been placed under the orders of the French admiral, Dumanoir; and six others had reached that harbour from Ferrol, while the English blockading squadrons, under Sir John Borlase Warren and Sir Richard Bickerton, had left their stations off these harbours in search of Admiral Gantheaume; and Admiral Linois, with three ships of the line, was to join them from Toulon. The British government, justly alarmed at such a concentration of force in the Isle of Leon, hastily despatched Sir James Saumarez with seven ships of the line and two frigates, to resume the blockade of Cadiz; and he had hardly arrived off the harbour's mouth, when advices were received that Admiral Linois, with three ships of the line and one frigate, was approaching from the Mediterranean. No sooner did the French admiral find that the blockade of Cadiz had been re-established by a force superior to his own, than he abandoned all hope of effecting the prescribed junction, and fell back to Algesiraz bay, where he took shelter under the powerful batteries which defend its coasts. Thither he was followed by Sir James Saumarez, whose squadron was now reduced to six ships of the line by the detachment of one of his vessels to the mouth of the Guadalquiver.<sup>1</sup> The British admiral resolved upon an immediate attack, notwithstanding that the forts,

51.  
Navalaction  
in the bay of  
Algesiraz.

June 13.

<sup>1</sup> James, iii.  
164, 168.  
Dum. vii.  
118, 120.  
Jom. xiv.  
366.

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52.  
In which  
the British  
are worsted.  
July 6.

and batteries, and gun-boats, now manned by gunners from the French ships, presented the most formidable appearance.

The British fleet stood into the bay, led by Captain Hood in the *Venerable*, with springs on their cables; and in a short time the action began. The *Audacious* and *Pompey*, successively approaching, gallantly took their stations alongside of the French vessels, between them and the batteries on shore. The wind, however, fell shortly after the leading ships got into action, so as to prevent the remainder of the squadron from advancing to their support; and when at length a light breeze from the south enabled the *Hannibal* to work into the scene of danger, she grounded in such a situation as to be exposed to the shot of the French squadron on one side, and of the formidable batteries of *Almirante* and *St Jago* on the other; while fourteen gun-boats, securely posted under her stern, kept up with great vigour a destructive raking fire, to which no return could be made. To complete the disaster, the wind totally failed soon after, so as to render it impossible for the other vessels, notwithstanding the utmost efforts, to render any effectual assistance; and the boats, which had been destined to storm the batteries on the islands, were all required to tow the line-of-battle ships which were still afloat, so as to bring their broadsides to bear upon the enemy. The *Pompey* also was so severely raked by the batteries and gun-boats that she became unmanageable, and required to be towed out of fire by the other vessels. After several gallant attempts, therefore, on the part of Sir James Saumarez and his squadron, to throw themselves between the batteries and the grounded vessel, they were compelled to draw off, leaving her to her fate, and, after an honourable resistance, she struck her colours.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> James, iii.  
164, 172.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 249.  
Dum. vii.  
118, 121.  
Jom. xiv.  
366, 368.

The loss of the British in killed and wounded in this action was 361, that on the part of the French and Spaniards, 586; but the unwonted occurrence of the

retreat of the former, and the capture of one of their line-of-battle ships, diffused the most extraordinary joy throughout France, in which the First Consul warmly participated.\* It was publicly announced at the theatres, and in the gazette issued on the occasion, that three French sail of the line had completely defeated six British, and captured one of their number—without the slightest mention of the batteries on shore, to which the Spanish official account, with more justice, ascribed the failure of the attack.† But these transports were of short duration, and an awful catastrophe was destined to close, for the present, the naval strife between the two nations. After the battle, the English fleet repaired to Gibraltar, and the utmost efforts were made, night and day, to get the squadron again ready for sea. But it was found that the Pompey was so much damaged that she could not be set afloat in time, and therefore her crew were distributed through the other vessels; and on the morning of the 12th July, the fleet stood out to sea to avenge the affront they had received.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile the Spanish squadron at Cadiz, consisting of six ships of the line and three frigates, two of the former bearing 112 guns each, had joined the

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53.

Great rejoicings in France at this event.

<sup>1</sup> James, iii. 179, 181.  
Ann. Reg. 1801, 252.  
Jom. xiv. 369. Dum. vii. 128.

\* "The First Consul," says the Duchess of Abrantès, "recounted this triumph to us with the most lively satisfaction, with eyes literally overflowing with joy at this unlooked-for event. Naval victories were rare at that period, and Napoleon felt the full satisfaction arising from this one. Admiral Linois received the sole recompense which it was in his power at that period to bestow—a sabre of honour. All those who have narrowly studied the character of Napoleon, must have seen that the ruling passion of his great mind was the humbling of England. It was his constant object of study; and I can safely affirm that, during the fourteen years that he held the reins of power, during which I certainly saw him very frequently, he was constantly set upon that object, and passionately desirous of the glory which it would produce. He constantly thought that he could give France the means of combating that power on equal terms, and subduing it; all his measures tended towards that end."—D'ABRANTÈS, v. 254, 256.

† "The action," says the Madrid Gazette extraordinary, "was very obstinate and bloody on both sides, and likewise on the part of our batteries, which decided the fate of the day. It is to the hot and sustained fire of fort St Jago that we owe the capture of the English ship; for her bold manœuvre of attempting to pass between the French admiral's ship and the shore made her ground, and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions to get her afloat, it was found impossible, and the fire of the batteries very soon compelled her to strike."—See JAMES, iii. 173.

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shattered French fleet in Algesiraz bay; and the combined force was moving towards the Isle of Leon, at the time that the English squadron, consisting of five ships of the line and one frigate, was working out of the harbour of Gibraltar.

54.  
The British  
squadron  
sets sail  
from Gib-  
raltar.

Nothing in war could be conceived more animating than the circumstances under which the British fleet then set forth to redeem the honour of their flag. The combined squadron, consisting of nine ships of the line and four frigates, was proudly and leisurely moving towards Cadiz, with all sails set and a favourable wind, bearing with them their prize, the Hannibal, which they had contrived to get afloat, in tow of the Indienne frigate. The anxiety of the British sailors to rescue her from their hands was indescribable; the day was clear, the rock covered with spectators, and loud shouts hailed every successive British vessel which cleared the pier-head of Gibraltar to proceed on the perilous service. The mole, the quays, the batteries, the cliffs, were crowded with anxious multitudes, eager to witness the approaching conflict; the band of the Admiral's ship, the Cæsar, played the popular air, "Come, cheer up, my lads, 'tis to glory we steer," while the military bands of the garrison made the rock re-echo with the notes of "Britons, strike home!" So thrilling was the interest of the scene, so overpowering the feelings which it excited, that the foreigners who witnessed it wished they had been Englishmen; and even the wounded begged to be taken on board to share in the honours of the approaching conflict.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Brenton, ii.  
39. James,  
iii. 180.

55.  
Second bat-  
tle of Alge-  
siraz, and  
terrible ca-  
tastrophe in  
the Spanish  
fleet.

It was in truth a proud sight for the English garrison to behold their fleet, of five ships of the line, only ten days after a bloody encounter, again put to sea to give chase to an enemy's squadron of nine line-of-battle ships, six of which were perfectly uninjured, and which contained two three-deckers of stupendous magnitude. The Hannibal soon fell astern, and, with the frigate which had her in tow, returned to Algesiraz; but the remainder of



the squadron cleared Cabritta point, and stood away, as darkness set in, with all sail towards Cadiz. At ten at night, a fresh breeze filled the sails of the English fleet; they gained rapidly on the enemy, and Sir James gave orders that they should engage the first vessels which they could overtake. At eleven, the leading ship, the *Superb*, steering right between the *Real Carlos* and *San Hermenegildo*, both of 112 guns, opened its fire on the first of these vessels. The first broadside, which was wholly unexpected, from the approach of the English vessel not being perceived in the dark, brought down part of the masts and rigging of the *Real Carlos*, which fell athwart the bows of the *Superb*; and the next set the sails thus lying across, which had been recently tarred, on fire. The flames, fanned by the tempestuous gale, spread with frightful rapidity, and the remaining masts and rigging were in a few minutes in a blaze. Deeming this gigantic adversary so far disabled that she must fall into the hands of the remainder of the fleet as they came up, the *Superb* passed on, and in half an hour overtook and engaged the *St-Antoine*, of 74 guns, which soon struck her colours. The *Cæsar* and *Venerable* came up in succession, and the chase was continued all night, in the midst of a tempestuous gale, by the light of the discharges which at intervals flashed through the gloom, and the awful conflagration of the burning ship, which gleamed upon the waves for miles around.<sup>1</sup> But while the sailors were making the greatest efforts, and constantly nearing the enemy, a terrible catastrophe occurred, which for a moment daunted the stoutest hearts. The *Superb*, after having disabled the *Real Carlos* on her starboard, passed on, poured a broadside on the larboard into the *San Hermenegildo*, also of 112 guns, and soon outstripped both her first-rate antagonists. The English captain was no sooner past the last of these vessels than he extinguished all the lights on board and ceased firing; so that his ship was lost sight of in the dark, and the Spaniards saw only

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<sup>1</sup> Thiers' Cons. et l'Emp. iii. 127, 129.

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<sup>1</sup> James, iii.  
180, 183.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 255.  
Jom. xiv.  
360. Dum.  
vii. 130, 132.

their own vessels, both of which were still firing, unaware that the enemy had passed on. In the darkness of the night, mutually mistaking each other for an enemy, they got involved in a mortal combat; the violence of the wind spread the flames from the one to the other, the heavens were illuminated by the awful conflagration, and at midnight they both blew up with an explosion so tremendous as to shake Cadiz to its foundations, and spread a thrill of horror through every soul that witnessed it. Out of two thousand men, of whom their crews consisted, not more than 250 were saved by the English boats, the remainder being blown into the air, or lost in the waves on that tempestuous night.<sup>1\*</sup>

56.  
Defeat of  
the French.

When morning dawned, both fleets were extremely scattered, the *Venerable* and *Thames* being far ahead of the rest of the British squadron, and the French ship *Formidable*, of eighty guns, in the rear of the French fleet, at some distance from the remainder of their vessels. The British ships instantly gave chase, and soon brought her to action. It began within musket-shot; and shortly the hostile ships were abreast of each other, within pistol range, and a tremendous fire was kept up on both sides. Undismayed by the superiority of the force brought against him, the French captain, Tronde, made the most gallant resistance, which was soon rendered equal, by the *Thames* unavoidably falling behind, and dropping out of the action. The fire of the *Venerable*, however, directed at the hull of her opponent, was beginning to tell severely on the enemy's crew, when the French gunners, by a fortunate discharge, succeeded in bringing down her main-

\* It is asserted by M. Thiers in his "*Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*," that the Spanish ship *Real Carlos* was set on fire by red-hot shot, heated for that purpose on board the *Superb*. This is an entire mistake. The fire arose from the sails of the Spanish ship taking fire from the broadside of the *Superb*, as she passed, almost touching her first-rate antagonist. There was not a heated shot fired from the *Superb*, nor any furnace for heating them on board. See a very interesting letter from Mr Outram, the surgeon of the vessel at the time, in *The Glasgow Courier*, 15th October 1845; and THIERS' *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, iii. 127, 128.

mast, and with it most of her rigging, so that she fell behind, and soon afterwards her other masts went by the board, and she struck on the shoals of San Pedro.\* In this desperate situation Captain Hood still maintained a contest with the stern-chasers of the Formidable, and gave time for two other ships of the line to come up; upon the appearance of which the enemy relinquished their design of attacking the disabled vessel, and, crowding all sail, stood in for Cadiz harbour, where they were soon after moored in safety. The intelligence of this bold and fortunate engagement, in which a British fleet so severely handled an enemy's squadron of nearly double its own force, excited the greater joy in Great Britain, that the preceding failure in Algesiraz bay had somewhat mortified a people, nursed by long-continued success to unreasonable expectations of constant triumph on their favourite element. On the other hand, the frightful catastrophe which befell their two first-rate men-of-war spread the utmost consternation through the Spanish peninsula, and increased that strong repugnance which the Castilian youth had long manifested for the naval service.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> James, iii.  
184, 185.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 258.  
Jom. xiv.  
368, 371.  
Dum. vii.  
132, 135.  
Bign. ii. 38,  
39. Thiers'  
Cons. iii.  
127, 130.

Contemporaneous with these maritime operations was a measure from which Napoleon anticipated much in the way of forming a counterpoise to the vast colonial acquisitions made by Great Britain during the war; and this was an attack upon Portugal, the ancient and tried ally of England. The French, according to their own admission, had no cause of complaint against that power; the only motive of the war was to provide an equivalent to the maritime conquests of England. "We only wished,"

57.  
Attack of  
Napoleon  
on Portu-  
gal. Treaty  
with Spain  
for this pur-  
pose.

\* An incident, highly characteristic of the English sailors, occurred in this action. In its voyage through the Mediterranean, the French fleet had fallen in with, and captured, the brig *Speedy*, of fourteen guns, commanded by Captain LORD COCHRANE, and that gallant officer, with his little crew, was on board the *Formidable* when the action took place in the bay of Algesiraz. At every broadside the vessel received from the English, these brave men gave three cheers, regardless alike of the threats of instant death from the French if they continued so unseemly an interruption, and the obvious danger that they themselves might be sent to the bottom by the discharges of their friends.

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says Bignon, "to enter that kingdom in order to leave it, and stipulate as the condition of that retreat some considerable concession from Great Britain." The most obvious means of effecting this object was to interest Spain in its execution, and this was adroitly managed by the First Consul. In the treaty of Lunéville, as already observed, it had been stipulated that the grand-duchy of Tuscany should be ceded by the Austrian family, and erected into a separate principality in favour of Don Louis, a prince of the Spanish family; and that duchy was soon after constituted a royal domain, under the title of the kingdom of Etruria. Europe was at a loss at first to divine what was the motive for this sudden condition in favour of the Spanish house of Bourbon; but it was soon made manifest, when it appeared that a treaty had been concluded between France and Spain, the object of which was, "to compel the court of Lisbon to separate itself from the alliance of Great Britain, and cede, till the conclusion of a general peace, a fourth of its territory to the French and Spanish forces."<sup>1</sup>

Oct. 1, 1800.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii. 10.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 256.

58.  
Napoleon's  
real object  
in this at-  
tack.

Dec. 1800.

March 8,  
1801.

This flagrant and unprovoked invasion of the rights of a pacific state took place, at the very time when France was loudly proclaiming the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and the utter injustice of one belligerent interfering with the trade or alliances of independent powers. But it soon appeared that the First Consul's tenderness for neutral rights was all on one element, where he was weakest; and that on the other, where his power was wellnigh irresistible, he was prepared to go the utmost length of warlike aggression, and compel every other state to enter into his projects of hostility against Great Britain. So early as December 1800, when the victory of Hohenlinden had relieved him of all anxiety on the side of Germany, he had given orders for the formation of an army of observation at Bordeaux, which gradually drew towards the Pyrenees, and was increased to twenty thousand men. This was followed, some months afterwards,

by a declaration of war on the part of Spain, against the court of Lisbon. The ostensible grounds of complaint on which this step was rested, was the refusal by the court of Lisbon to ratify a peace with France, signed by its plenipotentiary in 1797; accompanied with a complaint that she had furnished protection to the English fleets and sailors, and insulted the French in the harbour of Carthagea. The real reasons for the war were very different. "The courts of Lisbon and Madrid," says the French historian, "united by recent intermarriages, had no real subjects of dispute. They were drawn into the contest because the one was attached to the political system of France, the other to that of Great Britain."<sup>1</sup> The real object of the First Consul was to secure, by conquests in Portugal, more advantageous terms of peace with Great Britain. On such successes, and a victory in Egypt, he was aware the conditions to be obtained mainly depended.\* Spain was at this time entirely under the guidance of the Prince of the Peace—a vain and ambitious favourite, who had risen from an obscure origin, by court intrigue, to an elevation little short of the throne, and who threw himself willingly into the arms of France, in order to seek an effectual support against the pride and patriotism of the Castilian noblesse, who were exceedingly jealous of his authority. Guided by such a ruler, Spain made herself the willing instrument of France in this tyrannical aggression. She afterwards expiated her fault by torrents of blood.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Jom. xiv.  
289, 290.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 256.  
Dum. vii.  
61, 62.

In this extremity the Portuguese government naturally turned to England for support, and offered, if that power would send an army of twenty-five thousand men, to give her the command of the native forces. Had it been in the power of Great Britain to have acceded to this offer, the desperate struggle of the Peninsula might have been

59.  
The Portuguese apply to England for aid, which is refused.

\* " 'Tout depend,' écrivait M. Otto, 'de deux choses : l'armée Anglaise sera-t-elle battue en Égypte? l'Espagne marchera-t-elle franchement contre le Portugal? Hâtez-vous, obtenez ces deux résultats, ou l'un des deux, et vous aurez la plus belle paix du monde.' "—THIERS, iii. 28.

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<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
256, 257.  
Dum. vii.  
63. Jom.  
xiv. 294.

60.  
The Portu-  
guese make  
no resist-  
ance, and  
peace is con-  
cluded.

May 20.

June 6.  
<sup>2</sup> Bign. ii. 12,  
13. Jom.  
xiv. 298,  
299. Ann.  
Reg. 1801,  
258.

accelerated by eight years, and the triumphs of Busaco and Vimeira have graced the conclusion of the first part of the war. But it was thought impossible to make such an effort : her chief disposable force was already engaged in Egypt ; and the great contest in the north, as yet undecided, required all the means which were at the disposal of her government. All that could be done, therefore, was to send a few regiments to Lisbon, with a loan of £300,000, in order if possible to procure a respite from the impending danger till the general peace, which, it was already foreseen, could not be far distant.<sup>1</sup>

Deprived in this manner of any effectual external aid, the Portuguese government, to appearance at least, was not wanting to its ancient renown. An animated proclamation was put forth, in which the people were reminded of their ancestors' heroic resistance to the Romans, and their imperishable achievements in the southern hemisphere ; new armaments were ordered, works hastily constructed, a levy *en masse* called forth, and the plate borrowed from the churches to aid government in carrying on the means of defence. But during all this show of resistance, there was a secret understanding between the courts of Lisbon and Madrid. The regular troops on the frontier, about twenty thousand strong, were scarcely increased by a single soldier ; and when, in the end of May, the Spanish army of thirty thousand combatants invaded the country, they experienced hardly any resistance. Jurumenha and Olivenza at once opened their gates ; Campo Mayor, though amply provided with everything requisite to sustain a siege, only held out a fortnight ; and the Portuguese, flying in disorder, made haste to throw the Tagus between them and the enemy. Even Elvas, which never lowered its colours in a more glorious subsequent strife, surrendered ; and in a fortnight after the war commenced, this collusive contest was terminated by the signature of preliminaries of peace at Abrantes.<sup>2</sup> By this treaty, which was ratified on 29th September, Olivenza,

with its circumjacent territory, was ceded to Spain, and the ports of Portugal were shut against the English flag.

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No sooner were the terms of this treaty known in France, than the First Consul refused to ratify them. Not that he had either any animosity or cause of complaint against the cabinet of Lisbon, but that by this pacification the main object of the war was lost—namely, the occupation of such a portion of the Portuguese territory by the French troops, as might give weight to the demands of France for restitution of her conquered colonies from Great Britain. The French army of observation, accordingly, under Leclerc and St-Cyr, five-and-twenty thousand strong, which had advanced to Ciudad Rodrigo, entered Portugal, invested Almeida, and threatened both Lisbon and Oporto. Menacing letters were despatched to the Prince of the Peace by the First Consul, who openly declared that if the Spanish corps, fifteen thousand strong, stationed at Salamanca, made a single step in advance, he would consider it as a declaration of war, and that, in that event, the last hour of the Spanish monarchy had struck.\* The Portuguese government now commenced serious preparations: six sail of the line were detached from Lisbon to reinforce the English blockading squadron off Cadiz, and such efforts as the time would admit were made to reinforce the army on the frontier. But the contest was too unequal; and England, anticipating the seizure of the Continental dominions of the house of Braganza, had already taken possession of the island of Madeira, to secure its colonial dominions from

61.  
Which the  
First Consul  
refuses to  
ratify, and  
a French  
army in-  
vades Por-  
tugal.

June 28.

\* "Le billet du Général Prince de la Paix est si ridicule qu'il ne mérite pas une sérieuse réponse. Mais si ce prince, acheté par l'Angleterre, entraînait le roi et la reine dans des mesures contraires à l'honneur et aux intérêts de la République, la dernière heure de la monarchie Espagnole aurait sonné. Mon intention est, que les troupes Françaises restent en Espagne jusqu'au moment où la paix de la République sera faite avec le Portugal. Le moindre mouvement des troupes Espagnoles, ayant pour but de se rapprocher des troupes Françaises, serait considéré comme une déclaration de guerre."—NAPOLEON au Ministre des Relations Extérieures, 10th July 1801; THIERS, iii. 163.

CHAP.  
XXXIV.1801.  
July 23.1 Bign. ii.  
13, note.  
Thiers, iii.  
163.62.  
Peace concluded by enormous pecuniary spoliation; and Napoleon offers Hanover to Prussia, which is declined.\* Bign. ii.  
14, 17, 18.  
Hard. viii.  
134, 136.  
Dum. vii.  
264. Pièces  
Just. Thiers,  
ii. 443, and  
iii. 167.

insult, when the tempest was averted by external events. The near approach of an accommodation between France and England, made it a greater object for the First Consul to extend his colonial acquisitions, than to enlarge his conquests on the continent of Europe; while the arrival of a convoy with a great supply of silver from Brazil, gave the Portuguese government the means both of satisfying his pecuniary demands, and gratifying the cupidity of his inferior agents. To use the words of a French historian—"The Portuguese government, holding the purse, threw it at the feet of the robbers, and thus saved itself from destruction."<sup>1</sup>

Bribes were liberally bestowed on the French generals,\* and so completely did this seasonable supply remove all difficulties that a treaty was soon concluded, in virtue of which Olivenza, with its territory, was confirmed to Spain; the harbours of Portugal were closed against English ships, both of war and commerce; one half of Guiana, as far as the Carapanatuba stream, was ceded to France, and the commerce of the Republic was placed on the same footing as that with the most favoured nations. By a less honourable and secret article, the immediate payment of twenty million francs (£800,000) was made the condition of the retreat of the French troops. As the war approached a termination, the anxiety of Napoleon to procure equivalents for the English colonial acquisitions became more vehement. Talleyrand's letters to the Prince of the Peace, insisting on the cession of Trinidad by Spain, in pursuance of Napoleon's instructions, were of the most menacing kind.<sup>2†</sup> With the same view, as already noticed, he made

\* Leclerc got five million francs, or £200,000, for his own share.—HARD. viii. 136.

† L'Espagne a fait, pour me servir d'une de ses expressions, avec hypocrisie la guerre contre le Portugal: elle veut définitivement la paix. Le Prince de la Paix est, à ce qu'on nous mande, en pourparlers avec Angleterre. Une rupture avec l'Espagne est une menace risible quand nous avons ses vaisseaux à Brest, et que nos troupes sont dans le cœur du royaume. L'Espagne n'a qu'une chose à faire—c'est mettre à notre disposition l'île de la Trinité, dans les stipulations avec Angleterre."—M. TALLEYRAND au Ministre de la France à Madrid, 9th July 1801; THIERS, iii. 167.



propositions to Prussia to seize Hanover: an insidious though tempting offer, which he frequently after renewed, which would have rendered that power permanently a dependant on France, and totally altered the balance of European politics. But the Prussian cabinet had good sense enough, at that time at least, to see that no such gratuitous act of spoliation was likely to prove a permanent acquisition, and declined the proposal.

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Meanwhile Napoleon, relieved by the treaty of Lunéville from all apprehensions of a serious Continental struggle, bent all his attention to Great Britain, and made serious preparations for invasion on his own side of the Channel. Though not of the gigantic character which they assumed in a later period of the contest, after the renewal of the war, these efforts were of a kind to excite the serious attention of the English government. From the mouth of the Scheldt to that of the Garonne, every creek and headland was fortified, so as to afford protection to the small craft which were creeping along the shore from all the ports of the kingdom, to the general rendezvous at Dunkirk and Boulogne. The latter harbour was the general point of assemblage; gunboats and flat-bottomed praams were collected in great quantities, furnaces erected for heating shot, immense batteries constructed, and every preparation made, not only for a vigorous defence, but for the most energetic offensive operations. By an ordinance of 12th July, the flotilla was organised in nine divisions; and to them were assigned all the boats and artillerymen which had been attached to the armies of the Rhine and the Maine, which had been brought down those streams to the harbours on the Channel. The immensity of these preparations was studiously dwelt upon in the French papers; nothing was talked of but the approaching descent upon Great Britain; and fame, ever the first to sound the alarm, so magnified their amount, that, when a few battalions pitched their tents on the heights of Boulogne,<sup>1</sup> it was

63.  
Prepara-  
tions for the  
invasion of  
England.

<sup>1</sup> Dum. vii.  
140, 144.  
Jom. xiv.  
380, 381.  
Ann. Reg.  
1801, 263.

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64.  
Apprehen-  
sions of the  
British gov-  
ernment.

universally credited in England that the army of invasion was about to take its station preparatory to the threatened attempt.

Though not participating in the vulgar illusion as to the imminence of the danger, the English government had various weighty reasons for not disregarding the preparations on the southern coast of the Channel. The fleets of Great Britain in the narrow seas were, indeed, so powerful, that no attempt at invasion by open force could be made with any chance of success;\* but it was impossible to conceal the alarming fact, that the same wind which wafted the French flotilla out of its harbours might chain the English cruisers to theirs; and the recent expeditions of Ganteaume in the Mediterranean, and of Hoche to the coast of Ireland, had demonstrated that, notwithstanding the greatest maritime superiority, it was impossible at all times to prevent a vigilant and active enemy from putting to sea during the darkness of the autumnal or winter months. It could not be denied that, even although ultimate defeat might attend a descent, incalculable confusion and distress would necessarily follow it, in the first instance. Nor were they without hopes that the destruction of the armament might influence the issue of the negotiations for peace; and that, if the First Consul saw that his flotilla was not secure from insult even in his own harbours, he would probably abate something of the pretensions which his extraordinary successes had induced him to bring forward. The King declared his resolution, in the event of the enemy landing, to put himself at the head of his troops; and the Prince of Wales, in a most touching and honourable letter, reiterated an application which he had made to his royal father in 1798, to be allowed to serve his country in the command of part of the forces.<sup>†</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1801, 266.  
Jom. xiv.  
385. Pel-  
lew's Life  
of Sidmouth,  
i. 444.

\* England at this period had fourteen ships of the line under Admiral Cornwallis off Brest, and seventeen in the German Ocean observing the Dutch harbours.—JAMES, iii. App. No. 2; and DUMAS, vii. 144.

† "The serious and awful crisis in which this country now stands, calls for

Influenced by these views, the British government prepared a powerful armament of bombs and light vessels in the Downs, and intrusted the command to Lord Nelson, whose daring and successful exploits at the Nile and Copenhagen pointed him out as peculiarly fitted for an enterprise of this description. On the 1st August he set sail from Deal at the head of three ships of the line, two frigates, and thirty-five bombs, brigs, and smaller vessels, and stood over to the French coast. He himself strongly urged that the expedition, aided by a few thousand troops, should be sent against Flushing; but the cabinet resolved that it should proceed against Boulogne, and thither accordingly he went, much against his inclination. After a reconnoissance, attended with a slight cannonade on both sides, soon after his arrival, a more serious attack took place on the night of the 15th August. But in the interval the French line of boats had been rendered well-nigh unassailable. Every vessel was defended by long poles headed by iron spikes projecting from their sides; strong nettings were braced up to their lower yards; they were moored head and stern across the harbour-mouth in the strongest possible manner, chained to the ground and to each other, and on board each was from fifty to a hundred soldiers,<sup>1</sup> every one of whom was provided with three

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65.

Attack on  
the flotilla  
at Boulogne  
by Nelson.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1801, 271.  
South. ii.  
176. Jom.  
xiv. 366.

the united efforts of every British arm in the defence of all that can be dear to Englishmen, and it is with glowing pride that I behold the prevalence of this sentiment in every part of your Majesty's dominions. Whatever may, some time back, have been your Majesty's objections to my being in the way of actual service, yet at a crisis like this, unexampled in our history, when every subject in the realm is eagerly seeking for, and has his post assigned him, these objections will, I humbly trust, yield to the pressure of the times, and that your Majesty will be graciously pleased to call me to a station wherein I may prove myself worthy of the confidence of my country, and of the high rank I hold in it, by staking my life in its defence. Death would be preferable to being marked as the only man in the country who cannot be suffered to come forth on such an occasion. Should it be my fate to fall in so glorious a contest, no injury could arise to the line of the succession, on account of the number happily remaining of your Majesty's children. But were there fifty princes, or only one, it would, in my humble opinion, be equally incumbent on them to stand foremost in the ranks of danger, at so decisive a period as the present."—*PRINCE OF WALES to GEORGE III., August 3, 1801; PELLEW'S Life of Sidmouth, i. 439, 440.*

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loaded muskets, as in defending a breach threatened with assault. In addition to this, the whole were immediately under the guns of the batteries on shore, and every eminence capable of bearing cannon had been armed with a powerful array of artillery.

Notwithstanding these formidable circumstances, Nelson commenced the attack at midnight in four divisions of boats. The second division, under Captain Parker, first closed with the enemy; and in the most gallant style instantly endeavoured to board. But the strong netting baffled all their efforts, and as they were vainly endeavouring to cut their way through it, discharges of musketry from the soldiers on board killed or wounded above half their number, including their gallant leader Captain Parker, who was desperately maimed while cheering on his men. The darkness of the night, and the rapidity of the tide, which prevented the other divisions from getting into action at the same time as Captain Parker's, rendered the attack abortive, notwithstanding the most gallant efforts on the part of the seamen and marines engaged in the service. One of the commanders of the French division behaved like a generous enemy. He hailed the boats as they approached, and called out in English—"Let me advise you, brave Englishmen, to keep off; you can do nothing here; it is only shedding the blood of gallant men to attempt it." After four hours of gallant but unequal combat, the assailants were obliged to retire, with the loss of 172 men killed and wounded; but Nelson declared that, "If all the boats could have arrived at their destined points at the periods assigned to them, not all the chains in France could have prevented our men from bringing off the whole of the vessels."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Southey, ii. 176, 180.  
Ann. Reg. 1801, 271.  
Jom. xiv. 387. Dum. vii. 149, 159.  
Bign. ii. 59, 60.

66.  
Which is  
defeated.

A singular circumstance occurred at this time, which demonstrates how little the clearest intellect can anticipate the ultimate result of the discoveries which are destined to effect the greatest changes in human affairs. At the time when all eyes in Europe were fixed on the

Channel, and the orators in the French tribunate were wishing for "a fair wind and thirty-six hours," an unknown individual\* presented himself to the First Consul, and said, "The sea which separates you from your enemy gives him an immense advantage. Aided alternately by the winds and the tempests, he braves you in his inaccessible isle. This obstacle, his sole strength, I engage to overcome. I can, in spite of all his fleets, at any time, in a few hours transport your armies into his territory, without fearing the tempests, or having need of the winds. Consider the means which I offer you." The plan and details accompanying it were received by Napoleon, and by him remitted to a commission of the most learned men whom France could produce, who reported that the scheme was *visionary and impracticable*, and, in consequence, it at that time came to nothing.<sup>1</sup> Such was the reception which STEAM NAVIGATION received at the hands of philosophy; such is the first success of the greatest discovery of modern times since the invention of printing—of one destined in its ultimate effects to produce a revolution in the channels of commerce, alter the art of naval war, work out the overthrow of empires, change the face of the world. The discovery seemed made for the age; and yet genius and philosophy rejected it at the very time when it was most required, and when it seemed calculated to carry into effect the vast projects which were already matured by the great leader of its most formidable forces.

But the Continental writers were in error when they supposed that this vast acquisition to nautical power would, if it had been fully developed at that time, have led to the subjugation of Britain; the English maritime superiority would have appeared as clearly in the new method of carrying on naval war as it had in the old. Steam navigation has in a great degree altered the mode of carrying on naval warfare, but it has made no change on its principles, or the elements of strength by which

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67.

First proposal for the introduction of steam into naval operations.

<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii.  
61, 62.

68.

Its probable effect on future naval wars.

\* Fulton.

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ultimate success is to be attained. Gunpowder has changed in a considerable degree the arms of land contests ; but the principles of the military art, the sources of military strength, are the same as they were in the days of Hannibal and Cæsar. Albion would have been encircled by steam vessels ; if the French boats, aided by such auxiliaries, could have braved the wind and the tide, the English cruisers would have been equally assisted in the maintenance of their blockade ; the stoutest heart and the last guinea would have finally carried the day, whatever changes occurred in the mode of carrying on the contest ; the land of coal and iron would have maintained its superiority in the warfare of fire. Even if their wooden walls had been broken through, the future conquerors of Vitoria and Waterloo had no cause for despondency, if the war came to be conducted by land forces on their own shores.

69.  
Negotia-  
tions for  
peace be-  
tween  
France and  
England.

But these warlike demonstrations were a mere cover on both sides to the real intentions of the two cabinets ; and in the midst of the hostile fleets and armies which covered the Channel and the coasts of France, couriers were incessantly passing, carrying despatches, containing the negotiations for a general peace. In truth, the contest had now ceased to have any present or definite object with both the powers by whom it was maintained, and they were driven to an accommodation from the experienced impossibility of finding any common element on which their hostilities could be carried on. After the loss of all her colonies, the ruin of her commerce, and the disappearance of her flag from the ocean, it was as impossible for France to find a method of annoying Great Britain, as it was for England to discover the means of reducing the Continental power of her enemy, after the peace of Lunéville had prostrated the last array of the military monarchies of Europe. Even if their mutual hostility were inextinguishable, still both had need of a breathing-time to prepare for a renewal of the contest ;

the former that she might regain the commerce and colonies on which her naval strength depended, the latter that she might restore the finances which the enormous expenses of the war had seriously disorganised.

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So early as the 21st March, the British cabinet had signified to M. Otto, who still remained in London to superintend the arrangements for the exchange of prisoners, that they were disposed to renew the negotiations which had so often been opened without success ; and it was agreed between the two governments that, without any general suspension of arms, the basis of a treaty should be secretly adjusted. When the terms, however, first came to be proposed, there appeared to be an irreconcilable difference between them ; nor was this surprising, for both had enjoyed a career of almost unbroken success upon their separate elements, and each was called on to make sacrifices for peace, which, it was quite evident, could not be exacted from them by force of arms, if the contest were continued. Lord Hawkesbury's first proposals were, that the French should evacuate Egypt, and that the English should retain Malta, Ceylon, Trinidad, and Martinique, and evacuate all the other colonies which they had conquered during the war—acquisitions which, how great soever, did not seem disproportionate to the vast Continental additions received by France in the extension of her frontier to the Rhine, and the establishment of a girdle of affiliated republics round the parent state. But to these conditions the First Consul refused to accede. "The resolution of the First Consul," says the historian of his diplomacy, "was soon taken. France could neither surrender any part of its ancient domains nor its recent acquisitions."<sup>1</sup>

70.  
First proposals of England, which are refused.  
March 21.

April 2.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
379. Bignon.  
ii. 68.

The views of Napoleon were developed in a note of M. Otto, on the 23d July, after the dissolution of the northern confederacy had relieved England of one of the greatest of her dangers, and disposed France to proceed with more moderation in the negotiation, and when her defeat on the

71.  
Napoleon's views in the negotiation.  
July 23.

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<sup>1</sup> Note, 23d  
July.

<sup>2</sup> Note, 5th  
August.

<sup>3</sup> Bign. ii. 73,  
76. Jom.  
xiv. 333.

72.  
Prelimi-  
naries signed  
at London.  
Oct. 1, 1801.

banks of the Nile had deprived her of all hopes of retaining that colony by force of arms. He proposed that Egypt should be restored to the Porte ; that the republic formed of the seven Ionian islands should be recognised ; that the harbours of Italy should be restored to the Pope and the King of Naples, Port Mahon ceded to Spain, and Malta to the Knights of Jerusalem, with the offer to raze its fortifications. In the East Indies, he offered to abandon Ceylon, which had been wrested from the Dutch, to Great Britain, upon condition that all the other colonial conquests of England in both hemispheres, should be restored, and in that event he agreed to respect the integrity of Portugal.<sup>1</sup> Lord Hawkesbury, in answer, suggested some arrangement by which Malta might be rendered independent of both parties, and insisted for the retention of some of the British conquests in the West Indies.<sup>2</sup> The negotiations were prolonged for several months ; but at length the difficulties were all adjusted, and the preliminaries of a general peace signed at London on the 1st October.<sup>3</sup>

By these articles, it was agreed that hostilities should immediately cease by land and sea between the contracting parties ; that Great Britain should restore its colonial conquests in every part of the world—Ceylon in the East and Trinidad in the West Indies alone excepted, which were ceded in entire sovereignty to that power ; that Egypt should be restored to the Porte, Malta and its dependencies to the order of St John of Jerusalem, the Cape of Good Hope to Holland, but opened alike to the trade of both the contracting powers ; the integrity of Portugal guaranteed ; the harbours of the Roman and Neapolitan states evacuated by the French, and Porto Ferraio by the British forces ; a compensation provided for the House of Nassau ; and a new republic created in the Seven Islands of the Adriatic, which was recognised by the French Republic. The fisheries of Newfoundland were restored to the situation in which they had been



before the war, reserving their final arrangement to the definitive treaty.\* Though the negotiations had been so long in dependence, they had been kept a profound secret from the people of both countries, and their long continuance had sensibly weakened the hope of their being brought to a satisfactory result. Either from accident or design, this impression had been greatly strengthened, recently before the signature of the preliminaries; and the very day before, the report had gone abroad in London, that all hope of an amicable adjustment was at an end, and that interminable war was likely again to break out between the two nations.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bigu. ii. 77.  
Jom. xiv.  
393, 394.  
Martens, vii.  
377.

In proportion to the desponding feelings occasioned by this impression were the transports of joy excited by the appearance of a London Gazette Extraordinary on the 2d October, announcing the signature of the preliminaries on the preceding day. The three per cents instantly rose from 59 to 66; the *tiers consolidé* at Paris from 48 to 53. Universal joy pervaded both capitals. These feelings rapidly spread through the whole British nation, as the arrival of the post announced the joyful intelligence; and the public satisfaction was at its height when, on the 12th of the same month, Colonel Lauriston arrived, bearing the ratification of the treaty by the French government. Never since the restoration of Charles II. had such transports seized the public mind. The populace insisted on drawing the French envoys in their carriage; and they were conducted by this tumultuary array, followed by a guard of honour from the household brigade, through Parliament Street to Downing Street, where the ratifications were exchanged; and at night a general illumination

73.  
Transports  
of joy on the  
occasion,  
both in  
France and  
England.

\* The clause regarding Malta, which became of so much importance in the sequel, from being the ostensible ground of the rupture of the treaty, was in these terms:—"The island of Malta, with its dependencies, shall be evacuated by the English troops, and restored to the order of St John of Jerusalem. To secure the absolute independence of that isle from both the contracting parties, it shall be placed under the guarantee of a third power to be named in the definitive treaty."—DUMAS, vii. 319; and *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 18, 19.

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. vii.  
203, 209.  
Ann Reg.  
1801, 277.  
Jom. xiv.  
394, 395.  
Thiers, iii.  
181.

74.  
But the  
peace is  
severely  
stigmatised  
in England  
by many.  
Arguments  
used against  
it in the  
country.

gave vent to the feelings of universal exhilaration.\* Nor was the public joy manifested in a less emphatic manner at Paris. Hardly had the cannon of the Tuileries and the Invalides, in the evening, announced the unexpected intelligence, when every one stopped in the streets and congratulated his acquaintance on the news; the public flocked in crowds to the theatres, where it was officially promulgated, amidst transports long unfelt in the metropolis; and in the evening the city was universally and splendidly illuminated. There seemed no bounds to the prosperity and glory of the Republic, now that this auspicious event had removed the last and most inveterate of its enemies.<sup>1</sup>

But while these were the natural feelings of the inconsiderate populace, who are ever governed by present impressions, and were for the most part destitute of the information requisite to form a correct opinion on the subject, there were many men gifted with greater sagacity and foresight in Great Britain, who deeply lamented the conditions by which peace had been purchased, and from the very first prophesied that it could be of no long endurance. They observed, that the war had been abruptly terminated, without any one of the objects being gained for which it was undertaken: that it was entered into in order to curb the ambition, and stop the democratic propagandism of France, and in an especial manner prevent the extension of its authority in the Low Countries; whereas by the result its power was immensely extended, its frontier advanced to the Rhine, its influence to the Niemen, and a military chieftain placed at its head, capable of wielding to the best advantage its vast resources. That, supposing the destruction of some, and the humiliation of other powers, had absolved Britain from all her ties with the Continental states, and left her at full liberty

\* The lines of Claudian were then precisely applicable:—

“ Omnis in hoc uno variis discordia cessit  
Ordinibus; lætatur eques, plauditque senatus,  
Votaque patricio certant plebeia favori.”

to consult only her own interest in any treaty which might be formed, still it seemed at best extremely doubtful whether the preliminaries which had been signed were calculated to accomplish this object. That they contributed nothing towards the coercion of France on one element, while they gave that power the means of restoring its fleets and recruiting the sinews of war on another ; and that thus the result necessarily would be, that Britain would be compelled to renew the contest again, and that too at no distant period, in order to maintain her existence, and she would then find her enemy's resources as much strengthened as her own were weakened during its cessation. That during the struggle we had deprived France of all her colonies, blockaded her harbours, ruined her commerce, and almost annihilated her navy, and therefore had nothing to fear from her maritime hostility ; but would this superiority continue, if, in pursuance of this treaty, we restored almost all her colonial possessions, and enabled her, by a successful commerce, in a few years to revive her naval power ? If, therefore, the principle, so long maintained by Great Britain, had any foundation, that we had been driven into the war to provide for our own security, and the hostility of revolutionary France was implacable, it was evident that Britain had everything to fear and nothing to hope from this pacification ; and while she unbuckled her own armour, and laid aside her sword, she was in truth placing in the hands of her redoubtable adversary the weapons, and the only weapons, by which ere long that enemy might be enabled to aim mortal strokes at herself.

The partisans of the administration, and the advocates for peace throughout the country, opposed to these arguments considerations of another kind, perhaps still more specious. They contended that the real question was not, what were the views formed, or the hopes indulged, when we entered into the war, but what were the prospects which could rationally be entertained, now that we had reached

75.  
Arguments  
urged in  
support of  
it by the  
adminis-  
tration.

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<sup>1</sup> Dum. vii.  
203, 209.  
Ann Reg.  
1801, 277.  
Jom. xiv.  
394, 395.  
Thiers, iii.  
161.

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75.  
Arguments  
urged in  
support of  
it by the  
adminis-  
tration.

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its tenth year? Without pretending to affirm that the resources of Great Britain were worn out, or peace had become a matter of necessity, still it was impossible to dispute that, in consequence of the cessation of Continental hostilities, and the dissolution of the last coalition, the prospect of effectually reducing the military power of France had become almost hopeless. That thus the question was, whether, after it had become impossible, by the disasters of our allies, to attain one object of the war, we should obstinately and single-handed maintain the contest, without any definite end to be gained by its prosecution? Though the frontiers of France had been extended, and her power immensely increased, still the revolutionary mania, by far the greatest evil with which Europe was threatened, had been at length effectually extinguished. Thus the contest had ceased to be, as at first, one of life and death to Britain, and had returned to the usual state of warfare between regular governments, in which the cost of maintaining it was to be balanced by the advantages to be gained from its prosecution. Without doubt, the return of peace, and the restoration of her colonies, would give France the means of increasing her naval resources; but it would probably do the same in an equal or greater degree to Great Britain, and leave the maritime power of the two countries in the same relative situation as before. It is impossible to remain for ever at war, solely in order to prevent your enemy repairing the losses he has sustained during the contest; and the enormous expenses with which the struggle is attended will, if much longer continued, involve the finances of the country in inextricable embarrassment. It is surely, therefore, worth trying, now that a regular government is established in the Republic, whether it is not possible to remain with so near a neighbour on terms of amity; and it will be time enough to take up arms again, if the conduct of the First Consul shall come to demonstrate that he was not sincere in his professions,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1801, 278,  
279.

and that a renewal of the contest would be less perilous than a continuance of peace.

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76.

Peace between  
France and  
Turkey.

The termination of hostilities between France and England speedily drew after it the accommodation of the differences of the minor powers engaged in the war. No sooner were the preliminaries signed with Great Britain, than Napoleon used his utmost efforts to conclude a treaty on the most favourable terms with the Ottoman Porte. On this occasion the finesse of European diplomacy prevailed over the plain sense and upright dealing of the Osmanlis. The news of the surrender of Alexandria reached Paris on the 7th October, six days after the preliminaries had been signed with England; instantly the Turkish ambassador, Esseyd Ali Effendi, who had long been in a sort of confinement, was sent for; and before he was aware of the important success which had been gained, he was persuaded to agree to a treaty, which was signed two days afterwards. In this negotiation, the French diplomatists made great use of their alleged moderation in agreeing to the restoration of Egypt, which they knew was already lost; and so worked upon the fears of the ambassador by threats of a descent from Ancona and Otranto, that he consented to give to the Republican commerce in the Levant the same advantages which the most favoured nations enjoyed; and, at the same time, the Republic of the Seven Ionian Islands was recognised as an independent state. Thus, by the arts of M. Talleyrand, were the French, who, in defiance of ancient treaties, had done all in their power to wrest Egypt from the Turks, placed on the same footing with the English, by whose blood and treasure it had been rescued from their grasp.<sup>1</sup>

Oct. 9.

<sup>1</sup> Jom. xiv.  
398. Ann.  
Reg. 1801,  
280, and  
State Pa-  
pers, 292.  
Martens, vii.  
394.

In the end of August, a definitive treaty was concluded between France and Bavaria, by which the latter power renounced in favour of the former all its territories and possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, and received, on the other hand, a guarantee for its dominions on the

77.  
And with  
Bavaria,  
America,  
and the less-  
er powers.  
Aug. 24.

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1801.

Sept. 9.

Oct. 8.

<sup>1</sup> Ann. Reg.  
1801. State  
Papers, 251,  
297, 300.  
Jom. xiv.  
399. Mar-  
tens, vii.  
365, and  
96, 65, and  
386.

right bank. The preliminaries, signed at Morfontaine on 30th September 1800, between France and America, were ratified by a definitive treaty, which somewhat abridged the commercial advantages stipulated in favour of the Republic, although it placed the French on the footing of the most favoured nations. But notwithstanding all his exertions, the First Consul was obliged to forego the peculiar advantages which, in the treaty of 1778, the gratitude of the Americans to Louis XVI. had granted to the subjects of France. Finally, a treaty of peace was, on 8th October, concluded between France and Russia, and on 17th December, between the same power and the Dey of Algiers.<sup>1</sup>

78.

Important  
treaty be-  
tween  
France and  
Russia.

The public articles of the Russian treaty merely re-established the relations of the two empires on the footing on which they stood prior to the commencement of hostilities; but it contained also several secret articles, which ultimately became of the greatest importance in the complicated system of European policy. Then appeared, in diplomatic acts, decisive evidence of those sentiments which Alexander had revealed to the French minister Duroc in secret conference.\* The first article related to the division of the indemnities provided by the treaty of Lunéville for the princes dispossessed on the left bank of the Rhine. The two cabinets bound themselves "to form a perfect concert, to lead the parties interested to adopt their principles, which are to preserve a just equilibrium between the houses of Austria and Prussia." The second article provided, that the high contracting parties should come to an understanding to arrange on amicable terms the affairs of Italy and of the Holy See. The sixth article stipulated, that "the First Consul and the Emperor of Russia shall act in concert in relation to the King of Sardinia, and with all the regard possible to the actual state of affairs." The ninth article guaranteed the independence of the Republic of the Seven Islands: "and it is

\* *Ante*, Chap. XXXIII. § 73, note.



specially provided that those isles shall contain no foreign troops." Finally, the eleventh article, the most important of the whole, declared—"As soon as possible after the signature of the present treaty, and these secret articles, the two contracting parties shall enter upon the consideration of the establishment of a general peace, upon the following basis: 'To restore a *just equilibrium in the different parts of the world, and to insure the liberty of the seas*, binding themselves to act in concert for the attainment of these objects by all measures, whether of conciliation or vigour, mutually agreed on between them, for the good of humanity, the general repose, and the independence of governments.'" So early had these great potentates taken upon themselves to act as the arbiters of the whole affairs of the civilised world! These secret articles were in the end the cause of all the differences which ensued between those powers, and brought the French to Moscow and the Russians to Paris. So often does overweening ambition overvault itself, and fall on the other side.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bign. ii.  
90, 93.

The preliminary articles of the peace between Great Britain and France underwent a protracted discussion in both Houses of Parliament, immediately after the opening of the session in November 1801. The eyes of all the world were fixed on the only assembly in existence, where the merits of so important a treaty, and the mighty interests it involved, could receive a free discussion. It was urged by Lord Grenville, Mr Windham, and the war party in both houses:—"By the result of this treaty we are in truth a conquered people. Buonaparte is as much our master as he is of Spain or Prussia, or any of those countries which, though nominally independent, are really subjected to his control. Are our resources exhausted? Is the danger imminent, that such degrading terms are acceded to? On the contrary, our wealth is unbounded, our fleets are omnipotent, and we have recently humbled the veterans of France, even on

79.  
Debates in  
parliament  
on the peace.  
Arguments  
against it as  
degrading to  
England.

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their own element! We now make peace, it seems, because we foresee a time at no distant period when we shall be obliged to do so; we capitulate, like General Menou, while we have still some ammunition left. The first question for every independent power inheriting a glorious name to ask itself is, 'Is the part I am to act consonant to the high reputation I have borne in the world?' Judging by this standard, what shall we say of the present treaty? France gives up nothing; for Egypt, at the time of its conclusion, was not hers to give. England, with the exception of Trinidad and Ceylon, gives up everything. By the result of the treaty, France possesses in Europe all the continent, excepting Austria and Prussia; in Asia, Pondicherry, Cochin, Negapatam, and the Spice Islands; in Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, Goree, and Senegal; in the Mediterranean, every fortified port excepting Gibraltar, so that that inland sea may now be truly called a French lake; in the West Indies, part at least of St Domingo, Martinique, Tobago, St Lucia, Guadaloupe, Curaçoa; in North America, St Pierre, Miguelon, and Louisiana, in virtue of a secret treaty with Spain; in South America, Surinam, Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo, and Guiana, as far as the river of the Amazons. Such is the power which we are required to contemplate without dismay, and under the shadow of whose greatness we are invited to lie down with perfect tranquillity and composure. What would the Marlboroughs, the Godolphins, the Somers, or such weak and deluded men as viewed with jealousy the power of Louis XIV., have said to a peace which not only confirms to France the possession of nearly the whole of Europe, but extends her empire over every other part of the globe?

"But it is said that France and the First Consul will stop short in the career of ambition; that they will be satisfied with the successes they have gained, and that the progress of the Revolution will terminate at the elevation it has already attained. Is such the nature of

ambition? Is it the nature of French revolutionary ambition? Does it commonly happen that either communities or single men are cured of the passion for aggrandisement by unlimited success? On the contrary, if we examine the French Revolution, and trace it correctly to its causes, we shall find that the scheme of universal empire was, from the beginning, what was looked forward to as the consummation of its labours; the end first in view, though the last to be accomplished; the *primum mobile* that originally set it in motion, and has since guided and governed all its movements. The authors of the Revolution wished, in the first instance, to destroy morality and religion; but they wished these things, not as ends, but as means in a higher design. They wished for a double empire—an empire of opinion, and an empire of political power; and they used the one of these as the means of attaining the other. When there is but one country intervenes between France and universal dominion, is it to be supposed that she will stop of her own accord, and quietly abandon the last fruit of her efforts, when it is just within her grasp?

“But the peace is founded, it would appear, on another hope—on the idea that Buonaparte, now that he has become a sovereign, will no longer be a supporter of revolutionary schemes, but do his utmost to maintain the rank and authority which he has so recently acquired. But although nothing seems more certain than that, in that quarter at least, the democratic mania is for the present completely extinguished, yet it by no means follows from that circumstance that it does not exist, and that too in a most dangerous form, in other states in close alliance with the present ruler of France. Though the head of an absolute monarchy in that kingdom, he is adored as the essence of Jacobinism in this country; and maintains a party here, only the more dangerous that its members are willing to sacrifice to him not only the independence of their country, but the whole consistency of their previous

81.  
The alleged  
inveteracy  
of Napoleon  
against  
Great Bri-  
tain.

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opinions. If any doubt could exist in any reasonable mind that the grand object of the First Consul, as of all preceding governments in France, has been the destruction of this country, it would be removed by the conduct which has been pursued, and the objects that have been insisted for in this very treaty. What can be the object of demanding so many settlements in South America and the West Indies, the Cape, Cochín-China, and Malta, so recently won by our arms, if it be not that of building up a maritime and colonial power, which may in time come to rival that of this country? It does not augur very favourably of the intentions of a party in any transaction, that his conduct throughout has been marked by the clearest proofs of duplicity and fraud. Now, what shall we think of the candour and fairness which, in a treaty with us, proposes the evacuation of Egypt at the very time when they knew, though we did not, that at that moment all their soldiers in Egypt were prisoners of war? Where was their good faith to the Turks, when in the same circumstances they, knowing the fact and the Turks not, took credit from them for this very evacuation? What is this but insuring the lottery-ticket at the moment when they know it has been already drawn?

82.

Alleged impossibility of peace being maintained.

“What, it is said, are we to do? War cannot be eternal; and what prospect have we of reaching a period when it may be terminated under circumstances upon the whole more favourable? The extent to which this delusion has spread, may truly be said to have been the ruin of the country. The supporters of this opinion never seem to have apprehended the important truth, that if France is bent upon our destruction, there must be perpetual war till one or the other is destroyed. This was the conduct of the Romans, who resolved that Carthage should be destroyed, because they were sensible that if that was not done, it would speedily be their own fate. If we are to come at last only to an armed truce, would it not have been better to have suspended the war at once in that

way, than taken the roundabout course which has now been adopted? The evils of war are indeed many; but what are they compared to those of the armed, suspicious, jealous peace which we have formed? Against all its own dangers war provided; the existence of our fleets upon the ocean restrained effectually all those attempts which will now be directed against our possessions in every quarter of the globe. In peace, not the least part of our danger will arise from the irreligious principles and licentious manners which will be let loose upon our people, and spread with fatal rapidity, from the profligacy of the neighbouring capital. French Jacobinism will soon break through stronger bulwarks than the walls of Malta. The people of this country have enjoyed, in such an extraordinary degree, all the blessings of life during the war, public prosperity has increased so rapidly during its continuance, that they have never been able to comprehend the dangers which they were engaged in combating. If they had, we never should have heard, except among the ignorant and disaffected, of joy and exultation through the land, at a peace such as the present. When a great military monarch was at the lowest ebb of his fortunes, and had sustained a defeat which seemed to extinguish all his remaining hopes, he wrote from the field of battle: 'We have lost all except our honour.' Would to God that the same consolation, in circumstances likely to become in time not less disastrous, remained to Great Britain!

"France, it is true, has made great acquisitions—she has made the Rhine the boundary of her empire; but on our side we have gained successes no less brilliant and striking. We have multiplied our colonies, and our navy has been triumphant in every quarter of the globe. We had rescued Egypt, we had captured Malta and Minorca, and the Mediterranean was shut up from the ships of France and Spain. In the East Indies we had possessed ourselves of everything except Batavia, which we should

83.  
Successes  
gained dur-  
ing the war  
urged as  
arguments  
against the  
peace.

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have taken, if it had been worth the cost of an expedition. We had made ourselves masters of the Cape, an important and necessary step towards Eastern dominion. In the West Indies we had everything desirable,—Martinique, Trinidad, St Lucia, and Guadaloupe; while on the continent of South America we had an absolute empire, under the name of Surinam and Demerara, almost equal to the European power to which we have now restored it. But what have we done with these immense acquisitions, far exceeding, in present magnitude and ultimate importance, all the conquests of France on the continent of Europe? Have we retained them as pledges to compel the restoration of the balance of European power, or, if that was impossible, as counterpoises in our hands to the acquisitions of France? No! we have surrendered them all at one fell swoop to our implacable enemy, who has thus made as great strides towards maritime supremacy in one single treaty, as he had effected toward Continental dominion in nine successful campaigns.”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 86,  
139, 165,  
174.

84.  
Answer  
made by the  
govern-  
ment and  
Mr Pitt.  
Gains of the  
kingdom by  
the peace.

To these powerful and energetic arguments, it was replied by Lord Hawkesbury and Mr Addington, who on this occasion found an unexpected but powerful ally in Mr Pitt:—“After the conclusion of peace between France and the great Continental powers; after the dissolution of the confederacy of the European monarchies, a confederacy which government had most justly supported to the utmost of their power, the question of peace became merely one of time, and of the stipulations to be obtained for ourselves. With regard to the terms which were obtained, they were perhaps not so favourable as could have been wished, but they were decidedly preferable to a continuance of the contest, after the great objects for which it was undertaken were no longer attainable; and the difference between what we had attained, and the retaining all we had given up, would not have justified us in protracting the war. Minorca was a matter of little importance, for experience has proved

that it uniformly fell to the power which possessed the preponderating naval force in the Mediterranean ; and although it was certainly a matter of regret that we could not have retained so important an acquisition as Malta, yet, if we could not do this, no better arrangement could have been made as to its future destination, than had been provided for in the present treaty. Ceylon in the East, and Trinidad in the West Indies, are both acquisitions of great value ; and although it would be ridiculous to assert that they afforded any compensation for the expense of the war, yet if, by the force of external events over which we had no control, the chief objects of the struggle have been frustrated, it becomes a fit subject of congratulation, that we have obtained acquisitions and honourable terms for ourselves at the termination of a contest, which to all our allies had been pregnant with disaster.

“ The great object of the war on the part of Great Britain was *security* ; defence of ourselves and our allies in a war waged against most of the nations of Europe, and ourselves in particular, with especial malignity. In order to obtain this, we certainly did look for the subversion of the government which was founded on revolutionary principles ; but we never insisted, as a *sine quâ non*, on the restoration of the old government of France ; we only said, at different times, when terms of accommodation were proposed, there was no government with which we could treat. It doubtless would have been more consistent with the wishes of ministers, and the interest and security of this country, if such a restoration could have taken place ; and it must ever be a subject of regret that efforts corresponding to our own were not made by the other powers of Europe for the accomplishment of that great work. But in no one instance did we ever insist upon restoring the monarchy. We never denied to the French people the same right of choosing their form of government and ruling power which, at our own Revolu-

85.  
The original  
objects of the  
war had  
become un-  
attainable.

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tion, we had successfully asserted : it was security against their aggression, whether in the form of insidious propaganda or open hostility, which was the object of all our efforts. This object was now substantially gained, though not exactly in the way we had at one time contemplated. There had been periods during the continuance of the war when we had hopes of being able to put together the shattered fragments of that great and venerable edifice ; to have restored the exiled nobility of France ; to have re-established a government, certainly not free from defects, but built upon regular foundations, instead of that mad system of innovation which threatened, and had nearly effected, the destruction of Europe. This, it was true, had been found not attainable, but we had the satisfaction of knowing that we had survived the revolutionary fever, and we had seen the extent of its principles abated. We had seen Jacobinism deprived of its fascination ; we had seen it stripped of the name and pretext of liberty ; it had shown itself to be capable of destroying only, but not of building, and that it must necessarily end in military despotism.

86.  
Necessity  
thence ac-  
cruing for a  
change of  
object.

“ But being disappointed in our hopes of being able to drive France within her ancient limits, and to make barriers against her future incursions, it became then necessary with the change of circumstances to change our plans ; for no error could be more fatal than to look only at one object, and obstinately pursue it, when the hope of accomplishing it no longer remained. If it became impossible for us to obtain the full amount of our wishes, wisdom and policy both required that we should endeavour to obtain that which was next best. In these propositions there was no inconsistency, either in the former conduct or language of ministers, in refusing to treat with the person who now holds the destiny of France ; for it was even then announced, that if events should take the turn they have since done, peace would no longer be objectionable. Much exaggeration prevails as to the



real amount of the additional strength which France has acquired during the war. If, on the one hand, her territorial acquisitions are immense, it must be recollected, on the other, what she has lost in population, commerce, capital, and industry. The desolation produced by convulsions such as that country has undergone, cannot be repaired even by large acquisitions of territory. When, on the other hand, we contemplate the prodigious wealth of this country, and the natural and legitimate growth of that wealth, so much superior to the produce of rapacity and plunder, it is impossible not to entertain the hope, founded in justice and nature, of its solidity.

“When to these results we add the great increase of our maritime power, the additional naval triumphs we have obtained, the brilliant victories of our armies, gained over the flower of the troops of France, we have the satisfaction of thinking that, if we have failed in some of our wishes, we have succeeded in the main object of adding strength to our security, and at the same time shed additional lustre over our national character. Nor are our colonial acquisitions to be overlooked in estimating the consolidation of our resources. The destruction of the power of Tippoo Saib in India, who has fallen a victim to his attachment to France and his perfidy to us, cannot be viewed but as an important achievement. The union with Ireland, effected at a period of uncommon gloom and despondency, must be regarded as adding more to the power and strength of the British empire than all the conquests of France have effected for that country. If any additional proof were required of the increase of national strength to England, it would be found in the unparalleled efforts which she made in the last year of the war, contending at once against a powerful maritime confederacy in the north, and triumphing over the French on the sands of Egypt; while at the same time the harbours of Europe were so strictly blockaded, that not a frigate even could venture out to sea but under the cover

87.  
The true amount of the gains of France by the war stated; and those of Great Britain by the peace.

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of mist or darkness. Finally, we have seen that proud array of ships, got together for the invasion of this country, driven for shelter under their own batteries, and only preserved from destruction by the chains and nets thrown over them at their harbour-mouths.

88.  
Desirability of peace  
on any terms  
consistent  
with honour.

“ After nine years of ceaseless effusion of blood ; after contracting an increase of debt to the amount of above two hundred millions ; after the indefatigable and uninterrupted exertions of this country, and, it may be added, after its splendid and unexampled achievements, there is no one who can deny that peace is eminently desirable, if it can be purchased without the sacrifice of honour. This country never volunteered into a war with France ; she was drawn into it against her will by the intrigues of the Republicans in her own bosom, and the disaffection, sedition, anarchy, and revolt which they propagated without intermission in all the adjoining states. But that danger has now totally ceased. The revolutionary fervour of France is coerced by a military chieftain far more adequate to the task than the exiled race of monarchs would have been ; and the only peril that now exists is that arising from her military power. But if war is to be continued till adequate security against that danger is obtained, when will it terminate ? Where are the elements to be found of a new coalition against France ; and how can Great Britain, burdened as she is with colonial possessions in every part of the world, descend single-handed, with the arms of military warfare alone, into the Continental arena with her first-rate antagonist ? Peace can now, for the first time since the commencement of the war, be obtained without compromising the interests of any existing ally of England. Austria, Sardinia, Russia, Prussia, Spain, Holland, the original parties to the alliance, have successively, at different periods, dropped out of it, and requested to be liberated from their engagements. We did not blame them for having done so ; they acted under the influence of irresistible necessity ;

but unquestionably they had thereafter no remaining claim upon Great Britain. In so far, therefore, as we stipulated anything in favour of powers which had already made peace, we acted on large and liberal grounds, beyond what we were bound to have done either in honour or honesty.

“In this respect the stipulations in favour of Naples, which had not only excluded our shipping from her harbours, but joined in an alliance against us, were highly honourable to the British character. The like might be said of the provisions in favour of Portugal; while the Ottoman Porte, the only one of our allies who remained fighting by our side at the conclusion of the contest, has obtained complete restitution. The Seven Islands of the Adriatic, originally ceded by France to Austria, and again transferred by Austria to France, might, from their situation, have been highly dangerous in the hands of the latter power to the Turkish dominions, and therefore they have been erected into a separate republic, the independence of which is guaranteed. We have even done something in favour of the House of Orange and the King of Sardinia, although, from having left the confederacy, they had abandoned every claim excepting on our generosity. And thus, having faithfully performed our duties to all our remaining allies, and obtained terms, which, to say the least of them, took nothing from the security of this country, was it expedient to continue the contest for the sake of powers who had abandoned our alliance, and themselves given up as hopeless the objects we had originally entertained, and in which they were more immediately interested than ourselves? Compare this peace with any of those recorded in the former history of the two nations, and it will well stand the comparison. By the treaty of Ryswick and Aix-la-Chapelle we gained nothing; by that of Versailles we lost considerably; it was only by the peace of Utrecht in 1713, and that of Paris in 1763, that we made any acquisitions. But if

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89.  
Fidelity and  
generosity of  
Great Bri-  
tain toward  
her allies.

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<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 36,  
38.

we compare the present treaty with either of these, it will be found that it is by no means inferior either in point of advantage or the promise of durability. Minorca and Gibraltar, obtained by the former, and Canada and Florida, by the latter, will not bear a comparison with Ceylon, the Mysore, and Trinidad, the glorious trophies of the present contest."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. 191.

In the Commons no division took place on the preliminaries. In the Lords the house divided, 114 to 10, in favour of the Ministers; but in the minority were found the names of Earls Spenser, Grenville, and Caernarvon.<sup>2</sup>

90.  
Definitive  
treaty signed  
at Amiens.<sup>3</sup> Art. 15.<sup>4</sup> Art. 18.

The definitive treaty of peace was signed at AMIENS, on the 27th March 1802. Its conditions varied in no material circumstance from the preliminaries agreed to at London nine months before. The fisheries in Newfoundland were replaced in the condition in which they were before the war<sup>3</sup>; an "adequate compensation" was stipulated for the House of Orange<sup>4</sup>; and it was agreed that Malta should be placed in a state of entire independence of both powers; that there should be neither English nor French *langues*, or branches of the order; that a Maltese *langue* shall be established, and the King of Sicily invited to furnish a force of two thousand men to form a garrison for the fortresses of the island and its dependencies, along with the Grand Master and order of St John; and that "the forcès of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate the island and its dependencies within three months after the exchange of the ratifications, or sooner, if it can be done." The cession of Ceylon and Trinidad to Great Britain, and the restoration of all the other conquered colonies to France and Holland, the integrity of the Ottoman dominions, and the recognition of the Republic of the Seven Islands, were provided for as in the preliminary articles.<sup>5</sup> A long debate ensued in both houses on the definitive treaty, in which the topics already adverted to were enlarged on at great length.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> See the  
treaty in  
Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 559,  
Ann. Reg.  
1802. State  
Papers, 62,  
Martens, vii.  
404.<sup>6</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 733,  
827.

Government were supported by a majority of 276 to 20 in the lower, and 122 to 16 in the upper house.

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91.

Reflections  
on the peace,  
which ap-  
pear to have  
been expe-  
dient.

Such was the termination of the first period of the war; and such were the terms on which Great Britain obtained a temporary respite from its perils and expenses. On calmly reviewing the arguments urged both in the legislature and in the country on this great question, it is impossible to resist the conclusion, that the advocates of peace were correct in the views they entertained of the interests of the country at that period. Even admitting all that Mr Windham and Lord Grenville so strongly advanced,—as to the magnitude of the sacrifices made by Great Britain, and the danger to which she was exposed from the territorial acquisitions and insatiable ambition of France,—to be well founded, still the question remained—was it not incumbent on a prudent government to make at least the trial of a pacification, and relieve the country, though it should be but for a time, from the burdens and anxiety of war, on the faith of a treaty solemnly acceded to by the new ruler of its antagonist? The government of the First Consul, compared to any of the revolutionary ones which had preceded it, was stable and regular; the revolutionary fervour, the continuance of which had so long rendered any safe pacification out of the question, had exhausted itself, and given place to a general and anxious disposition to submit to the ruling authority. The dissolution of the last coalition had rendered hopeless, at least for a very long period, the reduction of the military power of France; and the maritime superiority of England was so decided, as to render any danger to her own independence a distant and problematical contingency.\*

\* Mr Pitt's opinion was decidedly in favour of the treaty of Amiens, though he disapproved of some of its conditions, and was convinced that no lasting pacification could be made with Buonaparte. But "rest," to use his own words, "had become indispensable to England." He was prepared, rather than have broken off the conference at Lille, to have given way either on the Cape or Ceylon.—See LORD MALMESBURY'S *Diary*, iv. 65; and PELLEW'S *Life of Sidmouth*, ii. 51.

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92.

Advantages  
of the peace.

In these circumstances, it seems indisputable that it was the duty of government, if it could be done without dishonour, to bring to a conclusion a contest of which the burdens were certain and immediate, and the advantages remote, if not illusory. It was worth while putting the sincerity of the First Consul's professions of moderation to such a test as might relieve them of all responsibility, in the event of their being obliged, at a subsequent period, to renew the contest. The fact of this having ultimately been found to be the case, and of the peace of Amiens having turned out only an armed truce, is no impeachment whatever of the justice of these views. It, on the contrary, affords the strongest corroboration of them. Britain lost none of her means of defence during the intermission of hostilities; and she avoided the heavy responsibility which otherwise would have lain upon her to the latest generation, of having obstinately continued the war, when peace was within her power, and compelled Napoleon, although he was otherwise inclined, to continue a contest which ultimately brought such unparalleled calamities on the civilised world. Nor could the terms of the treaty be impugned as disgraceful, with any degree of justice towards Great Britain, when she terminated a strife, which had proved so disastrous to the greatest Continental states, with her constitution untouched, and without the cession of a single acre which belonged to her at its commencement; while France, accustomed to such large acquisitions at every pacification, was compelled to surrender territories belonging to herself or her allies, larger than the whole realm of England, and, even in their existing state, of first-rate importance.

93.

Vast increase of the  
resources of  
England  
during the  
war as com-  
pared with  
those of  
France.

For these important advantages, Great Britain was indebted to the energy of her population, and the happy circumstances of her maritime situation, which enabled her to augment her commerce and increase her resources at the very time when those of all the other belligerent powers were wasting away under the influence of a protracted and desolating contest. The increase of the

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wealth, population, commerce, and industry, of these islands, was unprecedented during its whole continuance, and was so great as fully to justify Mr Pitt's observation, that it left the relative strength of the two powers nearly the same at its termination as at its commencement. Great as the increase of the French army had been, that of the British had been still greater; and, but for the immense surface which she had to defend, and the vast colonial possessions she was called on to protect, Britain might have descended with confidence into the Continental arena, and measured her strength, single-handed, with the conqueror of Europe.\* On the 1st February 1793, the British navy consisted of 153 sail of the line and 133 frigates; whereas, at the close of the war, it numbered no less than 202 sail of the line and 277 frigates, manned by 120,000 seamen and marines.† The navy of France was, at the

\* General Mathieu Dumas estimates the regular force of France, after the peace of Lunéville, at 277,000 men, exclusive of the coast-guards, the gendarmerie, the depots of the corps, and the national guard on active service. It is a most moderate computation to take these at 73,000 more.

In 1805 the military establishment of France consisted of the following forces:—

Infantry of the line,	341,000	Light cavalry,	60,500
Light infantry,	100,000	Heavy cavalry,	17,000
Infantry,	441,000	Cavalry,	77,500
Foot and horse artillery, pontooneers, engineers, &c.,			53,500
Imperial Guard,			8,500
Gendarmerie,			15,600
This would amount to a total of—			
Infantry,		441,000	
Cavalry,		77,500	
Artillery and engineers,		53,500	
Imperial Guard,		8,500	
Gendarmerie,		15,600	
Total,		596,100 men.	

—See DUMAS, vi. 70–71; and PEUCHET, *Statistique de la France*, 576, 580.

† The total British navy on 1st October 1801, was—

Line in commission,	104
Line in ordinary and building,	98
Frigates in commission,	126
Frigates in ordinary and building,	151
Sloops, brigs, &c.,	302
Total,	781

—See JAMES, vol. iii. tab. 10, *ad fin.*

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<sup>1</sup> Parl. Hist.  
xxxvi. 47.<sup>2</sup> Peuchet,  
Stat. de la  
France,  
591.

94.

Progress of  
the military  
and naval  
forces on  
both sides.

commencement of the war, 83 sail of the line and 77 frigates, manned by 80,000 seamen; at its termination, it consisted only of 39 sail of the line and 35 frigates.<sup>1</sup> That is, at the outset, the British sail of the line and frigates together were not double those of the enemy; whereas at its close they were above *six times* their number.<sup>2</sup>

The British during the war took or destroyed 58 ships of the line and 126 frigates, belonging to the enemy. Napoleon estimates a fleet of 30 ships of the line, and frigates in proportion, as equal to an army of 120,000 men: measured by that standard, the British navy in 1801 was equivalent to a land force of above 800,000 men. Nor had the military resources of the empire increased in a less striking manner. In 1793, the army amounted only to 64,000 regular soldiers and 12,000 fencibles in the British isles and its colonial dependencies; whereas in 1801 they had increased to the immense force of 380,000 men, besides 100,000 volunteers.\* The French army in 1793 consisted of 150,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery, exclusive of 77,000 provincial troops; in 1801, they amounted to 350,000 regular soldiers, exclusive of the national guards, who were twice as numerous. During the war the British navy increased a half, while the French declined a half. The British army was more than doubled, and the French increased in nearly the same proportion.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Ann. Reg.  
xxxiii. 250.  
Parl. Hist.  
xxxv. 15.  
Jom. i. 224.  
St-Cyr, i.  
36. Introd.  
Etat. de  
France,  
573. Dum.  
vi. 70, 71.

95.

Comparative  
increase  
in revenue of  
France and  
England.

The French revenue, notwithstanding all its territorial acquisitions, was diminished, while the permanent income of England was nearly doubled; the French debt, by the destruction of two-thirds of its amount, was diminished, while that of England was doubled; the French exports and imports were almost annihilated, while the British

* Regulars,	168,000
Militia,	80,000
Native troops in India,	130,000
Volunteers in Britain,	100,000
	<hr/>
	478,000



exports were doubled, and the imports had increased more than fifty per cent; the French commercial shipping was almost destroyed, while that of England had increased nearly a third. The regular revenue of France in 1789 (for no approximation, even, to a correct estimate of its amount can be formed during the period of confiscation and assignats) had reached 469,000,000 francs, or £18,800,000;<sup>1</sup> while that of England amounted to £16,382,000. At the termination of the war, the revenue of France was 450,000,000 francs, or £18,000,000, and its total expenditure 560,000,000 francs, or £22,400,000, charged on the financial resources of France itself. But this was irrespective of the sums extracted by force from the adjoining countries, which were obliged permanently to feed, clothe, lodge, and pay 110,000 soldiers, or a full third of the French army. The permanent revenue of England at the same period amounted to £28,000,000, exclusive of £8,000,000 war taxes, and its total expenditure to £61,617,000; but this immense sum was all drawn from its own resources, and no part of it was laid in the form of contributions on allied or conquered states.<sup>2\*</sup>

The public debt of France—which, at the commencement of the Revolution, was 5,587,000,000 francs, or £223,000,000, and occasioned an annual charge of

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<sup>1</sup> Lac. vi.  
110. *Etat*  
*de la Dette*  
*Publique*, 8.  
Young, i.  
577.

<sup>2</sup> *Ann. Reg.*  
1793, 250.  
Moreau and  
Pehrer's  
*Tables*, Feb.  
154. *Bign.*  
ii. 130, 131.

96.  
Public debts  
of the two  
countries.

\* M. Necker, in 1788, estimated the total revenue of Old France at 555,000,000 francs; whereas in 1801, notwithstanding the great addition to its territory which the Republic had received from the Low Countries, Savoy, Nice, and the frontier of the Rhine, which yielded an addition of 100,000,000 francs yearly, it had fallen to 450,000,000 francs—a striking proof how immensely the resources of the country had diminished during the Revolution. Before the increase of its territory, the territorial revenue of France was 1,200,000,000 francs; after it had been swelled by a fifth of superficial surface, it was only 850,000,000. Greater lightness of taxation was certainly not the cause of the diminution, for the direct land and window tax of the latter year amounted to 205,000,000 francs, or £10,600,000—a sum equivalent to at least double that amount in the British islands, if the difference of the value of money in the two countries is taken into account. Dupin estimates the income derived from the soil in France, in 1828, at 1,626,000,000 francs, or £65,000,000. Supposing the increase of cultivation between 1801 and 1828 to counterbalance the reduction of territory by the peace of Paris in 1815, it follows that the French landholders in 1801 paid about a sixth, or sixteen per cent, on their incomes.—See NECKER's *Compte Rendu*, 1785; *Stat. de la France*, 514; GAETA, i. 189, 310; BIGNON, ii. 130; and DUPIN, *Force Commerciale de France*, ii. 266.

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1801.

<sup>1</sup> *Etat de la Dette Pub. Gaeta, i. 199. Peuchet, 500. Young, ii. 578.*

<sup>2</sup> *Moreau's Tables. Feb. 154, 246.*

97.  
Exports and imports of both.

<sup>3</sup> *Young's Travels, ii. 501.*

<sup>4</sup> *Mr Ad-dington's finance resolutions.*

<sup>5</sup> *Parl. Hist. xxxvi. 787.*

<sup>6</sup> *Parl. Hist. xxxv. 1563. Pebrer's Tables, 340.*

<sup>7</sup> *Parl. Hist. xxxv. 1563, and xxxvi. 787.*

259,000,000 francs, or £10,400,000,—was still very considerable, amounting to 1,380,000,000 francs, or £55,000,000, and occasioning an annual charge of 69,000,000 francs, or £2,800,000, at the termination of the war. This was the burden still existing, notwithstanding the extinction of two-thirds of its amount during its continuance, and the unexampled measures of spoliation by which its expenses had been defrayed.<sup>1</sup> \* The public debt of England in 1792 was £244,440,000, and occasioned an annual charge, including the sinking-fund, of £9,317,000; while, at the termination of the war in 1801, it had risen to £484,465,000, funded and unfunded, of which 447,000,000 was funded, and £37,318,000 unfunded. The annual charge of this immense burden had swelled to £21,661,000, of which £8,653,000 was for the debt existing before 1792, £13,025,000 for that created since that period, and £4,649,000 for the sinking-fund.<sup>2</sup>

The imports of France in 1787 amounted to 349,725,000 francs, or about £14,000,000; the exports to 310,000,000 francs, or £12,400,000.<sup>3</sup> At the same period the exports of British manufactures were £14,700,000, and of foreign merchandise £5,460,000, and the imports £18,680,000.<sup>4</sup> In 1801, the French imports and exports were almost annihilated; the imports from the West Indies had fallen to £61,000, and the exports to the same quarter to £41,000;<sup>5</sup> whereas the British exports in that year were £24,440,000 manufactures, and £17,166,000 foreign and colonial produce, and the imports £29,900,000; amounting in real value to about £54,000,000.<sup>6</sup> Nor had the British shipping undergone a less striking increase: the tonnage, which, at the commencement of the war, was 1,600,000 tons, having risen in 1801 to 2,100,000; and the mercantile seamen, who at the former period were 118,000,<sup>7</sup> having at the latter increased to 143,000, exclu-

\* In 1789, according to the Duke of Gaeta, a deficit of 54,000,000 francs, or £2,160,000 yearly, was made "the apology for the Revolution." In 1801, when it was closed, it was above 100,000,000 francs annually, or £4,000,000 sterling.—GAETA, i. 189.

sive of 120,000 seamen and marines employed in the royal navy.\*

Nothing but this continual and rapid increase in the resources of the British empire, during the course of the struggle, could have accounted for the astonishing exertions which she made towards its close, and the facility with which, during its whole continuance, the vast supplies required for carrying it on were raised without any sensible inconvenience to the country. When we reflect that, during a war of nine years' duration, the yearly expenditure of the nation varied from forty to sixty millions; that loans to the amount of twenty or thirty millions were annually contracted; and that the British fleets covered the seas in every quarter of the globe, we are lost in astonishment at the magnitude of the efforts made by a state so inconsiderable in extent, and with a population, even at the close of the period, and including Ireland, not exceeding fifteen millions.† But the phenomenon becomes still more extraordinary when the efforts made at the termination of the struggle are considered; and the British empire, instead of being exhausted by eight years' warfare, is seen stretching forth its giant

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1801.

98.

Reflections  
on the im-  
mense efforts  
made by  
England  
during the  
war.

\* The revenue and charges of the Indian empire in the years 1793, 1799, and 1800, were as follows:—

	1793.	1799.	1800 & 1801.
Revenues—Bengal,	£5,454,000	£6,259,000	£6,339,000
Madras,	1,296,000	2,004,000	3,273,000
Bombay,	147,000	346,000	300,475
	£6,897,000	£8,609,000	£9,912,475
Charges — Bengal,	£3,131,000	£3,952,000	£4,422,000
Madras,	1,578,000	2,857,000	3,723,000
Bombay,	524,000	996,000	1,051,000
	£5,233,000	£7,807,000	£9,196,000
Surplus,	1,664,000	802,000	716,475

—*Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 15. *East India Budget*, and *Ann. Reg.* 1793, p. 78, and 1801, p. 164, *App. to Chronicle*.

† Population of Great Britain in 1801, . . . . . 10,942,000  
 ... Ireland, about . . . . . 4,000,000  
 14,942,000

—See PEBRER'S *Tables*, 322.

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arms at once into every quarter of the globe, striking down the throne of Tippoo Saib by as great a force as combated under the standards of Napoleon at Marengo;\* while it held every hostile harbour in Europe blockaded by its fleets, and sent forth Nelson to crush the confederacy of the northern powers at the very moment that it accumulated its forces in Europe and Asia against the Republican legions on the sands of Egypt. It had been frequently asserted, that the naval forces of England were equal to those of the whole world put together; and the matter was put to the test in spring 1801, when, without raising the blockade of a single harbour from the Texel to Calabria, she sent eighteen ships of the line with Abercromby to the mouth of the Nile, while nineteen under Nelson dissolved by the battle of Copenhagen the northern confederation. The annals of Rome contain no example of a similar display of strength, and few of equal resolution in exerting it.

99.  
Compared  
with the nig-  
gardly exer-  
tions at its  
commence-  
ment.

The contemplation of this astonishing display of strength at the close of the struggle, compared with the feeble and detached exertions made at its commencement, is calculated to awaken the most poignant regret at the niggardly use of the national resources so long made by government, and the inexplicable insensibility to the magnitude of the forces at her command, which so long paralysed the might of England during the earlier years of the war. From a return laid before the House of Commons, it appears that the number of men that had been raised for the service of the army, from the commencement of hostilities down to the close of 1800, was 208,808—being at the rate of 26,000 a-year on an average during its continuance. France, with a population hardly double that of Great Britain, raised 1,500,000 men in 1793 alone.<sup>1</sup> It is in the astonishing disproportion of

<sup>1</sup> Parl. Ret.  
Dec. 31,  
1800. Ann.  
Reg. 1800,  
40.

\* Thirty-five thousand British and Sepoy troops formed the siege of Seringapatam in May 1799. Thirty-one thousand French combated under the First Consul at Marengo.

the land forces of this country alike to her naval armaments, her national strength, or the levies of her antagonist, that the true secret of the long duration, enormous expenditure, and numerous disasters of the war is to be found.

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1801.

Secure in her insular situation, protected from invasion by invincible fleets, and relieved from the most disastrous consequences which resulted from defeat to the Continental powers, England was at liberty to employ her whole disposable force against the enemy. Yet she never brought 25,000 native troops into the field at any one point. Had she boldly levied 100,000 men in 1793, and sent them to Flanders after the rout in the Camp of Cæsar, or even sent the whole disposable forces in the country on that service, when the French troops were shut up in their intrenched camps, and could not be brought by any exertions to face the Allies in the field, her armics would beyond all question have encamped under the walls of Paris in two months. At the same time, and by the aid of so great a diversion, the royalists of the south and west would have obtained a decisive superiority over the anarchical faction in the capital, and the Revolution have been at an end. During the nine years of the war, upwards of £100,000,000 was paid in army, and a still larger sum in naval expenses; while in 1793 the military charges were not £4,000,000, and in the latter and more expensive years of the war, amounted annually to £12,000,000. If a fifth part of this total sum had been expended in any one of the early years in raising the military force of England to an amount worthy of her national strength and ancient renown, triple the British force which overthrew Napoleon at Waterloo might have been assembled on the plains of Flanders, and the war terminated in a single campaign. The incessant clamour of the Opposition against any increase in the expenditure at the outset, and when it might have averted future disaster, was the main cause of this deplor-

100.  
Disastrous  
effects of this  
parsimoni-  
ous spirit in  
the outset.

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XXXIV.

1801.

101.  
Great part  
of this pros-  
perity was  
owing to the  
paper cur-  
rency.

able result, and of the immense debt necessarily incurred in subsequently carrying on the contest, and which burdened the nation at its conclusion.\*

If the rapid growth of wealth, power, and prosperity in the British islands, during this memorable contest, had been all grounded on a safe and permanent foundation, it would have presented a phenomenon unparalleled in such circumstances in any age or country. But though part of this extraordinary increase was undoubtedly a real and substantial addition to the industry and resources of the empire, arising from the vast extension of its colonial possessions, and the monopoly of almost all the trade of the world in its hands,† yet part was to be ascribed to other causes, attended in the outset with deceptive and temporary advantages, and in the end with real and permanent evils. Like an extravagant individual, who squanders in the profusion of a few years the savings of past centuries, and the provision of unborn generations, the government of England threw a fleeting lustre over its present administration, by trenching deep on the resources of future years, and creating burdens little thought of at the time, when the vast expenditure was going forward, but grievously felt in subsequent times, when the excite-

\* The expenses of the army and navy, during the war, were as follows:—

	ARMY.	ORDNANCE.	NAVY.
1792, ...	£1,819,000	£422,000	£1,485,000
1793, ...	3,993,000	783,000	3,971,000
1794, ...	6,641,000	1,345,000	5,525,000
1795, ...	11,610,000	2,321,000	6,315,000
1796, ...	14,911,000	1,954,700	11,833,000
1797, ...	15,488,000	1,643,000	13,033,000
1798, ...	12,852,000	1,303,000	13,449,000
1799, ...	11,840,000	1,500,000	13,642,000
1800, ...	11,941,000	1,695,000	13,619,000
1801, ...	12,117,000	1,639,000	15,857,000

—See *PEBBE'S Tables*, 154.

† The operation of these causes appeared, in an especial manner, in the vast increase of our export of foreign and colonial merchandise during the war, which, on an average of six years, ending 5th January 1793, was £5,468,000; and in the year ending 5th January 1801, had risen to the enormous sum of £17,166,000; being more than triple its amount at the commencement of the contest.—See Mr ADDINGTON'S *Finance Resolutions*, 1801; *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1564.

ment of the moment had passed away, and the bitter consequences of the debt which had been contracted remained. But this was not all. England, during those eventful years, drank deep at the fountains of paper currency, and derived a feverish and unnatural strength from that perilous but intoxicating draught.

From the accounts laid before parliament, it appears that the notes of the Bank of England in circulation had increased upwards of a half, from 1793 to 1801,\* and that the commercial paper under discount at the same establishment, during the same period, had more than tripled. The effect of this great increase speedily appeared in the prices of grain, and every other article of life. Wheat which, on an average of five years prior to 1792, had sold at 5s. 4d. a bushel, had risen, on an average of five years, ending with 1802, to 10s. 8d., and on an average of

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1801.

102.  
Vast in-  
crease of the  
paper cur-  
rency dur-  
ing the war.

* Circulation in Bank of England notes.	Commercial paper discounted at the Bank.	Gold coined.
1792, ... £11,006,000	No account kept.	£1,171,000
1793, ... 11,888,000		2,747,000
1794, ... 10,744,000		2,558,000
1795, ... 14,017,000		493,000
1796, ... 10,729,000	£2,946,000	464,000
1797, Feb. 28, 9,674,000	3,505,000	2,000,000
1798, Aug. 31, 11,114,000	5,350,000	2,067,000
1798, ... 13,095,000	5,870,000	449,000
1799, ... 13,389,000	4,490,000	189,000
1800, ... 16,844,000	5,403,000	450,000
1801, ... 16,213,000	6,401,000	437,000
	7,905,000	

—See *Appendix to Report on Bank*, 1832; and *PEBRER'S Tables*, 254, 260, and 270.

The slightest consideration of this most instructive table is sufficient to demonstrate to what source the crisis of February 1797 was owing. The paper of the Bank was then contracted from fourteen millions, its amount in 1795, to nine millions. This was doubtless owing to necessity. The Bank directors, finding a steady demand for specie setting in upon them, in consequence of the panic of an invasion and the general desire to get gold for hoarding, vigorously set about contracting the currency by refusing discounts; thinking the gold coin going abroad, when in fact it was secreted in deposits at home. Thus the contraction of the currency did vast injury to credit, without restoring the circulation of specie. It unavoidably brought about the general panic which rendered the suspension of cash-payments in that month unavoidable, and landed the nation in the perilous experiment of paper currency, inconvertible into gold, and in all the prodigious change of prices with which it was necessarily attended.

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<sup>1</sup> Lords' Report on Banks, Ap. No. 39, and Lords' Report on Corn, 1814, No. 12.

five years, ending 1813, to 14s. 4d. a bushel.<sup>1</sup>\* Thus, during the progress of the war, the prices of the necessities of life were at one time nearly tripled, and even at the peace of Amiens had permanently more than doubled. The effect of this of course was, that the money-price of all the other articles of life rapidly rose in the same proportion. Rents advanced; all persons who lived by buying and selling, found their commodities constantly rising in value; credit, both public and private, immensely improved; industry was vivified by the progressive rise in the value of its produce; and difficulties were overcome by the rapid diminution in the weight of money debts. It is to the influence of this cause, combined with the vast expenditure of government, and the concentration of almost all the colonial trade of the world in the hands of Great Britain, in consequence of her maritime superiority, that the extraordinary prosperity of the empire during the latter years of the war is to be ascribed. But it was not unmixed good which accrued to the nation, even for a time, from these violent changes. The whole class of annuitants, and all dependent on a fixed money income, suffered as much as the holders of commodities gained by their effects. Creditors were defrauded during the war as much as debtors were relieved; and industry was depressed by the fall of prices, consequent on the return to cash payments after the peace, as much as the value of realised property was enhanced. So powerful was the operation of these causes, that almost as great a transference of property was ultimately effected by the silent operation of the alternation of prices which

\* The prices of wheat from 1790 to 1801 were as follow:—

Per Quarter.			Per Quarter.		
1790, . . .	£2	13 2	1796, . . .	£3	12 0
1791, . . .	2	7 0	1797, . . .	2	12 0
1792, . . .	2	2 4	1798, . . .	2	9 8
1793, . . .	2	8 8	1799, . . .	3	7 4
1794, . . .	2	11 0	1800, . . .	5	12 1 scarcity.
1795, . . .	4	7 0	1801, . . .	5	18 1 scarcity.

—See *Ann. Reg.* 1811, 167, *App. to Chron.*



followed this great experiment, as was produced in other countries by the direct convulsions of a revolution.

But without anticipating these ultimate effects, which as yet lay buried in the womb of time, and might have been avoided by a more manly adherence to the principles of Mr Pitt's financial policy than was deemed practicable in later times, after the terrors of the contest had ceased, it is impossible to conclude the history of this first period of the war without rendering a just tribute to the memory of those illustrious and high-minded men, who bore the British nation victorious through the greatest perils which had assailed it since the Norman Conquest; who, clearly perceiving, amidst all the delusion of the times, the disastrous tendency of the revolutionary spirit, "struggled with it when it was strongest, and ruled it when it was wildest;" who, unmoved by the greatest perils, disdained to purchase safety by submission, and, undismayed alike by foreign disaster and domestic treason, held on their glorious way conquering and to conquer. No other monument is required to the memory of Mr Pitt and Mr Burke but the British empire, as they left it at the peace of Amiens, unconquered by force, undivided by treason, unchanged in constitution, untainted in faith, the bulwark of order, the asylum of freedom, the refuge of religion; contending undauntedly against the world in arms, covering the ocean with its fleets, encircling the earth in its grasp; the ark which bore the fortunes of humanity amidst the waves of the Deluge, and to which alone the eye of hope was turned, from all the suffering realms of the earth.\* No other testimony is required but that

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103.

Glorious  
state and  
character of  
England at  
the conclu-  
sion of the  
contest.

\* In making these observations, the author is fully aware of the burdens consequent on Mr Pitt's administration, and the disastrous effects which have in the end followed the change of prices begun in 1797. What he rests upon is, that this change was forced upon the British statesman by overwhelming necessity, and that Mr Pitt had provided a system of finance, which, if steadily adhered to by his successors, as it might have been, and not disturbed by an unnecessary and disastrous contraction of the currency in 1819, would have discharged the whole debt contracted in the Revolutionary war before the year 1845—that is, in the same time that it was created. See *infra*, on Mr Pitt's financial policy, Chap. XLI. § 67-71.

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furnished by the ablest and most impassioned of hostile historians. "Representing," says Thiers, "in England, not merely the territorial but the commercial aristocracy, which supported him by their influence, Mr Pitt resisted alike the power of France and the contagion of democratic disorders with indomitable firmness, and preserved order in his country without diminishing its liberties. He left it burdened, it is true, with debt, but in possession of the undisputed sovereignty of India and the ocean. He used and abused the strength of England, but he had rendered it the second nation of the earth when he withdrew, and the first, eight years after his death."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thiers,  
vi. 435.

# APPENDIX.

## CHAPTER XXX.

NOTE A, p. 264.

THE Budget stood thus :—

### RECEIPTS—WAYS AND MEANS.

Land and Malt Tax, . . . . .	£2,750,000
Lottery, . . . . .	200,000
Duties on Exports and Imports, . . . . .	1,250,000
Income-Tax, . . . . .	5,300,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund, . . . . .	5,512,000
Loan by Exchequer Bills, . . . . .	3,000,000
Lent by Bank without interest, . . . . .	3,000,000
Loan for Great Britain, . . . . .	18,500,000
	<hr/>
	£39,512,000

### EXPENDITURE.

Navy, . . . . .	£12,619,000
Army, . . . . .	11,370,000
Miscellaneous, . . . . .	750,000
Interest on Exchequer Bills, . . . . .	816,000
Deficiencies of year 1799, . . . . .	440,000
Deficiency of Malt Tax and Land do., . . . . .	350,000
Exchequer Bills, . . . . .	2,500,000
Do. for 1798, . . . . .	1,075,000
Vote of Credit, . . . . .	3,000,000
Subsidies to Germans and Russians, . . . . .	3,000,000
Annual grant for National Debt, . . . . .	200,000
Unforeseen emergencies, . . . . .	1,800,000
	<hr/>
Carry over, . . . . .	£37,920,000

Brought forward, . . . . . £37,620,000

To provide for the interest of this loan, amounting in all to £21,500,000, Mr Pitt laid on some trifling taxes on spirits and tea, amounting in all to £350,000, the interest on the bulk of the debt being laid as a charge on the income-tax. The interest paid on the loan was only 4½ per cent; a fact which he justly stated as extraordinary in the eighth year of the war. The interest on the public debt at this time was £19,700,000, and on Exchequer Bills, &c., £1,983,000; in all, . . . . . £21,683,000

Civil List, . . . . .	898,000
Civil Expenses, . . . . .	647,000
Charges of Management, . . . . .	1,779,000
Other charges on Consolidated Fund, . . . . .	230,000

25,246,000

Total National Expenditure in 1800, . . . . . £63,166,000

—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxiv. 1515; and *Ann. Reg. App. to Chronicle* for 1800, pp. 151, 152.

#### NOTE B, p. 265.

From Mr Dundas's statement it appeared that the total revenue in 1798-9 was £8,610,000, the local charges £7,807,000, and the interest of debt and other charges £875,000, leaving a deficiency in territorial revenue of £71,000; to cover which there were the commercial profits, amounting to £630,000; leaving a general balance in favour of the company of £558,000 yearly.

The revenue and expenditure were thus divided:—

	Revenue.	Charges.
Bengal, . . . . .	£6,259,600	£3,952,847
Madras, . . . . .	2,004,993	2,857,519
Bombay, . . . . .	346,110	996,699
	£8,610,703	£7,807,065
	7,807,065	
Surplus, . . . . .	£803,638	
Interest on Debt, . . . . .	£758,135	
Other Charges, . . . . .	117,160	
	875,295	
Deficiency, . . . . .	£71,637	
Commercial Profits, . . . . .		£629,657
Deduct territorial loss, . . . . .		71,657
Annual Surplus, . . . . .		£558,000

—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 15.

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

## NOTE A, p. 518.

Mr Chancellor Addington, on June 29, 1810, brought forward a series of finance resolutions, which, as fully explaining the situation of the British empire at that period, are well deserving of attention. Their material parts are as follows:—

## 1. EXPENDITURE FOR 1801.

Interest of debt and sinking-fund, . . . . .	£20,144,000
Additional interest on loans of 1801, . . . . .	1,812,000
Civil list, share of Great Britain, . . . . .	1,376,000
Civil government pensions, charges, &c., in Scotland, . . . . .	635,000
Charges of collection, . . . . .	1,851,000
Great Britain's share of the war-charges of 1801, . . . . .	39,333,000
Advances to Ireland from England, . . . . .	2,500,000
Interest on Imperial loans, . . . . .	497,000
Total charges, . . . . .	<u>£68,153,000</u>

## 2. INCOME FOR 1801.

Permanent Revenue, as in 1800, . . . . .	£27,419,000
Produce of first quarter's taxes, 1801, . . . . .	1,000,000
Income-tax, . . . . .	5,822,000
Exports and Imports, . . . . .	1,200,000
Repayments from Grenada, . . . . .	800,000
Loan, . . . . .	25,500,000
Loan for Ireland, . . . . .	2,500,000
Exchequer bills charged on supplies of 1802, . . . . .	2,000,000
Additional produce of taxes deficient in 1800, . . . . .	1,100,000
Unpaid part of German loan, . . . . .	560,000
Redeemed land-tax, . . . . .	62,000
Total income, . . . . .	<u>£67,963,000</u>

## 3. PUBLIC DEBT.

Public debt on the 5th January 1793, . . . . .	£227,000,000
Annuities at same period, . . . . .	1,293,000
Public debt created from 5th Jan. 1793 to 1st Feb. 1801, . . . . .	214,661,000
Annuities created since the same period, . . . . .	302,000
Debt redeemed from 1793 to 1801, . . . . .	52,281,000
Drawn by land-tax, redeemed, . . . . .	16,083,000
Total public debt on 1st February 1801, . . . . .	400,709,000
Annuities existing then, . . . . .	1,540,000
Annual charge of debt incurred before 1793, with sinking-fund, . . . . .	10,325,000
Annual charge of debt incurred since 1793, with do., . . . . .	10,395,000

## 4. SINKING-FUND.

Amount of sinking-fund in 1786, . . . . .	£1,000,000, or 1-238 of debt.
... .. in 1793, . . . . .	1,427,000, or 1-160 of do.
... .. in 1801, . . . . .	5,300,000, or 1-76 of do.

## 5. PRODUCE OF TAXES.

	Years.	Permanent Taxes.	Years.	Permanent Taxes.
Ending 5th Jan.	1793,	£14,284,000	1798,	£13,332,000
...	1794,	13,941,000	1799,	14,275,000
...	1795,	13,858,000	1800,	15,743,000
...	1796,	13,537,000	1801,	14,194,000
...	1797,	14,292,000		

War Taxes of 1801, £8,079,000.

## 6. IMPORTS AND EXPORTS.

		Imports.
Average of six years ending 5th Jan.	1784,	£13,122,000
...	1793,	18,685,000
...	1801,	25,259,000
Real value of imports in 1801,	.	54,500,000

		Foreign goods Exported.	British Manufac- tures Exported.
Average of six years ending 5th Jan.	1784,	4,263,000	£8,616,000
...	1796,	5,468,000	14,771,000
...	1801,	17,166,000	20,085,000
Real value of exports in 1801,	.	16,300,000	39,500,000

## 7. SHIPPING.

	Registered vessels.	Tonnage.	Seamen.
1788,	13,327	1,363,000	107,500
1792,	16,079	1,540,000	118,000
1800,	18,877	1,905,000	143,000

The vast increase of exports, imports, and shipping, between 1793 and 1800, and especially since the Bank Restriction Act in 1797, is particularly worthy of observation.—See *Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1561, 1567.

END OF VOLUME V.

